Toyota Cars Recalls - Research Paper Example

?THE TOYOTA RECALL STORY Toyota Motors Corporation (TMC) is one of the leading car manufacturing companies in the world. Considering its multimillion automobile sales every year, its unique corporate culture they term as “The Toyota Way”, the Toyota Production System (TPS) it claims to be one of the secrets of its success and the confidence that the people worldwide has given this company through the years, who would think that this highly regarded and multi-awarded car company would falter one day. This paper seeks to present the factors in management and organization that contributed to what Toyota Motors Corporation is today. It also seeks to possibly identify the flaws that TMC has failed to recognize in its process of operations that led to the total recall incident. Finally, the purpose of this academic paper is to possibly recommend applicable solutions based on conflict management principles that would address the identified problems encountered by the Toyota Motor Corp. To further understand, how and why Toyota ended up with the Toyota Recall incident it is necessary to have knowledge on the background of the company and how it operates in the field of the automobile manufacturing industry. Toyota Motor Company Early Beginnings In 1933, Toyota did not out rightly start as an automobile manufacturing company. Actually, the family that started it was initially engaged with just spinning and weaving textiles and looms under Toyoda Automatic Loom Works, a small division, which was under the direction of Kiichiro Toyoda. It started to manufacture vehicles when the Japanese government at war with China encouraged this company to manufacture the needed domestic vehicles. (“History of Toyota”, 2011). A Window to Toyota Motor Corporation (TMC) Today The CEO Who is running Toyota Motor Corporation today? “Akio Toyoda is the present President and Representative Director of the company. He is the grandson of the late Kaiichiro Toyoda, who operated the Toyoda Automatic Loom Works, a company devoted to manufacture automobiles during the 1930’s. Akio Toyoda was elected to the said positions in 2009 replacing Katsuaki Watanabe.” (“The President”,2011) TMC’s Domain “TMC’s domain belongs to the automotive industry and thus, its main product is the automobile. However, TMC today has expanded to other non-automotive business activities to include financial service business segments” (“Toyota Company Overview”, n.d.).Their stakeholders include: customers, business partners (dealers and suppliers), investors, consumers, nongovernmental organisations government, community, stockholders. Vision & Philosophy “Since its foundation, Toyota has been using the Guiding Principle which says: to produce reliable vehicles and sustainable development of society by employing innovative and high quality products and services” (“Vision & Philosophy, 2011). Guiding Principle: “TMC’s guiding principle is to produce reliable vehicles and sustainable development of society by employing innovative and high quality products and services” (“Guiding Principle”, 2011). Toyota Global Vision 2020 “Toyota promotes efforts towards finding balance between the cycles of nature and the cycles of industry. Toyota commits to the ideals being pursued for People, Society and the Global Environment through the combined energy of people and technology” (“Toyota Global Vision 2020”, 2011). Employment: 320, 590 (Total in affiliated companies) Date Founded: August 28, 1937 Capital: 397.05 billion yen (as of March 31, 2010) Note: Information current as of June 2010. The number of employees includes those dispatched from other companies as of March 31, 2010 (“Company Profile”, 2011) TMC’s Organizational Structure “We have a fairly flat organization, which allows for ease of communications and flexibility. Within departments the organization divides into groups and teams, this team structure is a key element of the Company’s effectiveness.” (“Toyota Motor Mfg. (UK) Ltd.”, n.d.). Per company profile, TMC is considered a complex multi-divisional structured organization. The said organization with 24 worldwide Regional Offices; 30- Sectoral Divisions; 165- Sub-Sectoral Departments and 5-Administrative and Support Offices with total employment of 320,590 (“Toyota Organization Chart”, 2010) Divisions, Offices, Departments and Centers related to strategic planning, production / manufacturing, and Sales are the major units that provide support to Toyota’s headquarters and therefore