Bioterrorism Programs: Networks of Laboratory and Public Health Infrastructures - Research Paper Example

Affective bioterrorism response requires a rapid distribution of pharmaceutical and medical treatment and supplies to infected individuals, necessitating a complex supply chain that must remain effective even when bioterrorist threats are infrequent.  Medical and pharmaceutical supplies must be stockpiled in local areas in sufficient quantities to treat large populations, running the risk of huge amounts of waste.  These supplies, however, often have only a limited shelf life (Zaric et al., 2008).  They also are prone to contamination and loss of potency based on environmental factors, of necessitating expensive temperature and humidity controlled environments.

  Maintaining such a complex logistics network for every possible bioterrorism agent is near impossible, making it likely that bioterrorists will choose obscure agents, rendering the supplies on hand useless. Instead, central community response and supplies networks have been put in place, often functioning on a state-wide basis (Zaric et al., 2008).  In the case of bioterrorist attack, however, not only those infected will response and seek treatment.  A public response may include large numbers of uninfected individuals seeking treatment, drastically increasing the drain on supplies and manpower needed (Zaric et al., 2008).  Because of this, the ability to stockpile medicines is much less important than the ability to quickly diagnose the infective agent, identify the correct treatment option, and differentiate between infected and non-infected patients.