Operation Risk Failures - Fukushima Nuclear Disaster - Case Study Example

Name: XXXXXXXXXXXXX Course: XXXXXXXXXXXXX Title: Operation Risk Failures: Fukushima Nuclear Disaster Date: XXXXXXXXXXXXX Operation Risk Failures: Fukushima Nuclear Disaster Abstract This paper examines the operation risk failures that contributed to the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Through a critical review of the provided case study and other reports on the Fukushima nuclear disaster, this paper provides an in-depth outlook on some of the operation risks failures that characterised the nuclear disaster. Among the operational risks failures discussed in this paper include; emergency preparedness and response, training, equipment inspection, poor management and communication failures. TABLE OF CONTENT Introduction 4 Operation risk failures 5 Emergency Preparedness and Response 5 Training 7 Equipment Inspection 8 Poor Management 9 Communication Failures 11 Conclusion 12 References 14 Introduction Fukushima Nuclear Disaster was characterised by a series of nuclear meltdowns, equipment failures and emission of radioactive materials. According to Hasegawa (2012: 85) the disaster was the second most severe and largest nuclear disaster after the Chernobyl disaster which occurred in 1986. The severity of both nuclear disasters was ranked 7 on the International Nuclear Event Scale. This disaster resulted to the emission of radioactive materials which caused catastrophic harm to individuals, the environment and industries. People living around the vicinity of the Fukushima nuclear power plant were evacuated and lost their homes. Tourism, agriculture, fishing and other businesses within this area were significantly affected by this disaster (Osaka 2012). In addition to this, there were over 30 reported cases of severe injuries due to radiation burns. Although there were no immediate reported death cases, an empirical study conducted Hoeve & Jacobson (2012) predicted that the amount of radiation released as a result of the disaster would eventually result to 130 cancer-related death cases. The study showed that the magnitude of the radiation released during the disaster was lower than that released during the Chernobyl disaster (Hoeve & Jacobson 2012). The cause of this nuclear disaster has been attributed to operation failures on the part of the management of the plant. For instance, Funabashi (2012) asserts that the Fukushima nuclear disaster is a man-made calamity brought about by technological and operational failures. Similarly, the Japanese Parliament Independent Investigation Commission report which was published in July 2012 established that the nuclear disaster was profoundly a man-made disaster that could have been predicted and averted. Moreover, the report stated that the impacts of the disaster could have been mitigated through more effective and efficient human responses. The key aim of this paper is to examine the operation risk failures that contributed to the Fukushima nuclear disaster. The finding of this paper will be based on a critical review of the provided case study and other reports on the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Operation risk failures Generally, operational risks failures can be described as failures resulting from mishaps, inadequacies or failed internal systems, process and even people. Operational risks failures can also be considered as adverse outcomes and events that occur as a result of an organisation’s activities (Magnusson, Prasad & Storkey 2010: 1). Emergency Preparedness and Response Based on the findings depicted in the provided case study, it is evident that, emergency preparedness and response is one of key the operation risk failure that characterised the Fukushima nuclear disaster. It is apparent that the operators and regulators managing the nuclear plant lacked effective approaches, systems or processes of emergency preparedness and response. Effective emergency preparedness and response entails strategic management systems and processes that are put in place and executed in order to deter or minimize hazard risks that can cause the occurrence of catastrophes or disasters (Haddow, Bullock & Cappola 2011). As a result of the earthquake, three out of six operating reactors automatically shutdown. Consequently, the emergency generators were activated to regulate coolant systems. Nevertheless, the tsunami that followed the earthquake flooded the rooms in the lower sections where the emergency generators were kept causing the generators to become dysfunctional thus failing to supply power to critical pumps which supply coolant water that deter the reactors from melting down. This problem could have been prevented through saltwater flooding of the operating reactors however the decision to release seawater was delayed. When the Japanese government eventually ordered seawater flooding it was too late to avert the meltdown. This goes to show that the emergency preparedness and response of the various stakeholders managing the plant is not as effective as it should be. The management of the plant failed to take adequate safety measures despite the fact that there was evidence that the surrounding area was vulnerable to strong earthquakes and Tsunamis. One of the most important steps of executing an effective emergency preparedness and response entails foreseeing incoming hazard risk. According to the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, the direct causes of the nuclear disaster were all foreseeable (NAIIC 2012). Therefore, in order to prevent the meltdown of the reactors, the management of the plant should have foreseen the possibility of the tsunami flooding the rooms in the lower sections and disrupting the generators. Subsequently, the management of the plant should have relocated the generators or incorporated additional generators to supply power to critical pumps which supply coolant water that deter the reactors from melting down. The management should have also taken other measures to ensure that coolant water is supplied to the reactors so as to prevent their melt down. Alternatively, the management