An Outline of Foucauldian Critique of Modernity - Essay Example

? FOUCAULT’S CRITIQUE OF MODERNITY: OUTLINE AND ASSESSMENT by Presented to of the of the of University] [Name of the City and State] May 5, 2011 Introduction The purpose of this essay is to present an outline of Foucaultian critique of modernity as the stage in philosophical development, and as distinct project of social organization as exemplified by modern institutions. The problems of Foucault’s critique of modernity will be analysed in three sections. In the first one, the Foucaultian criticism of modernity’s claims for the possibility of objective knowledge as a result of scientific procedures will be examined. The second section deals with Foucault’s rejection of the notion of sovereign subject which forms the basic for modern theories of knowledge and cognition. Finally, the third section will be devoted to Foucaultian critique of institutional basis of modernity and the disciplinary character of its rationality. It will be argued that, while Foucault denounced various aspects of modernity, he did not attempt to idealise pre-modern thought/institutions, and remained unsure about social project alternative to modernity, thus contributing to similar indecisiveness among the following post-modernist thinkers. 1. Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge: A Critique of Rationalist Objectivity The modern account of knowledge was premised upon the representationalist epistemology founded by Descartes. Rejecting previous assumptions on the nature and purposes of human knowledge, Descartes posited that knowledge is derived from accurate determination of correspondence of certain representations with the actual objects of external world, a correspondence that can in principle be verified by constructing certain methodological arguments (Gutting, 1999, p. 116). Later modern thinkers basically followed this Cartesian epistemology, assuming that representations under consideration are derived from some innate properties of human mind and reality. Foucault based his epistemological critique of modern philosophy on the thorough deconstruction of Cartesian notions of knowledge. He affirms the historically specific character of knowledge, as opposed to ahistorical Cartesian account of epistemological procedures, assuming that development of structures of human knowledge is governed by alterations in episteme, i.e. ‘total set of relations that unite... the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalised systems’ (Foucault, 2002a, p. 211). Foucault believes that the development of distinctively modern episteme was caused by shift from the Renaissance view of knowledge as system of resemblances that was predicated upon the clarification of interrelation between various objects of surrounding world and men’s place in it, to analytical and interpretational forms of cognition (Carrette, 2000, pp. 15-16). The latter were based not on ‘the sudden and illuminating discovery that all thought is thought’ but on ‘constantly renewed interrogation’ of ‘the forms of non-thinking’ that leads to the reduction of empirical world to some universal and transcendental dialectics (Foucault, 2002b, p. 353). Foucault surmises that universalistic assumptions of modernity’s epistemology are invalidated by the discursive and ultimately relative nature of knowledge as such, for, in his view, the structures of knowledge depend on the character of discourse as practice that brings about the very object that are spoken of (Mahon, 1992, p. 11). Here, one may find that Foucault maintains that the discursive nature of language and knowledge practices does not allow for some objective, universal discourse, and therefore that modernity’s pretences for formulating a transparent methodology of knowledge are unfounded. 2. Foucault on Subject: The Rejection of A Priori Subjectivity The modernity’s view on subject is generally predicated upon the idea of its universality and humanist character, which means that ‘subject’ is conceived as self-conscious ego that is capable of potentially limitless self-improvement and development. Both Enlightenment thinkers and such later modern philosophers as Hegel and Sartre believed that the self was able to articulate its own historical agency and rationally follow the path towards its freedom (Seitz, 2004). Foucault views such claims of supporters of modernity and rationalism with scepticism. In The Order of Things, Foucault (2002b) disputes the objective existence of sovereign subject, noting that the very notion of subject as master of knowledge emerged as a result of formation of so-called ‘human sciences’ on the turn of the 19th century, when the discursive concept of ‘man’ achieved the status of totalizing construct (Foucault, 2002b). Foucault explains that formation of quasi-transcendental discourses of life, labour and language allowed for theorization of ‘epistemological consciousness’ of ‘man’ (Foucault, 2002b, p.336). While pre-modern forms of knowledge conceived of mind and body as of opposites that together constituted a human being, modernity regards ‘man’ as ‘a figuration of finitude’ (Foucault, 2002b, p. 346), i.e. the total subject and object of knowledge that is bound to follow certain laws of biology, linguistics and economics which predate him and over which he has no control. In Foucault’s view, modern concept of subject is riddled with inconsistencies that belie the claims of supporters of modernity to its universality. He identifies three general