The Louisiana Purchase: The Most Important Acquisition of the US History - Research Paper Example

The Louisiana Purchase: The Most Important Acquisition of the U.S. History In 1800, when Thomas Jefferson was voted for the presidency, the adjustment to Republican power implied a conversion in foreign policy from the commercial thinking and rigid realism of Alexander Hamilton to nationalistic boldness of Jefferson (Kennedy 2003). James Madison, Jefferson’s secretary of state, and the President himself took serious actions against any insults to the nation’s national pride and had faith in the capacity of the United States to preserve and protect itself. Jefferson and Madison, in power, aimed to enforce a utopian, rooted in a principled model of American ideas of morality, with the belief that these American ideas were generally legitimate (Kennedy 2003). It was a unique paradigm of foreign policy: a combination of ambitious goal and self-centered national objective. In 1802, the first challenge to the foreign policy of Jefferson came when he chose to deal with the Barbary bandits who blocked vessels in the surrounding area of their harbors in the Mediterranean Coast of Africa and asked for a fee or ‘tribute’ (Findling & Thackeray 1997, 1). Even though this process has been occurring since the 1780s, the President saw it an insult to American integrity and dispatched the U.S. navy to the vicinity to safeguard U.S. commercial transport. But the greatest accomplishment of Jefferson as a U.S. president, even though it damaged his political ideals, was the Louisiana Purchase (Findling & Thackeray 1997). This area is cone-shaped and comprised several of the existing plains states and extended down to New Orleans’s port city. In 1763, Spain had gained this area as an outcome of the Indian and French War (Channing 1906). However, Napoleon Bonaparte, the undisputed leader of France at the time, regained Louisiana in 1800 from Spain as payment for several areas somewhere else. Napoleon aimed to convert Louisiana into a food source for his territories in the French West Indies and finally put a stop to their reliance on the U.S. (Channing 1906). Yet in 1800, according to Williams (1956), Napoleon was heavily engaged in the military actions in Europe; neither material resources nor labor was accessible to take up and rebuild Louisiana. Another issue arose when Napoleon attempted to build a naval headquarters at Haiti, Santo Domingo for security against the British naval forces. In 1801, a slave rebellion headed by Haitian champion Toussaint L’Ouverture took place (Williams 1956). Napoleon dispatched armed forces to the area, and large numbers of Americans believed that it would effortlessly extinguish the fire in Santo Domingo and afterward advance to invade New Orleans and possibly East and West Florida too. If this were to happen, it would endanger American security and could result in the ultimate incorporation of neighboring U.S. areas into the French kingdom (Findling & Thackeray 1997). To put a stop to this, Jefferson was ready to collaborate with Great Britain. Anyhow, French troops were almost defenseless against the Haitian mutineers and a spate of yellow fever. At long last, Napoleon’s side lost 70,000 soldiers, and Haiti finally gained independence (Findling & Thackeray 1997, 2). According to Byrd (1960), this tragedy forced the Napoleon to reevaluate his aims about an American kingdom. He realized that maybe it was not a very wise plan nevertheless; invading Europe could be a wiser idea. In the meantime, with its difficulties in Haiti, the French emperor decided not to take up Louisiana, and there were no difference from the time Spain had owned the area. Certainly, Spain still exerted minor control in Louisiana, and authority over the utilization of New Orleans’s harbor, which the U.S. had been assured under the Pinckney’s Treaty’s conditions (Byrd 1960). However, in 1802, Spain unexpectedly pulled out authorization for the U.S. to utilize New Orleans, in breach of the agreement. This made the city vulnerable to French invasion and brought about much political chaos in Washington, where the Federalist adversaries of Jefferson persuaded him to dispatch armed forces to take hold of the Floridas and New Orleans (Kennedy 2003). At this moment, in 1803, the U.S. president assigned James Monroe as a representative to France for the acquisition of the area surrounding New Orleans, and the land of Florida, which Jefferson believed could also have been passed on from Spain to France (Williams 1956). According to Kennedy (2003), Monroe was ordered to collaborate with the U.S. ambassador to France, Robert Livingston, and the two representatives were ordered to set off to England with proposals for a treaty if the French emperor was reluctant to sell. Nevertheless, at about the time of Monroe’s entrance to Paris in 1803, Napoleon heard more unpleasant reports from Santo Domingo and gave the bid to get rid of not only the New Orleans but the entire of the Louisiana Territory. Livingston and Monroe immediately wrapped up the agreement on the 30th of April 1803 (Findling & Thackeray 1997). Nobody laid out precisely what had been purchased, only the area that had been in Spain’s possession, other than the fact that it cost $15 million (p. 3). Livingston and Monroe, at the time of the transaction, were not reasonably sure what had been bought; soon after, it was discovered that the transaction did not comprise the Floridas but did include 828,000 square miles of land, purchased for the huge price of 3 cents per acre (Findling & Thackeray 1997, 3). There were definite misdeeds about the transaction that raised risks. France had never formally seized the territory from Spain, and France’s legal decree ordered its legislature vote to authorize the sale of territory. Furthermore, there were no mention in the U.S. Constitution about the president’s power to purchase territory, and Jefferson took into consideration a legal revision to approve the acquisition. However, there