should have foreseen the disaster and responded immediately by flooding the plant by seawater so as to prevent the meltdown of the reactors which contribute to the emission of radioactive materials (Mahr 2012; NAIIC 2012). Training The investigations carried out by the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission depicted that lack of sufficient training among the personnel within the plant is one of the operation risk failures that contributed to the disaster (NAIIC 2012). According to the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (2003: 45), sufficient training of personnel working in nuclear plants is one of the most critical steps of minimizing risks and ensuring safety. According to the findings of the independent investigation commission, the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), the main owner and operator of the plant did not plan any measures for the Isolation Condenser (IC) operation and had not planned staff training regimes or developed any manuals for training. Clearly, this is an operational risk failure. The findings of the independent investigation commission also showed that, there were numerous problems with on-site operations in the course of the disaster. The steps that were executed by the personnel in the event of a blackout situation within the plant were limited and insufficient to effectively ensure the supply of power to the reactors. Moreover, recovery work like confirming the operation of the isolation condenser unit was not conducted. It would have been wise if it had been conducted immediately due the loss of the DC power. Furthermore, the investigations revealed that many security measures were simultaneously breached by the personnel in the plant this in turn contributed to the loss of power by four reactors at the same time. These problems could have been averted through sufficient training on how to respond to such hazard risks. In addition to this, the investigations established that training and emergency drillings had not been prioritized by the authorities managing the plant (NAIIC 2012). Besides, failing to provide sufficient training to personnel working in the nuclear plant, the authorities managing the plant and the overall disaster failed to provide adequate training to the evacuee in the course of the disaster. The official report released by the NAIIC indicated that at the plant there was little information provided regarding the possibility of a nuclear accident. Less than 15 % of the residents within the vicinities of the plan reported that they had received evacuation training for an occurrence of nuclear disaster. Some residents reported that they had received information that the nuclear power plants are safe thus they thought that accidents or nuclear disasters would never occur. Moreover, the overall percentage of residents who received evacuation training prior to the occurrence nuclear disaster was estimated to be 15%. This shows serious laxity on the part of the authorities managing the plant especially when it comes to implementing safety training programs for both personnel working in the plant and the residents living in the surrounding areas. In order to guarantee the safety of the public, it was necessary for the authorities managing the nuclear plant and the overall disasters to not only respond quickly and flexibly to the impending crisis but also to enhance their capabilities in operation risk management through a continuous and sufficient training regime (NAIIC 2012). Equipment Inspection A critical review of the provided case study reveals that the lack of thorough equipment inspection is among the operational risk failures that characterised the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Following the occurrence of the earthquake and tsunami, it was crucial that a quick and thorough equipment inspection is conducted so as to determine the impact of these catastrophes on the functioning of the equipments in the nuclear plant. A thorough inspection of equipments would have aided the managing authorities to come up with effective measures to avert further damage of the equipments or take necessary precautions to prevent a disaster from occurring. Although the earthquake and the tsunami were attributed as the main causes of the disaster, there is a high likelihood that failure on the part of the plant management to inspect and determine the state of equipments in the plant or failure to foresee damage that the equipments may have succumb to following the earthquake was the main cause of the disaster. Through the investigations conducted by the NAIIC, it was confirmed that the authorities managing the plant were well aware of the possible risks brought about by the earthquake and tsunami however, they were not certain on the impact or the damage that these two catastrophes would cause on the equipment. This uncertainty could have been averted through a thorough equipment inspection which would have helped in the decision making, For instance, it is depicted in the case study that due to lack of information regarding the scale of the disaster and how it has affected the equipments in the plant, there was delay in deciding what measures should be taken in order to avert a disaster (NAIIC 2012). Poor Management The Fukushima nuclear disaster is regarded as a manmade disaster mainly due to poor management on the part of authorities managing the disaster. Contrary to initial reports that indicated that the disaster was unimaginable and beyond prevention, thorough investigations conducted by several independent bodies established that the disaster was caused by poor regulation and collusion between the operator (TEPCO), the industry’s regulator and the government (McCurry 2012). The NAIIC report particularly pointed out that the root causes of the disaster were the regulatory and organisational systems that supported invalid rationales for decisions and actions instead of issues regarding competency. For instance, the first trigger of the Tsunami was under-estimated by the Japanese Nuclear Safety Commission (JNSC) and TEPCO, the operator of the nuclear plant. Although some