are considered critical to TMC’s Operations: (“Toyota Organization Chart” , 2010) Corporate Risk Management Division Corporate Strategy Planning Office Corporate Communications Division Marketing Division Corporate Management Division General Administration & Human Resources Division Corporate Purchasing Division Information Systems Division All Divisions, Departments, Offices Centers belonging to each Sectoral Area TMC’s Organizational Culture Many companies have tried to emulate TMC’s the “Toyota Way”. General Motors was one of those companies that attempted to copy but it failed (Denning, n.d.). Still unfathomable to outsiders, they still could not match the way TMC implements its “Toyota Way”. What is this “Toyota Way”? What makes TMC’s organizational culture unique? Empowering its workers is the center piece of Toyota’s philosophy ( Kotelnikov, n.d.). The reason why Toyota workers behave differently is because they are guided by the “Toyota Way”. What makes Toyota’s management style different is that it is deep-rooted to the Japanese culture and discipline. What does this mean? It means that the Japanese culture inevitably becomes part of the operations of the company. The real ‘Toyota Way' is a culture of control," says Masaki Saruta, a business professor at Japan's Chukyo University. (J. Shook, 2009). It blends Toyota culture with its Toyota Production System. TMC inculcates values to its workers, like “for them not to be content with status quo but to create a path to a new world and to work steadily towards the realization of society's dreams. This progress is to be achieved "through the energy of people and technology” (“Toyota Global Vision 2020”, 2011). Another unorthodox example is that if ever other companies are weeding out elderly or disabled employees from their company which they consider as liabilities rather than as assets to their companies well at TMC, the disabled and elderly are hired. “Toyota believes in helping disabled people achieve autonomy within society, and makes it a basic rule to have them work together with other employees” (“Respect for Diversity and Creating a Sense of Unity”, 2005). Key Factors or Core Competencies Contributing to TMC’s Success What TMC has achieved through all these years and what it is now may be attributed to its core competencies: “The Toyota Way” “The Toyota Way is not the Toyota Production System (TPS). It is the 14 Principles of the Toyota Way, a management philosophy used by the TMC that includes TPS, also known as lean manufacturing. TPS is the most systematic and highly developed example of what the principles of the Toyota Way can accomplish. The Toyota Way consists of the foundational principles of the Toyota culture, which allows the TPS to function so effectively” (Kotelnikov, n.d.) The main ideas Toyota Way want to impart has to be based on management decisions on “philosophical sense of purpose”. Kotelnikov enumerates some, as follows: To think long term To have a process for solving problems To add value to the organization by developing its people To recognize that continuously solving root problems drives organizational learning. (Kotelnikov, n.d.) “Toyota Production System” or “ Lean Production System” Kotelnikov emphasizes that “Real TPS is not just about “flow” or “pull production” or “cellular manufacturing” or "load leveling". TPS in Toyota is primarily concerned with making a profit, and satisfying the customer with the highest possible quality at the lowest cost in the shortest lead-time, while developing the talents and skills of its workforce through rigorous improvement routines and problem solving disciplines. This stated aim is mixed in with the twin production principles of Just in Time (make and deliver the right part, in the right amount, at the right time), and Jidoka (build in quality at the process), as well as the notion of continuous improvement by standardization and elimination of waste in all operations to improve quality, cost, productivity, lead-time, safety, morale and other metrics as needed.” (Kotelnikov, n.d.) TPS, according to Kotelnikov,V., is “the cornerstone of its human resource management to include key values practiced: challenges, kaizen, genchi, genbutsu, respect and teamwork guided by two Management Traditional principles: "Continuous Improvement" and "Respect for People". All Toyota employees, at every level, apply these principles to practices that focus upon continuous improvement of processes in their daily work. ” (Refer to Attachments A and