Risk Management of BP Deepwater Horizon Disaster - Essay Example

? . Risk Management: BP Deepwater Horizon Disaster By Candi s FACULTY OF BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT Executive Summary This report presentsa discussion about factors that contributed to the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster on April 20, 2010 as workers proceeded to drill an exploratory well, the Macondo well, in the Gulf of Mexico 13,000 feet under the sea bed and under 5000 feet of water. The BP Deepwater Horizon disaster was to present a spill of national significance that resulted in the loss of eleven lives, presented damage amounting to billions of dollars and was to affect the Gulf of Mexico region in complex ways due to the continued flow of hydrocarbons into the Gulf for eighty-seven days. Previously, the safety culture at BP had presented a cause for concern with the Texas City Refinery explosion and other events presenting an adverse image. Toney Hayward, the former CEO of BP, had tried to enhance safety at BP when he took office at a time when BP faced three criminal investigations. However, it would appear that the managerial decision-making processes at BP remained flawed as managers continued to take risks in efforts directed towards trying to manage costs and delays while neglecting safety. Although it is likely that a blowout preventer with a flawed design contributed to the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster, the managerial emphasis on costs and delays caused BP subcontractors to become negligent. BP managers refused Halliburton recommendations to use twenty-one centralisers and proceeded to cement the well using only six centralisers. Halliburton used cement that did not pass its own laboratory tests to cement the well and this contributed to the flow of hydrocarbons into the well. Transocean crew did not take adequate notice of the kick in the well that pointed to a loss of well control and proceeded to release gases from the well on to the rig through the mud gas separator instead of diverting the gas away from the rig. In addition, inadequate maintenance of the blowout preventer was to contribute to events. Because bonuses presented to BP project managers depended on completing projects close to budgeted costs and schedule, the wrong emphasis had persisted. It is likely that independent verification of managerial decision-making emphasising safety from a command that is distinct from the project management command at BP under a Chief Safety Officer reporting directly to the CEO at BP will help present the correct emphasis. BP did have a safety director at the time of the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster, but it will appear that this safety director lacked powers, a separate chain of command and a capacity for working effectively to give effect to his mandate. The new CEO at BP has promised to create a safety division at BP with sweeping powers. BP project managers should now receive bonuses that emphasise correctness of their managerial decision-making for a project instead of receiving rewards for trying to complete a job within budget and schedule while taking risks with safety. In addition, it will make sense for BP to try to contribute towards helping to improve the design and reliability of superior technology for offshore operations, including subsea blowout preventers. Contents Introduction 1 What Went Wrong? An Analysis of BP’s Approach to Risk Management that Influenced the BP Deepwater Horizon Disaster 3 A Reasoned Discussion about How BP Should Progress in the Future with Regard to Risk Management 15 Conclusion 19 Bibliography / References 22 List of Figures Figure 1: Typical Subsea Blowout Preventer Stack 7 Figure 2: Deepwater Drilling with Subsea Blowout Preventer 8 (This page intentionally left blank) Introduction The word “risk” refers to the possibility of loss, injury or harm, and it is unfortunately true that it is not possible to assign absolute certainty to the occurrence of any one event because there will always be some level of uncertainty associated with the outcome of events (Bonham, 2008, Pp. 183 – 184). Thus, all business must be prepared to confront risk, which is everywhere and derives from unpredictability. Because a plethora of risks confronts all organisations, risk management is now a core management discipline and the process of identifying, assessing and managing risks is essential for all business. Risks affect strategy and the way in which business goes about trying to achieve its goals. However, large and highly public organisational and Governmental failures within the past decade have caused many to wonder if directors, managers and boards are managing risks properly (Hopkin, 2010, Pp. xxiii – xxiv). Hopkin (2010, Pp. xxiii – xxiv) states that events associated with Woolworths, Golden Wonder, Northern Rock, Citigroup, Enron and even the entire banking system of Iceland led to a healthy scepticism for risk management. The latest disaster to have caught the attention of the entire world involving the BP Deepwater Horizon presented loss of precious lives, billions of dollars’ worth of material damage and damage inflicted on the environment that left the whole world transfixed and helpless. However, it is important to understand that the BP Deepwater Horizon was drilling the Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico 13,000 feet under the sea bed and under 5000 feet of water to satisfy humanity’s voracious appetite for petroleum products that has forced the oil and gas industry into deep ocean waters (OSC, 2010, Pp. vii – x). Clearly, offshore oil and gas exploration and production in deep ocean waters far from the shore represents a complex enterprise, and complex systems will fail in complex ways. However, if demands presented by humanity have resulted in complexity then it is important to learn from failure so that the ever more complex undertakings of the future do not result in catastrophes. This report presents