Modern Political Theory - Essay Example

Modern Political Theory 1. While John Locke’s political philosophy spans a wide range of insights and perspectives, perhaps the most central notion is his concept of natural law. Locke’s notion of natural law involves a complex number of elements. While Locke formulated the concept of natural law within a newly imagined perspective, the concept itself has a long historical precedent in philosophy (Dunn). The historic notion of natural law contended that there were specific moral elements that were universal to all members of the human race. The understanding is that these moral elements existed despite extraneous arrangements the individual had made, including social, legal, or governmental affiliations. Indeed, the understanding of natural law is that it necessarily distinguishes between laws of nature and those that have been artificially created by society, with the later referring to positive law. Locke understood that one of the main differentiating features between these is that natural law exists throughout all cultures, while positive law is experienced only through specific social or governmental designations (Dunn). Another prominent consideration Locke made in regards to natural law was in relation to theological elements. Locke distinguished between religious law and natural law, as natural law is law that emerges solely through the process of human reason and rationality. One recognizes that whereas natural law reveals itself to the individual through rationality, religious law implies a divine revelation as the primary substantiation. For instance, while there is elements of the Ten Commandments that are recognized elements of natural law, there are also elements that are not applicable to all humanity. In these regards, Locke’s understanding of natural law in relation to theology was the recognition that while there may be a divine entity that establishes laws that overlap with natural law, they are only considered natural law if they can be determined through human reason (Forde). Notably, Locke believed that when the Bible or religious principles went beyond or conflicted with natural law they were improperly formulated; as such, Locke chose to interpret the Bible in accord with natural law. To a large extent, Locke’s perspective on natural law in relation to religious law is formulated within the voluntarism and intellectualism debate. While Locke highly emphasizes the importance of rational understanding to the establishment of natural law, he also makes a number of prominent statements that seemingly supports theological perspectives on social obligations. For instance, in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding Locke argues that laws need have an individual lawgiver. In the Essays on the Law of Nature, Locke argues that individuals have an obligation to abide by their creator (Forde). It seems that for Locke the question of natural law then becomes a voluntarist in regards to the reasons humans should follow natural law, but remains highly rationalistic in the means by which a perspective establishes what constitute natural law. One must also consider Locke’s understanding of natural law as to whether he believed the predominant elements were rights or duties the individual must follow. It seems to a great degree most theorists believe that Locke’s notion of natural law is that it generally refers to aspects of human rights. In these regards, Locke is believed to have adopted a view of human nature that as motivated by hedonistic impulses. As humans are predominantly motivated by such self-interest the natural need for human self-preservation supersedes any types of duties by which humans might be restricted. Still, other theorists believe that Locke was also concerned with natural law as proscribing moral duties to humanity. To a degree such a different appears semantic. Consider that argued that some of the core elements of natural law were life, liberty, and property. While from one perspective one could contend that such principles were indicative of a rights based system – the right to liberty and property; however from another perspective they necessitate duties, as one has the duty to not steal from another, as well as the duty not to murder (Dunn). Notably, perhaps the most seminal implementation of Locke’s perspective on natural law occurs in the United States Declaration of Independence where it explicitly states, “The right to life, liberty…” Still, it’s possible that Jefferson merely use this as a rhetorical device for its active linguistic function. One of the more controversial aspects of natural law is the extent that individuals believe Locke intended humans have a duty to ensure that all members of society are taken care of. To a great degree one witnesses this continued debate playing out in notions of conservative against liberal conceptions of social organization. Examining Locke’s understanding of natural law requires that one consider it in relation to his notion of the state. In terms of the state Locke argues that consensus should play a central role in establishing basic tenants. Locke begins with considering a hypothetical situation where individuals exist prior to governmental authority of any kind. He then extends these considerations to foundational elements of the state as established through natural elements. In these regards, the individuals in this society must enter into a consensus agreement as a means of naturally establishing laws and regulations. While in modern societies individuals don’t outwardly ‘consent’ to government, they nonetheless tacitly consent to government regulation and law through engaging in elements of infrastructure and social organization. Locke believed then that it’s necessary for individuals to follow the laws of the government only when they are living within its jurisdictions. His notion of the state is further established through the acquisition of property wherein the individual has gone to a much greater extent of involvement in the government establishment of law and structure. There are a number of further elements related to Locke’s notion of natural law as related to the state, perhaps most prominently in terms of constitutionalism vs. the power of majorities. In these regards, the main distinguishing elements consider the nature of constitutions as being a form of mediated consent, wherein the consent is centered in the document of legislation (Ashcraft). This is opposed to a more natural vision of the state as directly supported through majority opinion. 