B). “Just- In- Time (JIT) System, a vital component of Lean Manufacturing means producing the necessary items in necessary quantities at the necessary time. It is a philosophy of continuous improvement in which non-value-adding activities (or wastes) are identified and removed. Putting this concept into practice means a reversal of the traditional thinking process. In JIT, each stage is required to go back to the previous stage to pick up the exact number of units needed.” (Kotelnikov, n.d.) The Total Recall Incident Toyota Motor Corporation, known to have a sterling reliability for having the reputation of invincibility to its safety and quality produced automobiles was lately left in a quandary with the impact of the Total Recall incident on the company. Although General Motors and Ford had their own total recalls, Morgan Rourke wrote that “it was in 2007 that the issue on Toyota surfaced after that tragic incident in August when four people driving a Lexus met a collision accident in California and died. This incident prompted investigators to pursue the investigation which revealed that the used car sped out of control when the floor mat stuck underneath the gas pedal. Subsequent investigations revealed that Toyota was again caught with another issue that recalled more than two million vehicles to fix the faulty pedal assembly. Unintended acceleration was not the only problem facing Toyota owners, however. In the weeks to follow, Toyota issued recalls for faulty anti-lock brake systems in Prius and Lexus hybrids, brake line defects in selected Camrys and front driveshaft issues in Tacoma trucks. Toyota even considered a Corolla recall in February after complaints about power steering problems.”(O’Rourke, 2011). (Refer to Time Line Recall Attachment) Impact of the Total Recall to TMC In all, “Toyota was forced to recall more than 12 million vehicles globally-more than its entire worldwide sales last year” (Welch, 2011). “Company officials estimated that the recalls could cost the automaker $2 billion in expenses and lost sales. And that was without factoring in the possibly larger cost of the lawsuits that the company will likely face and the reputation it has to recover” (‘O Rourke, 2011). Internal Problems Associated with the Total Recall Incident And Recommendations Strategies Related to Conflict Management: 1. Complex Organizational Structure TMC adopts the Flat structure. Flat structure enables snappy decisions reach the production team faster which is critical in the production line process. Based on the Toyota Motor Corp.’s organizational structure, the President or CEO, is positioned at the top of chain of command and becomes the overseer of TMC’s worldwide operations. Gleaning at TMC’s organizational structure and considering the less interrelated tasks therein of its divisions and department; complemented with its spatial management worldwide, this position demands a complex, wide span of control. It obvious that TMC has grown too big to manage. (Kurtzman, 2010). Unchecked “integration and span of control” in organizational structures complemented with introduced innovations in the practice of Japanese culture may disrupt organization and organization processes. Conflict Management Solution: Collaborative Mode is recommended. –Problem1 “Times when the collaborative mode is appropriate are when the conflict is important to the people who are constructing an integrative solution, when the issues are too important to compromise, when merging perspectives, when gaining commitment, when improving relationships, or when learning. Collaboration Skills to be used include: Active listening; nonthreatening confrontation; identifying concerns and analyzing inputs” (“Understanding Conflict and Conflict Management, n.d.”). 2. Organizational Culture – Too Rigid TMC’s too much formalities and rigidness or strictness in the corporate norms, rules and policies of the company which is pointed by some to become a probable cause for generating organizational dysfunctions. John Shook critiqued “ TMC with the following: “So, a degree of "toughness" may be called for at times, especially in the dirty business of manufacturing something like a car. The process of several thousand people working together to assemble tens of thousands of parts that converge once per minute to comprise an automobile is tough work, demanding legitimate discipline. Still, there were instances at the old Toyota when many observers would understandably cry foul. And I imagine vestiges of that Toyota