Emergency or Disaster Situation Occurred in the United States - Essay Example

 Lessons Learned During the Katrina Disaster Six days before the storm hit coastal Louisiana, weather watchers were aware that Hurricane Katrina had the potential to develop into a strong force. Although residents were urged to leave town, even going so far as to call for a mandatory evacuation as the storm did indeed gain in strength crossing the warm waters of the Gulf of Mexico, little was done to ensure the recovery or rescue efforts for those people who could not or would not leave the city were made readily available. While the storm caused significant damage, coupled with the subsequent flooding following the levee breaks, pre-storm positioning of rescue equipment from the Coast Guard and other entities proved to be insufficient to handle the degree of damage and flooding presented. Most disasters do not occur because of a single event. It takes the failure of multiple systems or stages, and for a number of incidents to happen in a precise, systematic order. This was the case with the New Orleans disaster as location, lack of proper advance planning and lack of appropriate infrastructure contributed significantly to the disaster. The rescue operations and the response to the hurricane’s aftermath showed that it was a total failure. This failure is not just about failures in emergency response at the local, state and federal levels or failures in the overall emergency management system, it is also about failures of the social support systems. Hurricane Katrina was one of the worst natural disasters to ever strike American soil. However, it might not have been such a costly storm if certain measures had been taken prior to the storm’s landfall and if others had been better organized following its departure. Hurricane Katrina was classified as a category 4 storm as it made landfall, although it had been rated as high as category 5 as it churned through the gulf. According to the National Hurricane Center cited in Lindell, Prater & Percy (2006), this level of storm would have been expected to blow down all street signs, cause extensive damage to some buildings while completely destroying others, including many residential failures, complete mobile home failure and major vegetative damage (Ch. 5). In the particular case of New Orleans, though, additional factors had to be taken into account as well. New Orleans is a city that sits on average 12 feet below sea level and is also located along the Gulf of Mexico. The city is also bordered by the Mississippi River and by Lake Pontchartrain. This bowl-shaped valley in which the city resides is a natural spill-over point if and when any of these bodies of water experience a significant increase in the water levels. The storm swell, as was predicted, caused water levels in Lake Ponchartrain to rise, which, again as expected, began to overflow the complicated yet antiquated levy system that rises in some places as much as 50 feet above the city. New Orleans presents such a unique disaster scenario that it was the subject of a disaster drill held by FEMA only two months before Katrina arrived (Niles, 2005). Action plans developed as a result of this disaster drill identified slightly more than 75 percent of the necessary local sheltering that would be required based upon an average sheltering period of 100 days, although state and local resources were only equipped to handle the first 3-5 days of this need. Local search and rescue groups were developed complete with transportation plans to evacuate stranded residents within a command structure that would encompass up to four areas while medical plans were found to be in serious need of revision as alternate care facilities and evacuation routes remained to be identified. Finally, debris was estimated from the likely damage and plans were made for prioritization of debris removal and locating landfill and hazardous material waste sites within state where this debris could be taken. In addition, numerous studies were conducted as a means of identifying the city’s most threatening weaknesses. Although studies had indicated the dangers regarding the aging levy system and expanding city, tax dollars raised to fortify the levy system were instead spent on improving roadways and public transportation systems designed to help city residents evacuate in cases of emergency. Unfortunately, many of these routes were also shut down, preventing approximately 20 percent of the city’s population from leaving. Storm unpredictability prevented the issuance of a mandatory evacuation until 9:30 Monday morning, only 22 hours prior to the storm’s landfall and approximately 3 days later than what would be needed to facilitate total evacuation of the city (Ch. 5). Pre-impact planning also did not consider the complete failure of 17th Street Canal levy, which “sent a churning sea of water from Lake Pontchartrain coursing across Lakeview and into Mid-City, Carrollton, Gentilly, City Park and neighborhoods farther south and east” (McCash & O’Byrne, 2005). Again, as should have been expected given the nature of the equipment, several of the pumping stations serving the city began to fail under the heavy strain of overflowing levees and torrential rain, complicating the 17th Street Canal levee failure which flooded the city. Despite the expected devastation that would occur within the city as a result of this direct hit by Katrina and the authorization given prior to the storm’s arrival for full federal aid, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) issued orders that first responders should not make a move toward New Orleans unless specifically dispatched by state and local authorities, which did not