The History of Excavation and Interpretation at Great Zimbabwe - Essay Example

Great Zimbabwe Throughout the colonial era, the advocated national development through resource management in order to control rural communities as well as regulate their incorporation into emerging colonial capitalism (Hall, 1996). Great Zimbabwe is a unique site only on account of its scale, for it is the largest of an estimated 150 ruins in the granite country that forms the Zambezi-limpopo water-shed. The regularly coursed masonry is in the Great Zimbabwe style. Those that have been excavated .contain occasional gold objects, copper-wire bracelet, glass beads, and the fire pots and spindle whorls characteristic of the Great Zimbabwe culture. At the Ruanga and Chipadze ruins, cattle were important. Five of the excavated ruins have produced dates that suggest they were all built and occupied between the beginning of the fourteenth and the end of the fifteenth centuries. Some have been dated as late as the sixteenth century (Fagan, 1984). In terms of development in the colonial era, the church offered education and what would today be known as "development" for Africans on the model of charitable church acts. These historical ties laid the foundations for modern development efforts: Christian missions worked arm-in-arm with the state to provide education as well as agricultural training in attempts to "educate" Africans, and at the same time, to create a passive, productive rural labor force for colonial capitalism. There has been widespread scholarship on colonial missions in Africa (Hall, & Bombardella, 2005). The colonial era was marked by the efforts of the state to control the work of missionaries, and by tensions of involvement between missionaries and colonial administrations. These dynamics are important not only in terms of historical context, but as points of reference, as they are noticeable in the modern work of Christian NGOs. In southern Rhodesia, missionaries worked in collaboration with colonial administrators, bargaining with Cecil Rhodes, the head of the British South Africa Company, for land to build schools, chapels, in addition to hospitals (Shepherd, 2002). The system of indirect rule positioned local rulers in opposition to missionaries. Although missions served the colonial regime by intervening the spread of Western culture as well as morally legitimizing colonial rule, they also undermined the regimes dependence on customary authority and "heathen" practices. In northern Rhodesia, this turned volatile, when native catechists worked in opposition to the traditions of the customary rulers supported by British indirect rule. To the extent that the command of African chiefs depended on the culture as well as customary infrastructure of social life, missionaries produced a novel type of "disorder" from the perspective of the colonial administration in the form of millennial movements. Garlake, (1982) documents how in South Africa, as missionaries advocated nonconformist native relations as well as abolitionist movements, they were placed in opposing and collaborative relationships with the colonial and settler states (Hall, 1995). After independence and through the newly formed socialist state, ZANU-PF renewed and transformed dialogues of community development from development-as-charity in the colonial era to development as the right of Zimbabwean citizens. In so doing, the state faced a challenge of legality as it required gaining authority over a rural population that had been politicized in opposition to the Rhodesian state during the war (Piriyaki, 1999). As the mission-educated African elite came to power in recently independent socialist Zimbabwe, the church once again (as in the colonial era) was politically associated with the state. In the early years of independence, doctrines of Christian socialism imposed a welfare state that promised to relieve economic inequalities created by colonialism and to bring fairness to all Africans (Fontein, 2006). This period saw a large propagation of NGO activity in Zimbabwe as the international effort to construct the nation coincided with Cold-War ideological struggles over democracy, socialism, capitalism, as well as development on the international stage (Schmidt, 2006). The important factor during this transition period was that southern Rhodesia had been isolated from the global economy because of international sanctions during the Unilateral Declaration of Independence. Churches, occasionally as NGOs and registered as welfare organizations, were at the front position of the process of leading development efforts as well as rebuilding the nation. At independence in 1980, the political detainees of Ian Smith's government who fought for the liberation of Zimbabwe, and who were educated and prearranged legal support by the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC) through Christian Care, became the new political leaders of independent Zimbabwe (Kinloch, 2006). The early postcolonial years of independence were distinguished by church-state socialism. Prime Minister Robert Gabriel Mugabe called on the church to help in national development, and the State President, Canaan Banana, a Methodist minister, strongly influenced ZCC's programs as well as priorities. He "intentionally pressed for instant interaction between the Church of the People and the People's Government" (Hallencreutz 1988b). In the meantime, Prime Minister Mugabe challenged heads of church denominations and the ZCC during the first International Development Consultation to describe the churches priorities in development relating to the national planning of the Government" (Lucas, 2006). As Christianity traversed with socialism in Zimbabwe, the church allied with the state in national development. Throughout this time, the