To What Extent Did Diplomacy Affect the Rise of the Modern State from 1648-1815 - Essay Example

?To what extent did diplomacy affect the rise of the modern from 1648-1815? Despite the fact that the peace of Westphalia has been consistentlyheralded by political actors and historians alike as marking the birth of the modern state, political scientists today are more skeptical and point to events and practices of the 15th and 16th century as fore-runners of Osnabrueck and Muenster and the origins of the state. Krasner goes so far as to claim that the state concept that emerged from the treaties of 1648 had little to do with the modern state of today and primarily reflected the needs of that era and that the meaning of concepts such as ‘sovereignty’ and ‘non-interference in internal affairs’ (which did emerge from Westphalia; Griffith et al., 2002) have had quite different meanings under different political configurations over time (Cruz, L. 1997). This requires a less teleological view of the emergence of the modern state by placing far more emphasis on the interrogation of the ostensible and hidden motivations of the diplomats of each era, who after all were the catalysts for change in the political arena. The ‘Westphalian’ state arose from the chaos of more than hundred years of European power struggle and it was brought about by the fiscal and military exhaustion of the participants. The need to put an end to the human, financial and environmental devastation brought the parties together in a five-year long diplomatic undertaking, with the goal of establishing collective security and a balance of power. Agreement was finally reached in 1648 on a new configuration of Europe that curtailed the power of the Holy Roman Empire and increased the number of member states substantially to allow sufficient numbers of states to form alliances that would constitute a ‘balance of power’ to avoid future conflicts. The Peace of Westphalia also empowered diplomacy to be the first and foremost means of maintaining security. Also enshrined in the ‘Westphalian peace treaties’ was the ideal that ‘state interests’ prevailed beyond all other reasons, based on the hope that princes would not let themselves be ruled by ‘disorderly appetites’ (Nathan J., 2002). It was thus firmly established that from then on, secular state interests were to be of primary importance and they were to be guarded by loyal, professional servants of this state, who were skilled in states craft and diplomacy. The underlying aim was to achieve that no one state could ever again gain supremacy. Many of the theories underlying the negotiations of Westphalia, had their origin in the politics of the Italian city-states but it was in Munster and Osnabruck that they were consolidated and shaped into rules and regulations, which from then on occupied politicians and theoreticians alike (Cruz, L. 1997). The value the Italians had placed on diplomacy had depended on ‘balance of power’, counteracting the dominance of Venice with the alliance of the remaining four states, under the watchful eyes of Lorenzo de Medici and Ferdinand of Naples, whose vigilance acted as ‘preventative diplomacy’ (Rucellai and Guicciardini in Sheehan, M., 2002). There were, however flaws in the system set up in 1648 that were not present in the Venetian, particularly in relation to diplomacy and the concept of ‘balance of power’, which in the much larger European theatre lacked clear definition and prominence. Most importantly, however, there was no diplomatic mechanism in place during peace times and no watchful group of sovereigns as there were in Venice (Treasure, M., 2003). This effectively meant that every act of aggression could directly lead to war, in the absence of a diplomatic charter that would prescribe arbitration and despite the fact that ‘recourse to arms was outlawed’, (Nathan, J., 2002) The treaties of Westphalia called for ‘great conferences’ in the case of impending conflict (Grotius cited in Nathan, J., 2002), but the ‘collective response’ was to prove problematic in the coming decades, as few states were as yet ready to recognize ‘the common good’ and subordinate their national interests to it. Notwithstanding these circumstances, diplomacy significantly influenced the direction of politics, in peace times as well as during the great conferences at the end of major conflicts in Utrecht in 1713 and in Vienna in 1815. More important than success in diplomacy perhaps was the fact that it had become an established pillar of international relations and conflict resolution and that it provided a viable alternative to armed conflict, even if for many of the major states diplomacy was still often a matter of expediency. This was particularly the case for France, with diplomats of the French court of Louis XIV explaining France’s frequent acts of aggression as ‘maintaining the provisions of Westphalia’ (Treasure, M., 2003). The ‘mantle’ of diplomacy was also sometimes taken on by the Kings themselves as well as their officers, with Richelieu claiming as early as 1616 the title of ‘arbitre’1 for the French King, which referred as much to the maintenance of ‘balance of power’ as it referred to the king’s diplomatic role. Similarly, the English parliamentarian Slingsby Bethel criticized Charles II (and Cromwell) for ‘playing diplomat’ without understanding the necessities of the day, thereby allowing France to ‘become too great for Christendom’ (Sheehan, M., 2002). In general, however, diplomacy was carried out by ‘a kind of well-born guild’ skilled in law and rhetoric and ‘adept at MELDING reason’ (Black, J., 2002). Due to the absence of provision for peacetime diplomacy (see above), major diplomatic maneuvers generally took place in association with or in the aftermath of conflicts. Whilst these often contributed much to the re-establishment of a semblance of order and the procurement of restitution, there were few diplomatic congresses that changed the way states dealt with each other. These included a series of Vienna conventions, which dealt with the question of state succession in respect to existing treaties, properties and debts (Sheehan, M. 1996) One of the most significant changes to international relations took place during the Vienna congress in 1815 and it was brought about by diplomats such as Metternich and Talleyrand, the