an analysis and discussion of BP’s approach to risk management that became apparent in the aftermath of the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster of April 20, 2010 in an attempt to try to learn from what went wrong. What Went Wrong? An Analysis of BP’s Approach to Risk Management that Influenced the BP Deepwater Horizon Disaster Although many authors, researchers, experts and journalists have written a lot on the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster, which after all caught the attention of the world in a most comprehensive manner, it will be right to suggest that a number of separate risk factors, oversights, and outright mistakes combined to cause the accident (OSC, 2011, Pp. 90 – 91). However, it is noteworthy that BP’s Deepwater Horizon was 43 days behind schedule drilling the Macondo well because of a string of problems involving stuck drill pipes and the loss of drilling mud, leading to an additional requirement for US$ 40 million on top of the US$ 96 million that BP had budgeted (Steffy, 2011, Pp. 164 – 166). Thus, BP staff responsible for overseeing drilling was trying to cut costs while neglecting safety (Steffy, 2011, Chapter 13). BP’s own investigation report into the accident presents the following eight key findings that contributed to the accident (BP, 2010, Pp. 10 – 11): The cement injected into the wellbore failed to isolate hydrocarbons from the well, which entered into the wellbore. This will point to a weakness in cement design, testing, quality assurance and risk assessment by BP engineers in Houston, who were overseeing Halliburton pump cement as a subcontractor. BP engineers decided that a bond log, which uses sonic tools and computer software to evaluate the integrity of cement pumped into the wellbore, was not necessary and this saved BP US$100,000 in expenses for Schlumberger team that was to conduct tests for the bond log as well as waiting time for the tests (Steffy, 2011, Chapter 13). Hydrocarbons from the well leaked into the production casing due to the failure of shoe track barriers, including shoe track cement and float collar. Halliburton, the cement contractor had questioned BP’s design for pumping cement into the well to seal it and although BP had planned to use the “tie-back method for sealing the well to prevent a blowout, this would have caused additional delays and US$ 10 million more than the long string method (Steffy, 2011, Pp. 160 - 170). In addition, Halliburton had asked for 21 centralizers for positioning the drill string centrally into the well hole, but BP engineers permitted only six centralizers despite Halliburton’s indication that use of six centralizers would present a well with severe gas flow problems. Thus, BP was trying to save time and money while neglecting safety. BP well site leaders and the Transocean rig crew acting as subcontractors accepted a negative pressure test despite indications that well integrity was not been established. During the test, about sixty barrels of drilling mud leaked through a blowout preventer and this was unusual, resulting in muddled negative pressure test results (Steffy, 2011, Pp. 170 - 175). It is likely that BP personnel ignored indications that pointed towards a malfunctioning and possibly faulty blowout preventer. Thus, the BP Deepwater Horizon’s ultimate fail-safe final protection against disaster, the blowout preventer was faulty and no one bothered to worry about this. It is likely that poor maintenance contributed to the automatic malfunction of the blowout preventer (OSC, 2011, Pp. 114 – 115). The rig crew working on the Macondo well did not recognise the influx of hydrocarbons into the well until the hydrocarbons from the well were flowing through the blowout preventer and into the riser. A total of forty minutes elapsed before any action by the crew to control the well. OSC (2011, Pp. 110 – 115) suggests that the crew responsible failed to notice indications of kicks presented by the well despite the fact that a pressure-relief valve on one of the pumps blew, and drill-pipe pressure shifted direction and started decreasing. When well control response actions failed to maintain control of the well and the faulty blowout preventer did not stop the flow of hydrocarbons, it was proper to divert fluids emanating from the well overboard from the rig instead of being fed into the mud gas separator on the BP Deepwater Horizon to gain more time. However, diversion of gas from the well into the mud gas separator on board the BP Deepwater Horizon contributed to the subsequent explosion and fire. The mud gas separator on board the BP Deepwater Horizon was set to vent gases from the well directly on to the rig itself and this increased the potential of the gas to reach an ignition source. In addition, the mud gas separator was set to high flow condition that permitted gases from the well to overwhelm the mud gas separator. The fire and gas systems on board the BP Deepwater Horizon did not prevent ignition of gas from the well and the heating, ventilation and air conditioning system probably transferred a gas rich mixture into areas where the potential for ignition was higher, including the engine room. This was probably a failing in the design of the system. The blowout preventer failed to operate automatically and potential weaknesses in the maintenance and testing regime were apparent from an examination of the records of the maintenance management system. Possible design flaws in the blowout preventer also contributed to its malfunction (Det Norske Veritas, 2011, Pp. 5 – 8) The BP Deepwater Horizon was leading edge technology for offshore drilling operations, but BP emphasised cost control for the Macondo well operations (Freudenburg, 2011, Pp. 10 – 20). Although the blowout preventer failed to work, and it is likely that design improvements are possible, the humans that were responsible for its maintenance and for working the rig were below standard (Det Norske Veritas, 2011, Pp. 5 – 8). According to (Freudenburg, 