inconsistencies in modern characteristic of subject, or ‘doublets’, as Foucault terms them: that of cogito/unthought, where it is claimed that subject is determined by exterior forces but still able to exert its will on them; that of retreat-and-return-of-the-origin, which implies that historical processes predate subject but are at the same time subordinated to development of ‘man’; and finally transcendental/empirical doublet, which provide that subject is both autonomous in constructing universal categories and dependent on external world in their construction (Foucault, 2002b, pp. 347-365). Foucault considers the limitations of human sciences caused by their uncritical embrace of subject as constructed by modernity, and comes to the conclusion that the ‘death of man’ is necessary so that epistemological subject can be ‘dethroned’ (Han, 2002, p. 18), and more deep understanding of subject as constructed by effects of desire, language and unconscious (‘unthought’) may lead to more comprehensive understanding of modern individuals. Foucault believes that ultimate ‘death of man’ as a concept is both possible and desirable, pondering that ‘man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea’ (Foucault, 2002b, p. 422). He calls for reconstitution of modernity-constructed human sciences, observing that ‘counter-sciences’ such as psychoanalysis and ethnology would play pivotal role in ‘dethroning’ of man as a sovereign subject, giving due place to unconscious, to ‘the Other’ as a force that shapes individuals (Foucault, 2002b, p. 414). In the writings of his genealogy period (the 1970s) Foucault regards modern individual as shaped by existing power-knowledge structures. Far from being autonomous and independent agent of historical process, the subject of modernity is actively formed by prevailing networks of power into a social construct ‘according to a whole technique of force and bodies’ (Foucault, 1977, p. 217). The very notion of constituent subject as a crux of modern society is thus nothing more than ideological mystification that allows the power networks to internalize their dominance over obedient individuals (Foucault, 1980, p. 117). In total, Foucaultian critique of modern subjectivity rests on the premises of historic specificity of subject as a concept and the structural determination thereof by power relations that define the basic constitution of modern subjectivity. His rejection of subject as a basic unit of analysis, however, is not complete, as Foucault returned to the notion of subject in the 1980s in his later writings on ethics and sexuality (Kelly, 2009, pp. 78-79). In this way it is pertinent to suggest that Foucault does not criticise subject per se, but rather a kind of subjectivity peculiar to the period of modernity. 3. Technologies of Power and Foucaultian Criticism of Modernity’s Disciplinary Rationalism Early modern philosophy and philosophy of Enlightenment generally viewed institutions, including the State ones, as rational organizations established by human subjects in order to safeguard their interests and protect their natural rights. This discourse is rather pronounced in the works of such thinkers as Locke, Hobbes, Montesquieu and Kant, despite all their other differences. The Hegelian philosophy, while criticising the contractarianist notions of Enlightenment thinkers, posits modern institutions as ultimate embodiment of innate development of World Spirit that finds its expression in modern bureaucratic State as its final, and most perfect, expression. Finally, Marxian and Marxian-inspired philosophy views socio-political and cultural institutions as by-products of struggle between various socio-economic classes, maintaining that such institutions are mere superstructure of economic base of a given society, and lack their own dynamics of development. Foucault rejects subjectivist and neutralist views on modern rationalist institutions, such as the State, school, prison and factory. He maintains that, rather than playing exclusively negative and secondary role, power in fact is the source of constitution of modern subject itself, rather than by-product of legalistic (social contract) or economistic (class struggle) phenomena. Focussing on such disciplinary institutions of modernity as prison and asylum, Foucault observes that, rather than mere confinement and isolation, the main aim of such institutions in modern period has been the manufacture of prescribed modes of behaviour that rest upon the conformance with certain disciplinary rules (Foucault, 1995, p. 231). According to Foucault, while pre-modern times were characterised by dominance of negative sovereign power that aimed at preclusion of certain kinds of behaviour through public violence, modern system of power is positive, rather than negative, and consists in two planes, one micro-political, as represented by discipline, another macro-political, expressing itself through biopower (Foucault, 2003, pp. 240-245). The former exists in the form of techniques for training and consequent subjection of individuals within the framework of educational and penitentiary institutions; the latter manifests itself through technologies of mass control, such as demographic measures of the State. Foucault observes that disciplinary techniques such as continual surveillance and tendency to infinite classification of the subject find their widespread expression in modern social life. He points to the school or hospital examinations as to the technique of subjugation and