The Arab-Israeli conflict - Research Paper Example

The Arab-Israeli conflict Introduction While studying the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Man Palestine is the best case study for analysis. The Mandate for Palestine is a lawfully binding treaty that gives the Jews the authority to establish their settlements anywhere in western Palestine, extending from River Jordan to the Mediterranean Sea. This is a treaty recognised by the international law and still in use up to date. In 1920, this treaty came into the limelight, in 1940, League of Nations approved it and in 1923, fully implemented. This mandate majorly aimed at shielding the indigenous population, the Palestinians from right infringement. This treaty became acceptable internationally due to the cognizance of Arab opposition to the historical rights of the Jews in Palestine. This mandate further survived the League of Nations dissolution in April 18, 1946. Analysis of the mandate This mandate aimed at solving the disputes that could arise in the settlement of the Israelis and the Palestinians hence preparing the country for self rule. However, it was to be a recipe for conflicts in Palestine. The failure by the Camp David meeting to give a Framework Agreement on Permanent status yielded conflicts between the Israelis and Palestine. This aimed at ending the Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza strip, Palestinian areas. This led to violent protests and radicalization in September 2000 as the seven year Oslo process ended (Rothstein and Khalil 39). These Israelis perceived these events leading to the end of Oslo process as an offer totally disregarded by the Palestinians. They also viewed the violence as intentional and encouraged by the Palestinian leadership. They accused them of not willing to accept negotiations for peace with Israel but rather had the agenda of dismantling the entire Israel state (Rothstein and Khalil 39). On the other hand, the Palestinians expected the Oslo’s declaration of 1993 to end the occupation of the Israelis in their territory. Finally, the Palestinians were disappointed and disillusioned with this peace progression. This led to the public view that the Israel government used Oslo as a shelter to acquire their land and bring their civilians to settle in it. The open ended nature of this Oslo agreement delayed for up to six years the resolution of the key issues in disputes between Israelis and Palestine. In order to solve the expanded conflict, the open-ended nature of Oslo only pronounced an already existing uncertainty. This would make neither of the conflicting sides be fully committed towards the peace progress. It only facilitated some three dynamics in the parties. First, determination of the Israeli to give the Palestinians as little land as possible and Palestinian unwillingness to revise their system of education Secondly, lack of willingness of the negotiating party to surrender the negotiating assets. Thirdly, since negotiations had not started, both the side tried to improve their negotiating ranks with Israel remained superior and controlled the land in question (Rothstein and Khalil 39). The ability of both parties to reconcile and make peace limited these agreements to a great extent. Lack of legality in the eyes of a significant category of the population on both parties also affected the peace process. The Israel settlers and the furthest right wing elements profoundly opposed this and resorted to violence to counteract this. On the Palestinian side, the national opposition and Islamists declined to recognize the authenticity of this peace process. Neither side also had the ability to combine a stable peace coalition for government with the process of making hard compromises (Sylvan 444). The public also unwilling to accept the laborious compromises needed to attain a lasting peace. The stipulations of these agreements concern a transformational process that is keen on revolutionizing both the political and mental surroundings. This makes the resolution of the most difficult problems easy. However, when the two parties met at Camp David the population size in their settlements had already doubled as compared to the amount that it was when the Oslo agreements began. The Israelis were more resolute than ever before to protect and expand their settlements while, on the other hand, the Palestinians were more determined to oppose this. These are some of the things that this treaty did not take into account (Bunton 436). The opposition intensified with time as the peace process dwindled. This was attributed to the propagation of persistent mistrust, repeated failure to adhere to stipulated deadlines and failure to enhance the living standards of Palestinian people. The depressing and disappointing leadership of Palestine leaders is also another factor to blame. The political aspect of Palestinian government during the mandate period. During the mandate period, the government used various economic, social and political agencies. These organizations formed the centre of administration in the Palestine Mandate government. These Palestinian Arabs did not have such a centralised political organization, nor did their leaders have the capacity to rally their citizens efficiently to a nationwide extent. The Palestinian Authority (PA), established through the Oslo agreements, is the governing organ made by the PLO. Its chairperson also chairs the PLO. Most of the members of the executive arm of the Palestine Authority are also members of the executive class of the PLO and if not most of the members of the Palestinian Authority. The legislative council representatives are members of Palestinian National Council (Barak 719). Conclusion The Palestinian mandate was uniquely a risky peace initiative but indeed the best that could be accepted at that moment. These initiatives gave the Palestinian rulers significant benefits, but the people never saw the actual benefits of it. It gave an assurance of all the vital issues of the Palestinians, but it could not and did not guarantee any of the expectations that each of the side anticipated. Neither of the parties was also able or willing to take risks that could jeopardize their status hence significantly affecting the success of this peace process. The consequence was a peace process that became propagation of the conflict by other means. This made peacemaking extremely difficult scenario and disappointing. Perhaps a wiser and supreme leadership could have prevented the worst conflicts. Works Cited Barak, Ossy. "The Failure of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, 1993-2000." Journal of Peace Research 42.6 (2005): 719-736. Print. Bunton, Martin. "Law and Identity in Mandate Palestine." Journal of British Studies 2.3 (2007): 436-437. Print. Gilbert, Ronnie. "Wrestling with Zion: Progressive Jewish-American Responses to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, And: One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate (review)." Fourth Genre: Explorations in Nonfiction 6.2 (2004): 145-147. Print. Ottolenghi, Elliot. "Why Palestinians and Israelis Are Not Ready For Peace." Survival 46.1(2004): 41-54. Print. Rasler, Kim. "Shocks, Expectancy Revision, and the De-escalation of Protracted Conflicts: The Israeli-Palestinian Case." Journal of Peace Research 37.6 (2000): 699-720. Print. Rothstein, Robert L., Moshe Ma'oz, and Khali?l Shiqa?qi?. The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Oslo and the Lessons of Failure : Perspectives, Predicaments and Prospects. Brighton: Sussex Academic, 2002. Print. Stanislawski, Michael. "Comments on Assaf Likhovski's: Law and Identity in Mandate Palestine." Israel Studies Forum 40.4 (2007): 103-105. Print. Sylvan, Donald, Jonathan W. Keller, and Yoram Z. Haftel. "Forecasting Israeli–Palestinian Relations." Journal of Peace Research 41. 4(2004): 444-463. Print. Read More