interests of the church were hard to separate from national interests. President Banana supported a "theology of development" and sponsored "religious socialism". In partnership with the state, the church set up rural development programs in medical, educational, as well as agricultural arenas. At the archaeological site of Great Zimbabwe, on the other hand, a nineteenth-century model village as a ‘live museum’ of the local Shona people has been built to add to the attraction value of the archaeological site, which dates from AD 1100-1450 and furthermore is a World Heritage Site. The village is not authentic in location or form and is more an ‘artist’s impression’ than a factual re-creation. The village gives out false information, on its location, its authenticity and on the Shona, including erroneous stereotyping, while also detracting from the World Heritage Site. The thinking behind the village is that visitors, not finding the archaeology sufficiently enthralling, will need an additional attraction in order to be induced to visit the site. Not only must the aim and intention of a museum or heritage park be clearly established and communicated to the visitor, but the boundaries between what is real and what is fantasy must also be made clear. Zimbabwe’s Shona Live Museum are attempts to re-create an urban, living environment of the past predominantly for an outside tourist market. Colonial Williamsburg, in the United States, is the epitome of the town museum concept and one of the most widely discussed. The re-creation of Williamsburg, capital of the eighteenth-century colony of Virginia, is one person’s vision that of Dr W. Goodwin, rector of Burton Parish, made possible through the auspices of John D. Rockefeller Jr. One of the ‘most important centers’ of white American history has thus been re-created and restored to ‘its former glory’. The ‘park’ re-created streets and open spaces, and contains up to 500 reproduction historic buildings and gardens, of which only eighty-eight were partly original. It reflects in a typically North American fashion a ‘grand’ concept, and the selective reinvention of urban heritage, to provide an ‘experience’. The borders of the Great Zimbabwe State are still ill-defined, although its heartland was in central Mashonaland. Some Great Zimbabwe-style ruins occure in what is now Matabeleland, where Great Zimbabwe people infiltrated Leopard's Kopje territory (Fagan, 1984). Internationally, throughout the 1980s, Western governments as well as foundations were unwilling to give funds to what they supposed were "unreliable" (and socialist) African governments, and chose instead to channel their support through NGOs as well as church bodies. Scholars described the period as the "NGO-ization of the mainline churches" (Lucas, 2006), for the reason that churches in effect became NGOs involved in development programs. In the late 1980s churches also played a vital part in efforts to "democratize" Africa. Local church bodies worked collaboratively with, and were funded by, international religious NGOs. These NGOs started hiring local field staff as well as working through national churches in addition to religious groups. Ecumenical in the field, they collaborated with agencies of different denominations as well as with non-religious NGOs. Christianity influenced and colored their humanitarian work. Towards the end of this period, the growth of churches and Christianity in Africa revealed a "disillusionment with governments that are less and less competent of meeting social needs and of providing economic inducements". In 1980 the Government of Zimbabwe inherited a nation virtually torn apart by a long and vicious bush war and where a tiny white minority had used every means possible to retain political domination. The use of wide-ranging emergency regulations together with other security legislation and a non-justiciable Declaration of Rights had created a legal framework which effectively eliminated individual freedoms. The new nation itself faced serious political, security and economic challenges from both within and without. The fact that it was possible to establish a non-racial, independent and relatively economically healthy nation in the face of these challenges was a considerable achievement for which the government must take great credit. Indeed the practical implementation of the policy of national reconciliation is one which is almost unique in Africa. This was linked to a commitment to constitutionalism despite the fact that the government bitterly disliked many features of the independence Constitution which was imposed by Britain. Despite these positive features, the previous discussion indicates that the Zimbabwean experience raises several vital policy issues. The first, and perhaps fundamental, issue concerns the actual declaration/retention of a state of emergency. In the case of Zimbabwe, the key question is whether its retention up to 1990 actually assisted government in tackling its problems. There is little evidence to suggest that this was the case. At the risk of being over-simplistic, the dissident question, which was for long the major reason for the retention of the state of emergency, was essentially a political problem which required a political solution — as the results of the Unity Agreement dramatically showed. In addition the increased powers given to the security forces were often abused and instead of helping to resolve the unrest in Matabeleland led to the alienation of a sizeable section of the population and to serious abuses of individual freedoms. This starkly illustrates the fact that the declaration/retention of a state of emergency is not a panacea for all national ills. It creates its own problems such that it must be utilised sparingly and only as a last resort. In this