can still be found lurking around, especially at the end of a bad day. But these are also dimensions of the company that decades ago some leaders recognized as needing change” (Shook, 2009). Conflict Management Solution: A Compromising Mode is recommended. –Problem 2 “Times when the compromising mode is appropriate are when you are dealing with issues of moderate importance, when you have equal power status, or when you have a strong commitment for resolution. Compromising mode can also be used as a temporary solution when there are time constraints. Compromising Skills to be used: Negotiating, finding a middle ground, assessing value, and making concessions” (“Understanding Conflict and Conflict Management, n.d.”). 3. Final Stage of an Organization Life Cycle “Toyota seemingly may have grown too much that it failed to anticipate, recognize, avoid, neutralize, or adapt to external or internal pressures that threaten its long-term survival. Thus, of the 5 Organizational Life Cycles, TMC’s displays symptoms of becoming a Decline Phase. This is characterized by inadequate leadership, poor planning and failure to change” (Johannsen, M., 2011) (“Understanding Conflict and Conflict Management, n.d.”). Conflict Management Solution: Competing Mode is recommended. – Problem 3 The competing conflict mode is high assertiveness and low cooperation. Times when the competing mode is appropriate are when quick action needs to be taken, when unpopular decisions need to be made, when vital issues must be handled, or when one is protecting self-interests. Competing Skills : Arguing or debating, Using rank or influence, Asserting your opinions and feelings, Standing your ground, Stating your Position clearly. (“Understanding Conflict and Conflict Management, n.d.”). 4. Leadership Failure J. Kurtz man perceives otherwise. He explained: “Toyota’s quality problems run deep, but they are not simply a failure of design, or a retreat from best-in-class manufacturing. They are a failure of leadership. TMC should have earlier reacted to the earlier recalls and rechecked their production design in detail. Failure of the organization would always reflect on who is on the top of chain of command (“Understanding Conflict and Conflict Management, n.d.”). Here, TMC has recognized its leadership failure with the resignation of Katsuaki Watanabe and replaced by Akio Toyoda. Conflict Management Solution: Avoiding Mode is recommended. –Problem 4 “The avoiding mode is low assertiveness and low cooperation. Many times people will avoid conflicts out of fear of engaging in a conflict because they do not have confidence in their conflict management skills. Times when the avoiding mode is appropriate are when you have issues of low importance, to reduce tensions, to buy some time, or when you are in a Position of lower power. Avoiding skills to be used are: Ability to withdraw and ability to sidestep.” (“Understanding Conflict and Conflict Management, n.d.”). 4. Oversight Production Design Technicality The higher specialized your technical skill is (for example an IT engineer) together with your scope of responsibility and discipline within the organization, the higher is your task variability and analyzability level. There was an oversight in coordination and software design. Conflict Management Solution: Accommodating Mode is recommended. – Problem 5 “The accommodating mode is low assertiveness and high cooperation. Times when the accommodating mode is appropriate are to show reasonableness, develop performance, create good will, or keep peace. Some people use the accommodating mode when the issue or outcome is of low importance to them. Accommodating skills include forgetting your desires, Selflessness, ability to yield, Obeying orders” (“Understanding Conflict and Conflict Management, n.d.”). Conclusion Mr. Beasley Allen reports from his Toyota Recall Timeline article that “On April 8, an internal e-mail was uncovered, in which from Irv Miller to a Japanese colleague, dated Jan. 16 of this year. At the time, Miller was Group Vice President, Environmental and Public Affairs, one of the company’s top spokespeople. In the email, Miller says, “I hate to break this to you but WE HAVE A tendency for MECHANICAL failure in accelerator pedals of a certain manufacturer on certain models.” (These words were capitalized in the email.) He goes on to say, “We are not protecting our customers by keeping this quiet. The time to hide on this one is over” and says, “we need to come clean.” (Beasley, If something like