Arab Spring - The Utility of the Foucauldian Notion of Resistance as Opposed to The Critical - Essay Example

?Introduction In the governments of Egypt, Tunisia and Libya were toppled in what was collectively known as the “Arab Spring.” Anderson p. 5) states that although all three of these nations had their regimes toppled, and all three of these countries are Arab countries, their situations are not homogeneous. Tunisia’s government was replaced because of protestors who were rural, and joined with labor, and that the Tunisian government was eventually replaced with a government which was amenable to labor. In Egypt, the cosmopolitan and educated young people organized the uprisings, and they soon were backed by the Islamic Brotherhood. However, these young people did not topple the government so much as the military did, and now there is a clash between the democratically backed Brotherhood and the military, and there is not yet a new power structure in place. In Libya, the country devolved into a civil war, as the power structure was voided and no new centralized power structure took its place, therefore, the nation is ran by tribes, and has been marked by multiple secessions, and kin networks are providing the goods and services, along with the safety and security (Anderson, 2011, p. 6). The question is whether the critical theory of international relations and emancipation mark these conflicts or do they more closely resemble the Foucauldian view of resistance? The short answer is that Egypt and Tunisia resemble resistance theory and Libya resembles emancipation theory. This paper will explain the two theories and show why each country more resembles one theory as opposed to the other. Emancipation Theory According to Dougherty (2001, p. 470), emancipation theory is based upon revolutionism, which, in turn, is one of the principal traditions of international-relations theory. Specifically, Dougherty (2001) states that revolutionism places human emancipation as being paramount, as it helps to reach “the fullest human potential” (Dougherty, 2001, p. 477). Devetak (1996, p. 155) states that critical international theory works to bring about radical change by removing constraints on freedom. To this end, Devetak (1996, p. 155) asserts that critical international theory underpins the theory of emancipation, in that it has as its focus the understanding of conditions which would make emancipation possible. Linklater (1990, p. 89) states that the other two traditions of international theory – realism and rationalism - are both based upon order and power. In contrast, emancipation theory is based upon individualism. Furthermore, emancipation, or revolutionism, forms the basis for critical theories of international relations whereas the other two traditions of realism and rationalism form the basis for traditional theories of international relations (Linklater, 1990, p. 90). Habermas, according to Goode (2005), promoted emancipation by stating that freedom is embodied in the public square of the bourgeois, while overlooking “antagonistic class relations” (Goode, 2005, p. 34). Neufeld (1995, p. 66) states that critical theory and emancipation have, at their roots, the theories of Kant, Hegel and Marx, although he credits Marx with bringing the theory into its maturation. Perhaps because Marx though that reason would somehow trump power structures and oppression, critics refer to emancipation theory as “Utopian,” although Wyn-Jones (2001, p. 58) states that while the principles underlying emancipation theory are utopian, the value of emancipation theory relies on this optimism. Devetak (1996, p. 157) further goes on to state that emancipation is based upon three concepts – autonomy, security and community. Autonomy means, according to Devetak (1996, p. 163) that individuals are free to live their lives without constraints which are unnecessary and are inhibiting to freedom. Security means the absence of threats, because autonomy cannot exist in the face of threats – threats curtail freedom, because if individuals are not safe, then they cannot pursue freedom. Among the threats which Devetak (1996) cites as being hindrances to freedom are “violence, war, poverty, political oppression, and poor education” (Devetak, 1996, p. 167). Community is the third concept underpinning emancipation, and Devetak (1996, p. 168) states that critical theorists do not see community as being governed by the state, and that the sovereign state is not the idealized form of community. Rather, the community is considered to be a political and moral community which transcends the sovereign state frontiers, while deepening within these borders. While Marx believed that reason would prevail, and that the proletariat could become emancipated by controlling the means of production, the implication of Marx’s theory is also that class struggles would end because domination would also cease. However, Edkins (1999, p. 53) believes that this view is also naive, because, if the power structure disappeared, so would the social fabric. Therefore, power is the foundation of society, and it a pre-requisite for society to exist. The harmonious society envisioned by Marxists and others interested in emancipation, therefore, could not exist; because of all societal institutions rely on some kind of power. Foucault While the critical theorists see that emancipation is based upon reason, Foucault understands that power may corrupt reason, especially the free judgment of such. Devetak (1996) states that Foucault began to question the tenet that knowledge can only exist where power relations are suspended, and can only develop outside the demands, interests and injunctions of power. In Foucault’s view, power may actually produce knowledge, according to Devetak (1996), and that knowledge and power affect one another, and that the two concepts are, in fact, symbiotic. Or, as Edkin et al. (2004) understands, Foucault understands that freedom is not an escape from power relations, but, rather, emancipation involves remaking power. According to Pickett (1996, p. 450), Foucault sees that power is not necessarily negative, although the powerful do have an interest in ensuring that the non-powerful are diffuse and divided. Pickett (1996, p. 455) also states that Foucault did not see resistance as merely a negation of power (although negation of power is an element of resistance), but, rather, also affirmative and productive and using power techniques. Heller (1996, p. 81) states that Foucault’s view of resistance is that resistance is really just another kind of power. Heller (1996, p. 81), in doing so, rejects notions from other scholars which suggest that Foucault views resistance as futile because Foucault’s view of subjectivity states that there is not a hegemonic and counter-hegemonic force. Heller (1996, p. 83) states that Foucault’s view is that power and