Facts About Alaska and the North - Research Paper Example

? Alaska Purchase In the mid-1600’s, about the time that the British were colonizing the Atlantic coastregion of North America, Russia occupied and had claimed the Northern Pacific region of the America’s now known as Alaska. Despite objections by many in both Russia and America, this vast territory, more than half a million square miles, was sold to the U.S. in 1867 by means of the Treaty of Cession. The majority on both sides of the pacific, however, believed their country profited from the transaction. The sales price was $7.2 million or approximately two cents per acre, a small sum even by 1867 standards. Alaska was the last major land-holdings of any non-American nation in the Western Hemisphere. U.S. Secretary of State William H. Seward initiated, promoted and brokered the deal. Opponents in the U.S. referred to the sale as ‘Seward’s Folly’ unaware of the riches contained in this massive region. Much of the public thought this region to be nothing but a frozen wasteland and a waste of money that could be used to reconstruct the South following the Civil War. Under Russian control, Alaska reflected the pioneer, adventurous spirit commonly characterized and romanticized in stories of the American West. Russian-American, as it was called, attracted explorers, merchants, adventurers, sinners and saints of all descriptions, most of which was attracted to the region by the lucrative fur trade. Few remnants of Russian control exist today outside of the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church which to this day has a strong tradition in Alaskan society (“Russian Colonization” 2005). In short, Russia sold Alaska for two reasons, the Russian American Company was no longer profiting in the fur trade as it had for over a century and the region was too far away to be adequately defended. Russia believed that eventually, either the U.S. or Britain would forcedly take its Eastern-most colony with relative ease. Continuing to hold Alaska had become less and less important to the Russians because of other, more pressing, geopolitical and economic concerns and by 1850 interest was all but non-existent. The sea otter fur market was in decline for various reasons therefore decreasing the value to Russian commercial interests and the government was busy acquiring other, more lucrative and useful lands at that time. Britain was a new enemy. It had allied with France and the Ottoman Empire during the Crimean War (1853-56) against Russia which lost great amounts of territory in the region north of Turkey. During the war, Britain had also attacked Russia in Eastern Siberia. Though Britain would have been more than interested in purchasing Alaska, the Russians were not going to sell it to an enemy. They reasoned that if the U.S. owned it, this would provide a degree of protection for Russia from Canada, much of it a under the control of Britain at that time. “Russia determined to seek a friendly Western power as purchaser of the Russian holdings in America; and yet, anxious to create a buffer zone between British North America and Siberia” (Rasche). The Hudson Bay Company, of British origin, had made it no secret it desired more access to Alaska so as to harvest its riches. Immediately following the sale of Alaska to the U.S., Britain formerly colonized all of western Canada to the Alaskan border. Russia had sold Alaska just in time. It prevented another certain defeat against Britain resulting in further loss of territory and resources. More importantly, the already low level of public confidence in the Russian government following the fresh defeat in the Crimean War would have been further diminished thus enhancing the possibility of rebellion (Tompkins, 1945). Russia had little choice but to sell Alaska to the U.S. The selling price of two cents per acre is ample evidence that the U.S. was well aware of Russia’s poor negotiating position. The two countries were on friendly terms and shared a common disdain of Britain. Just 50 years earlier, British troops invaded and burned the White House not to mention that Independence skirmish before that. Russia and the U.S. were not officially allies but shared a common enemy which by some interpretations constitutes an alliance. Russia had supported the Union during the Civil War, the only European nation to do so, a move that won it influence at a critical time. Betting on the North paid off for Russia with dividends coming very quickly, just two years after the war ended. Russia and the U.S. also generally agreed on foreign affairs issues and maintained high-level diplomatic communications (“Alaska Purchase” 2005). The interest to both sell and buy Alaska began in earnest during the mid-1850’s, during the Franklin Pierce administration. The growing tensions between the North and South then the ultimate war that ensued became the obvious priority for the U.S. government. All other issues were put on the ‘back-burner.’ Buying an obscure, mostly uninhabited region of ice far beyond the current or foreseeable border was hardly on anyone’s ‘to’ do’ list when the country was torn apart. Secretary of State Seward and other like-minded expansionists who believed the U.S. should push its borders as far as it could while the land was simply there for the taking quickly revived the idea of buying Alaska following the Civil War. At this same time in St. Petersburg, Russia, government officials were becoming increasingly concerned wondering how much longer they could hold on to Alaska without giving up to their enemy the British and for no compensation. In addition, Russia had more pressing security and economic concerns in areas closer to its borders. By 1865, Russia had long decided to concentrate and develop its strengths solely within its holdings in Europe and Asia. Russia was becoming increasingly desperate to unload Alaska. Unlike Russia, the U.S. did not have much concern with Britain buying much as it did not consider the colonization of Canada by Britain much of a security threat. U.S. interest in Alaska for some lied predominantly in the concept of manifest destiny, a desire to push its borders as far as possible, and an imperialistic ideology evidently well-learned from its British forefathers. “American interest in the Pacific had grown steadily during the early nineteenth century and many Americans considered it the manifest destiny of the United States to become a great power in the Pacific” (Rasche). Likely few Americans believe more in the manifest destiny of the U.S. than did Secretary Seward. As senator then later in his position of Secretary of State under both Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Jackson, he supported and promoted