2011, Pp. 16 – 17), rig operators and the regulators who were supposed to be watching over them were cutting corners on safety. Probably, no one believed that a disaster could strike and thought it appropriate not to chip in about safety when the Macondo well project was far above budget and over the time allocated to the project. Thus, human failure contributed to the disaster in a significant way. Figure 1: Typical Subsea Blowout Preventer Stack, from (Melendez, 2006, Pp. 4) Figure 2: Deepwater Drilling with Subsea Blowout Preventer, from (Melendez, 2006, Pp. 7) It is of concern to note that prior to the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster, BP had presented an unsatisfactory record of disregard for safety in its operations, and this company paid out a record US$ 50 million in fine for the year 2005 release of hazardous gasses from the Texas City refinery explosion (Steffy, 2011, Pp. 134 – 136). Accusations directed at BP for maintaining a fragmented managerial structure that tended to dispel accountability during investigations related to the 2005 Texas City refinery explosion would suggest that this company had a history of avoiding managerial accountability in its operations. The BP Texas City refinery presented a terrible safety record, with workers dying to make this refinery the deadliest in the United States of America even three years after the 2005 explosion (Steffy, 2011, Pp. 1347 – 140). After the BP Texas City refinery explosion, another two workers were to die at this refinery because BP had used substandard bolts to secure the water filtration system of an ultracracker unit. Later, the BP’s refinery in Cherry Point, USA was to add to the woes of the company and BP refineries acquired a reputation as the deadliest refineries in the United States of America. In the year 2007, a BP subsidiary in Alaska pleaded guilty to violations of the Clean Water Act and oversight related to corrosion monitoring for which the company paid a fine of US$ 12 million. In addition, BP America was to admit to manipulating prices of propane in the year 2003 and 2004 to receive a fine of US$ 300 million. Thus, it will appear that BP’s American operations presented a disregard for safety and a preference for cutting costs and trying to increase profits. Even after the appointment of Tony Hayward as the CEO of BP in the year 2007, the managerial structure of BP remained convoluted with responsibility hard to assign and decisions made under committees (Steffy, 2011, Pp. 159 – 161). Although Tony Hayward had taken over as CEO when BP faced three criminal investigations, with a mandate to improve on safety, he did not have much time before the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster would cut short his efforts to bring about change at BP. Despite the efforts made by Tony Hayward, upstream operations at BP could not make the connection between what had transpired at BP refineries and a need for improving safety. Exploration and production at BP continued to emphasise cost cutting and financial performance to overshadow operations and safety. No one at BP wanted to rock the boat or assume responsibility for trying to emphasise on safety at a time when production at BP’s Thunder Horse field in the Gulf of Mexico had declined rapidly due to an increased amount of water in production output (Steffy, 2011, Pp. 159 – 161). This was despite the fact that the BP’s Mad Dog field, also located in the Gulf of Mexico, could be twice larger than estimated. It is entirely possible that the main section of the Thunder Horse field was collapsing with water from the ocean displacing the hydrocarbons and this meant that deep-water exploration, and production presented unusual challenges with lowered expectations about producing from discoveries. Thus, it will appear that BP managers overseeing the BP Deepwater Horizon operations were reluctant to suggest incurring additional time and expense to do the job right, correctly and safely the first time around for somewhat greater expenses. Probably, the fact that no major disaster had occurred in upstream operations in the past had led managers to a false sense of security to neglect and to underestimate forces of geology, oceans and nature. Workers at BP talked about managers with an obsession for meeting performance targets because this determined their performance bonuses, and it will appear that BP continued to neglect routine matters related to maintenance and safety. According to Maleske (2011, Pp. 51 – 55), BP continues to suffer immense legal troubles one year after the Deepwater Horizon disaster with massive losses and a huge impact on the corporate image with massive damage to the environment. Perhaps, it would have been better to do things right the first time around. Sampson (2010, Pp. 19 – 20) states there has not been a blowout, an uncontrolled release of crude oil or natural gas or a disaster related to oil and gas exploration in United Kingdom waters for the past twenty years because the regulatory approaches differ between the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The British regulatory approach is a safety case regime that requires firms to minimise constantly the risk associated with oil and gas exploration, but the regulatory approach in the United States of America emphasises box ticking to ensure meeting requirements. A stronger emphasis exists in the United Kingdom for verification and perhaps if such an emphasis had existed in the United States of America, BP managers would have had to share information with those independent of the company, forcing greater care in decisions related to safety during drilling and exploration. United Kingdom regulations require employing an independent component person (ICP) who is independent of the firm engaged in drilling and exploration for offshore projects to examine the planning, execution and operation of a well. If a similar regulatory requirement had existed in the United States of America, it is likely that independent