Emotions, Consciousness and the Self - Term Paper Example

?Academia Test Order 534702 Bernhard Bierlich, Ph.D. 05.17.11 Completed: 23:00 Methodology: Emotions, Consciousness and the Self CONTENTS Introduction The research process Thesis and hypothesis Results: Sartre, 1985, pp. 56-91 Conclusion References Introduction This analysis explores the nature and origin of human emotions of anger, revenge, hatred, shame, sadness, etc. and draws mostly on the seminal work of Sartre’s Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions from 1939 (Sartre, 1985) that contextualizes the issue in the literature and advances a thesis for the social foundations of feelings, consciousness and the self. In the following I shall follow Sartre’s arguments and highlight where his hypothesis differs from other statements that appear to have their weaknesses and strengths compared to the social word in which feelings and the self are played out. The aim of this analysis is to assess Sartre’s theory of the emotions and how he, in his arguments, follows general scientific standards and the use of (appropriate) methods for the enquiry. As a core requirement in the presentation of an argument any scientific work has to begin by introducing the topic chosen in terms of a “research question” and a “hypothesis” (a “preliminary”, i.e. ahead of the actual research, answer to the question). One then has to proceed by clearly stating the aim of the research and how one wants to “explore the problem” by comparing one or the other “literary source and concept”. Importantly, one also has to define the topic by qualifying it and the literature in terms of a particular set of “methods” to be used and deemed appropriate, be they person-oriented and qualitative, or of a more quantitative nature, or a mix of the two groups. At this stage, follows the “results-section”, an analysis and discussion of the data collected. Finally, conclusions and recommendations are made, and one also notes in which sense one’s study has tested the research question (Ellen, 1984). ‘ The Research Process Research, the search for knowledge and problem-solving, is a process whereby one continually adds to knowledge (Ellen, 1984). By this understanding, research is an ongoing process. There are, however, certain procedures to be followed and standards to be adhered to, be they of an “inductive” (experimental: “arriving at a theory based on facts”) or “deductive” (“facts are organized to match theory”) nature. Based on this division, one arrives at a “positivistic” and “relativistic stance”, resulting in a contrast of “explanation” (deduction, positivism, quantification) and “understanding” (induction, relativism, qualification) (Alexander, 1983; Gellner, 1985)1. Thesis and hypothesis In his Sketch For A Theory Of The Emotions Sartre proposes a social and interactionist perspective by stressing the concept of “the social basis of emotions and the self”. His approach is inductive and grounded in arguments and examples to prove his thesis. His work is, he contends (and the present author tends to agree), an important critique of the “classic” literature on the constitution of emotions, consciousness and mind represented by such philosophers-psychologists as William James and Pierre Janet. Their focus is on the “individual” and his/her “consciousness”/”mind” as an analytical point of departure, an entity that exist a priori to one’s argument (Sartre, 1985, pp. 32 ff.)2. Opposed to this – and very revealing in terms of his empirical theory of emotions that are grounded in various fields of interaction with the social world (e.g., Mead, 1950) - Sartre states: “ It [consciousness] arises as a relation of our psychic being and the world; and this relation –or rather our awareness of it – is not a chaotic relationship between the self and the universe, it is an organized and describable structure” (Sartre, 1985, p. 34) In the latter words, “organized and describable”, lie his procedure of proving his hypothesis regarding the social foundation of emotions. This procedure is followed throughout his thesis in this Sketch. I shall cite various specific examples throughout illustrating his inductive, experiential approach. It is a very clear and systematic argumentation regarding his thesis, and that of “phenomenology”. According to Sartre, emotions are not to be understood in biological or physical terms. He challenges such, in his view, “limited” psychological propositions (explanations of emotions as physical responses that are ultimately confined within the human skull of the individual)3. Sartre proceeds with evidence from psychoanalysis attesting to the meaning of emotions4:. While psychoanalysis, however, understands consciousness and the meaning of emotions in terms of an underlying structure, the unconscious, Sartre and the phenomenological philosophy he represents, on the other hand, adopt a theory of the meaning of emotions that refer back to consciousness itself and where these (emotions) are produced by external situations (ibid: 55). Results: Sartre, 1985, pp. 56-91 In the results section, Sartre clearly lists the arguments and the evidence for his philosophy and the underlying assumptions, discussing these with notions and concepts from psychology (referred to as “classical theories”) that he is opposed to. He gives many and convincing examples of his alternative, phenomenological and experiential approach to emotions, consciousness and the self. Emotions emanate, according to Jean-Paul Sartre, from a relation with the world (they are not merely individual, physical responses). He defines for us the key concepts and questions, i.e. what consciousness, mind and experience are, especially with regard to emotions. Sartre’s position corresponds also to Mead’s (1950) social psychology, which Sartre does not refer to specifically. Mead deals with the experience of the self from the standpoint of society, or from the point of view of communication being essential to the social order. We are thus taken to consider the arguments of social psychology, especially with regard to the effect which the social group has in forming individual experience and behaviour. According to him, a very sharp line cannot be drawn between social psychology and individual psychology. “… we may regard the development of the individual’s self, and of his self-consciousness within the field of his experience, as the social psychologist’s special interest” (Mead, 1950, pp. 209-222). The social theory of consciousness takes the social process of experience or behaviour as logically prior to the individuals and their individual experiencing which are involved in it, and explains their existence in terms of that social process (and not the other way around as some developmental psychologist hold, such as Erikson 1963). Sartre’s influential views of the mind also find their expression in the work on Tahitian, mind and experience in the Society Islands by the psychiatrist and anthropologist Robert Levy (1973). Consistent with