Noxious Odours Emitted from a Waste Water Treatment Plant - Assignment Example

Question 1: Noxious Odours Emitted from a Waste Water Treatment Plant There have been complaints about noxious odours emitted from a waste water treatment plants. These problems have often resulted in impact assessment methods that value the problems that such noxious odours cause. This question therefore caries detailed research analysis to explain how Gas Chromatography Analysis with Olfactometric Detection (GC-O) as a method operates, how they are used in dealing with emissions of noxious odours and the type of values it can elicit. Based on approaches that have been suggested by scholars such as Brattoli et al. (2013), the question assesses problems associated with this method. a. Methods used to Value Waste Water from Treatment Plant The process of valuing the problems that are linked with noxious odours from a waste water treatment plant means identifying method that provides economic analysis of pollution control and examines general impacts of odourous compounds on the quality of human life as well as environment. Gas Chromatography Analysis with Olfactometric Detection (GC-O) has been identified as the method since it is able to examine complex mixtures of different odourous substances from waste water treatment plant and identify odour active compounds that are harmful to either human life or environment. Brattoli et al. (2014) add that the method is suitable in valuing problems that are caused by waste water treatment plant because it can move the odour emission assessment from olfactometric to characterization of the volatile compounds deemed to be harmful or nuisance to the environment. In its operation and how it has managed to categorise and elicit different types of values the methods has the following sub-strata or methods. The first sub-method of Gas Chromatography Analysis with Olfactometric Detection that has been used in valuing problems associated with noxious odours emitted from waste water is Frequency Detection Methods. In this case, a team of 6-8 people take a sample of noxious odours emitted from a waste water treatment plants and carry deeper analysis in order to ascertain the percentage of users who sense the odour compound within a given retention time (Brattoli et al., 2014). Tietenberg and Lewis (2016) took a case study on Deer Island Treatment Plant and noted that each sample gathered is evaluated by Nasal Impact Frequency (NIF). The impact or value of the odour is then grouped in terms of specific anosmia. If, for instance, the impact of the compound is the waste water is found to be greater than what environment can consume then a minimization process is undertaken. The second sub-method that GC-O uses is Dilution to Threshold Methods. This method provides a quantitative analysis of harmful substances present in waste water from treatment plant. The analysis therefore provides a description of the odour potential of different compounds so that analysis can ascertain the extent to which these compounds can be harmful to the environment or human life. Reich (2005) while using this method to value the harm the compounds have to the environment stated that the method allows assessors to state under which dilution the compound in waste water from treatment plant can still be sensed and the extent the smell is nuisance to human life. However, studies have recently embraced Combined Hedonic Aroma Response Measurement (commonly known as CharmAnalysis) and Aroma Extract Dilution Analysis (referred by other studies as AEDA) in the process of valuing waste water from treatment plant (Sterner, 2003). The two methods are sub-methods of Dillution to Threshold Methods which are used to measure the highest dilution of sample to ascertain compounds present in such waste waters and the extent they are harmful when inhaled. Conclusively, GC-O is reliable air sampling method that measure different chemicals in the waste water from treatment plant that cause odours. Generally, Gas Chromatography Analysis with Olfactometric Detection remains to be dependable method in valuing impacts of noxious odours emitted from a waste water treatment plant. Basing the two sub-methods (Dilution to Threshold Methods and Frequency Detection Methods) to the principle of property rights and economic analysis, GC-O can elicit values from waste water from treatment plant as follows: Harm to the ecosystem including decline in specific species of fish Triggering climate change Depletion of ozone layer as a result of the chemicals present in the waste water Depletion or decline in the biodiversity b. Benefits and Problems Associated with GC-O There exist a number of methods that scholars have found to be useful in valuing the problems caused by noxious odours emitted from a waste water treatment plant. However, when compared GC-O provides benefits as listed below. It identifies, separates and categorise hazardous solid waste from the waste Identifies chemicals in the waste that trigger the odours and how harmful such chemicals are when inhaled. Identifies how the odour can be used to determine the extent of health effects To begin with, GC-O separates and categorise hazardous solid waste from the waste. Basing on the principle of economic analysis of pollution control, the methods elucidate how the socially optimal levels of pollution can be determined in economic terms. Furthermore, this study finds that GC-O identifies chemicals in the waste that can trigger the odour and how the odour can be harmful to the environment or human life. It simply means that unlike other methods, GC-O define and classify different economic externalities thus allowing stakeholders or simple economic analysis to understand the welfare implications of positive and negative externalities inherent in such wastes. Additionally, Kneese, Ayres and d'Arge (2015) argue that any method adopted for impact analysis or valuing of a given problem must balance the aspect of pollution and social optimality. That is, it has to ascertain the socially accepted optimal levels of a given pollution. It is for these reasons that GC-O is recommended since it identifies how the odour can be used to determine the extent of health effects thus achieving the socially optimal level of pollution. On the other hand, there are a number of problems associated with the method chosen (GC-O). Dilution to threshold have been criticized by different studies including Kneese, Ayres and d'Arge (2015) because it has underlying assumption that the intensity of odour from waste water increases in parallel with the concentration for all odour components in a given sample. As noted, it is not possible to attain zero pollution with economic activity (since economists would argue that zero pollution = zero economic activity) however, with this method, the assumption is premised on the fact that environment has some assimilative capacity to absorb and transform waste; which may not be the case all the times. Question 2: a. How Marginal Control Costs are Equalised Across Firms In an ideal environment, studies have acknowledged that pollution