a defined plan for the Pacific regions of North America. His strategy called for building strong diplomatic ties with Russia and China. He recommended annexing the Hawaiian Islands as well as other Pacific islands, control Alaska for economic, security and strategic purposes, dig a canal in Central America, buy the Virgin Islands, Cuba, Iceland and Greenland as an Atlantic defensive strategy. None of these goals were accomplished during Seward’s years in Washington D.C. however except for the acquisition of the Midway Islands and, of course, Alaska which was not easily accomplished. “Winning Congressional approval for the purchase of Alaska was touch-and-go, and the wisdom of acquiring it was widely questioned at the time” (Rasche). The opinion of some Congressmen simply reflected public sentiment regarding the purchase of Alaska. “Most Americans thought Alaska had little value and that the purchase was a waste of money” (Trover, 1972 pp. 7-9). After but briefly examining the benefit of 150 years hindsight, the Alaskan Purchase was undeniably a tremendous bargain. However, at that time a faction of politicians in Washington did not think it to be a good deal at all. Some did not deem it a prudent expenditure when the South lay in ruins. Others opposed expansionism for two reasons, one, the perception of the U.S. being overtly imperialistic, much as their enemy Britain and two, the expense involved in retaining and maintaining a remote area twice the size of Texas. “There were those opposed to the purchase just as earlier some had objected to every other substantial addition to the national territory” (Gordon, 2007). Still others thought it ridiculous to pay millions of dollars for a big chunk of Arctic ice that contained little value outside of a seal population that had been greatly diminished due to a century of over-hunting. Congress considered millions of dollars to be a substantial amount of money 150 years ago and about half its members did not want to waste seven million on what was dubbed ‘Johnson’s Polar Bear Garden,’ ‘Seward’s Icebox’ and most famously, ‘Seward’s Folly.’ New York Tribune Editor Horace Greeley, who was made famous by his vocal anti-slavery stance during the Civil War, characterized Alaska as “nothing more than a frozen wilderness” (Gordon, 2007). A slight majority of Congress approved of acquiring Alaska from Russia, among those the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner. This was to the obvious advantage of Seward and those who backed the purchase. The Treaty of Cession had to first win approval by Sumner’s Committee before being sent to the Senate floor for a vote. Had the Foreign Relations Chairman been against the Treaty, Alaskan’s might today fly the Union Jack instead of the Stars and Stripes over its government buildings. Sumner was an influential Senator who argued that, among other reasons, the U.S. should help Russia because of its support during the Civil War and also so as to not allow the British to gain control. Anti-British sentiment was high at that time. The two nations were not presently at war but had been in the recent past and hardly considered the other as allies or were even on friendly diplomatic terms. It was a chance to reward the Russians and take away something the British prized. (Gordon, 2007) An untold number of Senators voted for the Treaty for no or little other reason than it represented a symbolic slap in the face to Britain. The Senate ratified the Treaty of Cession by a vote of 27 to 2 on April 9, 1867. The House of Representatives does not have the Constitutional authority to vote on treaties but the highest law in the land does give it the ‘power of the purse’ therefore this body held the crucial vote in the completion of the sale. Some Representatives argued that Russia set Alaska’s value too high, that the wasteland was not worth half that price and a few did not think it was worth one Confederate dollar which, of course, was worthless following the Civil War. Fortunately for the country and those who advocated the sale, the U.S. experienced a surplus of funds in 1867. Government revenues were $491 million as opposed to expenditure of $347 million therefore $7.2 million did not break the nation’s bank. The first Americans to profit from the sale were Congressmen, many of whom took the estimated $100,000 to $200,000 in bribe money offered from the Russian government (Gedney, 1984). The first publicly acknowledged benefit came in 1896 when large deposits of gold were found in the Yukon. Alaska contains vast amounts of oil both off and on-shore as well as enormous coal and gas reserves. “Following the Prudhoe Bay oil and gas reservoir discovery in 1968, Alaska quickly began its incredible economic contribution (in the billions) to the U.S. economy” (“Alaska” 2008). Its forests supply much of the countries paper and timber products and more than half of commercial fishing in the country is done off Alaskan shores. Alaska’s location was an asset during the Cold War and World War II and continues to be strategically important for the U.S. military, particularly the U.S. Air Force. Its location is also help to proliferate trade between the U.S., Canada, Russia and Asia. “Alaska has more than made good on (the U.S.) investment, the Federal revenue from the development of (its) resources has repaid this investment hundreds of times over” (Gordon, 2007). The Alaskan Purchase is arguably the best purchase the U.S. ever made though no one at that time, even the proponents of the acquisition, could have foreseen to what degree. Russian short-term interests were served but the long-term gain continues to be reaped by the U.S. “Seward’s Folly” was no folly. Rather the foreword thinking employed by Seward was nothing short of brilliant. If only we had that type of thinking in Washington today. Most would be satisfied if Congress could balance the budget as well as those a century and a half ago. References Alaska State of Alaska, U.S. Census, University of Washington. U.S. Library of Congress Accessed March 21, 2011 from Gedney, Larry. More Facts About Alaska and the North (Alaska Science Forum June 15, 1984). Accessed March 21, 2011 from Gordon, John Steele. Why Did Russia Sell Us Alaska So Cheap? American (Heritage.com, 2007) Accessed March 21, 2011 from The Russian Colonization of Alaska (The Library of Congress, August 29, 2005) Retrieved Accessed March 21, 2011 from Tompkins, R. Alaska Promyshlennik and Sourdough. (University of Oklahoma Press, 1945). Trover, Ellen Lloyd. Chronology and Documentary Handbook of the State of Alaska (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1972) Rasche, Herbert H. Alaska Purchase Centennial: 1867-1967 Accessed March 21, 2011 from Read More