Conferences in Cairo and Teheran in 1943 - Research Paper Example

? CONFERENCES IN CAIRO AND TEHERAN IN 1943 Conferences in Cairo and Teheran in 1943 The conference of Cairo and Teheran took place in the year 1943 during World War II. The Cairo Conference occurred between November 22 and 26 in Cairo, Egypt. It mainly dealt with its position against Japan during the war and discussed issues related to Asia after the war. President Franklin Roosevelt of United States, Winston Churchill of United Kingdom and Chiang Kai-shek of China attended the meeting. The Teheran Conference was also attended by the same people except Chiang Kai-shek. This time Joseph Stalin of Soviet Union joined the meeting and hence it is considered to be the first conference between the Big Three1. It immediately followed the Cairo Conference and was held during November 28 and December 1, 1943 in Teheran, Iran. This meeting focused on the opening of the second front in Western Europe and finalized the stratagem for the war against Nazi Germany and its allies2. The purpose of this paper is to attempt a close study of the conferences held in Cairo and Teheran in order to evaluate the larger picture of the World War situation. It is through revisiting these conferences that one can properly assess and analyze the occurrences that led to the world war. The main purpose of the argument at both the conferences in Cairo and Teheran was the act and measures taken by the U.S. and the U.K. regarding the Overlord and the Mediterranean invasion, for which they needed support3. The U.S. leaders were keen on grabbing the opportunity to attack from the northwest, which was the Overlord from which the British seemed to withdraw. What mainly came into conflict between the core parties was whether to postpone the Overlord operation to proceed with the eastern invasion of Mediterranean during the war. This decision depended upon the availability of landing craft which was provided by the United States, called the Landing Ship Tank (LST). There were almost 139 of these, headed towards the Mediterranean and 67 allocated to the United Kingdom for the Overlord right after the Italian campaign was finished4. The Cairo-Teheran Conferences allow the historians to analyze and develop a deeper understanding of the intricacies of the cross-channel invasion which was resisted by both Stalin and Roosevelt for different reasons. One can get a closer look at the real intentions of the American ideas and suspicions towards their ally5. The Cairo Conference led to the defeat of Japan and eventually the Cold War was aggravated in East Asia. Hence, the meeting was significant in relation to the bond developed between the Great Britain, the United States and China. The conference took its official start by Generalissimo demanding a fixed amount for military equipment for the South East Asia Command operations. The Generalissimo reasserted the demand of providing 10,000 of tonnage per month expressing the need to Mountbatten irrespective of his own demands. In a series of meetings in Cairo other demands were heard and possible solutions were derived. General Eisenhower the Allies Supreme Commander laid stress on the significance of “maximum possible operations” in the existing scenario because a new base would take up a lot of time6. These were some of the major demands that were placed in the conference and these demands had an impact on the overall result of the conference. The same can be said about the Teheran collaborations of Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin. But there was a clash of cultures as the decisions were finalized at a high level and Heiferman writes, “Summit conferences may make for good theater, but do not necessarily result in good policies, as an examination of the Cairo Conference reveals.”7 Heiferman reasserts that the conferences were a mixture of contradictory agendas due to differences in culture and various stereotypes and myths about realities. China’s inclusion in the Cairo conference was primarily Roosevelt’s concern. He gave Chiang the impression that he would provide him anything if the Chinese troops showed the strength that they were looking for. The long discussions with Chiang were mainly Roosevelt’s way of assessing the potentials the country carried with it. At the Teheran summit, Churchill proposed to explore the opportunities in eastern Mediterranean in response to the Soviet Union’s apprehension about the delay in the Overlord operation. This brought a turning point between the three forces because Stalin bluntly declared his notion about the entire Mediterranean program which he considered to be a game of forces being dispersed quite comprehensively. Roosevelt dealt with the situation very diplomatically to Churchill’s surprise. He requested both the parties to come to a final decision regarding the Overlord and the attack on southern France8. This was the starting point of the “Teheran Formula” as well because on the same day of the conference, the Foreign Office proposed the following statements: Poles should be assured that Russia would launch instantaneous diplomatic affairs, Once the military conditions allow, the Polish government should be restored and There should be no pressure from the outside forces especially by the Soviet Union. The Teheran Formula was accepted because it was a very sensitive moment when Germans were moved west of Dnieper by the Red Army and Churchill was keen on having the conference earlier so that it did not give Stalin an equal chance to reinstate his views.9 In the midst of this scenario, Roosevelt was seen in a totally different light. He was more concerned with the postwar world rather than shaping the military for the war. It is due to this reason, he was observed by many as a