this happens, it simply reflects that a Wrong must always be corrected with Right and not with a Wrong. WORKS CITED Beasley, Allen Toyota Recall Timeline (2010) . Retrieved March 06, 2011 from http://www.toyota-lawsuit.com/toyota-recall/toyota-recall-timeline/ “Car Recalls Update: Toyota Conducting One Final Recall for Possible Gas Pedal Flawed Vehicles”. articlesbase.com. Feb 28, 2011. Retrieved March 06, 2011 from http://www.articlesbase.com/cars-articles/car-recalls-update-toyota-conducting-one-final-recall-for-possible-gas-pedal-flawed-vehicles-4327637.html “Company Profile” Retrieved March 04, 2011 from http://www.toyota-global.com/company/profile/overview/ Denning, Steve. Why Is Toyota So Hard To Copy? stevedenning.com., n.d., Retrieved. Web. March 03, 2011. http://www.stevedenning.com/Documents/WhyIsToyotaSoHardToCopy.pdf “Understanding Conflict and Conflict Management [PDF document]. Retrieved from The Foundation Coalition. Web site: http://www.foundationcoalition.org/publications/brochures/conflict.pdf “Guiding Principle” (2011) Retrieved March 05, 2011 from http://www.toyota-global.com/company/vision_philosophy/guiding_principles.html “History of Toyota”. (2011) Retrieved March 05, 2011 from http://www.toyota-global.com/company/history_of_toyota/ -X Johannsen, Murray, The Five Phases of The Organizational Life Cycle (2011) Retrieved March 06, 2011from http://www.legacee.com/FastGrowth/OrgLifeCycle.html Kotelnikov, Vadim ( n.d.) . A case study Toyota. Toyota Production System as a Sustainable Competitive Advantage. Retrieved from http://www.1000ventures.com/business_guide/cs_efficiency_toyota_ps.html Kurtzman, Joel. Toyota’s Problems Start At the Top (2011) Retrieved March 06, 2011 from http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2010/03/toyotas_problems_start_at_the_1.html “Message of the President”. (2011) Retrieved March 05, 2011 from http://www.toyota-global.com/company/message_from_president/ -X “Respect for Diversity and Creating a Sense of Unity: Long Term Contracts To Contract Employees”. Retrieved from http://www.toyota-global.com/sustainability/sustainability_report/pdf_file_download/05/pdf/so_02.pdf Rouke, Morgan. (2010). Toyota’s Recall . Retrieved from http://www.rmmag.com/MGTemplate.cfm?Section=RMMagazine&NavMenuID=128&template=/Magazine/DisplayMagazines.cfm&IssueID=344&AID=4080&Volume=57&Sh Shook, J. Toyota The Bad Guy. 2009. Lean Enterprise Institute, Inc. Web. 24 June 2010 URL: Source: http://www.lean.org/shook/ “Toyota Motor Corp.: Company Overview., n.d. Retrieved March 04, 2011 from http://www.lognet.com.br/psn/pestrategico2/toyota.pdf - X “Toyota’s Global Vision 2020: The Ideal Being Pursued for People, Society and the Global Environment” Retrieved March 3, 2011 from http://www.toyota-global.com/company/vision_philosophy/toyota_global_vision_2020.html “Toyota Organization Chart” (2010) Retrieved March 05, 2011 from http://www.kddi.com/corporate/kddi/annai/pdf/app_p04.pdf “Toyota: Toyota Motor Manufacturing (UK) LTD. – Team Working at Toyota Manufacturing UK” [PDF Document] Retrieved March 06, 2011 from http://www.toyotau k.com/main/download/pdf/Team%20working%20at%20TMUK.pdf “Vision and Philsophy”. (2011) Retrieved March 05, 2011 from http://www.toyota-global.com/company/vision_philosophy/ Welch, David. Toyota Recalls Another 2 Million Cars. Apology Needed. Web. Mar 02, 2011 Retrieved from http://www.businessweek.com/autos/autobeat/archives/2011/02/toyota_recalls_another_2_million_cars_apology_needed.html BIBLIOGRAPHY Abilla, P. Toyota Motor Corp. : Company History. Shmula.com. Jan. 05, 2007 Retrieved. Web. March 05, 2011. http://www.shmula.com/291/toyota-motor-corporation-company-history Liker, Jeffrey K. The Toyota way: 14 management principles from the world's greatest manufacturer  [PDF Document] Retrieved from Web site: http://books.google.com.ph/books?id=9v_sxqERqvMC&pg=PR11&lpg=PR11&dq=Toyota+Way-+explanation&source=bl&ots=g6TZ8LnPIG&sig=2qbOWGf3hckQKY9D2LMHBJXMIyQ&hl=en&ei=mZpxTfOFMYa8cKKtzfgC&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=6 Attachmet A Envisioned Goal of TMC through TPS Notes: Translation of Japanese Terms Japanese original term – heijunka for production smoothing or – by its (???),[1] is a technique for reducing the muda waste and vital to the development of production efficiency in the Toyota Production System and Lean Manufacturing. Jidoka, as practiced at Toyota has several meanings. It may mean "automation with human intelligence"  (Autonomation). Jidoka also refers to the practice