2. John Locke establishes a number of perspectives on the government as a trust. In considering Locke’s perspective on the government as a trust one must recognize the variety of these insights. In understanding Locke’s perspective on government as trust one must first consider the foundational understanding of Locke’s vision of the very notion of trust. There are three main notions to consider in understanding Locke’s notion of government as trust: commencement, the maintenance, and the dissolution. For Locke, as established earlier, human society is envisioned as free and individualistic until it enters into a tacit acceptance of governmental rules and regulations; it is in this tacit acceptance of government wherein the individual enters a ‘trust’ relationship. As the individual enters into this trust relationship they have the furthered responsibility of seeking self-preservation as long as it doesn’t interfere with the natural rights of other citizens. The notion of government as trust takes most prominence when individuals recognize that while they have entered into a tacit consensus acceptance of government wherein they must follow natural law, an amount of citizens may choose to disregard such natural law. The nature of government is contingent upon citizens possessing a degree of trust in the government as being able to preserve this natural law. For instance, one of Locke’s cornerstone elements of social organization is private property. As a means of self-preservation humans purchase property with the trust that the government will be able to preserve their claims to this land well into the future (Dunn). If the individual is unable to have this trust than they risk the propensity of other individuals to overreach in their own self-preservation measures. Ultimately, such considerations alter or defer the individual’s natural rights. One considers that to a degree Locke’s notion of government as trust complicates the notion of natural rights. As has been well established, Locke’s articulations of natural rights are those rights that can be established through rationality and reason. While one considers such notions of reason and rationality as guaranteeing rights that are universal among all world regions, this becomes complicated, as individuals must enter into a tacit acceptance of government. In these regards, natural rights alter, as they must be rationalized in relation to the governmental structure. As such, individuals may have at one instance natural claims towards individuality and power, yet as they enter into this tacit acceptance of governance they trust these natural claims to the governmental structure. The extent that such a tacit acceptance of government is a continuation of natural law is largely contingent on the government structure; as such the nature of accepting government regulation involves a degree of trust that the government will abide by natural principles and ensure an ordered and equitable social structure (Dunn). Researchers link this trust notion of government as trust to Locke’s position as the ‘father of modern liberalism’ as it becomes the government’s responsibility to ensure that citizens receive their natural rights in a society that is composed of rampant pursuit of self-preservation. Another prominent consideration is Locke’s perspective on the connection between government and society. One of the pervasive notions in this mode of investigation is the extent that individuals in society should adhere to governmental regulations even in times when such regulations conflict with natural laws. In this context of understanding one of the prominent aspects where society and government become in conflict is in situations where the individual’s self-preservation becomes threatened. For instance, upon entering a trust relationship with the government individuals under the auspices of this government structure may find themselves required to go to war and risk their life to preserve this government structure. The natural rights of society contain the necessity of self-preservation, which can be threatened if one is required to die for their country. In these situations, Locke believes that individuals consenting to advanced forms of government and social organization to an extent forego a degree of their natural rights. It follows that individuals who consent to this governmental organization who later go on to desert their duty to fight in war deserve to die. This notion regarding the interaction of government and society places considerable vested power in the government as responsibly limiting citizens’ natural rights as a means of achieving a great social good. Society and government are also interrelated in terms of punishment mechanisms that are implemented as a means of regulation. In these situations, as individuals are promised their own self-preservation, it’s recognized some members of society will involve themselves in actions that infringe on the rights of others; in these situations, it’s necessary for the government to enact power through punishment as a means of retaining social organization. Still, Locke contends that punishment also exists prior to government organization as without a form of punishment the natural law of self-preservation would be made impossible (Locke). One of the problems of punishment is that such judicial processes must necessitate that in some situations individuals in society without governmental organization will necessarily oversee their own cases. For Locke then the establishment of an equitable structure of punishment becomes one of the foundational elements between mere society and society mediated by social organization. One of the major challenges of governmental organization in relation to society is the extent that the government should function to maintain the common good in the present, or also function to enact elements that will curb criminal actions in future contexts. In the Two Treatises on Government Locke notes, “one Man comes by a Power over another…to use a Criminal when he has got him in his hands… to retribute to him, so far as calm reason and conscience dictates, what is proportionate to his Transgression, which is so much as may serve for Reparation and Restraint” (Locke, p. 43). In this context of understanding Locke is indicating that the government functions to both punish the individual – ‘reparation’ – for past actions wherein they threatened the rights of other individuals, as well as to engage in actions that will ensure that such actions will not occur in future contexts – ‘restraint’. Ultimately, the nature of society and government is such that social organization necessitates a limiting of natural rights for the common good. 3. Alexander Hamilton was one of the most prominent