Predicting and Preventing Genocide - Essay Example

?Predicting and Preventing Genocide Introduction The term genocide was first used in the 20th century by Raphael Lemkin, a Polish Jewish immigrant, in reference to the Nazis’ holocaust.1 It was the Nazis’ perception of Jews as a biological group that completes the definition of genocide. As Chalk informs, a study of genocide from ancient history onwards, reflects that genocide is either state or authority-based “one-sided” mass killings aimed at destroying a group pursuant to the perpetrator’s definition of that group.2 The phrase one-sided is necessary otherwise a legitimate war could render the victor accused of genocide. Likewise, the perpetrator’s definition of the group is necessary for establishing a specific intent. It also distinguishes genocide from other heinous crimes or justified acts such as a pre-emptive strike.3 This definition of genocide is significant because it informs of the broader characteristics of genocide and guides theoretical approaches to recognizing the instances in which genocide is most likely to occur and therefore provides a means by which genocide can be predicted and prevented. This paper provides a critical analysis of these theories and argues that history instructs however, that genocide is largely incapable of qualification and as such it is unpredictable and most likely unpreventable. If history is any indication, genocide typically occurs during war. However, it does not occur during all wars. Therefore differentiating what kind of war or what wars are consistent with the propensity to commit genocide is futile. A. Historical Overview of Genocide Mamdani’s brief history of genocide distinguishes genocide from the systematic killing of an enemy. In 1994 Rwanda, the military and its supporters orchestrated the mass murder by Rwandan Hutu majority of Rwandan Tutsi minority. Non-conforming Hutus were also killed. The difference is, Hutus were killed as enemies, whereas the Tutsi were killed simply because they were Tutsi.4 Mamdani also suggests that “the genocidal impulse may be as old as organized power” and while “the impulse to destroy an enemy is ancient, the technology of genocide is constantly evolving”.5 Looked at in this way, it is difficult to predict genocide. If genocide is an impulse in much the same way as the impulse to kill one’s enemies, genocide like any act of violence is difficult to predict and just as difficult to prevent. History bears this out. Genocide is not specific to any particular location, politics, economy, race, ethnicity or gender. While there are specific themes such as ethnicity there are other themes that are far more subtle such as the influence of outsiders. Moreover, genocide has occurred on virtually every continent. The best explanation is that genocide is a result of “the conjunction of influences and actions widely present in the world.”6 Nsereko informs that, “the history of human race abounds with episodes of genocide.”7 Historically, genocide has been for the most part conducted during the course of a war. Evidence of this trend goes back to the Bible. In more recent times, the Nazis committed the holocaust executions during the Second World War. Other genocidal acts in the last century occurred in Turkey, Vietnam, Pakistan, Nigeria, Rwanda, Burundi, Iraq, Bosnia Herzegovina and Zaire.8 History also informs that genocide was not prevented by international customary law. Crowe informs that not only is genocide “as old as history”, but so are norms, standards and laws regulating standards of conduct during conflict.9 In 1943, the Allied Powers adopted a charter establishing the war tribunal for trying the Nazis for their war crimes. Some of the charges included genocide.10 On December 11 1946 the UN’s General Assembly adopted Resolution 96(I) in which genocide was characterized as a crime pursuant to international law. The Resolution also instructed the Economic and Social Council to draft a genocide convention.11 Two years later the UN’s General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention).12 The Genocide Convention was first used to prosecute crimes of genocide in September 1998 by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.13 Serbia was the first State found to have contravened the Genocide Convention by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia.14 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998 creates the first permanent court for the prosecution of crimes against humanity, including genocide.15 The history of the international conventions and military tribunals thus inform that there is a prevailing view that genocide most often occurs and is most likely to occur during times of conflict. However, the succession of these tribunals from Nuremburg, Tokyo, the Hague and to the latter tribunals of Rwanda and Yugoslavia and the establishment of the International Criminal Courts also reveal that each tribunal and the initial Genocide Convention have not been able to prevent genocide. Despite the efforts by international customary law to regulate and enforce the conduct of war, genocide continues to be a reality. B. Theories of Genocide as Predictable and therefore Preventable Harff and Gurr identify two main theories that attempt to explain the conditions and or circumstances under which genocide is most likely to occur. First there is the political theory which emphasizes the state’s role and the perpetrators’ goals. In these circumstances there is typically a desire to solidify the power of the state following chaos or “in response to dissent”.16 Cultural theories direct attention to the conditions existing around on-equities which at some stage intensify to such an extent that “one group seeks to eliminate its opponents”, by either “using or seizing state power to accomplish its ends”.17 Other theoretical perspectives attempt to portray ideologies as having a decisive role in the propensity to commit genocide. Of significance are those ideologies that support the existence of an exclusive group which refuses admission of others or will insist that those outside the group do not have the right to “exist in dignity”.18 Other theories highlight the importance of economic inequalities and the role of international conditions that magnify or inhibit genocide.19 The difficulty with theories of genocide however, is that it does not