of stopping a manual line or process when something goes amiss. (Source: http://www.strategosinc.com/jidoka.htm) Kaizen – Japanese term for “continuous improvement”. Attachment B “Toyota supports this by the two main pillars of "Continuous Improvement" and "Respect for People" and can be summed up in the five key terms - challenge, kaizen, genchi genbutsu, respect, and teamwork. All Toyota employees, at every level, use these two values in their daily work,” ATTACHMENT TIMELINE RECALL Toyota Recall Timeline Toyota has recalled more than 9 million vehicles worldwide amid concerns of sudden unintended acceleration SOURCE : http://www.toyota-lawsuit.com/toyota-recall/toyota-recall-timeline/ 1986 • In September, NHTSA orders its first recall of Toyota cars because of “speed control” problems related to a faulty cruise control system in models as far back as 1982. A second investigation into sudden-acceleration dangers with Toyota vehicles takes place that same year. 1999 • Toyota recalls the popular Lexus RX for problems with an electronic control unit that causes the headlights and taillights to turn on and off without warning. 2000 • Toyota discontinues using mechanical linkage in their throttle systems in favor of an electronic throttle control system. 2003 • Toyota makes 6.78 million vehicles and overtakes Ford Motor Co. in annual sales to become the world No.2 behind General Motors. • In February, NHTSA conducts the first of many defect investigations regarding speed control problems. The first two involve the Camry and Solara models. • In April, Toyota internally deals with an “unwanted acceleration” incident during the production testing of the Sienna model. Toyota blamed a faulty trim panel clip, trapping the pedal assembly. Toyota calls this an “isolated incident”. Toyota does not report to NHTSA until 5 years later during a blanket information request by the agency. • In July, NHTSA opens first probe of sudden-acceleration complaints in Lexus sedans at owner’s request. • In September, the Lexus probe is closed claiming no defect was found. 2004 • In March, after another customer petition, NHTSA (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration) opens a wider probe into Lexus Sedans. NHTSA also informs Toyota that the agency is opening an investigation into unwanted acceleration and vehicle surge complaints in 2002-2003 Camry and Solaris models. Toyota’s VP for regulatory affairs, Christopher Tinto, and another of his employees Christopher Santucci, “work closely” with NHTSA and manage to narrow the investigation to 11 incidents involving 5 crashes. Both Mr. Tinto and Mr. Santucci are former NHTSA employees. • In July, NHTSA closes its investigations again, claiming no defects were found. NHTSA turns down two more requests from owners for new looks at the problem. NHTSA cites lack of resources as the reason for that decision. 2005 • CTS, a manufacturer, begins to make pedal assemblies for Toyota. • In August, NHTSA conducts an evaluation of the Camry after reports of “inappropriate and uncontrollable vehicle accelerations.” • In November, Toyota’s Tinto writes NHTSA that a dealership-led review of 59 owner complaints about their Toyota vehicles found that “no evidence of a system or component failure was found and the vehicles operated as designed.” 2006 • By January, NHTSA had opened a second investigation and had received questionnaires sent to Camry owners. Hundreds are returned from owners with reports of problems of acceleration and braking. NHTSA says the claims are of “ambiguous significance” and closes the investigation. Again, a strange turn of events. • Toyota group global sales of 8.808 million vehicles exceed GM’s by 128,000, making it the world’s biggest automaker. • In August, NHTSA receives more complaints about the accelerator issues with the Camry models that covers model years from 2002-2006. • In September, NHTSA opens a third investigation. Another Camry owner petitions the administration to investigate multiple “engine surging” incidents he experienced. • Toyota’s Tinto writes NHTSA and says that Toyota found no abnormality in the throttle controller and blames water damage from driving in heavy rain as the reason for any problems that might exist. • NHTSA fails to identify the problem and closes the investigation citing “the need to best allocate limited administration resources” as the reason for the closure. Again – even if true – very strange. 