American Diplomacy in Vietnam - Term Paper Example

? American Diplomacy in Vietnam: A Journal Review Presented American Diplomacy in Vietnam: A Journal Review Kissinger d the controversy surrounding the Vietnamese war tore the country apart in the midst of the crisis. The controversy surrounding the war shaped foreign policies and diplomatic relations over generations. 1This implies the Vietnam conflict was not only a homemade conflict, but one that shaped foreign diplomatic approaches, and how the country handled foreign policies later, in addition to the effects of these policies on diplomatic relations later. These foreign policies related to massive interference of the civil war by other foreign countries, a situation that might have aggravated a delicate situation in Vietnam. The diplomatic interests in Vietnam dates back to after the Second World War, when the Americans quickly moved to block the spread of communism in the South East Asia region. Japan was strategically located not only for trade interests, but its deviation from the larger Asian political and trade dynamics meant the country was not prone to the communism ideologies that were spreading fast in the Asian region. Japan was thus used as a strategic location to help in curbing the spread of communism from Russia and China, towards the South East Asia region. 2 This implies foreign diplomatic approaches in the Indochina region by the Americans were mainly designed to curb the spread of communism in the region, rather than to promote trade; the Asian countries were a bit poor, and with little trade links with the outer world as Schaller argues. The American interests were therefore based on blocking communism in Indochina region, rather than policies to help in developing Vietnam and other South East Asia region. The conflict between eh regional interests and ideologies in Vietnam and eh western policies introduced by Americans were responsible for escalating the crisis in Vietnam, reducing the crisis to a contest of ideology supremacy. Despite the conflict of the policies and moral values as Kissinger points out, the American government raised controversy of the national interests in Vietnam. Why did the government support the Junta by the massive warfare budgets under Nixon? Though Kissinger does not elaborate on how the ethical and moral concepts were being evaluated in this case, the actions of supporting a Junta in a country deep in civil crises raised doubts over the national interests of the American government in Vietnam. Kissinger critically elaborates American interests and their conflict with moral authority, which led to involvement of the American armies in the Vietnamese war, and critically tries to investigate the policies under President Nixon after inheriting the war in 1969. The conflict with moral principles is observed in serious critics that resulted after the war to challenge this mission.3 However, Kissinger notes that the Americans were fighting a vague war, and no ultimate answers concerning American interests have been clearly outlined.4 All the same, the article does not provide elaborate response by other nations involved in this crisis in the Indochina region. The article critically takes the Vietnam War on a moral approach in describing reasons behind American involvement in the war, and its affects. In addition to the interests that the American government had in Vietnam, the war presented a case of a badly prepared army in a foreign land to fight for unknown causes. After the collapse of the South Vietnam in April 30 1975, although having achieved a resounding victory over the battle field, the Vietnamese were holding Unites States over promised reconstruction aid amounting to over $ 4 billion.5 Though the Vietnamese people had worn the war, there was still a bargain to make in pressing the United States government to inject funds for reconstruction. The aim of this aid by the United States government could be read suspiciously. Either the government had some interests to promote in Vietnam, to which they had promised massive aid in return of unknown privileges. These interests were well observed after the passing of the Marshal Plan in 1947, which passed to reconstruct and empower the workshops of Europe and Asia; Japan and Germany in this case. The reconstruction of a strategic base in Japan was the gateway to introducing the American diplomatic policies in Asia, and mainly towards the South East Asia region that had not fully embraced communism. This was the initial diplomatic strategy towards gaining ideological supremacy in Vietnam. 6 The threat of American ideology in Vietnam by the communism ideologies from China and Russia later led to major sweeps and destructive operations in central Vietnam in the 1960s and 70s. The suitability of these ideologies in blowing to a full crisis that the Americans finally lost was therefore inappropriate. The article by Schaller fails to address the actual events in Vietnam and how America used various methods to push for their ideologies in the region. However, the article lays a good basis to understand reasons that led to American interests in the South East Asian region, particularly in Vietnam. Schaller portrays that the American government diplomatic intervention in the Asian region, though based on trade was mainly driven by an aim to curb the communist ideology, and to declare supremacy in the Asian region. This contradicts the view that the flexibility within the emerging Western alliance resulted chiefly from willingness among the U.S officials who were steeped in the tradition of democracy and political compromise. 