was basis to think that Napoleon could pull out the bid if there was any form of interruption hence Jefferson forgot his ideals momentarily and sent the agreement to Congress (Kennedy 2003). According to Byrd (1960), a number of Federalists criticized the acquisition as needless and costly, and some were troubled about the assimilation of new French-Creole nationals, yet the Senate endorsed the agreement. After the Louisiana Purchase, the U.S. president aspired to carry on with his expansionist campaign and take hold of Texas and Florida from Spain. He attempted in vain to ally with Napoleon, and afterward he had to confront Aaron Burr, his ex-vice president, at the time a despised political opponent, who organized a mission down the Mississippi River that the president and several others thought, was intended to build a secessionist state in Louisiana under the administration of Burr (Findling & Thackeray 1997). Findling and Thackeray (1997) further add that the former vice president was taken into custody, but the beginning of naval problems with Great Britain stopped Jefferson from advancing his plans for Texas and Florida. Annotated Bibliography (1) Byrd, E. Treaties and Executive Agreements in the United States. The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1960. The author emphasizes here the setback of the nature of administrative contracts and treaties in U.S. constitutional process, and the legitimacy of the use of the administrative contract in the governance of global affairs. However, in spite of the extent of the available literature or material on the issue, it would seem that most of it has brought about a great deal of uncertainty. The author has carried out a review, analysis, and synthesis of these sources. He has constructed a comprehensive assessment of the basic values involved in the Louisiana Purchase, and a thorough legal examination of the essence and use of the administrative contract during the Jefferson administration. (2) Channing, E. The Jeffersonian System, 1801-1811. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1906. The author is greatly interested in the initial administration of Jefferson. He then decided to make the subject matter a full-blown analysis. From that inspiration the author’s attention was diverted to Henry Adam’s writings on the early Republican governments. Hence, his analysis of the Louisiana Purchase is in connection to Henry Adam’s works. The book is quite concise and straightforward because the author only included topics which are accessible to him. He used primary correspondences, reports, and documents. References to these relevant writings are properly footnoted. At the book’s conclusion is an investigative evaluation of the importance of Louisiana Purchase to Jefferson’s foreign policy and American history. (3) Findling, J. & F. Thackeray. Events that Changed America in the Nineteenth Century. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997. The authors try to explain and assess the importance of the most significant episodes in the U.S. throughout the 19th century. The objective is to notify the readers with the influential and determining episodes of American history. The book is purely descriptive but integrates actual classroom interactions and knowledge about the issues, especially with regard to the Louisiana Purchase. The authors collaborated with their students to write a series of volumes that would focus on the most significant occurrences influencing these students with the expectation that they would appreciate more their nation and its history, particularly the importance of the frequently overlooked Louisiana Purchase. (4) Kennedy, R. Mr. Jefferson’s Lost Cause: Land, Farmers, Slavery, and the Louisiana Purchase. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. The author shows how the Louisiana Purchase had a large-scale effect on the development of slavery and land use. He describes how the Louisiana Purchase had expanded slavery up to the Mississippi River. He explores the immense monetary motives that condemn the numerous adversaries of slavery in the South. He puts emphasis on the plans, insights, and personality of Thomas Jefferson to demonstrate how he fought with the moral and constitutional troubles of his time. The book is simply a narration of the Jefferson’s most important challenges and accomplishments during his presidency. But due to its comprehensiveness the book is quite useful to the discussion about the Louisiana Purchase. (5) Williams, W. The Shaping of American Diplomacy. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1956. In discussing the historical development of American foreign policy, the author examines a chain of events or any particular policy from various perspectives. He argues that primary outcomes can be considered as the direct and instant occurrences which resulted upon the implementation of the policy, regardless of its final outcome. An excellent case in point is the Louisiana Purchase. The author includes a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the Louisiana Purchase to the American nation, such as the change in the entire path of American progress and the availability of important resources. The author is able to show, in an explanatory way, how these developments influenced the hopes, ideas, and attitudes of Americans toward foreign policy. Works Cited Byrd, E. Treaties and Executive Agreements in the United States. The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1960. Channing, E. The Jeffersonian System, 1801-1811. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1906. Findling, J. & F. Thackeray. Events that Changed America in the Nineteenth Century. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997. Kennedy, R. Mr. Jefferson’s Lost Cause: Land, Farmers, Slavery, and the Louisiana Purchase. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Williams, W. The Shaping of American Diplomacy. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1956. Read More