The Kyoto Protocol and climate change - Essay Example

? The Kyoto Protocol and climate change Why have countries failed to agree a follow-up to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and what does this say about the politics of climate change would be the best questions to ask regarding the Kyoto protocol. This is an agreement of historic proportion to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNCFCC) that treats the global warming seriously (Coppock ,1998). This agreement brings to attention the challenges the world is facing due to human induced climate change. By doing so it legally binds industrialized countries that are key producers of emissions to reduce the emissions of six noxious greenhouse gases by 5.2 % below the bas year (1990) level by 2008-2012. Thus the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) will not be sidelined due to its pivotal role of investing in the fossil fuels (Ghanem et al., 2000). Climate change is an inherent phenomenon and beside human activities inducing it, there are other natural process impacting it to varied degrees such as volcanic eruption, natural fires, and landslides among others. But if the natural processes were the only ones operating on the planet Earth, changes in climates will not only be minimal but one that natural system can adjust itself for. The impact of human is thus devastating as it increases more global emissions into the atmosphere. The Kyoto protocol covered four main greenhouse gases namely CO2, Methane, Nitrous Oxide, Sulphur hexafluoride, Hydofluorocarbons and Perfluorocarbons while neglecting another warming force; the black soot particles from the incomplete combustion of wood and fossil fuels (Schiermeir 2012 p.3). The agreement was meant to rally the world to sort for less polluting and damaging causes to the environment and the international economy with the ultimate goal of reducing human health threat (Coppock 1998 p.1). However, the protocol has received mix reactions and quite a good resistance from nations that are key emitters. This has hampered its key objective of slowing global warming by reducing CO2 emissions (Schmidt 2000). This paper looks through the agreement to shed light on why the nations failed to follow-up the agreement and the implication of this to the politics on climate change. Global warming and Political climate Global warming is a phenomenon that occurs as a result of greenhouse gases (GHGs) averting thermal radiations from being reflected back to the space. (Wang and Wiser 2002). Coppock (1998, p.2) defines it as the increase in average global temperatures as a result of pumping CO2 into the atmosphere thus changing its temperature levels which in turn affect the water bodies such as oceans and seas leading to alteration of the Earth’s hydrologic cycle. The global warming not only creates fear to the planet’s residents because of rising global temperatures, (currently above 1° C higher than 5 centuries ago) but also an increase in intensity of hydrologic cycles. This causes storms which are responsible to flooding that leads to destruction of farmlands, life and property (Painuly and Rowlands 2001). Generally global warming has more immediate consequences such as floods, rising global temperatures and far-reaching environmental, economic and social impact that does not chose whether one nation is the main producer of emissions or not (Carr and Thomas 1998). The ecosystem, a natural sink( the uptake of greenhouse gas by forests, soil etc) is of paramount importance as the changes in climates may cause organisms of fresh water and wetlands to face new conditions due to higher temperatures and altered precipitation thus may have trouble producing enough organic sediments and root material that enable them to adjust. Contentious issues According to Schiermeir (2012 p.3), for the planet Earth to get rid of dangerous climate change, countries should limit global emissions to less than 2° C above preindustrial levels, the EU’s threshold likely to prevent dangerous climate change. Further, he assert that to contain a temperature rise of 2° C that give the world a 75% chance of containing this temperatures, it require CO2 to stay below 1000 billion tonnes between years 2000 and 2050. This is worrying since the emissions from fossil fuels and deforestation since 2000 has generated more than 450 billion of CO2 into the atmosphere (Schiermeir 2012, p.3). Therefore, Schiermeir reiterates that with the continuation of the current trends, there is a chance of the 1000-billion tonne margin to be surpassed in the near future. Grubb (1998) posited that “foremost amongst the political debates in the Kyoto protocol about implementation mechanisms were those surrounding emissions trading’. This indeed had been a hurdle since then because emission trading also carries dangers and raises more questions that were at the core of political opposition. Thus, Coppock (1998) and Grubb (1998) all agree that the establishment of emissions trading was mired with myriad hurdles of political nature that will either delay the enforcement of the agreement or even to a worse degree, impede it completely. This brought about the question, contingent upon how countries will address the relevant principles, rules, modalities, and guidelines regarding emissions trading. Grubb (1998) remarks regarding emissions trading that it is imperative to ensure that mechanisms are implemented in ways that protect the interests of the atmosphere and not those that protect economic and political interests at the expense of the atmosphere. The ‘hot air’ defined as the degree to which a country’s assigned amount exceeds what its emissions would be in the absence of any abatement measures is thus becoming a point of contention where countries that reduce their emissions through joint implementation (JI) are worried of non-compliance by parties. It is therefore imperative to note that many countries were skeptical even from the beginning to enter into the pact. Ott (1998, p.5) informs that ‘due