respect the Zimbabwean experience highlights the wisdom and importance of Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It follows that any such declaration must inevitably be temporary, must be of the last resort and that governments have a duty to terminate it at the earliest possible moment. Otherwise the 'Permanence of the Temporary' will prevail, with all its attendant ills. This is a point which the Government of Zimbabwe (as well as many other African governments) seemingly overlooked or simply ignored. A related issue concerns the reasons propounded for the continued state of emergency. In Zimbabwe these included increasing crime; security threats from South Africa; internal unrest; re-structuring of the economy; economic problems and industrial unrest. It was argued in earlier chapters that based on Article 4 of the International Covenant (which was the declared basis of the state of emergency in Zimbabwe), these reasons did not justify the retention of the state of emergency. At best reliance on them demonstrated a lack of understanding as to the grounds for proclaiming a state of emergency. At worst they illustrated a desire to use emergency powers to circumvent the normal constitutional process and to rule by decree. This raises the question of what safeguards are possible to prevent unwarranted emergency proclamations. The Zimbabwean (and the Rhodesian) experience demonstrates that effective safeguards enshrined in domestic law are problematical. As was noted earlier, the six-monthly extension process had some value for it at least permitted some public debate on the issue. Even so, the consent of the legislature was always a foregone conclusion. Indeed, despite the existence of a multi-party system the dominance of the ruling party in Parliament ensured that any objective analysis by parliamentarians as to the need for the continued state of emergency was rare indeed. This one-party domination is likely to continue despite the decision of government to retain the present multi-party State. 3 It remains to be seen whether the political changes throughout Africa will encourage a more assertive role for the legislature. Similarly, the effectiveness of constitutional and judicial safeguards in this respect is limited. Even so, the attempt by some African countries, such as Nigeria and Tanzania, to specify the grounds for an emergency proclamation at least has the merit of directing attention to the need for the declaration in the first place. In this respect, the introduction of a similar provision into other African Constitutions would be helpful. The shortcomings of domestic safeguards underscore the importance of international safeguards in this field. Today many international human rights documents ensure that international bodies maintain reviewability over a State's determination as to what constitutes a public emergency. This is in recognition of the basic principle that the proclamation of a state of emergency is not a purely internal matter for a State but one which is open to international scrutiny. Regrettably, Zimbabwe, together with several other African nations, has shown little interest in such documents and, by the end of 1990, had not ratified either of the International Covenants. Clearly this is a situation which must be rectified rapidly. Regrettably the African Charter does not specifically provide for a review of State action in this field by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. Whilst arguably it is possible for the Commission to do so where the State concerned is party to the ICCPR, a specific power would remove all doubt. In this respect it is hoped that eventually the Commission will operate along similar lines to the European model. This would place a duty on a State to report to the Commission the fact of a declaration or renewal of a state of emergency together with the reasons therefore and the steps being taken to end the emergency. In response the Commission would have the power to give an opinion as to whether or not the crisis constituted a public emergency. This procedure has the merit of not only objectively legitimising the emergency declaration in appropriate cases but also of ensuring that pressure is exerted upon governments to end the state of emergency if the reasons are rejected and to help end 'permanent' states of emergency. The third issue concerns the use of emergency regulations. The Zimbabwean experience illustrates that there is a real danger that wide-ranging regulations are used to deal with issues far removed from the stated reasons for the state of emergency. In order to control their use/abuse, it is vital that regulations are limited to areas directly connected with the emergency. This is another reason for requiring governments to give a clear and unambiguous statement as to the reasons for the emergency. Coupled with this is the need to ensure that regulations have a limited life and require specific parliamentary approval. Such principles should be enshrined into the national constitution and be reinforced by a willingness on the part of the judiciary to enforce it. The fourth issue concerns the protection of individual freedoms. Throughout the book it was argued that, especially during a period of public emergency, an effective constitutional framework is necessary to ensure that an acceptable and realistic balance is maintained between the needs of the State and the protection of individual freedoms. Whilst international standards and norms remain influential, domestic safeguards can play a decisive role here. In this respect a justiciable Declaration of Rights which contains adequate protections for individual freedoms is a prerequisite. The critical point here is that there is always a danger that these freedoms will be abrogated or amended by