explain why any of these conditions should give rise to genocide. Certainly, there are diverse cultures in many countries where the dominant group feels superior and self-entitled, yet those inequities have never given rise to genocide. Similarly, there are countless situations throughout history where political parties have felt that their power was threatened, yet they did not commit genocide to maintain their power. Therefore these theories only identify some characteristics or conditions that exist where there have been episodes of genocide. Houghton is of the opinion that cultural or “social identity theory” is particularly problematic since it indicates that genocide is essentially an extreme expression of racism or group identity.20 While inclusion and group identity and group distinctions are necessary for conflict, it does not explain why genocide should be the outcome.21 Perhaps it is now necessary to explore how these conditions coincide with other factors such as “personality and beliefs to produce extreme behaviours”.22 However, there is very little research into this possibility and we are left with theoretical approaches that merely identify common factors that characterise genocide, but also characterise non-genocidal processes. Genocide typically occurs so suddenly that it is virtually impossible to predict. The ethnic cleansing genocide episodes in Yugoslavia during the 1990s exemplify the point. The ethnic groups, the Serbs, Bosnians and Croats had been apparently co-existing peacefully for a very long time and out of the blue waged war against one another and began destroying one another.23 Valentino is also sceptical about theoretical explanations for genocide. Valentino notes that the theories of genocide will identify the circumstances that exist and are likely to result in genocide but do not reconcile these conditions with any of the contradictions. The result is, these theoretical explanations merely suggest “casual” rather than causative factors.24 For example, theories suggesting genocide results from deeply entrenched social disparities dividing groups are problematic.25 This explanation does not comport with the distinction between ordinary conflict and the one-sided nature of genocide. Valentino also takes issue with is the suggestion that war, revolution and other types of national crisis often give rise to genocidal behaviour.26 This is only partially true and does not explain why these conditions do not always and quite frequently does not give rise to genocidal behaviour. Valentino likewise argues that the theory emphasising political ambition only partly explains genocide.27 There are many instances where political concentration have not given rise to genocide. Bloxhm and Moses argue that theories of genocide do not adequately explain genocide and focus instead on the link between war and genocide. It is the conditions of war that entangle military and political powers, the main prerequisite for genocide. It is only when these two powers are acting in concert that genocide is most likely to occur.28 The nexus between the military and political leaders together with the “uncertainty and insecurity” created in combat environments and the perception of civilians as enemies might explain the causes of genocide.29 However, there is still the fact that a majority of armed conflicts do not lead to genocide. It might instead be useful to examine, what factors restrain genocidal impulses during armed conflict. Unfortunately, little or no attention have been given to the factors that restrain genocidal impulses. C. How History Informs Theories of Genocide as Predictable and Preventable Vincent suggests that the rise of the nation state facilitated genocide. Vincent specifically states that: The nation state was the vessel which carried the hopes and expectations of so many groups in the world from the late nineteenth century. It had been naturalized (in evolutionary terms) in the later nineteenth century and had subsequently adsorbed all the language of law, history, politics, and even morality. For many it was also the fundamental unit of social evolutionary struggle; it was also self-determining (in fact, it had a right to be so). In sum, this deeply valued model of political organization had self-generated, from within its own institutional logic, the practice of genocide.30 In other words, the nation state itself is responsible for generating and facilitating genocide. When we look to Nazi Germany, there is evidence to support this conceptualization of the potential for genocide. Nazi Germany identified non-Germans as a threat to Germany, the nation state and expressed what amounted to a racial ideology that facilitated genocide.31 The 1990 atrocities in the former Yugoslavia are also supportive of this view. In that case Serbia conceptualized genocide in the form of ethnic cleansing as not only a duty of the state, but also the duty of its population.32 Accepting that the state plays a role in the formulation and perpetuation of the conditions for genocide, the question for consideration is what state characteristics point to a propensity for committing genocide. Alvarez maintains that when genocide is understood as a “power crime”, the propensity for genocide arises when the state has unchallenged and unchecked powers.33 Essentially, this is the difference between the genocidal state and the non-genocidal state. For instance, the on-going ethnic conflict in Ireland did not rise to the level of genocide. The Northern Irish experience however, informs that where the power of the state is distributed among the population so that the minority has power, genocide can be avoided.34 The victims of genocide are typically smaller and persecuted or marginalized groups. However, if state’s power is judicially distributed, groups may not be marginalized nor may they be persecuted as evidenced by the ethnic conflicts in Northern Ireland. Alvarez cautions however, that it is not entirely guaranteed that the democratic distribution of power will provide a safeguard against genocide. For instance, the ethnic cleansing that took place in the former Yugoslavia was linked to the transitioning from socialism to democracy. Moreover, history tells us that this theory of genocide is entirely flawed as there have been instances in history where democratic states supported genocidal regimes. For instance