2007 • In March, NHTSA launches probe into floor mats in Lexus models. Toyota says “issue is not a safety concern.” • On July 26, for the first time, NHTSA verifies fatal crash link to floor mats. Troy Edwin Johnson is killed when a Camry accelerating out of control hits his car at 120 mph. The driver of the Camry had been unable to slow the vehicle for 23 miles prior to the accident. Toyota eventually settles with the family for an undisclosed amount. • In August, NHTSA upgrades its investigation to an “engineering analysis.” This means the agency will do vehicle testing instead of just reviewing complaints or single vehicles and crunching questionnaire numbers as done in the past. • State Farm Insurance notifies NHTSA of accident data related to 2005-2007 Toyota’s and an uptick in numerous complaints of “unwanted acceleration.” The insurer did the right thing and you would think NHTSA would have to pay attention to this warning. • In September, under pressure from NHTSA, Toyota recalls 55,000 Camry and Lexus models because of suspected floor mats that interfere with the accelerator pedal. • Documents now obtained from Toyota show that the carmaker noted that it had saved $100 million by conducting a limited recall as opposed to a full recall. The company said that was a “win.” 2008 • In January, NHTSA, again, at a customer’s request, launches probe of sudden acceleration in Tacoma pickups. The complaints involve 478 incidents where 2004-2008 model year Tacoma engines allegedly sped up even when the accelerator pedal wasn’t pushed. Toyota’s Tinto told NHTSA that the automaker couldn’t find enough evidence to support allegations and an investigation wasn’t warranted. • In August, after an eight month review, NHTSA closes the Tacoma investigation, claiming to find no defect despite hundreds of complaints. This is the eighth investigation of Toyota vehicles since 2003. Over 2600 complaints of Toyotas and “run away cars” have been reported. 271 of these complaints were rejected by NHTSA without even asking Toyota for data. Again, most strange! 2009 • In April, NHTSA receives another petition, this one to investigate throttle-control problems unrelated to floor-mat issues in the Lexus ES vehicles. • In August, the fatal crash of a Lexus ES350 in California kills four people. NHTSA quickly links this incident to floor mats. • In September, NHTSA tells Toyota it expects wider recall of mats by the end of the month. • In October, Toyota issues floor mat warning but has to be pushed by NHTSA to issue recall. • In October, Toyota recalls 3.8 million vehicles related to the floor mat issue. • In November, Toyota expands the floor mat recall by over a million vehicles. • In December, NHTSA opens investigations on whether the electronic control modules in some Corolla and Matrix models causes them to stall without warning. The agency also opens an investigation into the 2003 Sequoia SUV model for problems with the computerized vehicle stability control system. • In December, NHTSA officials fly to Tokyo to meet with Toyota executives, asking for quicker response to safety concerns. • NHTSA investigations of Toyota and allegations of Unintended Acceleration rise to 13 in a 25 year period resulting directly in four recalls. 2010 • On January 16, Toyota tells NHTSA it may have “an issue” with sticking accelerator pedals. • On January 19, NHTSA meets with Toyota officials in Washington, telling the automaker it must conduct a recall. • On January 21, Toyota issues recall for 2.3 million vehicles for sticking accelerator pedal. • On January 26, Toyota halts production and stops selling eight models under pressure from NHTSA. • On January 27, Toyota expands the pedal recall by 1.1 million vehicles. • On February 3, Kelley Blue Book is reported as devaluing Toyota models by as much as 5%. Edmunds (an auto research firm) states the average devaluation between 4% and 8% on Toyota vehicles. Both companies state that this devaluation could continue. • On February 5, Toyota admits problems with brake software in 2010 Prius Hybrids. • On February 8, Toyota recalls 2010 Prius, 2010 Lexus HS 250h, 2010 Camry Hybrids, and the Sai (sold only in Japan) due to faulty brake systems. This recall affects 437,000 vehicles worldwide. • On February 9, Toyota announces that Exponent Consulting (formerly Failure Analysis Associates Inc.) had completed a 56 page report and sent to Congress a report that a test of Toyota’s electronic throttle system behaved as intended. Exponent was “unable to induce…unintended acceleration or behavior that might be a precursor to such an event.” • Exponent’s