government in such a manner as to render them ineffective. Indeed it was seen in earlier chapters that, on occasions, the State sought to interpret the Constitution in a manner which would have rendered certain individual freedoms entirely nugatory just at the time when they were most needed. Because of the vital importance of the individual freedoms enshrined in the Constitution, it is argued that they should be protected from any further abrogation. One approach is based on the doctrine of the 'basic structure' or 'essential features' of the Constitution which has received the support of courts in both India and Bangladesh. This states that a constitution stands on certain fundamental principles which are its structural pillars. If these pillars are demolished or even damaged, the constitutional edifice will fall. Consequently, any law which has that effect must be pronounced invalid by the judiciary. Whilst an attractive argument in theory, the all too clear danger is that such a judicial pronouncement will lead to a damaging confrontation between the judiciary and government. Thus in practice it is a doctrine which is fraught with danger and should be avoided at all costs by the courts in Africa. The issue is not without importance because clear support for the doctrine was given by the Chief Justice of Zimbabwe, the Honourable Mr Justice A.R. Gubbay, at the opening of the 1991 Legal Year. 10 It is hoped that the courts in Zimbabwe do not seek to adopt the doctrine. The best approach is to provide a clear constitutional provision which specifically prevents the abrogation of individual freedoms, whilst permitting a strengthening of such freedoms. This was recognized by the drafters of the Namibian Constitution who accordingly enshrined the principle in Article 25(1) which states: Save in so far as it may be authorized to do so by this Constitution, Parliament, or any other subordinate legislative authority, shall not make any laws, and the Executive and the agencies of government shall not take any action which abolishes or abridges the fundamental rights and freedoms conferred by this Chapter, and any law or action in contravention thereof shall to the extent of the contravention be invalid. The enactment of such a provision to protect individual freedoms in all African constitutional documents is highly desirable. In the case of Zimbabwe, such a provision would be particularly timely in view of the fact that amendments to the Declaration of Rights now require only a two-thirds parliamentary majority and there are indications of government willingness to weaken individual freedoms. The final issue concerns the use of quasi-emergency legislation. This is used inseveral African states to give the government greatly increased security powers without having to declare a state of emergency. The problem is well illustrated in the case of Zimbabwe for, despite the ending of the state of emergency, other wide-ranging security legislation remains in force. The powers contained in these statutes, and in particular the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act are anachronistic (and many are, arguably, unconstitutional) and remain a threat to the full exercise of individual freedoms. Indeed in many respects it is difficult to differentiate between LOMA and the hated Internal Security Act of South Africa. The failure of the Zimbabwean government to repeal all repressive colonial legislation contrasts markedly with the position in Mozambique where all such legislation was swept away after independence. Overall, the Zimbabwean experience shows that the protection of individual freedoms during a state of emergency is a complex undertaking involving a range of safeguards each of which can make a unique contribution. The basis for such protection is the existence of an enforceable constitutional document backed up by the active co-operation of the legislature, judiciary and other bodies such as statutory human rights bodies and non? governmental organisations. This is then reinforced by the adherence of the State to its international human rights obligations. Of course, at the end of the day, the degree of governmental respect for the rule of law and the protection of individual freedoms during a state of emergency rests on the attitude of the governors themselves. Perhaps the fundamental lesson is therefore that governors have got to work at developing respect for individual freedoms themselves. This is indeed a challenge for many African States. Zimbabwe illustrates some of the difficulties involved in attaining this objective but also shows that it is one which can be achieved. References Hall, M 1996. Archaeology Africa. London: James Currey. Garlake, P 1982. Prehistory and ideology in Zimbabwe, (Manchester: Manchester UP), Hall. M. 1995. The legend of the Lost City. Journal of Southern African Studies 21. Fagan, Brian (1984). The secrets of Zimbabwe - excavation of Great Zimbabwe, UNESCO courier. Fontein, J. 2006. The Silence of Great Zimbabwe: Contested Landscapes and the Power of Heritage (New York: UCL Press). Hall, M. and Bombardella, P. 2005. Las Vegas in Africaa€™, Journal of Social Archaeology 5(1). Kinloch, G.C. 2006. Changing racial attitudes in Zimbabwe: colonial and post-colonial dynamicsa€™, Journal of Black Studies 34. Lucas, G. 2006. Archaeology of Colonial Identity: Power and Material Culture in the Dwars Valley South Africa (UAS: Springer). Piriyaki, I. 1999. Research trends in the Historical Archaeology of Zimbabwe in Funari et al (eds) Historical Archaeology Back from the Edge, (London: Routledge). Schmidt, P. 2006. Historical Archaeology in Africa; Representation, Social Memory and Oral Traditions (New York: AltaMira) Shepherd, N. 2002. The politics of Archaeology in Africa, Annual Review of Anthropology 31. Read More