7 The democracy that the American government was said to posses was not clear in the Vietnam War; instead, they portrayed a tendency to kill the same democracy, by fighting for supremacy and control of interests in this region. Considering that the war between Vietnam and France was as a result of French ideology of asserting dominion over the Indochina region in the years after World War II, later American intervention in the crisis portrays how the power struggle in the region sucked in the Americans to support the French policies, only to be involved in a battle over control supremacy with the French and Britain governments later, over the same region. Lawrence in this argument portrays the conflict of interests, and changing interests in the American diplomacy policies. Though according to Lawrence, the American invasion in the Asian policies was a result of partnership between likeminded policy makers, the conflict between the French, Britain and American policies creates doubts over the like-mindedness of the three states in formulating a diplomatic course in Vietnam.8 The case could not therefore be based on likeminded nations as Lawrence noted, but was a case of having more vested national interests in Vietnam, which made the American government to make the promises. The view of a united front between Britain, France, and America as Lawrence notes could not therefore count in this case, as each country pushed for their respective policies in the region.9 Lawrence in this article dwells much on the western ideology in Vietnam, the effects that this had, as well as the delicate balance between the competing western countries; France, Britain and America. However, the article does not go deeper to access the damages and losses suffered by the involved parties, but heavily deals with policies and the diplomatic approach in solving the Vietnam crisis. The fight over superiority was portrayed by the massive US reconstruction promises to Vietnam. Though the French, Britain and Americans were all involved in the war, it’s only the Americans under Nixon who promised to rake in more than four billion dollars for reconstruction purposes.10 This implies that, the American government arm twisted the Vietnamese people by dangling carrots to have their policies sail through, in the fight for supremacy over the Indochina region, as compared to the other two countries. However, since Jespersen concentrates on Nixon’s contributions in this war, it is not clear if the other two governments contributed to this reconstruction, or whether it was a preserve of the American government alone. All the same the fact that Nixon wanted to maintain credibility of the Americans towards allies, and the deterrent posture towards adversaries proves that the American government had more vested powers in the Indochina region.11 Therefore Jespersen critically analyzed the American efforts to clean its diplomatic face in the wider Asian region after humiliation in Vietnam, amidst rising critics over the interference. An example of this clean up was Ford’s address in Hawaii over the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which seemed to ease worsening diplomacy relations with Asian countries, and especially Japan.12 Though the article introduces by portraying the huge losses and the defeat suffered by the Americans in Vietnam, the article does not portray the roles of the other countries with competing interests over the Indochina region, and hugely relies on the effects of the war on the American policies and diplomacy. It is not clear whether this diplomacy to clean the American image was successful, or the effects it had in the Asian region. The intervention in the Vietnamese crisis by the American government was ill prepared, and did not bear any fruits. Lawrence notes that the Vietnamese expectations were marked by low enthusiasm regarding the American efforts.13 This might imply the Vietnamese were still suspicious of the Americans and their policies, a situation that could have hindered their support in the region. However, Lawrence premise that the United State’s involvement in Vietnam was both a noble idea in its design and was effective in securing a stable and prosperous Asia could be deceptive. The American policies in the Asian continent in the cold War period were viewed as intruders trying to sneak in unpopular practices and beliefs in the Asian countries. This is portrayed by the standoff between the Russian advocated communist ideologies; with the American and French being not comfortable with the spread of the communist ideology, which was the main ingredient in the standoff leading to Cold War, 14and which played a large role in events leading to Vietnam intervention by western powers. However, the active participation of the Russians in the crisis has not been elaborated. The three articles present the events of the Vietnamese war on policy, diplomatic and national interest fronts, while elaborating the effects that this intervention had for the Americans, Vietnamese, the French, Britain and other involved parties such as the Russians and Chinese on different perspectives, all of whom had different policies over the same region. All the same, the articles portray cases of disunity, poorly planned policies, and aggregated mistrust and suspicion among the involved parties, including the western powers that were viewed to have a common front. The relationship between the Indochina region and American though explained under cold War has not been brought out clearly in the articles, particularly how it reshaped after the Vietnamese invasion. This could have portrayed dimensions in U.S diplomacy policies after the war. However, the failure of this U.S diplomacy in the Vietnam crisis is evident from all the readings. Bibliography Schaller Michael “Securing the Great Crescent: Occupied Japan and the Origins of Containment in Southeast Asia.” Journal of American History, vol 69, no.2 (1982), 392-414 Jespersen T. Christopher. “The Bitter end and the Lost Chance in Vietnam: Congress, the Ford Administration and the Battle over Vietnam, 1975-76.” Diplomatic History. Kissinger Henry. “Ending Vietnam War: A History of America’s involvement and Extrication from the Vietnam War.” NY: Simon & Schuster Inc, 2003 Lawrence A. Mark. “Transnational Coalition-Building and the Making of the Cold War in Indochina, 1947-1949.” Diplomatic History. Read More