resistance are not ontologically different from one another, and that, while resistance is power, and power is resistance (Heller states that in a power struggle, that both sides are exercising power over one another and both sides are resisting one another, therefore there is an ontological correlation between the two concepts), there is also the reality that one side of the power equation will have less power than the other side. Examples are prisoners, workers, students, etc., all of whom have some degree of power, yet have considerably less power than the other side. Heller (1996, p. 96) states that Foucault is referring to the group who has less power when he talks about resistance, stating that such groups have less power, yet are not powerless. Discussion The two modes of power discussed have fundamental differences at their core. The critical theory of international relations, with its focus upon emancipation, states that there essentially should be an absence of power, and that conflicts center upon ideology and individualism. Foucault’s resistance, on the other hand, does not call for an abolishment of power. Rather, he believes that power structures can be remade. He also sees resistance and power as being different sides of the same coin, in that, in any power relation, there is resistance and power on both sides. In viewing the Arab Spring, there is some indication that the uprisings in Tunisia and in Egypt more closely resemble the Foucaultian view of resistance, while the uprising in Libya more closely resembles the critical theory of international relations and emancipation (Anderson, 2011, p. 5). This is because, according to Anderson, in Tunisia and in Egypt, there was essentially a remaking of the power structure by the resistors. In Tunisia, this took the form of the neglected citizens of the rural areas of the country teaming up with the labor movement to remove Ben Ali from power. Anderson (2011, p. 4) states that, for instance, in Tunisia, the governmental institutions under Ben Ali were free from corruption, so these governmental institutions would efficiently be able to replace Ben Ali. In particular, Anderson (2011, p. 4) states that the new government which replaced Ali is amenable to the labor movement, which was at the heart of the resistance, therefore the resistance was able to become the more powerful, yet it is still representative of the exchange of one power regime for another, which is consistent with Foucault’s resistance notions. In Egypt, the resistance was more diffuse than in Tunisia, yet, it essentially remained an exchange of one power regime for another power regime, according to Anderson (2011, p. 6)’s analysis. In Egypt, the resistance was spearheaded by well-educated young people, who had a voice in how to reshape the country. That said, Anderson (2011, p. 7) states that the protestors have a realistic view of how much they can reshape the Egyptian government, as the military took over the Egyptian government after the downfall of Mubarak, and that the military would not allow the protestors to substantially erode the governmental institutions. Therefore, Anderson (2011, p. 7) states that the uprising might have the effect of remaking power, yet the governmental institutions would still be in place, therefore the government would not be completely remade in the protestors’ image. Indeed, the current situation in Egypt is classic Foucaultian, as there is a clash between two powerful forces – the military and the Islamic Democrats, with the army representing the traditional power structure and the Islamic Democrats representing the will of the people (Feldman, 2012, p. 1). For now, the Islamic Brotherhood is in power, having won the presidency, but the military has a substantial amount of power as well, and the outcome of whom will eventually rule the country is still undecided (Feldman, 2012, p. 1). Libya, however, appears to fit more of the definition of the critical theory of international relations, because its Arab Spring did not result in an uprising so much as a civil war, according to Anderson (2011, p. 5). Anderson (2011, p. 4) states that Libya, at the time of the Arab Spring, was fractured, with no networks of economic associations, no system of political alliances and no national organizations. It also did not have public sector bureaucracy. In short, it lacked any kind of governmental or social cohesion, so the country, after Qaddafi was deposed, was essentially ruled by clans and provinces, and there have been multiple secessions from the state ever since (Anderson, 2011, p. 5). In other words, the country itself was not cohesive, so when the figurehead disappeared, so did any semblance of cohesion in the country. Because the situation in Libya was not one power structure in exchange for another power structure, but, rather, a vacuum of power, with the people essentially ruling the country, Libya’s situation more closely resembles emancipation than resistance. Conclusion The main difference between the concept of emancipation and resistance is the definition of power, and how power is reflected in any new configuration of nation-states after a revolution. In Foucault’s view, power does not disappear when there is resistance, but, rather, the power structure may be remade by the resisters. After all, the resisters also have some degree of power, although their power is less than the other side. That said, the resisters do have a chance to become the more powerful by co-opting some of the techniques of those who have more power. On the other hand, in emancipation, the power structure is essentially voided, as the people rule according to reason and their principles, and they are freed from constraints on their individual liberties. In emancipation, civil wars are not between nation-states, but, rather, between ideals. In viewing these two concepts with regards to the Arab Spring, it is evident that Tunisia and Egypt both resemble the concept of resistance more than emancipation, as both of these countries essentially remade the power structures, exchanging one power structure for another. Furthermore, in Egypt, there is still resistance, as there are two opposed factions who are, even now, trying to gain control of the government. That said, there is some kind of power structure even in Egypt. On the other hand, Libya, which, as a state, did not have a cohesive form of power structures, devolved into a fractured nation of tribes, with no centralized power, therefore, this country more closely resembles the principles of emancipation. References Anderson, L. (2011). Demystifying the Arab Spring. Foreign Affairs, vol. 90, no. 2, pp. 2-7. Burchill, S. & Linklater, A. (1996). Theories of International Relations. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Devetak, R. (1996). Critical theory. 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