Why Did the US Become Embroiled in Vietnam - Essay Example

? 10 February Why Did the U.S. Become Embroiled in Vietnam? Analyzing Interpretations Introduction The Vietnam War became one of the painful moments in the history of the United States. Between 1965 and 1975, the war in Vietnam was one of the most contentious issues of American domestic and international politics. From unanimous support, the American public gradually moved to complete rejection of the U.S.’s involvement in Vietnam. Simultaneously, political scholars and the common public tried to discover the main causes of the U.S.’s intervention in Vietnam. The current state of political science offers multiple explanations to the U.S.’s decision to intervene Vietnam. From political to economic and international relations explanations, public opinions of the Vietnam War vary across individuals and countries. More often than not, the Vietnam War is believed to be the sign of the U.S.’s power arrogance, although it is possible to assume that the Vietnam War also resulted from the domestic bureaucracy and balance of power concerns in America during the Cold War. That the Vietnam War remains one of the most controversial aspects of American history cannot be denied. Much has been written and said about the causes and consequences of the Vietnam War. More often than not, the Vietnam War is claimed to be a result of the U.S.’s power arrogance. In other words, the United States used its intervention to Vietnam to reaffirm its political and military superiority and used the Vietnam War to achieve its political objectives. However, the relevance of other interpretations cannot be disregarded. The U.S. embroiled in Vietnam because (a) domestic bureaucracy misinterpreted the seriousness of the political situation in Vietnam and (b) the rapid expansion of communism in the Vietnamese territories shifted the balance of power in the international political arena. All these interpretations have their strengths and deficiencies and all of them deserve professional attention. The arrogance of power is one of the most common explanations of the Vietnam War. Put simply, the Vietnam War is believed to be the sign of the U.S.’s striving to reestablish its military and political superiority in the East Asian region. The arrogance of power philosophy implies that, as the biggest and most powerful nation in the world, America wanted to use its power by all possible means and at every possible opportunity (Anonymous 126). Actually, the arrogance of power word combination was borrowed from the speech delivered by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright, who warned the Senate that the U.S.’s embroilment in Vietnam would result in the escalation of violence in China (Anonymous 126). In his speech Fulbright expressed doubts as for whether the United States was able and willing to overcome arrogance of power that had weakened and destroyed earlier nations and people (Anonymous 126). In Fulbright’s view, the U.S.’s involvement in Vietnam meant that the country and its leaders could distinguish power from virtue and, instead, believed that its superiority and power were but a product of God’s favor (Anonymous 126). The arrogance of power interpretation of the U.S.’s embroilment in Vietnam suggests that, throughout its history, the United States existed in the atmosphere of an ongoing conflict between Puritanism and democracy and, at times of heightened emotions, Puritanism would break through and border on unreasonable moralism (Lobe). As a result, arrogant in its power, the United States would view its military operations as a quest for morality, freedom and democracy – the philosophy that has continuously guided all American operations until present. Despite the growing amount of evidence supporting this view, this interpretation is not without weaknesses. The main criticism relates to the relationship between arrogance and the beginning of the Vietnam War. On the one hand, at the heart of American intervention was more than one reason, and these reasons shifted over time (Rotter). On the other hand, at the time when America decided to intervene with Vietnam most of the arrogant power ambitions had been forgotten. For many years, President Eisenhower restrained U.S. involvement with Vietnam, since he was not confident that such intervention was possible (Rotter). Eisenhower was not confident that the United States had sufficient power and resources to win in the war with Vietnam. However, by the time the war reached its culmination, reason gave place to arrogance, as the U.S. was no longer willing to leave the country defeated. It would be fair to say that arrogance was present in U.S. intentions and actions, starting with the middle of the military conflict. The first successes deepened the country’s commitment to the goal of subordinating Vietnam to the power of the United States and reducing the risks of communism expansion over the Vietnamese territories. When the first troops were sent to Vietnam in 1965, the basic intention was to fight a quick, limited war (Rotter). No one could expect that the Vietnamese would be so persistent and