occur until well after the hurricane struck, placing no specific emphasis on the need for quick action (Niles, 2005). In keeping with the action plans devised during the Hurricane Pam disaster drill, state and local agencies were expected to respond to the initial emergency situations brought on by the storm in such areas as search and rescue, medical assistance and evacuation. When the storm hit, though, much of the necessary infrastructure of these systems were rendered impossible or hopelessly ineffective as communications systems and transportation routes were taken offline. FEMA, organized more as a coordinating umbrella group rather than a first responder, was slow to realize the gravity of the situation and the inability of the local authorities to meet the overwhelming and often conflicting need for additional resources. As is mentioned in the Lindell (2006) text, the units of the system (the households, governmental agencies and private organizations within the city) were rendered incapable of action while the organizational functions of FEMA, in keeping with the National Response Plan (NRP), held back slightly, allowing the space for these agencies to implement the plans (Ch. 9). When state and local agencies were able to make it clear that they were incapable of managing the emergency from the ground, the national agencies found it difficult to step in and organize the local efforts such as rescue, law enforcement and evacuation that it had never prepared for. While it was recognized that the federal level should not be considered or expected to be a first responder in cases of emergency, one of the lessons learned through Katrina was that FEMA and other national responders should prepare to become the first responder should conditions become so severe that local and state agencies are rendered incapable of acting on their own behalf. Taking an All Hazards approach to emergency management planning meant the city of New Orleans had previously identified the various risk factors likely to arise in the event of an emergency, including assessing which emergencies might have similar demands on resources as a means of extending training, facilities and equipment to cover a range of issues. “Commonality of emergency response functions provides multiple use opportunities for personnel, procedures, facilities and equipment – which, in turn, simplifies the EOP by reducing the number of functional annexes. In addition, it simplifies training and enhances the reliability of organizational performance during emergencies” (Lindell, Prater & Perry, 2006: Ch. 9). However, the scope of the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina was much more widespread than had been anticipated and these resources, further incapacitated by the infrastructure failures, were spread too thin to deal with the situation effectively. According to secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, the levy break was the killing point of the disaster: “I think that second catastrophe really caught everybody by surprise.  In fact, I think that’s one of the reasons people didn’t continue to leave after the hurricane had passed initially.  So this was clearly an unprecedented catastrophe.  And I think it caused a tremendous dislocation in the response effort and, in fact, in our ability to get materials to people” (Russert, 2005). As a perfect example of the doubling of resources and the problems this caused, with many roads flooded and entire sections of the city completely inaccessible by ground vehicles, the only means of getting supplies to people was through air drops and helicopters, the very resources that were necessary for rescue and evacuation. This highlights the need for federal organizations such as FEMA through the NRP and National Incident Management System to streamline the departmental cooperative process, encouraging more seamless integration of such services as the Coast Guard, FEMA task forces and Department of Defense (DOD) forces with state and local forces in whatever state of readiness they might be operating in given the conditions of infrastructure and communication resources following the disaster. At the same time that local resources were being stretched to their limits and pre-staged resources were moving in sporadic and individual fashion to do what they could in the chaos following the storm and subsequent flood, it also became clear that the national organizations operated to such a bureaucratic level that they were rendered nearly totally incapable of efficiently and effectively allocating appropriate resources and offers of aid to the appropriate areas. FEMA demonstrated that it was too wrapped up in governmental red tape to be sufficiently flexible to handle the unique double catastrophe that was occurring on the ground and woefully behind technological achievements in asset management and distribution that have long been the success factor for thousands of US businesses. Aaron Broussard, the president of the Jefferson Parish of New Orleans, appeared on the Tim Russert show discussing the various ways in which the bureaucracy of the national organizations have served to indirectly cause the deaths of many individuals rather than preventing unnecessary suffering. “It’s so obvious. FEMA needs more congressional funding. It needs more presidential support. … It needs to be an independent agency that will be able to fulfill its mission to work in partnership with state and local governments around America.  FEMA needs to be empowered to do the things it was created to do.  