The Buncefield Oil Storage Depot Incident - Coursework Example

The Buncefield Oil Storage Depot Incident Report 1. Introduction On 11 December 2005, several explosions occurred at the Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal, better known as the Buncefield Oil Depot. The explosions were of enormous proportion and fire engulfed a high proportion of the site. The fire burned for a number of days, damaging most of the site and releasing large clouds of smoke into the environment. Altogether, forty three people were hurt but there were no fatalities. Considerable damage occurred to both commercial and residential properties in the area and a large region around the site was evacuated on emergency service instruction. The purpose of this report is to describe the accident and analyzed the causes and circumstance leading up to the incident. It includes reference to some relevant legislation and a summary of findings and recommendation of the Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board regarding the responsibility and liability of operators and other agencies for the incident. 2. The Buncefield Oil Storage Depot Incident The tranquillity of that early winter’s morning of December 11, 2005 was shattered by an initial gigantic explosion closely followed by smaller but still large explosions at the Buncefield Oil Storage Depot in Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire (Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service 2006, p.3). A fire broke out, which spread to more than 20 large fuel storage tanks. Forty-three people suffered minor injuries but luckily, nobody died. The was an evacuation that include over 2000 people present in the surrounding area. The fire burned for a number of days and destroyed large part of the plant emitting huge, black clouds of smoke. The massive quantities of water and foam used for fire fighting polluted the surface and ground waters. The fire destroyed the commercial units of 20 companies, with 500 employees, and another 60 buildings of companies, employing 3,500 people were damaged. The accident also cause considerable damage to building nearby, at least 300 houses also had minor damage. The fuel supply for London and the south of England, particularly for Heathrow airport, was interrupted due to the fire (Postol 2008, p.92). Since 1968, mineral oils were stored at Buncefield. Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal Limited or HOSL, the fifth biggest complex of mineral oil storage tanks in the United Kingdom has a capacity of 273 million litres of fuel and process about 2.37 million tons of fuel annually before the incident. Four hundred tanker trucks delivered the fuels stored in Buncefield daily. The largest proportion of the aviation fuel was delivered to the London airports, Heathrow and Gatwick, via two 6” pipelines run by BPA or British Pipeline Agency (Postol 2008, p.92). 3. Investigation of the Incident 3.1 The Causes of Explosion The Health and Safety Executive or HSE in collaboration with the Environment Agency investigated the incident under section 14(2) (a) of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. In a report by the Major Incident Investigation Board headed by Lord Newton, a delivery of unleaded petrol from the T/K pipeline started to arrive at Tank 912 in bund A at about 05:30 on December 11. The safety systems used to prevent overfilling the tank failed to operate. In bund A, petrol flowed down the side of the tank creating a vapour cloud consist of a mixture of petrol and air. Ten percent of estimated three hundred tonnes of petrol escaped turned to vapour and mixed with the cold air concentrated enough to support combustion. At 6:00 a.m., the first of a series of explosions occur. The main explosion was huge and caused a huge fire, which engulfed over twenty large storage tanks. It burned for five days emitting a plume of black smoke from the burning fuel that can be seen from many miles away (BMIIB 2008a, p.7). 3.2 Explosion Mechanism Normally, when a gas cloud is ignited within a confined volume such as a building, an explosion may occur. However, the type of explosion in Buncefield was different, as the clouds were not confined. Although there are some doubts, the Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board’s report suggests that the emergency generator cabin and emergency pump contained potential ignition sources. Furthermore, these buildings show some indication of internal confined explosion. The Board considered that there was evidence, In view of forensic evidence and belief that the emergency pump house was located within a fuel-rich part of the vapour cloud, the Board suggest that the first ignition took place at a source in the emergency generator cabin, after an adequately combustible mixture had accumulated there (BMIIB 2007, p.12). 3.3 Effects of the Explosion and Fire No one was killed in the incident, although 43 people suffered minor injuries. Aside from wiping out majority of the depot, there was extensive damage to nearby property and disorder to local communities. Some houses near the depot were destroyed and others experienced severe structural damage. Some people were also affected by shock and require psychological assistance. However, no severe health effects were reported from exposure to the plume of smoke. Escaped fuel and fire fighting foam and water polluted the nearby soil and water. However, although there were threats of escaped fuel and foam contamination of ground water, there were no contaminants found in the drinking water supply. The incident did little damage to soil and plants and did not affect the air quality in the area (BMIIB 2008a, p.11). 3.4 The Response The scale of the emergency response matched the exceptional scale of the incident. The full operation involved 1000 personnel and those who were at the scene were Hertfordshire Police and Fire and Rescue Service, Hertfordshire Country Council, Dacorum Borough Council, the EA and HPA, volunteer organizations. At the height of the fire, Hertfordshire used twenty-five pumps, twenty support vehicles and one hundred eighty fire fighters. It took thirty-two hours to put out the main blaze and there were still burning tanks four days later. The fire service let the other tanks burn out safely. Overall, seven hundred fifty thousand litres of foam concentrate and fifty five million litres of water were applied during the fire fighting operations (BMIIB 2008a, p.9). 