active in their fight against Americans. By the time the U.S. realized that it could not restrain the power of the Vietnamese people, its power arrogance went too far to let the U.S. leave the country without major losses on both sides. Yet, it is at least incorrect that power and arrogance were the basic explanations to the American intervention in Vietnam. The current state of history and literature provides ample theories explaining the roots of the U.S.’s intervention to Vietnam in 1965. Very often, bureaucracy is claimed to be one of the major forces behind the U.S.’s decision to enter Vietnam. The bureaucratic view is one of the most popular explanations of the U.S.’s entanglement in Vietnam. This explanation implies that the decision to attack Vietnam was the product of U.S.’s political short-sightedness and failure to give the political and bureaucratic legacy of the fifties. National security bureaucrats were found to have heavily contributed to the rapid escalation of violence in Vietnam, since it was natural and even expected for successful politicians to show their preparedness to use force (Wohlstetter). The main bureaucratic constraints leading to unreasonable entanglement of the U.S. to Vietnam and responsible for its failure included: (a) excessive weight placed on militarization of politics; (b) fragmentation of command and authority diffusion; (c) reluctance to change the existing structure of relationships among civilians and the military; and (d) reluctance to violate and adjust the existing lines of responsibility to the demands of the new time (Komer 3). The root of Vietnam’s intervention and failure was in the so-called national security bureaucracy, which entailed progressive militarization of U.S.’s foreign politics efforts under the influence of the outdated national security mechanisms (Wohlstetter). As a result, the political and military threat coming from Vietnam was persistently exaggerated, presenting the world as inherently anarchic and dangerous (Wohlstetter). The bureaucratic explanation to U.S.’s entanglement in Vietnam has some share of truth in it. Integral to this explanation of the Vietnam War is the well-known fact that American policymakers of the 1960s continued to rely on the political and military legacy of the 1950s. The Vietnam policy was shaped by a number of factors that precipitated U.S.’s intervention in Vietnam and, simultaneously, turned bureaucracy into one of the most valid explanations to the Vietnam War. To begin with, the political and policymaking legacy of the 1950s was a complex political by-product of the Kennedy Administration: at that time, the Department of State had a reputation of being the hardest nut to crack and the best connoisseur of East Asia affairs (Rotter 314). In addition, the U.S. leadership at the beginning of the 1960s inherited a deeply flawed vision of the Far East and Asia as a monolithic bloc with no radical distinctions among people, nations and cultures (Rotter 315). The U.S. bureaucracy at that time built on the political and cultural blindness toward the strength and perseverance of Asian nationalism (Rotter 315). As a result, the United States simply could not envision the far-reaching effects of interventionist decisions and, simultaneously, could not evaluate the political and military situation in the Far East in its entirety. The reason why bureaucracy failed the U.S. was that the country’s bureaucrats were not knowledgeable in Indochina and Vietnam matters, and the American government of the beginning of the 1960s lacked expertise in real Vietnam (Rotter 315). The prevailing majority of the embassy and foreign relations staff was made by French-speaking personnel who had been in place since the 1950s and, for that reason, could not anticipate and recognize the dramatic changes happening to Vietnam and the U.S. in the middle of the 1960s (Rotter 315). As a result, there was virtually no possibility for the U.S. diplomats to come in contact with the Vietnamese. No attempt was made to understand their internal political drivers and the logic behind their political actions. Again, the bureaucracy view on the Vietnam War has a number of weaknesses. In most cases, this theory falls short of an explanation to the real causes of U.S.’s intervention in Vietnam. The bureaucratic view of American politics during the 1960s provides perfect explanations to the military and political decisions that followed the intervention, describing the President and his advisers as a group of people trapped in their own political disability and blindness. Even if bureaucracy contributed to the development of the conflict, it was not the only cause of violence between Vietnam and the United States. Bearing in mind that the conflict took place when the Cold War was in its climax, it would be correct to assume that the fear of Communist China and the fear of communist expansion to Vietnam played one of the major roles in the development of the Vietnam conflict. The balance of power politics predetermined the direction of many political movements during the 1950s and 1960s. That was the balance of power politics that was claimed to