The Cold War and American Foreign Policy - Essay Example

? and Section # of The Cold War and American Foreign Policy Two s more important than perhaps any other in terms of The United States foreign policy and its impact, position and effect in the Cold war are those of Paul Nitze and George Kennan, senior officials in the American administration, with sharply contradicting views and positions of strategy. Each had a highly contrasted sense of policy from the other, in terms of how the United States should take a stand towards the Cold War and what would be the most favorable policy for their victory and the Soviets’ defeat. These views and the lives of these two men are outlined in Nicholas Thompson’s book, The Hawk and The Dove, and are investigated in the paragraphs to follow, along with the question of who influenced American foreign policy more favorably and what effect it would have on the ultimate result of the Cold War. To outline their most fundamental disagreement in a nutshell, one believed in prevention and the other believed in action. One of them, Nitze, believed their strategy should be to surpass any limits of capability the soviets may hold them responsible for and then act on them, while the other, Kennan, believed to think like the soviets would, try to analyze their intentions and then counter or contain them until they themselves internally collapsed, known as his policy of containment. Kennan, who believed in the latter, was of the belief that the soviets were fundamentally weak and insecure and that it would not take much for them to collapse, assuming they were handled correctly. Nitze on the other hand was of the opposing view that the Soviets were fast gaining power and that Moscow would attain strategic superiority from the United States in a few years, which he hoped to counter before it occurred. Where Kennan believed that it just took to understand the Soviets’ intentions and thoughts to end the cold war, Nitze believed it took to understanding and surpassing their every capability. To understand how fundamentally different the two men were, it is of interest to note that foreign policy aside, they even differed on their own country: Kennan condemned America for its vulgar culture, and its people for having a complacent and mediocre standard. Nitze on the other hand was convinced of America’s power and central hold on the world. Therefore, given their completely contrasting view, one ready to take the back-seat and one ready to accelerate with full force, they can both be said to sum up the two sides of a generation’s argument on the Cold War and America's foreign policy regarding it. Of course there were also many incidents where the two men, who were close friends, did agree, such as the Marshall Plan, or their stance on the American position in Vietnam, in which cases they tended to prove that they were quite correct in their judgment and often received favorable reaction. Nonetheless, those few times aside, they had different viewpoints at a primary and fundamental level, thereby making it more likely for them to disagree than agree. These differences however did not prevent them from seeking mutual benefit from each other’s policies. For example, Nitze extracted military benefit from Kennan’s theory of containment, by negotiating deals with Soviets regarding the United States military, and by keeping the military and its allies safe. Kennan on the other hand enjoyed a certain level of military and otherwise superiority from which to excise his policy of containment, thereby proving that each was necessary factor in American policy on the Cold War and that while each contradicted each other, it did not necessarily mean that they clashed with each other. Where the differences in their thinking arose from is of no mystery, as it was indeed early experience in the lives of both these men that were to shape them for the rest of their life. One’s experience with the Cold War, Nitze's, consisted of dealing with the live aftermath of a Nuclear War, on the scene in Russia, while the other, Kennan, found himself examining and evaluating the thoughts and processes behind the men and machines physically responsible for the war. These experiences were each to have a profound on interest on either of the men and were to shape their thinking perspective and viewpoint for the rest of their lives. But exactly what were these viewpoints, and what effect did each of these men have on foreign policy? Furthermore, how did they contribute to America’s position in the Cold War? As stated earlier, the basic difference was that Nitze believed in action, thinking that they needed to prove their power and control the Soviets' only through practical demonstration of superiority, a policy to which Kennan was fundamentally opposed. Because he had experience with working at a non-physical mental level, he felt that the Americans should benefit from the knowledge they had of the Soviets and the predictability they demonstrated in their actions and intentions, believing that America would benefit more, financially and in terms of military position, if they chose to counteract the Soviet's actions by prevention rather than by physical means. To demonstrate one example of the differences of opinion this led to, to follow through with his policy, Nitze believed in hoarding arms and using them at every given opportunity, while Kennan believed in restraint and minimal use of arms. Did this make the Soviets believe the Americans were insecure, thereby hoarding on arms, yet afraid to use them, as Kennan predicted it would make them believe, or did it indicate to them, as Nitze hoped it would, a cool, composed sense of victory where they had all the weapons they might need and yet still did not feel the need to use them? To be fair, it would be difficult to choose one side of the argument as the correct one, and given its dramatically exaggerated stand on either side, I personally believe that each had his own role to play, which contributed to the ultimate end of the Cold War. Where Kennan was realistic and did not think America needed to take a strong military stand and active position in cultures it did not understand, Nitze, holding an idealistic view of the United States, believed otherwise and felt that military occupation was all it took to increase America’s strategic edge over the world. Nonetheless, while I do feel that in many cases Kennan’s calmer approach was necessary to maintain a certain sort of Balance, without Nitze’s views and policies, the United States would not have had a very favorable position and policy. For example, where Kennan did not believe in developing the hydrogen bomb, Nitze rightfully disagreed. If the United States were not to use or make the bomb it did not mean that other countries would refrain from doing so as well. Preparation for the scenario was only logical, and to refrain development, just to refrain from usage would have been an unnecessarily docile approach to the matter. Furthermore, where Kennan opposed the creation of NATO, Nitze very rightfully supported it and in fact aimed for its expansion. Time and again Nitze indicated that although he seemed to have radical views and an erratic sense action over prevention, when he was actually in a position of power, he exercised control over that sense and he tended to consider and evaluate his position clearly before acting out. He seemed to be shrewdly aware of his position and ready to attack at the drop of hat, hence acquiring the title of the ‘hawk’ in Thompson’s book, but in reality, his decisions and policies showed that he too was willing to negotiate on topics of discussion rather than directly act. He just believed in being prepared should the need for superiority ever arise, and he believed in holding a certain edge over his enemies, which during those critical times, made very good sense. In summary, I support Nitze’s perspective and influence on the foreign policy of the United States more because while Kennan had a good sense in being able to predict and understand the Soviets’ intentions, it is likely that it was more of Nitze’s interference and position that the United States was able to counter and control those intentions. Perhaps if the United States had relied only on Kennan's policy of containment they would have faced negative action from the Soviets themselves, who might have judged them as a weaker nation and perhaps rightfully so too. Without Nitze's domination based policies, America might not have had the strong negotiating position that it did. Nonetheless, it can only be safe to say that each had their own significant impact on American foreign policy, and without Kennan’s sense of predicting the Soviets’ intentions, or without Nitze’s sense of the importance of military superiority, the United States would have been in a far weaker state than the strong one it was in with the influence of both their contradictory policies. And it was likely this knowledge, that each complemented the other and that ultimately they were both working for the same purpose and country, which allowed the two rivals to remain on civil, and even friendly, terms throughout their lives. Works Cited Thompson, N. (2006) The Hawk and The Dove. Read More