to the uncertainty surrounding the uptake of greenhouse gases, many delegations felt that their inclusion in the targets was premature’. Quite a number of flaws have been registered since then thus complicating the implementation as well as giving more opportunity for countries to either stay passive as producers of emissions or rejecting to ratify like the United States. Researchers observed that the language of the agreement was also not particularly clear permitting a wide range of interpretations of the protocol. Hence allowing the retroactive nature of application of any decision on additional human induced activities for the first commitment period thus increasing uncertainty about the pact’s scope obligation (Ghanem et al, 2000 and Carr 1998). Inclusion of carbon sink has also reduced the obligation of several countries for instance the U.S announcement regarding to this that its obligation of 7% with sinks will equals a 4% without them. Many nations thus have crafted dubious ways of handling the matter. For instance, the European nations which had an overall reduction obligation of 8 percent came up with the ‘bubble concept’ which proposed a joint implementation to fulfill their obligation. These countries could thus maneuver their schemes that have seen little action towards solving the problem rather than complicating it (Coppock 1998 and Schiermeir 2012). This was seen when the European Community (EC) and its member state had challenges in the negotiations arising from a lack of a legal language and communicating the importance of the bubble to its partners in the first months of the joint implementation (JI) agreement (Ott 1998, p6.). Therefore there is need to be cautious of the impact of the bubble negotiations since some countries such as the United States, Japan Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Russia have had bubble negotiations even before the protocol thus providing a looming danger where the general bubble provision has the potential to create a loophole in the protocol’s obligation rendering it ineffective. This is open to manipulation owing to the fact that there is no mandate given to negotiate further rules about bubbling thus the opportunity could be seized by the countries concerned. Of great concern too in the agreement is the flexibility of economic instruments purported to provide flexibility in the implementation of the reduction obligation (Ghanem et al., 2000, p.5). This, since inception had been rocked by mixed reactions as well as outright opposition especially from developing nations basing their arguments on ethical grounds about the idea of creating the ‘rights to pollute’, and a negotiation ploy against the U.S idea to have developing countries commit themselves (Painuly 2001). And since the United States is the lead emitter, it has been eyed by many nations and the the very slow and uncertain ratification procedures in the U.S Senate delayed any entry force. Coppock (2012 p.9) highlighted that ‘if the US does not ratify the Kyoto protocol, virtually all other industrialized countries will have to accede to it for it to enter into force’ The Kyoto Protocol failed to win the biggest emitters partly because it relied on a mix of ethical and environmental rationale rather than an economic one. Thus since making energy expensive is a political liability everywhere, and when emissions reductions run up against economic growth, economic will inevitably win out, Schiermeir suggest that there is a need for any treaty developed to have tangible goals to avoid clashing politics. Emissions targets for countries should therefore be allocated in a way that acknowledges the political and economic complying with a climate agreement. He also offers that in order to meet their commitments regarding climate change protection, countries can cut their emissions or buy emission allotments from other nations that have exceeded their required reductions as well as rich ones getting credit by investing in low-carbon technologies in developing countries. Although a 2% drop that was attributed to economic downturn was recorded between 2007 and 2008 in the emissions of Kyoto protocol countries, the reductions made under the treaty were dwarfed by huge CO2 emissions from the nations not covered by that accord thus the tripling of emissions by China to almost 10 billion tonnes and those by India doubled to around 2 billion tonnes since 2000. Research shows that the upsurge emissions in the Asian continent is a result of the migration of heavy industry from the developed nations to developing ones whose products are then shipped to the developed wealthy nations .Thus between 1990 and 2010 the emissions resulting from this phenomenon has risen by an average of 10% to give an annual total of 1.4 billion tonnes hence surpassing the total emissions reductions achieved under Kyoto. Carr (1998, p.2) also postulated that key elements such as the OPEC countries, coal mining companies, aluminum producers among other will never readily accept a stringent greenhouse gas reduction because their core economic interests are too vitally threaten. Researchers seem to agree on the mechanisms developed to give impetus to any climate treaty or agreement. Schiermeir (2012, p.3) mentions researchers and experts in the area of climate who offered that attaching a price to carbon, for instance, compensating countries that reduce their emissions below the baseline level through credits that they too could sell to governments or private sectors through the carbon markets thus may act as an impetus for technological advances that reduces emissions. However, it poses a challenge on how to get the right price as well as ensuring that the revenues will be directed to the investments in technology. For instance, they argued that a moderate carbon cost of removing fossil fuels from the ground might work best to stimulate innovation in technology that may eventually trigger emergence of energy sources cheaper than fossils fuels, but it needs to be global. Also a