experts with no interests in costs associated with exploration would have assessed what was going on with the Macondo well operations and this could have resulted in exercise of greater care that could have prevented the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster. It is important to understand that BP is not involved in any great mischief in other parts of the world, and it is equally important to understand that BP employees in the United States of America are mostly Americans. Do firms headquartered outside of the United States of America employ Americans, who perform poorly? The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling report to the President of the United States of America is critical of BP’s safety culture and the focus that this company maintains for controlling costs at the expense of safety (OSC, 2011, Pp. 215 – 228). However, this report goes beyond blaming only BP to include Halliburton and Transocean who worked as subcontractors. Transocean personnel failed to monitor adequately the Macondo well and they failed to divert the mud and the gas away from the rig during the first few minutes of the blowout. If due attention was directed to the kick in the well and the gas was diverted away from the rig instead of being fed into the mud gas separator, it is likely that the blowout could be avoided. Transocean crew feared reprisals for reporting unsafe work practices and those interviewed suggested that a shortage of available staff made an impact. Crewmembers working for Transocean complained that the safety manual provided to them was difficult to understand, unstructured and not written with the end user in mind. Halliburton, which is a one of the world’s largest provider of services to the oil and gas industry and an expert in cementing of oil wells failed to prepare cement that passed its own laboratory tests for the Macondo well (OSC, 2011, Pp. 223 – 225). Halliburton then proceeded to use the defective cement that had failed stability tests to cement the well and this probably contributed to the disaster. However, BP insisted that six centralizers were adequate for the well when Halliburton had asked for twenty-one centralizers. Thus, it is obvious that a tendency had existed to get along with the job without asking for more time or for additional work that would cost more and this obsession with costs had presented a paralysis that affected all contractors on the rig. Perhaps all those involved thought that a reasonable chance existed that nothing horrible would happen, and that they could somehow get away with it all. The joint tendency for not rocking the boat could probably explain the frame of mind that led to a lack of maintenance for the blowout preventer, which malfunctioned when needed. However, BP must assume the greatest responsibility for a neglect of safety on board the BP Deepwater Horizon because according to American Petroleum Institute Contractor Safety Management guidelines, BP as an operator should have identified the safety requirements and communicated these to the subcontractors (American Petroleum Institute, 2007, Pp. 4 – 6). Thus, because BP had rejected Halliburton’s request for centralizers and it had presented its subcontractor’s with an indication of a preference for economy and speed, it failed to lead adequately the team to emphasise safety. Carnegie (1988, Pp. 8 – 12) emphasises the role that frontline supervisors and managers play in ensuring safety and proper functioning of a safety management system for the offshore oil and gas industry. However, it is clear that those on board the BP Deepwater Horizon presented a neglect of safety, and this means that probably the right emphasis was lacking from frontline supervisors and managers. When trying to economise on costs, lead managers must still ensure that safety is adequately covered and this calls for the right emphasis in terms of value and culture. MacKie (2007, Pp. 2 – 9) states that firms operating in the upstream oil and gas industry must constantly strive to improve decision-making under uncertainty with decisions influencing large sums of money. Thus, a need exists to ensure that safety remains an important component in the chain of systematic considerations that need examining for any decision. Clearly, those responsible for making decisions for the Macondo well had somehow forgotten safety in their quest for expediting work and minimising costs and the failure was human. In the oil and gas industry, decisions are good if the outcome is good, but it is important to have a systematic and detached approach that maintains safety as a paramount consideration above financial expediencies because the cost of a bad decision may be far higher than any attempted savings. Although it is important to strive constantly to improve technology, Melendez (2006, Pp. 9 – 14) suggests that BP was using the best available technology for the Gulf of Mexico, but the human element failed because the proper organisational emphasis was lacking in decision-making that influenced decisions spread over time (Duffey, 2008, Pp. 8 – 10). A Reasoned Discussion about How BP Should Progress in the Future with Regard to Risk Management It is clear that a need exists for BP to do better at operating rigs and other offshore assets to appropriate standards, and it makes sense for this company to improve the emphasis on safety in managerial decision-making. Although BP executives have presented numerous statements in the past about this company is working to bring about an improvement in emphasis on safety, it will appear that the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster soon after the Texas City refinery explosion suggests that concrete progress is lacking. The events that unfolded prior to the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster will tend to indicate flawed emphasis on costs in decision-making that not only compromised BP itself, but also forced BP subcontractors Halliburton and Transocean to compromise on safety. It