Cuban Missile crisis and Cold War intelligence - Term Paper Example

?Cuban Missile Crisis and Cold War intelligence Introduction Relations between the Soviet Union and the United s of America (U.S.A) were always strained. It was to defeat the common enemy Germany that the relationship between the Soviet Union and U.S.A. witnessed better times during the Second World War. The defeat of Germany towards the end of the Second World War removed the reason for any bonhomie, and the two reverted to their opposing positions. This relationship between the Soviet Union and U.S.A. from the end of the Second World War till the collapse of the Soviet Union came to be known as the Cold War. The hallmark of the Cold War was that though confrontations occurred between these two super powers in different parts of the world in their attempts to enhance their spheres of influence, they never came into direct conflict with each either. Instead proxies took up the cudgels for the two competing super powers in these conflicts. This characteristic of the Cold War was good for humanity, as both possessed nuclear weapons in enough quantities to destroy each other and the rest of the world. However, the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 brought these two super powers close to direct conflict with each other and the possibility of nuclear destruction. The world watched with bated breath as the moves and counter moves went on for six days. The American ground forces were readied for the invasion of Cuba and the nuclear might of America was al set for delivery onto the Soviet. The order for these actions never came, as in the eleventh hour the Russian Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev decided use the option for defusing the tension provided by President Kennedy of pulling out the troublesome missiles from Cuba in exchange for non-invasion of Cuba pledge by the U.S.A (Divine, 1988). Background In April 1961 a Cuban exile force armed and sponsored by U.S.A was sent into Cuba to remove Fidel Castro and the threat of communism on the door steps of U.S.A. The result was a disastrous defeat of the Cuban exile force at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba. Almost a year later the Defence minister of Cuba and younger brother of Fidel Castro paid a visit to the Soviet Union. The result of this visit was the despatch of Soviet Union military personnel and weapons to Cuba on the plea that Fidel Castro required the support of the Soviet Union to defend Cuba against any invasion of Cuba by U.S.A. (Garthoff, 1989). Republican protests on the large military build up in Cuba started in the U.S.A., which became even more strident, when photographs taken by a U-2 plane overflying Cuba, revealed ongoing construction work for a surface-to-air missile (SAM) site, which was taken to be defensive posture by the Kennedy administration. The CIA perception of this was that it could be the prelude to the more ominous introduction of SAM’s with offensive potential. Though the Soviet Union continued to deny any offensive posturing, Republican pressure on the Kennedy administration for a response began to mount. Subsequent CIA U-2 provided even more disquieting news of the Soviet Union building launching sites for their medium-range ballistic missiles and long-range ballistic missiles (Divine, 1988). America needed to respond now. Two options of response were studied. The first involved the use of the American Air Force to bomb the missile sites. The second was a blockade of Cuba by the American Navy to prevent the transportation of any missiles to Cuba. The second option became the chosen response, for it provided the benefit of slow escalation. The Soviet response was to challenge the blockade. However, better sense prevailed and there was no attempt to break the blockade. Instead, the Russians agreed to withdraw the offending missiles, stop the missile site build-up, and withdraw the Russian bombers capable of delivering nuclear bombs that were stationed in Cuba. In response U.S.A. declared that it would not invade Cuba (Divine, 1988). Cold War Intelligence Evaluation of the American intelligence activities from the start of the Cold War, through the Korean War and up to the Cuban missiles shows clear disparities in understanding of the intentions of the Soviet Union and their willingness to go to war, particularly a nuclear war in the pursuit of their aim of spreading communism (Hughes-Wilson, 2004). To a very large extent the disparities in the understanding of Soviet Union risking a war with U.S.A to attain its communism expansion activities can be attributed to the divergent perspectives between the civilian intelligence agency in the form of the CIA and military intelligence. CIA analysts using the Marxist conception of history that was at the heart of Communism, with it’s posit that a Communist world would finally emerge without the requirement of wars and Communist military conquests, strongly espoused the view that the Soviet Union would not go to war, and many of its apparent aggressive postures were really defensive postures. This position could be held to have some basis, from the observation that whenever U.S.A took a firm position that was based on historical strength, the Soviet Union either moderated their stand or backed down. However, Military Intelligence on the other hand believed strongly