4. Relevant Legislations glitch In this kind of incident, the COMAH Regulations apply. Operators in the process industries are responsible to the requirements of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 and the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999, which require, in that order, safety policies, health, and safety risk assessments. COMAH or the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 chief objective is to avert and lessen the effects of major accidents involving hazardous substances. A joint Competent Authority or CA comprising HSE and EA in England and Wales, and HSE and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency or SEPA in Scotland enforces the COMAH Regulations. EA and SEPA working under the Pollution Prevention and Control Act of 1999 or PPC also regulate these establishments. In 2007, PPC replaced regimes under EPA 90. Although there is some dissimilarity with COMAH and IPC/PPC or LAPC, the methods employed to comply is almost the same. Generally, these agencies require the industry to have a good management system to control risk. For instance, PPC includes a specific duty to prevent and mitigate accidents to the environment that is relevant to major COMAH duties. In UK, the Planning (Hazardous Substance) Regulations 1992 direct the Seveso II Directive. The Hazardous Substances Authority or HAS under these regulations, is the authority to regulate the presence of hazardous chemicals above a particular limit while the HSE server as a statutory consulted. The function of HSE is to care about the hazards and risks which hazardous substances would be bring to the community around the site and based on this recommend whether or not the establishment should be permitted to operate by the HSA (BMIIB 2008b, p.164). 5. Responsibility and Liability of Operators The aspiration of health and safety guidance relating to land use planning is to lessen the impact of a major catastrophe on people living near hazardous installations. This is done by following a constant and methodical approach to verify information on applications for planning permission around such installations. There is an agreement that the means to effectual major hazard management and efficient disaster arrangements is the sufficiency of the operator’s evaluation of the primary hazard potential of a site. Operators were therefore asked to re-examine their emergency action plan to make certain that it can provide for every realistically predictable emergency scenarios arising out of credible major hazard incidents that includes vapour cloud detonation and dangerous multi-tank fires that before Buncefield incident were not regarded as rationally believable. Operators must guarantee that they employ highly experienced personnel available 24 hours a day to carry out the requirements of the on-site arrangement. Operators should consider the placement of appropriate protection of emergency response facilities such as fire fighting pumps, manual switches, emergency control centre, safety report updates as appropriate, and taking the needed corrective actions. Moreover, they should determine vulnerable critical emergency response resources, introduce emergency arrangements in and around the site in case of failure at any time of the year, and put together accepted amendments to the on-site emergency plan. This should incorporate identification and establishment of a substitute emergency control centre with a duplicate set of plans and technical information (BMIIB 2008b, p.78). 6. Proposed changes in Design, Construction, Operating Procedures, and Safety Measures The incidence of a gigantic fuel vapour explosion corroborates the dominant need to guarantee the integrity of the primary means of containment. This is to ensure that liquid does not leak from the container where it is supposedly confined. Operators of Buncefield-type sites should protect against loss of containment of petrol and other highly flammable liquids by fitting a high integrity, automatic operating overfill prevention system that is physically and electrically separate and independent from the gauging system. Such systems should meet the requirement so of Part 1 of BS EN 61511 for the required safety integrity level. Upon installation, the systems efficiency and dependability should be reappraised aligned with the principles of Part BS EN 61511 for the required safety integrity level (BMIIB 2008b, p.137). 7. Conclusion The investigation conducted found that the massive explosion and fire incident that occur at the Buncefield Oil Storage Terminal on December 11, 2005 is due to malfunction of a shut-off system used to prevent overfilling. Petrol cascaded down the side of tank 912 in bund A. Consequently, the mixture of petrol and air formed a hazardous and flammable vapour cloud. The report of BMIIB suggests that the source of ignition is generator cabin on the south side the Buncefield Northgate building. Although 43 people suffered minor injuries, the incident did not kill anyone. Houses were destroyed and some were seriously damaged. There were no serious health affects from exposure to the plume of smoke. However, nearby soil and water was contaminated by fuel, foam, and water. However, it did not affect potable water supplies and air quality at ground level. The emergency response was well coordinated with over 1000 fire fighters and police forces conducted full operation. Operators of Buncefield are subject to the requirement of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 and regulated by the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations of 1999. Some of the establishments regulated by COMAH are also regulated by EA and SEPA under the Pollution Prevention and Control Act of 1999. The UK’s Planning Regulations 1992 for Hazardous Substances is responsible for land use planning. The operator’s of such establishment is expected to assess adequately the major hazard potential of their site. There were asked to review their emergency arrangements and ensure the availability of full competent staff. The incident confirms the prevailing need to ensure integrity of the primary means of containment thus the BMIIB recommended the use of a separate high integrity, automatic operating overfill prevention system. In general, the Buncefield Oil Storage Depot incident is the result of poor management, ineffective implementation of rules and regulations, and faulty design. 8. Bibliography BMIIB. 2008a. The Buncefield Incident 11 December 2005: The Final Report of the Major Incident Investigation Board Volume 1. Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board. The Office of the Public Sector Information, U.K. BMIIB. 2008b. The Buncefield Incident 11 December 2005: The Final Report of the Major Incident Investigation Board Volume 2. Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board. The Office of the Public Sector Information, U.K. BMIIB 2007, Explosion Mechanism: The Advisory Group Report. Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board. The Office of the Public Sector Information, U.K. Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service. 2006. Buncefield: Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service's Review of the Fire Response. The Stationery Office, U.K. Postol Ion. 2008. Risk Assessment as a Basis for the Forecast and Prevention of Catastrophies. IOS Press, Netherlands Read More