would have helped if independent verification officers stationed on board the BP Deepwater Horizon could report directly to senior BP executives, who were closer to the BP board, about possible threats to safety, including decisions to proceed with six centralizers instead of twenty-one and the decision to use cement of a lower quality for cementing the Macondo well. Thus, because BP has persistently presented cultural flaws for safety and an emphasis on cost reduction, perhaps having a Chief Safety Officer for the company with a separate hierarchy of command that emphasises a reporting and verification function will help bring about the needed emphasis on safety. Failure to maintain adequately the blowout preventer for the Macondo well, attempts by BP project managers affiliated with BP Deepwater Horizon to coerce subcontractors into compromising on safety and the use of substandard bolts that caused the Texas City refinery explosion support the need for a safety and verification function. A chain of command that is distinct from the operations and project command presenting reports to a Chief Safety Officer will act to double check on performance and decision-making of project managers to emphasise safety, compliance with operational requirements and disaster prevention. Clearly, the hydrocarbons trapped deep below the ocean bed are capable of unleashing mighty forces and this means that drilling, exploration, maintenance and routine operations must always strictly observe best practices and specified procedures. In the offshore oil and gas industry, project managers will always have to make difficult decisions under uncertainty, but they cannot compromise on safety and best practice to unleash massive forces that will not only bring financial ruin to BP itself, but will also force government agencies to become involved in expensive disaster management operations. Thus, a double check on safety is highly recommended within BP itself and perhaps government regulation too should emphasise independent verification, something that was lacking in the United States regulatory regime prior to the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster. Prior to the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster, bonuses presented to BP project managers depended on achieving of project objectives within budgets. This encouraged the BP project manager to try to get the job done at the lowest possible cost, accept risks that could present nasty surprises and compromise safety. Perhaps a different approach that will decide on a bonus based on an examination of soundness of all decisions made for a project and the capacity for managerial decisions to present the best possible result for BP should decide the bonus. Thus, the handling of a project by BP project managers should be subject to scrutiny, and it should be clear to all that decisions that compromise safety to result in less than optimal results will not receive encouragement. It is not right to encourage managers to think that safety is an overhead. According to Steffy (2011, Chapter 8), after the Texas City refinery explosion BP had tried to improve on safety by hiring high profile individuals to improve on safety at the refinery. However, this was only for the Texas City refinery. When Tony Hayward took office as the CEO at a time when BP was facing three criminal charges related to safety violations, he had made some effort to improve things. However, in corporations, it is usual to appoint an executive with substantial powers close to the board to emphasise desirable values, and it will appear that a distinct safety hierarchy was lacking at BP at the time of the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster (Kollewe, 2010, “BP boss Bob Dudley to create new safety division”). According to Beyerstein (2010, Paragraphs 1 – 12) BP did have a safety officer prior to the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster, but how much power did this safety officer have and what was the chain of command that the safety officer headed? In addition to change that will present the right managerial emphasis on safety to bring about a corporate culture that strongly emphasises safety, perhaps BP will do well to invest some of its earnings to support research to develop superior technology for offshore drilling and disaster management. Conclusion It is clear that the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster would not have occurred if BP focussed on safe operations instead of emphasising on delays and costs in its operations. Because the Macondo well was above budget and presented delays, managers overseeing the project emphasised cost cutting and minimisation of delays in the hope that they could somehow remain protected from the awesome forces of nature with which they were fiddling around. However, the events that transpired later would teach everyone a lesson about being extremely careful when dealing with hydrocarbons trapped deep below the seabed. The failure was human failure despite the fact that it is possible to improve the design of subsea blowout preventers and the BP Deepwater disaster together with other problems that BP had presented pointed to a need to improve on the emphasis on safety in BP’s managerial decision-making. Although BP had previously tried to improve on safety after running into problems in the United States of America, probably these efforts were not entirely successful. BP needs independent verification and monitoring for safety with a safety compliance chain of command under a Chief Safety Officer reporting to the CEO. In addition, a need exists to ensure that project managers at BP understand that they cannot receive rewards or recognition for unduly compromising the company by taking risks to cut costs while neglecting safety. Thus, it will make sense to ensure that managers receive bonuses for rejecting risks and delivering projects that reflect sound managerial decision-making. 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