A Comparative Analysis of the Foreign Policy Process between France and Germany - Essay Example

?A Comparative Analysis of the Foreign Policy Process between France and Germany Introduction Due to the fact that nations are going through major external and internal changes, it becomes vital to look at the continuities and discontinuities between states as regards foreign policy processes. The relationship between the foreign policy of Germany and France is a perfect example of convergence and divergence in the field of international relations. Both France and Germany have went through recurrent pressures and conflicts, influenced by frequently contradictory foreign policy developments and perceptions of national interests and priorities. As observed by Philip Gordon, “Franco-German military cooperation in the postwar period seems to have taken place despite important differences in perspective between the two countries, not because of a fundamental rapprochement of views” (Krotz, 2001, p. 3). He added that “at both public and elite levels, French and German attitudes toward security and defence were highly different” (Krotz, 2001, p. 3). However, as stated, France and Germany, despite of their different approaches to foreign policy were able to build an alliance and become a major force in the European Union (EU). This essay analyses the similarities and differences between the foreign policy process in France and Germany. Comparing and Contrasting French and German Foreign Policy In analysing the specific similarities and differences between the foreign policies of France and Germany, it is important to take into account the historical foundation of the Franco-German relations. The assumption that a strong diplomacy in Europe should be based on compromise between France and Germany is firmly embraced throughout the German political community. The ‘rapprochement’—reconciliation—between Germany and France was established in 1963 through the Elysee Treaty (McCarthy, 2001, p. 118). Nevertheless, contrary to their strong alliance in the economic sector, a strong cooperation has been problematic in the security and defence arena. The Franco-German relationship throughout the Cold War was mainly rooted in the effort of Germany to discreetly take part in security and foreign policy, which allowed France to control the arrangement. The eastward territorial expansion and reunification of Germany thus brought about a level of apprehension in France that Germany would reassess their alliance, specifically when dealing with the objectives and interests of Germany in Eastern Europe (McCarthy, 2001, pp. 118-119). It is widely documented that the relationship between France and Germany has become more overwrought and very difficult to manage during the post-Cold War period. The foreign policy objectives of Germany are obviously centred on the strengthening of Eastern Europe, whereas the interests of France are focused on the southern portion of the Mediterranean. Moreover, the Eastern European expansion of Europe will situate Germany at the centre of Europe, whilst the geopolitical status of France will become marginalised (Magone, 2010, p. 557). Without the power of the Cold War to reconcile their objectives, Germany and France had massive problems building a shared security and defence policies in Yugoslavia and Europe. They performed markedly divergent tasks in the Persian Gulf War and have embraced conflicting objectives in Eastern and Central Europe (Wong & Hill, 2012, p. 88). Although there appears to have been a certain extent of commonality with regards to perceptions about the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and on the issue of cooperative security and defence strategies outside Europe, positive national outlooks and strategies in each state towards the other perhaps have not been reinforced by the occurrences of the earlier decade (Janning, 1996, p. 35). Perhaps especially significant, a Germany emancipated from earlier restraints and under considerable pressures may be forced to prioritise foreign policy objectives and interests over its long-established bond with France, which may possibly provoke French attempts to hinder German objectives. The relationship between France and Germany is very complex. It is, in several regards, a mystery as to how these two nations remain different in their foreign policy perspectives and interests in spite of a great deal of dealings, contact, and institutionalisation. The major issue with the security and defence relationship between France and Germany is, therefore, not really maintaining the bond between these two nations but furnishing the alliance with greater importance and transforming a common determination to work together towards a more successful outcome for Atlantic and European security and defence (Manners & Whitman, 2001, p. 76). Security collaboration between France and Germany has not yet transformed into the capacity to operate as a critical and consistent entity in the arena of international security. The major issue that Germany and France have in delivering headship in the arena of security and foreign policy integration is that they have basically opposite ideas of political cooperation, which is manifested in their perceptions about the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). Primarily, they seem to diverge in their focus on the degree to which the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) must stay a fundamentally intergovernmental structure (McCarthy, 2001, p. 52). While France insists on the development of the CFSP within the rigidly intergovernmental framework of the European Council, Germany is a fervent supporter of popular voting and wants the European parliament to be greatly involved. Moreover, Germany and France seem to disagree on the absolute objective of the CFSP. For Germany, the expansion and intensification of the integration of foreign policy is less a matter of exercising European influence and more about scattering it, thus thwarting foreign policy nationalisation that may result in national enmity and suspicion between the members of the EU. On the contrary, the idea of France of a European foreign policy focuses on the exercise of influence and autonomy as an international actor (McCarthy, 2001, pp. 52-53). The difference between the foreign policy process in