charges or taxes and transferable (or tradable) permit schemes are variables that can reduce the extent of pollution (de Lange, Botha and Oberholster, 2016). Arguments that have adopted Pigovian tax theory assert that different market based instruments can be essential economically than standards of imposition (de Lange, Botha and Oberholster, 2016). That is, tax on a producer can equal the social cost of the externality attain the needed level of the activity polluting. However, it is essential to understand ways in which marginal control costs can be equalised across firms under a transferable pollution permit system. Taking a case where Environment Protecting Authority (EPA) sells all permits by auction the case will be as follows: Figure 1: Determination of the Market Price of Emissions Permits (Auctioned) Based on the figure above, any firm will bid to buy an additional emissions permit whenever the marginal cost of controlling emissions is in excess to the permit price. Similarly, equilibrium permit market price can be determined by the value of the collective marginal control costs at the level of control implied by the permits issued. However, when EPA gives permits at no cost (implying that there must be a choice on distribution rule) then the following case will apply. Figure 2: Determination of Market Price of Emissions Permits (Case of Free Initial) In figure 2 above, EPA distributes permits freely and allows them to be transferable in a free market. It therefore means that the initial allocation may not correspond to the needed maximization of profits, permit holding. The marginal valuations of permits to the identified firms will be depended on their emissions control costs. For instance, there will be a case where some will have high marginal control costs. Such firms will be willing to pay higher prices in purchasing emission permits. Some firms on the other hand will control cheaply and in such cases they will be willing to part with small fees to obtain permits---making their marginal valuation of permits to be low (de Lange, Botha and Oberholster, 2016). It is for these reasons that studies such as Sterner (2003) even suggested that if permits could be banked or stored so that they are used in future then their worth would be positive instead of zero since such storage would generate positive probability that they would be used later when companies or firms would otherwise not have sufficient permits to cover what they would wish to emit. Figure 3: Efficient Control with Different Firms under Transferable Pollution Permit System Looking at 3 figure from the perspective of transferable or tradable permit schemes, equilibrium marginal control costs is seen to be equal over all the firms. It is therefore possible to conclude that marketable permits, which can be subsidies and taxes, can attain any given target at least cost. In addition to that, if the total quantity of permits issued by EPA is as marked M* and at the same time quantity is identical to the level of waste emissions which will likely emerge from control subsidy or emission tax at the rate * then it remains that marketable permits schemes is likely to generate an equilibrium permit price as indicated above (*). b. Advantages of Equalisation of Marginal Control Cost over Command and Control Methods Sterner, (2003) looks at the advantage of equalisation of marginal control costs over command and control methods of controlling pollution in terms of efficiency. In most cases, EPA would be working to ensure that there is a system that allows a pull of polluters to reduce the impact their wastes have on the environment. To that regard, equalisation of marginal control costs achieves the needed results of reducing pollution and at the same time ensuring that different polluters are able to minimize the cost of operations. This level of efficiency is not available with command and control method which is only targeting the reduction of waste and pollution without paying interest to the cost that can be incurred by operators or polluters. On the other hand, studies look at the advantage of equalisation of marginal control costs in terms of economic benefits. While researching on waste management practices and ways in which marginal control costs are equalised across firms in Australia, Hong and Sim (2016) found that equalisation of marginal control costs is enabling different producers to have different abatement levels and cost. The freedom to make such decisions means that they have freedom of deciding the extent or level of pollution abatement or control strategy economically viable to them. For instance, there can be a case where there is low control cost thus cutting back pollution further. The meaning of this approach to producers is that they will be in a position where they will be paying less tax. However, it has to be noted that in cases where there will be reduction in high control cost then they will pay more when it comes to tax. Additionally, the advantages inherent in equalisation of marginal control costs can be seen from what authors term as ‘a slightly different form of the equimarginal principle’ (Hong and Sim, 2016). A slightly different form of the equimarginal principle would mean that equalisation of marginal control costs allows for eqaulisation of marginal control costs across different firms. However, there is one factor that must be noted as far as negating equimarginal principle is concerned. That is, when such firms have set tax at a level equaling the actual damage cost then the result effect would be that MCC = MCD. References Brattoli, M., Cisternino, E., Dambruoso, P. R., de Gennaro, G., Giungato, P., Mazzone, A., ... & Tutino, M. (2013). Gas chromatography analysis with olfactometric detection (GC-O) as a useful methodology for chemical characterization of odorous compounds. Sensors, 13(12), 16759-16800. Brattoli, M., Cisternino, E., De Gennaro, G., Giungato, P., Mazzone, A., Palmisani, J., & Tutino, M. (2014). Gas chromatography analysis with olfactometric detection (GC-O): an innovative approach for chemical characterization of odor active volatile organic compounds (VOCs) emitted from a consumer product. Chemical Engineering Transactions, 40, 121-126. de Lange, W. J., Botha, A. M., & Oberholster, P. J. (2016). Towards tradable permits for filamentous green algae pollution. Journal of environmental management, 179, 21-30. Hong, S. W., & Sim, S. G. A. (2016). Technology Spillover and Environmental Policy Instruments: Price Control Versus Quantity Control. Available at SSRN. Kneese, A. V., Ayres, R. U., & d'Arge, R. C. (2015). Economics and the environment: a materials balance approach. Routledge. Reich, M. C. (2005). Economic assessment of municipal waste management systems—case studies using a combination of life cycle assessment (LCA) and life cycle costing (LCC). Journal of Cleaner Production, 13(3), 253-263. Sterner, T. (2003). Policy instruments for environmental and natural resource management. Resources for the Future. Tietenberg, T. H., & Lewis, L. (2016). Environmental and natural resource economics. Routledge. Read More