Empire’s and France’s most skilled diplomats. To some extent, the views of these men were diametrically opposed, with Metternich attempting to weaken elements of justice and public law established at Westphalia and Talleyrand attempting to strengthen them. Metternich was motivated by the horror of the French revolution and the inconceivable concept of ‘mob rule’ (Nathan, J., 2002) and for his vision of European security he was willing to sacrifice ‘justice’ to fortify the region against a recurrence of revolution. He proposed to do just that by creating an ‘elite alliance’ between Great Britain, Russia, Prussia and Austria. This alliance was invested (by the alliance) with powers to exclude other states from the negotiating table and reduce their participation to ‘rubber-stamping’ of foregone conclusions. This was paramount to an ‘unraveling’ of the achievements of the treaties of 1648, which was violently opposed by Talleyrand. Neither Metternich nor Talleyrand saw at this point in time that there were choices and that the it would have been better to move now to anticipate popular demand for autonomy (Nathan, J., 2002). Firmly entrenched in dynastic systems and being part of its elite fabric, they were motivated by a desire to perpetuate existing forms of sovereignty. It is not clear whether Talleyrand’s opposition occurred only on patriotic or also on procedural grounds but it was most definitely prompted by the fact that Metternich’s politics of ‘super powers’ would most definitely hurt French interests (Baird, R. 1997). In Metternich’s defense it must be pointed out that at this point, 150 years after the first attempt at laying down regulations concerning international relations, many of the concepts and practices of diplomacy were either still not well-established or were being already circumvented (Baird, R. 1997). Through systematic questioning of terms of reference, Talleyrand forced clarification of terms and protocols, reducing the self-appointed control of Metternich’s powerful state alliance, and brought back to prominence the issue of ‘public law’. He also brought about a re-examination of ‘legitimate sovereignty’, which hereto had been loosely interpreted, clarifying not only it’s meaning under public law but also the rules governing its transfer. Thus he proposed that sovereignty cannot be lost through conquest or through transfer against the will of the legitimate sovereign and must be returned to this legitimate sovereign once states were freed from occupation (Baird, R. 1997). In support of his proposals, Talleyrand enlisted the support of precisely those states that were to be excluded from decision-making in the future and who were now vocal in their disapproval. Metternich and his allies bowed to public pressure - a major victory for Talleyrand. It was also a victory for ‘balance of power’ in Europe, although Metternich as well as Castlereagh, who represented Great Britain at the Vienna Congress did no longer consider balance of power a concept sufficient to prevent war in its most extreme form – such as had just been experienced at the hands of Napoleon I. While both men recognized that it would be impossible to dispense with the concept of ‘balance of power’, they were looking for a pro-active mechanism, a less passive device. What these diplomats considered in Vienna was a ‘Concert system’, whereby great powers would meet regularly to analyze political developments in Europe and anticipate revolutionary and aggressive developments (Nathan, J. 2002). The mechanics of this system appear to have been a series of conferences attended by diplomats and Congresses at less regular intervals attended by Heads of State. It is clear from comments made by Metternich in 1820 that this system was actually in operation, however, initially the committees would appear to have been bogged down in less serious conflicts and disputes, putting a large a strain on diplomatic resources (Elrod 168 in Nathan, J. 2002). Nevertheless, this constituted the beginning of what Henry Kissinger later called ‘a government of Europe’ but was known to the Europeans of that time as ‘the public law and concert of Europe’. Whilst not reshaping the internal affairs of the state, it did reformulate the way in which the state ‘behaved’, which Nathan likened to being the member of an exclusive club and Hedley Bull described as “a standard of civilization laid down by Europeans” (Bull in Nathan, J. 2002). Diplomacy did bring about changes to the sovereign state that originated at Westphalia during the 150 years from 1648 to 1815, in procedural and legal aspects. They came about through a more comprehensive definition of ‘sovereignty’ and also through the re-enforcement of the concept of ‘public law. And there were also changes to the ‘balance of power’, the premise upon which the 1648 states system had been built. The process of reducing the large number of European states, which had begun in 1648, continued, but through wars rather than through diplomatic means. A lack of diplomatic mechanisms to prevent war meant that the balance of power alone was unable to prevent conflict and that there was a likelihood of every act of aggression directly leading to war. This prompted the development of a ‘concert system’ with the aim of supplementing a ‘balance of power’. Such a system meant that states must conform to international protocols and subordinate their own interests to a common good, thereby effectively changing their philosophical and political ‘mindset’ in relation to other states. Reference List Baird, R., Talleyrand and the Congress of Vienna. International History Honors Society. March 1997. Conference Paper. Black, J., (2008). Great Powers and the Quest for Hegemony: the World Order Since 1500. New York: Routledge. Cruz, L., Policy Point-Counterpoint: Is Westphalia History? International Social Science Review. Volume 80. Issue 3-4. P 151. 2005. Griffiths, M., & O'Callaghan, T., (2002). International relations: The key concepts. London: Routledge. Nathan, J. A. (2002). Soldiers, Statecraft and History: Coercive Diplomacy and International Order. Westport CT: Praeger. Sheehan, M., (1996). The Balance of Power: History and Theory. New York: Routledge. Treasure, G., (2003). The Making of Modern Europe, 1658-1780. London: Routledge. 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