Germany and France is highlighted in each nation’s approach towards CFSP and European integration. Quite a few presidents of France, particularly Francois Mitterrand and George Pompidou, have already given their approval of the European integration, but France stayed hesitant to about CFSP. General del Gaulle is perhaps the most prominent for his protective justification of France’s national rights and privileges (Wong & Hill, 2012, p. 38). Nicolas Sarkozy and Jacques Chirac, former French presidents, have also been widely known for Gaullist inclinations frustrating harmonised European foreign policy integration. The perception of France about an ‘Europeanised’ foreign policy has been influenced by some prevailing political ideas. The first idea is that the European Union should not be treated as a driving force but instead as an instrument. French presidents consistently proclaim that “there can be no strong France without Europe, just as there can be no powerful Europe without France” (Wong & Hill, 2012, p. 38). This obviously implies that France should therefore expand its international relations with the help of its European allies. The second idea is that the CFSP could be certainly a valuable channel of diplomatic interaction, but simply for weak nations that would gain from taking part in these prestigious political interactions (Nunlist, Locher, & Martin, 2010, p. 38). France, being a strong nation with major diplomatic framework, would not require this undertaking. On the contrary, the post-Cold War period signified a twofold challenge for German leaders. It projected Germany as one of the major European powers. Concurrently, the Maastricht Treaty on the EU created the opportunity for the EU to come forward as a foreign policy agent through CFSP. The overlapping development of these seemingly opposing outcomes has escorted German leaders from then on (This, 1995, p. 188). To guarantee a harmonious relationship between the two, Germany adopted a ‘two-lane policy’ model. In the first ‘policy’ lane, German political leaders started to recognise the fact that the rise of Germany’s new status as a possible European power created new obligations and expectations of it as a possible leader of the CFSP, and as an individual foreign policy actor. In the second ‘policy lane’, Germany maintained its multilateral diplomacy in the NATO and the EU, encouraging the expansion of these two organizations (Wong & Hill, 2012, p. 44). Thus, Germany supported the establishment of the CFSP as a foundation of the EU. Ever since the Cold War, German foreign policy has tried to advance toward ‘Europeanisation’—“a process of change in national institutional and policy practices that can be attributed to European integration” (Neuhold et al., 2007, p. 119)-- which would condemn confrontational actions and which would geographically cover the North Atlantic region and Europe. This idea has influenced and informed German foreign policy from then on. Germany’s foreign policies have aspired to surpass European differences and adding Eastern European countries into the security and defence institutions of the West. Germany has tried to speed up the process of European integration, to frustrate possible renationalisation of European countries, and to boost international alliance, cooperation, and agreements (Bulmer & Paterson, 1996). Differentiating and stitching together national influence has been a major driving force for these German foreign policies. The ‘Europeanisation’ orientation of Germany’s foreign policy has sometimes angered France because of apprehensions that Germany might compromise its attachment to the West for an inclusive European system. German foreign policy over the recent decades has remained integrationist and multilateralist. Germany keeps away from the pointed sides of complicated options and choosing rather not choosing (Otte & Greve, 2000, p. 15). For instance, with regard to alliance issues, Germany has consistently avoided the decision between Europe and the North Atlantic region. In a similar vein, Germany criticised the option between either intensification or expansion of European integration as misleading choices, and demanded concerted policies (Krotz, 2001, p. 9). The objectives of France have been almost similar to those of Germany. In the point of view of France, ‘Europeanisation’ has implied building global Europe under the headship of France. Nevertheless, it would have been a continental Europe autonomous and different from the auspices of major powers to its Western part. Without a doubt, these have been the enduring foreign policy interests of France, sometimes hard to sustain and disrupted by unfavourable situations and the conflicting objectives of other European countries (Endow, 2003, p. 91). Nevertheless, throughout the 1990s, the foreign policy objectives of France have frequently remained ambiguous and disconnected. The EU is to become a transnational political player, while maintaining the intergovernmental framework of its CFSP. The foreign policy of France does not aim for renationalisation, but it is hesitant to accept CFSP. Even though indecisive and vague, the Gaullist ideals remain the source of inspiration for French foreign policy. France’s decision to withdraw from the NATO in 1966 represents the essence of Gaullist diplomacy (Gordon, 1995, p. 49). It arises from France’s aspiration of absolute autonomy, and its yearning to raise itself to superpower position. It is a profoundly held idea in France and Germany that their partnership is a solution to the maintenance of an integrated unified European Union. From the point of view of Germany, the importance of a functional relationship between France and Germany is often emphasised. This is supported by the party leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Wolfgang Schauble, who stressed that if Germany and France refuse to find common ground, “things will go wrong in Europe” (Manners & Whitman, 2001, p. 77). In order to surmount these divergent processes in the alliance, Germany and France have tried to deal with and become dynamically concerned about the problems and issues of each other. Germany, for instance, has endorsed the French idea of building a general EU policy for the Mediterranean (Manners & Whitman, 2001, p. 77). Metaphor is essential in the Franco-German relationship. The political