Middle East and the United States History, Politics, and Ideologies - Book Report/Review Example

?The book “Middle East and the United s history, politics, and ideologies” by David W. Lesch and Mark L. published in is basically a compilation of articles, specifically twenty eight, all of which address and bring forth their take on the history and background of the Middle East and the United States. It is the fifth part of a series of such compilations which have been done over a number of years. The articles compiled as part of the book were all published by academic specialists who are well versed about the topic on hand. Other than one piece done by a retired British diplomat which addresses the Massadik era that took place in Iran, all the other contributions are by academic experts. Each editor makes a contribution of one article; Rashid Khalidi also contributes a piece. This is totally based on his own personal endorsement of the entire collection is displayed at the back cover of the publication. These articles are thorough, well versed and extensive, with a seventeen page index towards the end of the volume. The fact that the availability of the book served to be of a general issue as it was available at the local shelves after quiet a while of its release. The scattershot technique which is adopted by its distribution tends to suggest that its objective is not simply to enlighten the general public that goes through the literature but to provide a base for well versed articles which are not published elsewhere. An area of concern which was noticeable is the difficulty it poses even as far as its academic use is concerned. The articles lack a date of compilation which makes it difficult to judge how recent the scholarship really is. In fact with the quick progress and developments in the regions it addresses up to date information is rather critical; so an academic analysis which is based on prior information and events would tend to have a limited relevance except to elucidate areas of confusion, which as far as the scope of U.S Middle East policy are concerned, are numerous. The major themes along which the compilations of articles in the publication focus on can be divided into two sections. The first of these focuses on addressing the Iraq War that took place in 2003; it aims to answer the critical question: What were the reasons behind the United States decision to invade Iraq? Following along the lines of this theme the main idea’s towards formulating an explanation by listing down reasons for this undertaking of the United States, more specifically George Bush, can be categorized into seven possible motives. The first of these motives is the allegation that Iraq has initiated a program well on its way to acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The time frame of when the Bush administration made the decision to invade Iraq is not mentioned specifically. Also the report by the Secretary of Treasury back then following Bush’s announced decision to make a move towards Iraq was not referred. Despite the fact that this announcement took place at Bush’s first cabinet meeting, eight months prior to the attacks of 9th November 2011. Yetiv, one of the authors of the compilation, a Professor of Political Science, refers to a report which goes to reflect the intentions of the administration switching to non-WMD justifications for the invasion. Even here no reference is made to the report of May 2003 published in Vanity Fair, which states the undisputed rationale mentioned by the Deputy Secretary of Defense – Weapons of Mass Destruction. The second point made to contribute to our understanding of the reasons behind the US invasion of Iraq was that of the country’s allege complicity in the 9/11 incident. Pointed out here is the early conclusion by the Bush administration and Wolfowitz, the Secretary of Defense, which Iraq had conspired with Al Qa’idah to bring out the American loss of lives that took place on 9/11; even though it is obvious from the contributions of the authors that there is a general agreement on this thesis not being very convincing. A key weakness noticeable in Yetiv’s argument is the fact that he cities the work of Mylroie, without equating the fact that the author is biased when it comes to her writings of Israel. Democratization of Iraq, a third contributing factor based on the administrations perspective that an early invasion of the country would facilitate its conversion from a dictatorship to that of a democracy. The naivety of the Bush administration is undeniable at this point as they evidently overlooked their lack of knowledge of Iraqi politics. The next factor is one which is popular and crossed the minds of many individuals who read about the US and Middle East politics – Oil. Authors, Yetiv being a key representative, dismiss the notion that a major motivation for the invasion was to monopolize Iraq’s oil sources. He instead explores the possibility that the invasion would give the administration a advantage as far as compromising Iraq’s status as a back up producer of oil was concerned, if ever there was a possibility that Saudi Arabia faced a collapse. There was also an educated guess made towards the possibility that by installing a government in Baghdad would make it simpler to exploit Iraq’s reserves efficiently and put the recurring claim in Kuwait. Another interesting line of argument touched upon was that of the speculation that Bush might have had tendencies to avenge the alleged attempt to assassinate his father, which took place in Kuwait. Or it might have been an extension towards the completion of the task in Iraq which Bush 41 had left incomplete. The military-industrial complexity equates into the issue a constituting push towards Washington’s decision to invade Iraq. The on going operations of the military and the industrial complex, which aim to conceal an organization which has the political influence to effect the decisions of numerous states. Without being specific there are hints which indicate that Washington’s decision was influenced by a organization with higher and widespread political