compromising figure throughout the conference10. On returning from the conferences, he addressed his people and told them that the war is not a matter of overnight. He asserted that great energy and strength is required in the times of war. He told them that it was not easy to face the military men abroad who are in the war fighting with them. He said, “These hard-headed realists testify to the strength and skill and resourcefulness of the enemy generals and men whom we must beat before final victory is won. The war is now reaching the stage where we shall all have to look forward to large casualty lists -- dead, wounded and missing”11. Thus, Roosevelt maintained a very balanced approach and understood the difficulties of war. At the same time, he also tried to keep his people in confidence. The Teheran conference was also mainly held after an entreaty by Iran. America had insisted that it set Iran as an example of showing a progressive nation through the selfless help it could provide to the minorities and victims of imperialism12. Eventually Iran developed a firm relationship with American and demanded the exodus of Soviet Union troops. A question here arose that were the Soviet Union, the Great Britain and America attempting to face each other through negotiating with Iran. In other words, it was being asked that was Iran a sort of mediating region whereby the super powers met and conferred their intentions. It is very difficult to say at this stage but Russia easily let go of its emotions to reveal the conservatively guarded Iran. It even planned on raising a voice when Roosevelt intervened in the business of Iran but when Iran openly confessed its level of comfort with the USA, Russia was not left with much choice13. Roosevelt’s intentions are gaining more visibility as one proceeds to observe the moves taken by him in order to gain a more ‘anti-colonial’ image of a leader in power. He stressed and expected that Stalin would understand his idea of handling the territories after the war. Both were mutual about not returning Indochina to France. Roosevelt’s proposal to have an international committee that would visit the colonies annually for keeping a check and balance did not receive an expected response. But he did not stop at that. John highlights in his paper how Roosevelt dealt with Russia and Britain. The President was very clear about his moves in Teheran Conference. He was content with what he did to secure his conception of a postwar Indochina. Little can be said about Churchill at this point because he was still overcoming the shock of this new anti-colonial representative. Even though United States of America and the Great Britain were on excellent terms, this difference of opinion was rather an attempt of teasing that Churchill suffered because of Roosevelt. This at least brings one to this conclusion; that the conferences in Teheran and Cairo were not happening for no reason. Each leader had his intentions clearly demarcated but Roosevelt had more votes than the other two. In any case, Stalin and Churchill were representing the ancient rival countries and Roosevelt had his hands clean. Since in the Cairo conference, not much was said about returning the pre-war colonies, Britain was not much concerned about the matter14. On the whole the conference were successful because both Roosevelt and Churchill were optimistic about the defeat of Germany and the futuristic world that Roosevelt had in mind started to take its form15. It is, however, through certain ‘post-conference released’ remarks by the leaders of lunch and dinner that one is able to decipher the code of the events that have been taking place. For research’s sake, certain facts have to be shared without conspiracy. Looking back in the papers released after the conference by the Foreign Relations of United States, one finds that these conferences had a therapeutic effect on all the politicians except for Soviet Union, which found major faults in the dealing of France with Germany and considered the exiled Polish government to be secret agents of Hitler. According to Roosevelt “Such a condition is distinctly damaging to that unity of purpose and action which the conferences at Cairo and Teheran were designed to promote”16. The conference saw its results in the form of the World War II. Bibliography Dallek, Robert. 1979. Franklin D. Roosevelt and American foreign policy, 1932-1945. New York: Oxford University Press. Heiferman, Ronald. 2011. The Cairo Conference of 1943: Roosevelt, Churchill, Chiang Kai-shek, and Madame Chiang. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland. Kimball, Warren F. 1991. The juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as wartime statesman. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Top of Form Leighton, Richard M. 1990. Overlord versus the Mediterranean at the Cairo-Tehran conferences, Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army. Mark, Eduard M. 1975. "Allied Relations in Iran, 1941-1947: The Origins of a Cold War Crisis". The Wisconsin Magazine of History. 59 (1): 51-63. Medlicott, W. N. 1963. "Review of Foreign Relations of the United States, the Conferences at Cairo and Tehran 1943", English Historical Review. 78 (306): 208. Roosevelt, Franklin D., Russell D. Buhite, and David W. Levy. 1992. FDR's fireside chats. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Sharp, Tony. 1977. "The Origins of the 'Teheran Formula' on Polish Frontiers". Journal of Contemporary History. 12 (2): 381-393 Sebrega, John J. 1986. "The Anticolonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Reappraisal". Political Science Quarterly. 101 (1): 65-84Top of Form United States. 1961. The conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943. Washington: U.S. G.P.O. Top of Form Read More