thinkers in the newly formed American republic. His federalist views on the nature of constitution and judicial system would come to form a significant influence on foundational elements of the United States government. One of Hamilton’s notable perspectives considered is on the judicial system, as he indicated that the courts have no power to act--that they have neither force nor will--and that they can only say what the law is (Wright). There are a variety of complex elements that must be considered when examining Hamilton’s perspective on this issue. Perhaps the most comprehensive articulation of Hamilton’s perspective on this issue emerged in his writings throughout the Federalist Papers. In these papers Hamilton argued that the Constitution represents the supreme element of law to which the judicial system and judges only function to articulate the Constitution’s perspective on law. In the Federalist No. 78 Hamilton argues, No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid. To deny this, would be to affirm, that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers, may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid. ... To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them (Hamilton). This is a next to comprehensive articulation of the perspective on the relation between the American judicial system and the Constitution. Here Hamilton is indicating that the Constitution has been formed through the democratic consensus of the people of the United States. Emanating from the Constitution is the judicial body of the government, with the judges being the representatives of this body of government. For Hamilton it follows that if the judges were to develop or establish their own law then they would be going against one of the very foundational elements of the United States government (Sharp). As such, it becomes not only desirable, but essential that judges do not establish their own laws, as they are not directly elected and in so doing would be challenging the very nature of the United States democratic process. Hamilton recognizes that the Constitution makes no measures for guarding against the capricious nature of certain judges (Sharp). Still, he believes that such a process is not necessarily a negative element, but instead is essential to the very fabric of a functional society. In these regards, Hamilton believes that it’s possible oppressive or overbearing tendencies overtake a nation for a period. In these situations, the judicial system can function as a means of resisting these tendencies that have been passed; as such the judicial system, to a degree, can also function as a check and balance on the legislature. Another prominent consideration is Hamilton’s contention that the courts have the power to declare laws contrary to the constitution null and void. To a large degree Hamilton’s perspective on this element of judicial responsibility is founded on his perspective that the judicial body functions not as a means of establishing laws, but instead maintaining the legitimacy of the Constitution (Wright). As recognized earlier, Hamilton understands that the judicial body is given considerable interpretive power in maintaining laws. In large part this interpretive function, while a shortcoming of the nature of establishing laws, is beneficial as a system of checks and balances. To one extent the judicial body represents a challenge to capricious laws passed by the legislature. In addition to this function, the judicial branch of the United States government is actively engaged in rejecting laws passed by the legislature that contradict the Constitution. Hamilton states, “It is not otherwise to be supposed, that the Constitution could intend to enable the representatives of the people to substitute their will to that of their constituents. It is far more rational to suppose, that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature… to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority” (Hamilton). In these regards, the judicial branch is not only entrusted with interpretive the legislature’s passage of laws, but is also engaged in interpreting the Constitution to ensure that the laws passed by their legislature are in line with its tenants. Not only does Hamilton believe that it is the judicial system’s responsibility to interpret the Constitutionality of the laws passed by the legislature, but he also argues that the Federal Court system bears the responsibility of declaring a law null and void if it is deemed to be in conflict with the Constitution. Hamilton states, “Where the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former. They ought to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws, rather than by those which are not fundamental” (Hamilton). Here Hamilton has indicated the important notion of the primacy of the Constitution to the legislature. While both the Constitution and the legislature are subject to democratic processes, Hamilton indicates that the Constitution is the supreme referent. In these regards, it appears that an understanding that the legislature is mediated through elected representatives who are themselves subject to personal bias and caprice influences Hamilton’s primacy of the Constitution. Conversely, the Constitution represents a document that was established through democratic representation that is meant to stand outside the transitory nature of social trends, or the necessarily flawed nature of legislative or judicial biases. Ultimately, it is through reference to the Constitution that he believes all further laws should be established and maintained. 4. The foundation of the American governmental system is democracy through elected representatives. While this is the overarching process, there are a diverse variety of perspectives on representation. In these regards, the two primary theories of representation are the trustee and delegate theories. A number of theorists have supported the delegate theory of representation. Perhaps the most prominent among these individuals was James Madison who argued that representatives should function as a means of expressing the direct preferences of their constituents (Madison). This is contrasted with trustee theories of representation that argue representatives need not express the direct preferences of their constituency, but instead act in the best interest of these individuals. One of the most prominent thinkers in these regards was Edmund Burke. Thinking in terms of the European parliamentary representational structure Burke stated, Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which interest each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates; but Parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole… You choose a member, indeed; but when you have chosen him he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a member of Parliament (Burke, pg. 115). In this context of understanding Burke is arguing that the nature of democratic society is structured as such not so that representatives act with the self-interests of segments of their constituency, but rather function as a whole. In these regards, Burke is arguing that it’s necessary that representatives function as trustees because they must think in terms of the entirety of the country. This is contrasted with notions of delegate forms of representation wherein a more divided vision of legislation is envisioned wherein competing regional interests compete for representation and reform. The challenge then becomes evident as delegate and trustee forms of representation are in a necessarily paradoxical relationship, as delegate forms of representation seek to advance regional interests, whereas trustee forms seek a more comprehensive perspective on the issue. Still, a number of theorists have argued that this paradoxical relationship is not necessarily a negative aspect of the legislative process (Pitkin). This perspective contends that the process of representation is highly complex and necessarily involves a complex array of representational forms. For instance, it’s oftentimes necessary for broad ranging national interests to be implemented as a means of benefiting the regional majority (Pitkin). From this perspective, representation cannot simply be limited to delegate or trustee forms, but occurs in a dynamic and fluid structure. Consider that oftentimes legislative measures function on international or national grounds. Furthermore, arguments can be made that regional constituencies at times may not understand the subtle intricacies of the legislative process so it’s necessary for the representative to at times vote in counter-intuitive ways. In these situations, theorists have argued that representatives and constituencies must function in a dynamic process of checks and balances where the representative does not simply assume delegate or trustee form, but is considered in terms of the fluid contextual elements of macro and micro-legislative concerns. To a great extent the theories of the delegate and trustee forms of representation reflect and express the nature and form of the United States Congress. As established above the central paradox of representation is the conflict between regional and national interests, with the delegate and trustee forms of representation reflecting these respectively. To an extent the structure of the United States Congress understands that there are conflicting representational interests and modes of operation. In these regards, the division between the House of Representatives and the Senate speak to these theories of representation. One considers that the House of Representatives is divided among regions largely on a population basis, wherein states contain inequitable amount of representation proportional to the population size. To an extent this form of representation is akin to the delegate mode of representation. There are a variety of reasons for linking the delegate mode of representation to the United States House of Representatives. Perhaps the most pervasive such understanding is that the House of Representatives in being more greatly linked to regions and population figures engenders a process more closely linked to delegate forms of representation. This notion is further heightened by the nature of these delegates as being elected for a relatively short time frame – two years. This process is such that the elected representatives must function closely linked to constituency interests or face not being reelected. In addition, they lack the ability to institute long-term initiatives that could potentially go against the short-term region wishes to achieve long-term gains. While the House of Representatives is greatly linked to the delegate theory of representation, the Senate functions more in terms of the trustee form. There are a number of elements that link the Senate to the trustee form of representation. One of the most prominent is that Senators are limited to two representatives per state. This has a variety of implications, including the notion that these individuals constitute to a greater degree the interests of the country as a whole as they must considered an extensive array of issues for a much divided populace. The limited amount of Senators relative to Congressman also demonstrates a greater degree of public trust in these delegates, placing in them furthered amounts of representational power and autonomy. While members of the House of Representatives are elected every two years, Senators are given six-year terms. This extended term period places them in a position wherein they are able to implement measures that may upset members of their constituency without immediate threat of not receiving reelection. The interaction between the American delegate and trustee forms of representation finds a sound articulation in the government structure of the House of Representatives and Senate. While it’s clear that there is a paradoxical interaction between varied elements of representation, the American governmental structure is such that it places checks and balances on these forms of legislature. References Ashcraft, Richard. Revolutionary Politics & Locke's Two Treatises of Government. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1986 Burke, Edmund. Reflections on the Revolution in France, London: Penguin Books. 1968 Dunn, John, The Political Thought of John Locke, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1969 Forde, Steven, “Natural Law, Theology, and Morality in Locke”, American Journal of Political Science, 45: 396–409, 2001. Hamilton, Alexander. Federalist 78. http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa78.htm 2011 Locke, John. 1689, Two Treatises of Government, P. Laslett (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Madison, James, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, 1787–8. The Federalist Papers, Isaac Kramnick (ed.), Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1987. Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. The Concept of Representation, Berkeley: University of California. 1967. Sharp, James. American Politics in the Early Republic: The New Nation in Crisis. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1995. Wright, Robert E. Hamilton Unbound: Finance and the Creation of the American Republic. Westport: Greenwood Press. 2002. Read More