heads often come out together initiating political programmes to establish the EU’s purpose, aiming to demonstrate how Germany and France have a common foreign policy objective. The formation of the ‘Eurocorps’, for instance, was instigated by Germany and France (Manners & Whitman, 2000, p. 77). These two countries lead the EU in terms of establishing European integration and creating new proposals. Although Germany is usually careful about bringing the issue of leadership to the fore, the intensification of the process of European integration is viewed as a specific historical obligation that Germany should assume a top position in persevering: “no single country can lay claim to leadership in Europe, at least not in terms of power. But in terms of ideas and of their tenacious pursuit, a number of nations can and must lead the process of European unification” (Manners & Whitman, 2000, p. 77). For instance, the CDU introduced the questionable concept of a central Europe where in France and Germany, together with the Benelux (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) nations, would make up the ‘core’ (Manners & Whitman, 2000, pp. 77-78) of the integration effort. Despite of these setbacks, failures, tensions, and threats, the new security and defence relationship between France and Germany is likely to survive. Primarily, both nations are aware that their alliance is still important. The existing Franco-German relationship has been the outcome of each nation seeking its own national objectives and interests through collaboration rather than disagreement with the other. Currently, Germany and France comprise a significant portion of their external trade and are obviously co-dependent in economic matters. Due to these risks in each other’s fortune, it appears doubtful that Germany and France would ever allow outside occurrences or forces destroy their relationship (Feldman, 2012, p. 52). Although catastrophes like the state of affairs in ex-Yugoslavia have revealed the possibility of actual clashes, it is difficult to visualise the specific external problems that may appear more crucial to France and Germany than their relationship with each other. Certainly, it is important to emphasise that the Yugoslavian crisis did not result in conflict between France and Germany (Feldman, 2012, pp. 52-53), as it most likely would have in earlier periods. In addition, if factual, that Germany no longer requires much of France’s cooperation, it would be a grave error to assume that Germany is now completely allowed to disregard its main European partner. The foreign policy of Germany may function with less restrictions of the past, but it is still quite reliant on the cooperation and assistance of its partners. Germany is still largely susceptible to the manner its foreign policies are viewed overseas and will keep on striving to persuade their neighbours that the nation is securely and strongly assimilated in its Atlantic and European coalitions, and specifically, with its previous rival, France (Banchoff, 1997). The aggressiveness and determination showed by German officials in the accession of Slovenia and Croatia was somewhat an anomaly, and the response it raised has acted as an indication of how challenging or difficult a national or independent German foreign policy would be (McCarthy, 2001). The eventual international vigilance of Germany indicates that regard for or even respect for the opinions and interests of their partners will continue to be a central feature of German foreign policy. Ultimately, and most crucial, there appears to be reliable proof of what may be referred to as Franco-German ‘partnership prejudice’, defined as “a bias toward bilateral cooperation for cooperation’s sake and a desire to do everything possible to avoid both the impression and the existence of divergence” (Gordon, 1995, p. 102). Instead of shattering the Franco-German relationship, crises in fact appear to strengthen the bond between Germany and France. For instance, the reaction to conflicts over the issue of unification was not separation but bilateral support for a European union. The originally opposing responses to the Gulf War concluded with Germany and France wholly endorsing the U.S.-led alliance. Even in ex-Yugoslavia, Germany and France have amended their favoured policies so as not to isolate the other (Mcleod, 1997). As argued by Wong and Hill (2012), the fundamental explanations for the decision of Germany and France to form an alliance—to weaken German influence, to merge their resources for a more powerful global influence, to boost their success and wealth, and to surmount past antagonism—remain true today. Conclusions The past and existing Franco-German relationship demonstrates the similarities and differences between the foreign policy process in France and Germany. The foreign policy interests and objectives of these two countries converge in terms of economic issues, primarily because they are both under the single market and monetary system of the European Union. Moreover, they have similar agendas as regards leadership of the EU. They both detest a state-centred European order, and so they strive to promote the process of European integration. However, differences between the foreign policies of France and Germany are evident in the arena of security and defence. The two countries diverge in the issue of common foreign and security policy. While Germany is willing to reinforce CFSP, France is reluctant to endorse it. This difference is rooted in the basic feature of each of the country’s foreign policy structure. Germany is more integrationist and multilateralist, whilst France remains under the Gaullist influence. CFSP threatens France’s geopolitical position, while it strengthens Germany’s potential as a major European power. CFSP, evidently, is a major threat to France’s aspiration of becoming a global superpower. References Banchoff, T., 1997. German Policy towards the European Union. German Politics, 6(1), pp. 60-76. Bulmer, S. & Paterson, W., 1996. Germany in the European Union: Gentle Giant or Emergent Leader. International Affairs, 72(1), pp. 9+ Endow, A., 2003. France, Germany and the European Union. New Delhi: Aakar Books. Feldman, L., 2012. Germany’s Foreign Policy of Reconciliation: From Enmity to Amity. 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