objectification of the ‘docile bodies’ of their subjects (Foucault, 1995, p. 138), as the development of further methods of surveillance and registration gives rise to the new, supposedly ‘natural’ standards of normality. This in turn leads to the emergence of new apparatuses of production that define both production of knowledge and material goods, and imply the accumulation of people directly tied to accumulation of capital (Goldstein, 2005, p. 47). Foucault observes that in the course of the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries such disciplinary techniques spread across the whole range of social institutions, which enabled the mutual reinforcement of power and knowledge structures, and modern society has been gradually transformed into ‘a subtle graduated carceral net, with compact institutions, but also separate and diffused methods’ (Foucault, 1995, p. 297). Even sexual behaviour becomes an object of surveillance and domination, as the transformation of sexuality into a ‘perpetual discourse’ compels the subjects to subordinate their sexual desire to prevalent institutional practices of modern society (Foucault, 1990, p. 33). To summarise, the Foucaultian view of the modern institutions, both of penal and more cultural/educational character, tends to emphasize the hidden oppressive side of instrumental rationality inherent in these institutions. Foucault believes that disciplinary rationality of institutions regarded as crucial to the project of modernity, – such as schools and factories, – far from reflecting the conscious arrangements made by rational individuals, dominates and moulds these individuals according to its own logic if rationalisation and surveillance. The regulation of social life inherent in modernity social structure thus leads to panopticism, whereby all members of society finally end themselves under constant surveillance and discipline (Foucault, 1995, pp. 195-230). 4. Criticism of Foucaultian Views of Modernity Having presented Foucault’s critique of oppressive aspects of modernity and its institutions, it should be noted that Foucaultian notions of modernity may be subjected to reciprocal criticism as well. Habermas (1990) believes that Foucault presents a totalizing and one-sided critique of the Enlightenment project, asserting that the very achievements of the Enlightenment that Foucault criticized enabled him to voice such a critique in the first place. According to Habermas, it was the Enlightenment orientation towards universal morality and objective science freed from earlier transcendental and scholastic constraints that allowed the critical theory to flourish. Indeed, according to Ingram (2005), Habermas viewed Foucault’s critique of modern notions of human rights as merely an attempt to create a new political paradigm for the same normative concept, which would call into doubt Foucault’s anti-humanist pretences (Ingram, 2005, p. 252). Habermas believed that Foucaultian critique was inherently self-contradictory, as Foucault simultaneously denounced modernity’s discursive structures, while following their basic rules in his argumentation (Habermas, 1990, p. 247) Taylor (1984) believed that Foucault’s notions of power and surveillance society suffer from major self-contradiction, as Foucault simultaneously tries to unmask the repressive structures of power and rejects the idea of “a liberating truth” (Taylor, 1984, p. 176), arguing that truth is relative to a particular regime. However, as Taylor observes, if all truth is imposed, there can be no hope of liberation from the repressive power structures (1984, p. 177). Therefore Foucaultian criticism of repressive institutions of modernity is inherently self-contradictory; in its renunciation of modernity, it rejects the very idea of liberation as such (Taylor, 194, p. 152). Finally, it should be noted that Foucault himself appears to have modified his previous position on modernity and the Enlightenment rationalism in his later writings. In his essay “What is Enlightenment?” Foucault (1984) acknowledges the importance of the Enlightenment in introducing a practice of questioning epistemological and political conventions. For Foucault, a true ethos of the Enlightenment now meant the non-acceptance of dominant power-truth structures and the desubjectification, which amounted to defiance of conformist socio-political norms (Foucault, 1984). In this lecture, Foucault apparently makes peace with at least some aspects of the Enlightenment/modernity project, viewing its critical potential as an important factor in developing any possible counter-power initiatives. He rejects the dichotomy of either rejecting the Enlightenment wholesale, or accepting it uncritically (Foucault, 1984, p. 43), preferring to take the historical significance of the Enlightenment into account. Conclusion In general sense, the Foucaultian critique of modernity rests on three pillars: the denunciation of assumption about objective character of social knowledge; the rejection of the notion of sovereign subject as the key agent of historical process and scientific research; and finally, the sceptic attitude towards instrumental rationality and institutions of modernity that reflect this rationality. Foucault does not call for a return to pre-modern forms of discourse and/or power; on the contrary, he believes that, even though modernity’s ethics is rather inadequate, the pre-modern ethics were thoroughly repressive and “disgusting”. 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