work is highly criticized by many independent experts as not being neutral. Exponent’s executive chairman Mike Gaulke was quoted as saying 65% of the company’s $228 million dollars in revenue is derived from research related to materials created for litigation in defense of companies. A noted environmental consultant Cindy Sage is quoted in the LA Times as saying “The first thing you know is that when Exponent is brought in to help a company, that company is in big trouble.” • Exponent’s actual testing in the report is criticized as not complying with the type of testing necessary to replicate the methods that automotive engineers say are needed to ensure that electromagnetic interference does not cause failure of the hardware or software of engine controls. • If any of our readers – or the consuming public in the U.S. – believe that Exponents is an “independent investigator,” they are sadly mistaken. This company has been paid hundreds of millions to defend design defects for the automobile industry over the years. • On February 12, Toyota recalls 2010 Tacoma due to a dangerous drive shaft condition. • The Wall Street Journal publishes an article that discusses Toyota’s “black box” event recorder and its use for investigating Toyota’s safety problems. According to the NHTSA and Toyota, only one “reader” exists in the U.S. and is located at Toyota’s headquarters in California. • Toyota claims that the unit is still experimental and can give false readings. • In comparison, all U.S. automakers have made their event recorders easily readable by third party companies that make diagnostic equipment. • On February 16, the Department of Transportation demands that Toyota turn over documents related to its massive recalls to see how long the automaker knew of safety defects before taking action. The company is given between 30 and 60 days to respond or face fines. Toyota’s recalled vehicles tops 9 million units. • On February 16, Toyota begins to “look into” steering problems with its Corolla models. • On February 18, it was learned that NHTSA had excluded eight early reports of deaths linked to the sudden acceleration problem. That may well bring the total deaths to 42. • On February 23, the congressional hearings started and I would encourage all of our readers to find out what all the Toyota bosses had to say at the hearings. Some of what they said there will shock you. • On March 11, Toyota officials were forced to turn over a memo produced by its own factory workers in 2006, which raised their fears about safety issues in the manufacturing process. The memo is a “smoking gun” that proves management was made aware of a looming disaster due to an emphasis on profits over production standards. • On March 24, new evidence emerged revealing that both Toyota and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration knew that reported sudden acceleration incidents were linked to a glitch in the vehicles’ electronic system. In August 2002, Toyota Motor Corp. issued a Technical Service Bulletin warning every dealership in the country that Camrys were reportedly surging out of control and that recommended adjustments to the electronic controls could fix the problem. Toyota also sent the bulletin to NHTSA, which issued an internal memo acknowledging Toyota unintended acceleration (UA) in 2002 and 2003 Camrys. The document was never made public until a group of attorneys submitted a copy of it to CNN. • On April 8, an internal e-mail was uncovered, in which from Irv Miller to a Japanese colleague, dated Jan. 16 of this year. At the time, Miller was Group Vice President, Environmental and Public Affairs, one of the company’s top spokespeople. In the email, Miller says, “I hate to break this to you but WE HAVE A tendency for MECHANICAL failure in accelerator pedals of a certain manufacturer on certain models.” (These words were capitalized in the email.) He goes on to say, “We are not protecting our customers by keeping this quiet. The time to hide on this one is over” and says, “we need to come clean.” • On April 9, the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation (MDL) announced it has selected the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California to hear litigation surrounding Toyota sudden unintended acceleration (SUA). Lawsuits include both individual personal injury claims and consumer class actions filed on behalf of Toyota owners who claim the value of their vehicles has been negatively affected by Toyota’s SUA problems. Read More