Coup in Honduras of 2009 - Research Paper Example

?2009 Coup in Honduras First and College First and Department..., of... [Student’s First and Last Name] is now at Department of..., University of... This research was in part supported by the grant awarded to [Student’s First and Last Name] by [Sample Grant Programme]. Correspondence concerning this research paper should be addressed to [Student’s First and Last Name], Department..., University of..., [Address] Contact: 2009 Coup in Honduras The research in political history of modern Central America cannot leave out the subject of the 28 June 2009 coup d’etat in the nation of Honduras. The aforementioned events proved the first setback on the way of the extension of left-leaning governments across Latin America, demonstrating the potential for right-wing opposition that had until then felt insecure after the failure of similar attempt at anti-Chavez coup in Venezuela (April 2002)1. At the same time, the 2009 Honduras coup demonstrated the weakness of inter-American system of conflict settlement, as well as the absence of political will on the side of the U.S. to live up to its own commitment to promoting the principle of legitimate elected government in the Western Hemisphere. Historical Background The presidency of Manuel Zelaya proved to be marred by constant conflicts between the executive branch of government and the Congress and judiciary, with the latter being bitterly opposed to the redistributive economic policies proposed by the president. Even though Zelaya had been known as a relatively conservative politician before his election on 27 November 20052, the program of reforms his government embarked on from 2006 onwards was roughly modeled on the measures undertaken by Chavez administration in Venezuela. Among the most prominent policy steps taken by Zelaya government, one should include such measures as the increase in minimum wage, the governmental efforts at modernizing the telephone system, and the general attempts at increasing the well-being of the socially disadvantaged strata of population. The populist socioeconomic program undertaken by Zelaya, nonetheless, relied on the growth in bureaucratic apparatus directly controlled by the president, which led to increase in corruption and notable authoritarian tendencies in the conduct of the government. The fact that the implementation of Zelaya’s policies coincided with the first shots of the global economic crisis being experienced as early as the late 2006, did not add efficiency to his government. Moreover, Zelaya’s foreign policy, which was aimed at limiting traditional ties with the U.S. and launching closer partnership with Venezuela and Bolivia within such inter-governmental structures and bodies as ALBA, alienated the wide strata of Honduran population that were opposed to increased entente with Chavez, as well as the traditional political elites that feared further ‘socialist’ policies and resented breaking ties with the U.S. The last factor that led to coalescing of anti-Zelaya forces around conservative opposition and the military was the president’s efforts at revising the national constitution that became the source of controversy in March to June 2009. On 23 March Zelaya declared his attention to add the fourth ballot to the future election that was to be held in November 2009. The president’s intention was that of convening the constituent assembly that was to revise the constitution of Honduras. A preliminary poll for ascertaining the desirability of convening the constitutional assembly was due to be held on 28 June 2009, according to Zelaya’s plans. The media controlled by traditional oligarchy launched an anti-Zelaya campaign, while the government made use of its new powers to impose pro-government reporting on some national media3. The resulting controversy pitted the key national political forces – the Conservatives and Liberals – against each other, while the Liberal Party found itself split between the supporters and opponents of Zelaya’s policies. A key step in escalating the tensions between Zelaya and his opponents was the series of rulings by the nation’s highest judicial bodies against the president’s plans for modifying the constitution. The respective decisions by Honduras’ Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the Supreme Court itself, adopted in late May 2009, pointed clearly to the illegality of Zelaya’s constitutional proposals. The president’s plans were now viewed as the expression of abuse of power, which meant that the Congress and other bodies opposed to Zelaya’s governmental conduct obtained the legal foundation for attacking the president’s entire policies. After the upholding of the anti-Zelaya decision by the Supreme Court, the Congress adopted a resolution calling upon the president to change his political plans (3 June)4. Earlier, on 27 May, the Administrative Law Tribunal found the president’s plans illegal at the request by Honduras’ Attorney General. On 23 June, a bill was passed by the Congress, forbidding the holding of any referenda or similar polls less than 180 days before a general election, which meant that Zelaya’s constitutional referendum was considered illegal. This led to immediate stand-off between the president and his supporters, on the one hand, and the legislative and judicial branches, on the other. Key Actors The understanding of the situation that was precipitated by the coup shall be incomplete without the analysis of major actors that were involved in its development. Both domestic and external actors shall be taken into account, as the development of the political crisis caused by the coup was invariably entangled with the geopolitical balance in the Western Hemisphere in general. The conservative opposition against Manuel Zelaya’s government found its main spokesperson in the person of the president of the Congress, Roberto Micheletti. The opposition, being centered on the Conservative Party, felt indignation at the supposed plans by Zelaya at instituting Venezuela-style political and economic regime. Being supported by traditional vested interests, including the oligarchic families that have traditionally controlled the main media of Honduras, this section of political class was vehemently opposed to the political changes being proposed by Zelaya. The supporters of Zelaya mainly included the representatives of the poorest layers of Honduras’ populace that partially alleviated their life conditions under Zelaya’s government and did not wish the reversal of social benefits put into force under his administration. On the other hand, the officials installed under Zelaya were likewise opposed to any attempts at changing the composition and/or status of the national executive, as their position within the