that military power was the sole determinant of the behavior of states. Hence, with the Soviet Union still wedded to carrying out programs to enhance their military power, the commitment of the Soviet Union towards a Communist world would always carry with it the threat of a nuclear war, and responses of U.S.A. to the moves and counter moves of the Soviet Union would need to keep this potential of a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union in its calculations (Mathias, 2001). The development of the Cuban Missile Crisis had its origins in the Bag of Pigs incident in 1961 that ended in disaster. The failure did not deter the military, which drew up fresh contingency plans for an invasion of Cuba. However, the Kennedy did not believe in any future military misadventures against Cuba, as it was fraught with several moral and political risks. Instead it preferred less overt means to sabotage the Cuban government (Fischer, 1998). Cuban intelligence and the Soviet intelligence gave serious thought to the American strategies against Cuba and the possibility of another invasion. Soviet intelligence lacked the ability to penetrate into the decision making processes in the Kennedy administration. So, they relied more on information that they could glean from American diplomats and third party sources. It is not easy to assess the understanding of the Soviet intelligence on an American attack on Cuba, since their utterances on this varied, based on situations and circumstances. There are indications that Soviet intelligence had correctly read the situation that the Kennedy administration would not allow the military to attack Cuba. However, what they portrayed to Cuban military intelligence was just the opposite. This raises the strong possibility that though the reason for placing missiles in Cuba was for the defence of Cuba against any possible future attacks by U.S.A, this was merely a ruse for the in reality the interest was strategic, particularly with the Soviet Union facing American missiles close to home from the missile bases in Turkey (Fischer, 1998). This raises the first mistake of American intelligence during the Cuban missile crisis, which is the failure to understand the true motives of the Soviet missile deployment in Cuba. Thus, in the development of the strategic response to the Soviet missile deployment in Cuba the strong possibility of strategic interests of the Soviet Union were not taken into consideration (Fischer, 1998). The next issue with regard to American intelligence during the Cuban missile crisis is in the failure of the CIA to detect the presence of the Soviet missiles in Cuba much earlier. America was closely watching the Soviet weaponry build-up in Cuba. Yet, it missed the transhipment of the Soviet missiles and the supporting equipment required for the missiles. The construction of missile sites scarred the landscape of Cuba, as the Soviet Union made no attempt to mask the construction sites and yet, the CIA failed to detect them. Data available with Cuban intelligence shows that information on the missiles and the construction sites was being sent to the U.S.A. from their covert network in Cuba. It remains baffling as to why the CIA remained blind and deaf, leading to a delayed response in the Cuban missile crisis (Fischer, 1998). Finally, there is the issue of the underestimation of the number of Soviet military personnel present in Cuba just prior to the Cuban missile crisis. Just prior to the Cuban missile crisis there were 42,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba, while CIA estimates gave the presence of Soviet military personnel in Cuba as 16,000. The CIA may use the excuse that these Soviet military personnel used civilian clothing during their presence in Cuba. However, they moved in military formations, had short cropped hair, and were much fairer than the local populace, thus making it easy for identification. The failures of American intelligence led to delayed response and heightened tension during the Cuban missile crisis (Fischer, 1998). Conclusion The Cuban missile crisis may appear as an offshoot of the Bay of Pigs incident sponsored by the U.S.A. However, it is quite likely that the Soviet Union attempted to utilize the opportunity to strengthen their strategic position against the U.S.A and fed their Cuban allies with the deception of the strong possibility an American attack to facilitate the placing of Soviet missiles on Cuban soil. Failures on the part of the American intelligence led to a delayed response to the presence of Soviet missiles on Cuban soil so close to home. Literary References Divine, R. A. (1988).The Crisis. In Robert, A. Divine (Ed.), The Cuban Missile Crisis (pp.3-8). Second Edition. Broadway, New York: Markus Weiner Publishing. Fischer, B. A. (1998). Perception, Intelligence Errors, and the Cuban Military Crisis. In James, G, Blight and David, A. Welch, (Eds). Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis (pp.150-172). London: Frank Cass Publishers. Garthoff, R. L. (1989). Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute. Hughes-Wilson, J. (2004). Military intelligence blunders and cover-ups. New York: Avalon Publishing Group. Mathias, W. C. (2001). America’s Strategic Blunders: Intelligence Analysis and Security Policy: University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press. Read More