influence – the Zionist lobby. Bush’s Evangelicalism is also a factor which has been highlighted. Bush’s image as a prominent believer of the notion of the resurgence of Israel as a key part of the Biblical prophecy might have had an effect on the impending decision to make a move towards Iraq. Some statements by Bush have been referenced which hint strongly towards his belief of a Judeo-Christian war opposing the “axis of evil”. Some author’s disagree on this notion which leads one to assume that their inclination towards accepting the influence of the Zionist pressure might have been a more prominent motive for the Bush administration. An overall analysis of the literature suggests the notion that the key motivation for Bush when he came into office was that of making a move towards Iraq. This was perceived to be on top of his priority list and his decision was aided by individuals which he closely associated with; Wolfowitz, Rumsfield and Feith who were of the same notions and aided his agenda. They made use of the 9/11 attacks to influence the intelligence, and used it as a bases for extracting a pro-invasion NIE from Tenet’s organization. Mentioned here more prominently is the interview of the NPR with Ron Susskind. A standing conclusion that one can derive from the topic at hand is to look at the evidence at hand; the two official commissions from 2004 and 2005 which find no traces of evidence of any kind of pressure, political or otherwise, applied which added to the failure of the NIE to be successful. That is, it didn’t show any evidence that Saddam had given up on the nuclear weapon program, but wanted Iran to have a misleading impression. This leaves the viewer to formulate his own opinion on the available information or to wait for more evidence which would lead to a more solid analysis of the situation. The second theme which this publication aims to address is that of the new policies of the United States as far as the New Middle East is concerned. This is primarily addressed towards the later half of the book. The crux of which is discussed by a Professor of Politics, William Quandt at Virginia University. His entry aims to give the fifth edition of this book credibility and authority. Quandt is popular for his thorough and central contribution to the Democratic administrations. These are mainly towards their aspects of policy making. Simply put, he defends standard policies which administrations of both parties have been long term followers. Going over the standard policy which has been mapped by Quandt, there are several points of differences which a reader after thorough analysis realizes. Quandt points out the basic flaws in the U.S Middle East policy: that of its support for repressive regimes, an inability to introduce a resolution for the Israeli-Palestine conflict and sanctions in opposition to Iraq. What Quandt fails to do is take his analysis to more complex parallels and point out the U.S’s practice of taking obvious sides in parochial conflicts. The side taken being primarily based on which party’s goals is more aligned to their own. A prominent example of this practice is that of the United States military support for Iraq in opposition to Iran. Quandt’s major criticism is based on the failure to appease Palestine skips over one key point. This point being the belief that the conflict cannot be resolved until Israel agrees to alter its basic laws and permits the country to integrate into an environment which is acceptable of non-Jews. Another barrier towards reaching a resolution is due to Washington being influenced and sticking to Israel due to its Zionist configuration. Another flaw which is difficult to ignore is the fact that he classifies Al Qaidah’s attacks as ineffective when it is obvious how the incidents orchestrated by them managed to trap Americans in two attritional wars. Quandt, from his article, accepts that Bush did not make up his mind to make a move against Iraq until 2002. His opinion primarily based on the obvious evidence; the incompetent and ineffective invasion planning. The basic fact that the invasion of Iraq carried out was poorly planned and can be considered as a shocking blunder made by America. There are several contradictions which can be seen in the numerous readings that view the disparity in the various lines of argument presented by the authors. These all seem to undeniably stem from the mismatched formulated definitions and perceptions of the American national interest. While one line of thought proposes that the Middle East should be denied hegemony to the Soviet Union. Based on this notion Washington aimed to use diplomatic and subversive measures in the region for the object of neutralizing the risk of a Soviet takeover – a threat, which in retrospect never was. The second line of thought endorses such actions due to access to oil. A quest for America is investing trillions on military efforts of the region. During this time China is taking advantage of the U.S’s distracted efforts and beating them by becoming a leader of consumption of Middle East petroleum. This they are able to do without any use of military force or use of a fleet. The third definition formulated as per America’s national interest is based on its relationship with Israel. It should be pointed out that this is not a national interest. It is a political affiliation which effectively clashes with the U.S’s national interest. These aspects are critical to highlighting the elements mentioned in the publication by the authors. It indicates how the United States did a fairly good job of safeguarding its main interests as far as the Middle East was concerned up to the year 2000. The shift in the numerous disparities and the confusion created can be seen to initiate as a result of the 9/11. This was when it all changed. The only noticeable America interest that Washington has been able to serve till date is its domestic political agenda as far as the survival of Israel is concerned. References Lesch, David. & Haas, Mark. “The Middle East and the United states history, politics, and ideologies.” Fifth addition. (2012). Read More