guide U.S.’s decision to intervene in Vietnam. The balance of power argument suggests that the intervention in Vietnam initiated by the United States was the necessary precondition for retaining the balance of powers in the bipolar world (Wirtz 126). Actually, the concept of the balance of power by itself suggests that balancing behaviors are crucial for deterring military and political conflicts in the world (Wirtz 126). Back to the case of Vietnam, at the beginning of the 1960s the United States found itself trapped in fears of the communist expansion to the Far East. The new Administration inherited the vision of the communist bloc as a monolithic conception and, simultaneously, disregarded the corrosive impacts of Asian nationalism on Communism (Rotter 315). Just before the beginning of the Vietnam War, the United States used ample opportunities in Geneva to express its open hostility with the communist ambitions affecting Vietnam (Lawrence). In Geneva, the great powers, namely the United States and France, reached a compromise with regard to the division of Vietnam into noncommunist and communist halves (Lawrence). Needless to say, such a compromise was only temporary and could not satisfy the power and anti-communist ambitions of the U.S. This explanation does not account for two important factors, one theoretical and one practical. On the theoretical side, the war between the U.S. and Vietnam was not that of the two huge powers. Rather, it was the war between a stronger and a weaker state, the so-called balance of powers paradox (Wirtz 127). The outbreak of war between the two states that exhibit considerable power disparities suggests that the stronger state has everything required to achieve its military objectives quickly and without major losses (Wirtz 127). This is what theory says; but in reality, the fight between a stronger and a weaker state turned into a lengthy bloody conflict covering ten years of modern American history. Is it possible that the balance of power had nothing to do with U.S. entanglement in Vietnam? Only future research can give answer to this question. On the practical side, and despite the growing weight of communism in the bipolar world, the United States had virtually no reason to believe that the Soviet Union, through Vietnam, threatened its political and military survival (Wirtz 130). Vietnam could not play any crucial role in the development of the military and political force in the United States. The main reason why the balance of power explanation was irrelevant was because “American and Soviet desires to strengthen themselves vis-a-vis their main competitor were best realized through internal efforts” (Wirtz 130). Even the strongest ally could add little to U.S.’s security against the Soviet Union. In the bipolar world of the Cold War, only the United States and the Soviet Union had the potential to change the sides, but changes among lesser rivals and allies could not alter the balance of power in the world (Wirtz 130). As a result, no restructuring of the national political power in Vietnam could shift the balance of power between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Conclusion The main reasons why the United States decided to enter Vietnam are still poorly understood. Despite the growing body of literature on the subject, the controversies among various theories and explanations cannot be ignored. More often than not, the Vietnam War is believed to be the sign of the U.S.’s power arrogance, although it is possible to assume that the Vietnam War also resulted from the domestic bureaucracy and balance of power concerns in America during the Cold War. None of these explanations is fully satisfactory. U.S.’s power arrogance could become an important driver of its entanglement in Vietnam, although arrogance became obvious at the latter stages of the Vietnam War. Bureaucracy, the lack of expertise in Far East politics and the balance of power concerns could contribute to the escalation of violence between the U.S. and Vietnam. Most probably, all these theories have something to tell about the real causes of the Vietnam War. Simultaneously, much of what precipitated the conflict between the two countries will forever remain a huge political secret for the future generations. Works Cited Anonymous. The Korean War and the Vietnam War: People, Politics, and Power. Britannica Educational Publishing, 2009. Print. Komer, Robert W. Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam. Rand Corporation, 1972. Print. Lawrence, Mark Atwood. The Vietnam War: A Concise International History. Oxford University Press, 2010. Print. Lobe, Jim. “The Arrogance of Power.” Common Dreams, 29 Nov 2003. Web. 11 February 2012. Rotter, Andrew J. “The Causes of the Vietnam War.” Modern American Poetry, 1999. Web. 11 February 2012. Rotter, Andrew J. Light at the End of the Tunnel: A Vietnam War Anthology. Rowman & Littlefield, 1999. Print. Wirtz, James J. Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century. Stanford University Press, 2004. Print. Wohlstetter, Albert. “On Vietnam and Bureaucracy.” Rand Corporation, 1968. Web. 11 February 2012. Read More