Sartre, but introducing a challenging cultural perspective as well, Levy shows the Tahitian language in many respects to be “action-oriented” and not to have general terms for “feeling” or “emotion”. “In an emotion, say anger (“being angry with somebody”), there is an emphasis on something wrong in the relationship of the person to his external physical and social context, the world of actions, plans, and socially defined meanings. The emotions are feelings that are connected with the external relationship of the self with another person. This self in humans is intimately constructed out of group processes and interpersonal relationships (Levy, 1973, p.198). In terms of his criticism of “classical” psychological theories (above), Sartre makes the following introductory comment. “It is obvious indeed, that the man who is frightened is afraid of something. Even if it is a case of one of those indefinite anxieties that one experiences in the dark, in a sinister and deserted passage, etc., it is still of certain aspects of the night, of the world, that one is afraid. And without doubt, all the psychologist have noted that emotion is touched off by some perception – a representative signal etc. But for them, as it appears, emotion then parts company with th object to become absorbed in itself… how can we speak about anger, in which one strikes, reviles and threatens, without mentioning the person who represents the objective unity of all those insults, menaces and blows? In a word, the emotional subject and object of the emotion are united in an indissoluble synthesis. The emotion is a certain way of apprehending the world” (ibid: 57). For Sartre consciousness is being aware of itself (Descartes’ famous dictum “I think, therefore I am”, Baird and Kaufmann, 2008) and the related emotions are a consequence of an “external” act or situation. Emotions (features of consciousness) are, accordingly, first of all related to the world around us. For example, we may feel horror on seeing a face at the window. We feel terror because we are seeing the world, not rationally (“the window is shut, so the man from the outside can not get in”) but “magically” (irrationally) and feel great uncertainty and discomfort and scream and faint – a means of annihilating the world by severing our connection with it for the time being”. (ibid: 86).“ Sartre thinks of consciousness and emotions as being inseparable and the person is directly involved in his emotional experiences. S/he is not, as psychology often claims (see the classical theories cited by him, Sartre, 1985, 99. 32-48) a passive figure exposed to the selfish and enigmatic whims of emotions acting upon him. S/he is an agent of one’s emotions, but situations often compel the person to distance him/herself from a situation perceived to pose a great problem or producing terror. Sartre gives the example of “passive fear and fainting”. This is a clear example of Sartre’s notion of “apprehending the world” differently, magically5. Another example of this magical apprehension of the world may be useful: “If, for example, I have just learned that I am ruined, I no longer dispose of the same means (a private car, etc.) to accomplish them. I shall have to substitute means new to me (taking the motor-bus, etc.) which is precisely what I do not want to do. My melancholy is a method of suppressing the obligation to look for these new ways …” (ibid: 68). In other words, the “magical” (opposite the “rational”) is the name of one of the many ways we have of seeing the world, especially when our emotions are aroused. In the case of emotions, a clear relation of the world to the self exists, and the psychological mechanism of uncertainty/irrationality (“magical thinking”) “does the job”, so to speak, i.e. ensures that what cultural norms and understandings intend to happen occurs. According to Sartre, we can only understand an emotion is its relation to the world which gives the emotion its meaning. Conclusion Sartre does not believe that our emotions are largely instinctual, physiological reactions over which we have no control. Our emotions, Sartre says, are "magical transformations of the world," voluntary ways in which we alter our consciousness of events and things to give us a more pleasing view of the world. Typically, Sartre argues, these "transformations" are a form of "escape-behavior," ways of avoiding some crucial recognition about ourselves. A fine example is also that of “the fox and the grapes”. The fox tries to reach the grapes on the vine but cannot. He explains his failure by deciding "They are sour/too green anyway." But, "it is not the chemistry of the grapes that has changed," Sartre says - it is the fox's attitude. He has come to look at the grapes as sour, to prove he didn't want them anyway. So too, he generalizes, our emotions are strategies we employ to avoid action. (ibid: 65-66). Sartre’s phenomenology of the emotions, one notes, is well-structured. The use of literature to contextualize his arguments and results are of the highest standards and very convincing. Sartre’s work is clearly qualitatively oriented in his argumentation and presentation of evidence. Backed with many examples in the results-section, Sartre tests his hypothesis about the social foundation of emotions successfully. “All emotions have this in common, that they evoke the appearance of a world, cruel, terrible, bleak, joyful, etc, but in which the relations of things to consciousness are always and exclusively magical. We have to speak of a world of emotion as one speaks of a world of dreams or of worlds of madness… The horrible, [e.g.] can appear only in a world which is such that all the things existing in it are magical by nature, and the only defences against them are magical. This is what we experience often enough in the universe of dreams, where doors, locks and walls are no protection against the threats of robbers or wild animals for they are all grasped in one and the same act of horror. And since the act which is to disarm them is the same as that which is creating them, we see the assassins passing through doors and walls; we press the trigger of our revolver in vain, no shot goes off” (ibid: 81,89). References Alexander, J 1983 Theoretical Logic in Sociology. Vol.1: Positivism, Presuppositions, and Current Controversies. Berkeley, University of California Press. Baird, F and Kaufmann, W 2008 From Plato to Derrida. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, Pearson Prentice Hall. Ellen, R Ed. 1984 Ethnographic Research. London, Academic Press. Erikson, E 1963 (orig., 1950) Childhood and society. New York, W.W Norton. Levy, R 1973 Tahitians: mind and experience in the Society Islands. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press. Mead, G 1950 Mind, Self, and Society. From The Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist. Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press. Sartre, J-P 1985 (orig., 1939) Sketch For A Theory Of The Emotions. London, Methuen & Co. Ltd. Read More