researchers has predicted as early as 2008 that a tsunami 15.7-m is likely to hit Japan, both TEPCO and JNSC did not take into account this warning. As a result, the nuclear plant was only designed to withstand a 5.7-m tsunami. It is worth noting that the height of the March 2011 tsunami was 14-15 as earlier predicted by scientists in 2008. This shows that there was laxity on the part of JNSC, TEPCO and the government when it comes to responding to risk hazards (Hasegawa 2012). The investigations conducted by the independent commission also revealed that all relevant authorities failed to correctly and effectively come up with safety requirements such as evaluating the possible of the damage, making necessary preparations for containing the damaged caused by the disaster. The investigations also established that the authorities failed to develop appropriate evacuation plan for the general public in case a serious radiation release occurred (NAIIC 2012). Additionally, poor management on the part of the management brought about confusion among residents over the evacuation patterns. The investigation commission concluded that the confusion among residents over evacuation was due to failure and negligence of the regulators to execute adequate and appropriate measures to manage nuclear disasters. From the investigations carried out by the NAIIC, it becomes evident that the TEPCO management, the government and relevant regulators lacked appropriate management tact to operate an effective emergency response and management to a disaster of that scope. Therefore, their efforts in averting or limiting the damage caused by the disaster were not as effective as expected (NAIIC 2012). Communication Failures Communication breakdown and miscommunication are some of the operational risk failures that characterised the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Hasegawa (2012) observes that, following the incident a lot of confusing, misleading and contradicting information was disseminated to evacuees and the general public. Furthermore, there was concealment and delays when it came to the disclosure of important information about the disaster. Similar to the sentiments of Hasegawa (2012), the Investigation Committee revealed that during the incident there was miscommunication between TEPCO and Kantei on issues relating to withdrawal from the plant. Moreover, due to communication breakdown between the government and other relevant authorities, these bodies were not fully aware of each other decisions and actions. Although, the tsunami and the earthquake caused significant damage to the emergency communication systems that had be put in place earlier on, communication failures can also be attributed to oversights made by the management authorities especially when it comes to providing clear and substantiated information and putting in place effective measures and systems that facilitate effective communication. The official report compiled by the NAIIC indicated that, awareness of the disaster was extremely low among the residents living in the surrounding areas despite the fact that information about the incident was released. The report also showed that there were substantial differences when it came to the transmission speed of disaster information to the areas of evacuation. Evacuees living in areas near the plant received information about the disaster faster than those living far off the plant (NAIIC 2012). Combs (2011) notes that, effective communication is very crucial in cases of disasters or emergencies. In order to effectively plan and execute a response during incidences, effective communication between relevant stakeholders, victims and involved parties is of great importance (Combs 2011). Conclusion This paper has examined the operation risk failures that contributed to the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Through a critical review of the provided case study and other reports on the Fukushima nuclear disaster, this paper has discussed in depth some of the operation risks failures that characterised the nuclear disaster. Among the operational risks failures discussed include; emergency preparedness and response, training, equipment inspection, poor management and communication failures. It is established in this paper that the operators and regulators managing the nuclear plant lacked effective approaches, systems or processes of emergency preparedness and response. The management of the plant, the government and regulatory bodies failed to take adequate safety measures despite the fact that there was evidence that the surrounding area was vulnerable to strong earthquakes and Tsunamis. As a result, their efforts in averting or limiting the damage caused by the disaster were not as effective as expected. Moreover, the lack of sufficient training among the personnel within the plant and the lack of thorough equipment inspection further aggravated the occurrence of the disaster. In addition to this, communication failures and poor management on the part of the government, the Japanese Nuclear Safety Commission (JNSC) and TEPCO, the operator of the nuclear plant further heightened the gravity of the disaster. Based on the findings of the provided case study and the report compiled by the NAIIC, it is apparent that the TEPCO management, the government and relevant regulators lacked appropriate management tact to operate an effective emergency response and management to a disaster of that scope (NAIIC 2012). References Coombs, T., 2011, Ongoing crisis communication: Planning, Managing and Responding, SAGE, London. Funabashi, H., 2012, “Why the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster is a man-made calamity”, International Journal of Japanese Sociology vol 21, Issue 1, pp. 65-75. Haddow, G. & Bullock, J. & Cappola, D., 2011, Introduction to Emergency Management, Butterworth-Heinemann, Burlington, MA. Hasegawa, K., 2012, “Facing Nuclear Risks: Lessons from the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster”, International Journal of Japenese Sociology, vol 21, issue 1, pp. 84-91. 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