pragmatic, diversified and less bureaucratic climate agreements and treaties unlike the Kyoto which will wean the global economy off carbon as a by-product of reducing poverty as well as expanding energy to the poor should be sorted for. Since CO2 has long lifetime in the atmosphere, there is also a need to cut emissions by black carbon and methane that do not last long thus slowing global warming more quickly while providing time for a transitional low carbon economy. . Conclusion The Kyoto Protocol is seen by some researchers as a remarkable achievement in international affairs. First it has put the world on the right path by bringing in the issues of climate change to table so as the nations can chose to join the work force to regulate the emissions. Second it will leave a valuable legacy since it developed methodologies for reporting and verifying national greenhouse-gas emissions and land-use changes that will act as guide for future climate treaty -as with any agreement containing specific quantified and legally binding commitments, issues of monitoring and compliance are central. Third, it has come with a way of trading carbon emissions through the EU’s Emission Trading Scheme among countries that face limits. Also through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) transactions, an establishment of market incentives is proposed for rich countries to get credits towards achieving their emissions’ targets by making cost-effective emissions cuts in poor. The CDM despite critics that it is plagued by bureaucracy, had an arm’s length investment worth almost U$100 billion supporting some 5000 CDM projects whose services range from provision of solar cookers to rural people, e.g. in China to supporting clean energy production projects such the 100-megawatt wind firm in Mexico (Schiermeir 2012 p.3). In addressing the development of other treaties like the Kyoto, preceding treaties should be constructed like trade accords that are tailored using realistic assumptions about commitments and rely on mutual action since more flexible treaties will help countries to craft deals that are truly independent. And on its shortcomings, according to Schmidt (2000 p.4), the Kyoto protocol main hurdles lies on the take by the industrialized countries. Up to 2000, out of 150 countries that negotiated for the protocol in 1997only 24 countries all of them in the developing world had ratified the agreement excluding the major powers that are the key bulk producers of emissions worldwide; and up to date (2013) only 37 countries have ratified it. The U.S with the highest threshold equivocally criticized the protocol as unfairly saddling the US with most of the responsibility for emission reduction while considerably being lenient on the requirements imposed on developing countries. This has made the Annex I parties to offer a cold shoulder in ratifying the agreement thus its failure in Copenhagen in 2009 as a result of the nations ambivalence actions on a follow-up of the protocol. The political scope of the protocol will therefore continue to widen has there is minimal possibilities to come into force without key emissions producers ,yet, the total CO2 emissions have raised from 22.7 in 19990 to 33.9 billion in 2011, Schiermei (2012 p.3). And finally, countries may not achieve the goal of the protocol without clear ways since those targeted to ratify are key emissions producers who argue that the implementation of the protocol is costly and may jeopardize industry economics. Even with more than 200 multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) since 1972 as Wang and Wiser (2002) posit, it is a challenging thing as it confronts governments and the international community regarding how best to implement and comply with the commitments under the environmental agreements. It is this core element that will help the nations that ratify any environmental treaty to deal with those that may fail to meet the obligations of the protocol that has been the key point of contention and it is this that has seen the U.S out of the protocol in 2001. Thus the Kyoto protocol on global warming will continue to struggle to survive in a political climate hotter than the global climate it was intended to cool, as Schmidt Charles remarked. The protocol will continued to be rocked by myriad of constraints as without the support of the US which is not only the world’s largest GHGs emitter but also the world’s only superpower thus it has more resources to invest in clean technologies and development than any other country. These has a great influence on other countries as it has been seen by the ambivalent action of Russia which delayed its ratification 7 years down the line till 2004. Ideally developing nations that are also in the bracket of GHGs emitters like China and India actually may not have incentives to take on emissions targets if their biggest trade competitor is out of the scene. Apart from the above reasons as why the US’s absence in the protocol may render it ineffective, historically it has made a lot of contributions in environmental circles including the drafting of this contentious protocol. 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Rowlands, IH 2001, ‘The Kyoto protocol’s clean development mechanism: a sustainability assessment, ’Third World Quarterly, vol.22, no.5 Ott, HE 1998, ‘The Kyoto protocol: Unfinished business,’ Environment, Wuppertal, Germany, vol.40, no.6, pp.4&9 Painuly, JP 2001, ‘The Kyoto protocol, emissions, trading and CDM: An analysis from developing countries’ perspective,’ The Energy Journal, Roskilde, Denmark, vol.22,no.3 Schiermeir, Q 2012, ‘Hot Air,’ Nature, Macmillan Publishers Limited, Munich, Germany, vol. 491, pp.3 Schmidt, CW2000, ‘Spheres of influence: The Kyoto protocol,’ Environmental Health Perspective, vol.108, no.8 Wang, X& Wiser, G2002, ‘The implementation and compliance regime under the climate change convention and its Kyoto protocol,’ RECIEL, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, Oxford, UK, vol.11, no.2 Read More