during the Cold War the US sent aid as well as support to genocidal states in South and Central America and in Asia.35 Even so there is an important difference. While democratic states may for political purposes, support and give aid to genocidal states, it is difficult to identify a single episode of state-sponsored genocide in a modern democracy. The former Yugoslavia is not a good example of a democracy in which the state sponsored or implicitly sponsored genocide. The point to remember is that at the time, the former Yugoslavia was a transitioning social state. Its democratic institutions were weak and were not strong enough to distribute democratic powers and equities among all people. Nevertheless theorists remind that democracies have historically facilitated genocide away from home. One such example is the infamous School of the Americas located in the US. At the school, the US trained military and law enforcement officials from the Americas who went on to commit crimes against humanity including genocide in South and Central America. Therefore, theorists conclude that historically, “democratic governments” “have assisted and exploited the genocidal policies of other states”.36 It is important to note however, that these states with genocidal policies were non-democratic states. If these states did not have genocidal policies, there would be no genocidal policies to support or exploit. Although it is hypocritical of democratic states to restrain genocide at home, but to support it abroad, democratic states do not create the genocidal policies at home or abroad. On the other side of the argument, if democratic states did not support or ignore genocidal policies abroad, the propensity for genocide might decline. According to Grunfeld and Juijboom, “bystanders” or more specifically, the failure of other governments to respond to genocidal conditions can be a powerful facilitator.37 The fact is, “a lack of protest can confirm the perpetrators’ faith in what they are doing”.38 History informs that as brutal as the Nazis were in committing genocide, they were forced to back off several times when confronted with outside objections.39 Essentially, history informs that the circumstances in which genocide is most likely to occur are those connected to state power and the state as an enabler. While states in which genocide occur as more likely to be non-democratic states, democratic states have a role to play in genocide by either facilitating through support and aid, or by merely standing mute. Therefore regardless of the theoretical perceptions of genocidal conditions and the conceptualization of the genocide state, non-genocidal states while unlikely to permit or enable genocide at home, will quite often facilitate genocide abroad. Conclusion Genocide is very difficult to conceptualize as it has occurred in varying degrees and in various states throughout history. While theories of genocide have narrowed genocide down to state influences and the conditions of war, the fact is, a majority of states with non-democratic institutions, ethnic disparities, economic inequities, dominant cultural norms and in conflict do not give way to a genocidal impulse. The international efforts to criminalize and prosecute genocide bear this out. The best that can be accomplished is to examine the factors that characterize non-genocidal states. In these states, the distribution of rights and powers typically prevent genocide. However, the behaviour of non-genocidal states also inform that they can facilitate genocide by lending support to genocidal regimes or by standing mute. Bibliography Alvarez, Alex. Genocidal Crimes. New York, NY: Taylor and Francis 2009. Alvarez, Alex. Governments, Citizens, and Genocide: A Comparative and Interdisciplinary Approach. US: Indiana University Press, 2002. Bloxham, D. and Moses, A. Dirk. The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010. Chalk, Frank. “Genocide in the 20th Century: Definitions of Genocide and Their Implications for Prediction and Prevention.” Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 4(2)(1989): 149-160. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948. Cordell, Karl and Wolff, Stefan. Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict. New York, NY: Taylor and Francis, 2010. Crowe, D.M. “War Crimes and Genocide in History, and the Evolution of Responsive International Law.” Nationalities Papers, 37(6)(November 2009) 757-806. Freeland, “International Criminal Justice and the Death Penalty.” Cited in Jon Yorke (ED), The Right to Life and the Value of Life. New York, NY: Ashgate Publishing, 2010) Ch. 9. Grunfeld, Fred and Huijboom, Ankre. The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda: The Role of Bystanders. Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2007. Harff, Barbara and Gurr, Ted, Robers. “Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: Identification and Measurement of Cases Since 1945”. International Studies Quarterly, 32(3)(September 1988) 359-371. Hoare, Marko Attila. “Genocide in the Former Yugoslavia Before and After Communism,” Europe-Asia Studies. 62(7) (September 2010), 1193-1214. Houghton, David Patrick. Political Psychology: Situations, Individuals, and Cases. New York, NY: Taylor and Francis 2009. Mamdani, Mahmood.“A Brief History of Genocide.” Transition, 87(10/3) (2001): 26-47. Newbury, David. “Understanding Genocide.” African Studies Review 41(1)(April 1998) 73-97. Nsereko, Daniel, D. Ntanda.“Genocide: A Crime Against Mankind”. Cited in Gabrielle Kirk McDonald and Olivia Swaak-Goldman (Eds) Substantive and Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law: Commentary. The Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2000. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998. Subotic, Jelena. Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans. US: Cornell University Press 2009. Suedfield, Peter.“Theories of Holocaust: Trying to Explain the Unimaginable.” Cited in Daniel Chirot and Martin E. P. Seligman (Eds), Ethnopolitical Warfare: Causes, Consequences, and Possible Solutions. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2001) 55-79. UN Resolution 96(I). Valentino, Benjamin, A. Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century. US: Cornell University Press 2005. Vincent, Andew. The Politics of Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Read More