governmental system itself was at stake. The foreign policy aspects of the coup should be emphasized here, because the main motivation of anti-Zelaya forces within the course of the coup was that the pro-Venezuelan policy of the left-leaning government had harmful consequences for well-being and development of Honduran nation. While Cuba, Venezuela and Bolivia were constantly demonized by the anti-Zelaya media and the coup’s conservative leaders, the governments of these nations were firmly in favor of retaining of Zelaya’s government due to their desire to further extend the influence of ALBA, a Cuba and Venezuela-driven hemispheric integration project5. The U.S., on the other hand, was deeply concerned by the possibilities of growing Venezuelan and Cuban influence in Central America that was regarded as a potential threat to the American interests in the regions. At the same time, the U.S. was bound by the inter-American political norms and values prescribing support for government that came to power in a violent or unconstitutional way, and its own commitments for electoral democracy, which made it more difficult for the Obama administration to make any moves aimed at condemning Zelaya or supporting the Honduran coup organizers. At the same time, the Republican Party spokespersons and lawmakers were much less discreet in their response to the overthrow of Zelaya, openly lauding the Micheletti government and alleging that Zelaya was directly controlled by Venezuela6. Chronological Order of the Coup The commencement of the coup events coincided with Zelaya’s attempt at dismissing the army chief, General Romeo Vasquez Velasquez, for the latter’s refusal to organize the opinion poll survey on the president’s referendum proposal (24 June). In protest against such decision, the top military leaders of Honduras, including the defense minister, resigned later on the same day. The Supreme Court entered into controversy on the side of the military, and on 26 June it issued a warrant against Zelaya that provided for his detention7. Consequently, the members of the military stormed the residence of the head of state on 28 June, taking Zelaya hostage. The president was forced into exile to Costa Rica, being effectively overthrown. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court’s warrant against Zelaya was not published until 30 June, when Colonel Herberth Inestroza, the head of the military’s legal office, provided it to the media8. The Congress named Roberto Micheletti Acting President, and the curfew was imposed, lasting from 28 to 30 June. On 1 July the curfew was extended to an unlimited duration, with freedoms of transit and freedom from unwarranted search and seizure being limited. Influences and political outcome The main domestic influence of the 28 June coup lied in the installation of the military-backed interim government, led by Roberto Micheletti, that proceeded with dismantling the system of government put into force by Zelaya and clamping down on pro-Zelaya’s forces, with lawmakers of leftist Democratic Unification Party and some government members (including Foreign Minister) being detained. The country was overtaken by pro- and anti-Zelaya’s demonstrations that often had a conflict potential. With regard to foreign relations, the coup led to immense controversy within the Organization of American States (OAS), which suspended Honduras from its membership on 4 July, after Micheletti’s government refused to accept the return of Zelaya’s as a legitimate president9. The exiled president of Honduras met with the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Washington on 7 July, and the negotiations with the interim government were scheduled for the second half of that month, which, however, did not end in any kind of substantial agreement until Zelaya’s secret return to Honduras on 21 September 200910. After the confrontation that ensued, the both parties reached an agreement on 26 October, with the assistance on the part of the U.S. and OAS, that provided for the formation of unity government11. However, the agreement was effectively breached by the Micheletti side, when it formed the government without the consideration of Zelaya’s nominations, and the agreement fell apart in November. In the very end, the 29 November 2009 presidential election sidelined Zelaya, who did not participate, and his supporters, bringing Porfirio Lobo, a conservative candidate, to power, with 55 percent of the vote cast12. The former president Manuel Zelaya remained in exile until June 2011, when he was allowed to return to Honduras as a private person. Only then Honduras was readmitted to the OAS13. The assessment of the coup In my opinion, the 2009 coup in Honduras represented an attempt on the part of the section of country’s establishment to prevent the potential threat to their privileges posed by Zelaya’s populist policies. At the same time, the observable authoritarian tendencies in Zelaya’s conduct in the government and his close political and economic ties with Venezuela and Cuba may lead to a conclusion that partially the conservatives’ concern for the future of Honduras’ elected democracy was motivated and founded on empirical grounds. References BBC News (2009). Ousted leader returns to Honduras. BBC News. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/ . BBC News (2011). OAS lifts Honduras suspension after Zelaya agreement. BBC News. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/ . Cameron, M.A., & Tockman, J. (2010). A diplomatic theatre of absurd: Canada, the OAS and the coup in Honduras. NACLA: Report of the Americas, 43(3), pp. 18-22. Casas-Zamora, K. (2011). The Honduran Crisis and the Obama Administration. In A.F. Lowenthal, T. Piccone, & L. Whitehead (Eds.), Shifting the balance: Obama and the Americas (pp.114-131). Washington, D.C.: Brookings. De Cordoba, J. (2009). Honduras lurches toward crisis over election. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http://online.wsj.com . Lacy, M. (2009). Leader’s ouster not a coup, says the Honduran military. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com . Leonard, T.M. (2011). The history of Honduras. Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Publishing. Nichols, J. (2009). The Nation: In Honduras the heat is on. NPR. Retrieved from http://www.npr.org. Reuters (2009). Ousted Honduran leader mulls return after OAS ruling. Reuters. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/ . Rohter, R. (2002). Uprising in Venezuela: Latin America: Fear of loss of democracy led neighbors to aid return. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com . Sheridan, M.B. (2009). Honduran leadership finds friend among GOP lawmakers. The Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com . Read More