It needs to come somewhere, like New Orleans, with all of its force immediately, without red tape, without bureaucracy, act immediately with common sense and leadership, and save lives” (cited in Russert, 2005). In making this claim, Broussard pointed to several instances in which FEMA directives actually contributed to suffering and death rather than relieving the needs of the people. These included the turning back of three trucks full of drinking water, the refusal to distribute diesel fuel held on Coast Guard vessels for rescue trucks on the ground and the intentional disconnection of the emergency communication lines within one of the heavily flooded areas of the city.  All of these examples exhibit a complete breakdown in communication regarding which resources were needed in various areas of the city, as well as conflicts in the distribution of the assets that were available. Thus, a third lesson learned in the Katrina disaster was the need for the national agencies to develop a more flexible operational model in which the ability to take first responder status should the need arise would exist to some degree of effectiveness while still efficiently managing resources and assets at the local, state and national level as well as those offered through public, private and foreign sectors to greatest good. The evacuation order issued by Mayor Nagin the morning before the storm’s landfall is estimated to have mobilized approximately 1 million of the city’s 1.3 million inhabitants safely out of the area before the hurricane (“New Orleans”, 2005), but these numbers indicate approximately 300,000 people were still in New Orleans when the storm hit and were presumably still there when the levees broke. Of these, emergency planners had estimated approximately 112,000 residents did not have access to their own transportation and were thus unable to leave unless able to find rides with friends, neighbors or relatives (Russell, 2005). These were the individuals who were instructed to make their way to the Superdome, a ‘shelter of last resort’ as it was labeled by Nagin (Russell, 2005). With the stadium filling up with approximately 20,000 people and proving itself structurally unsound, two big holes being ripped in the ceiling during the storm and no food or water on hand, requests for as many as 700 buses were met with only 100 sent (Niles, 2005). Like many of the other resources within the city, the buses were chiefly occupied with bringing residents or the recently homeless to the Superdome and convention center rather than attempting to take them out of the area altogether. Many individuals restricted to the city because of various medical conditions were found dead within the shelters because of a lack of adequate evacuation efforts improperly managed by a broken state and local effort and mismanaged by a national effort that wasn’t properly prepared for taking on these responsibilities. Although state and local agencies had participated in evacuation planning prior to the storm including elements such as evacuation routes, communication methods, transportation assets, evacuee processing and agencies coordination, the federal agencies had little involvement with or knowledge of these plans. As a result, FEMA had difficulty obtaining the buses necessary to evacuate the city as well as difficulty in delivering the food, water and medicine that evacuees required despite the close proximity of Red Cross Services. Through the problems that emerged as a result of poor inter-departmental cooperation and organization, almost complete break down and/or overwhelming of state and local resources, tremendous interference of complicated bureaucracy on the part of federal agencies and lack of adequate information sharing among agencies, the Katrina disaster was made worse. Perhaps the greatest lesson learned through the disaster was not the specific individual failures that resulted, but rather the need for a more effective, efficient means of communication among agencies and a pre-structured hierarchy of control. As soon as it is obvious that one agency has been incapacitated, the next agency takes over. Integration of modern technology in terms of asset management and material distribution would somewhat reduce the issues of getting adequate supplies into disaster areas in a timely manner as well as getting people out when necessary. By the same token, increased integration of the various response agencies in formulating disaster response techniques and policies would enable such agencies as the Coast Guard, National Guard and FEMA task forces to work together for more effective and efficient provision of services rather than overlap, neglect and mismanagement. This type of advance planning could help to reduce some of the more blatant bureaucratic delays that occurred in New Orleans as well as facilitate greater use of materials and supplies whether they are brought in by public, private or foreign groups. Greater transparency among agencies and greater flexibility through technology should ensure disasters such as Katrina will not be mismanaged to such devastating effect in the future. Works Cited Lindell, Michael K; Prater, Carla S. & Perry, Ronald W. Fundamentals of Emergency Management. Washington D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Management Institute, 2006. “New Orleans Braces for Monster Hurricane.” Weather. CNN [online]. (August 29, 2005). June 24, 2007 Niles, Robert. “A Timeline of Government Response to Hurricane Katrina.” AUSC Annenburg. Los Angeles, CA: University of Southern California, Annenburg Center for Communication, (September 7, 2005). June 24, 2007 Russell, G. “Nagin Orders First-Ever Mandatory Evacuation of New Orleans.” The Times-Picayune. New Orleans, LA, (August 28, 2005). June 24, 2007 Russert, Tim. Meet the Press. [Transcript]. MSNBC. (September 4, 2005). June 24, 2007 Read More