The Debate between Universalism and Cultural Relativists in the Context of Asian Values - Essay Example

?The Debate between Universalists and Cultural Relativists in the Context of Asian Values and Human Rights Dis of Professor Date of Submission Introduction The most heated debate among academics of human rights in the recent decades has been the clash between cultural relativists and Universalists. While theories of modernization or development envisioned an ‘evolution’ from undeveloped to developed society, or from traditional to industrial, it is often argued by proponents of universality than non-Western cultures will slowly progress which will raise the status of the universalist principle of human rights (Bruun & Jacobsen, 2000). However, such a deterministic view of universality is destined to be unsuccessful as it was in the case of development theory (Donnelly, 2007). According to Barr (2002), consequently, cultural relativists are often similarly deterministic, arguing the permanence and fixity of traditional culture. Specifically, in the aftermath of the Second World War, when human rights became a component of international affairs and political scheme as a result of the Holocaust, the universal human rights theory became ever more detached from its previous socioeconomic and cultural ties (Doebbler, 2004). Theorists such as John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and Maurice Cranston argue that political and civil rights are natural, and are privileges for everyone (Bruun & Jacobsen, 2000). However, these rights have been interpreted as theoretical legal rights, thus assigning a value to equality without thought on the required condition for the accessibility of such rights, either institutionally or concerning the socioeconomic prerequisites (Brannigan, 2000) fundamental to their attainment. Moreover, social and economic privileges were discounted at some point in the Cold War period by political leaders and Western intellectuals as only a great deal of Soviet expression to fight the West’s stress on political and civil rights and individual liberties (Brannigan, 2000). Community, the heart of the argument of cultural relativists, was absent in the framework of universal human rights. The system of communism is frequently viewed as repressive and a defiance of genuine human nature (Hashimoto, 2004). In other words, it can be claimed that the advocates of universality have deconstructed political and civil rights, which are allowed to churn in their own dimension, as scholars discuss the details of their arguments (Hashimoto, 2004), which are frequently enveloped in moral principles. The objective of this essay is to review and discuss the debate on the universality of human rights. The discussion will be composed of a comprehensive analysis of the arguments and danger of cultural relativism and cultural imperialism, specifically in the context of the Asian values debate. The Debate between Universalists and Relativists Basically, cultural relativists claim that basic values or rights are specific to a culture and that the collective, and not the individual, is the core social component (Pollis & Schwab, 2000). An individual’s identity is rigid, reliant on group membership, and the role and status of an individual in this community (Bruun & Jacobsen, 2000). A contemporary Western creation, the rhetoric of rights, is absent in most instances. Interpersonal ties are ruled by a mutuality of disproportionate duties and privileges, which are varied, similar to their core behavioral norms and values (Brannigan, 2000). Nevertheless, what is widespread is that concepts like legal equality, free will, or individualism are foreign, usually hollow notions. The individual is included within the collective whose interests and security has dominance, though the specifics of what comprises the collective good differ (Bell, Nathan & Peleg, 2001). As stated by Sloane (2001), basic to the collective structure is a network of alternative cultural and/or philosophic ideals that furnish legality and authenticity to the social order. Developing Clifford Geertz’s groundbreaking research on what he called ‘primordial cultures’ (Bruun & Jacobsen, 2000, 59), Western scholars created the cultural relativism principle as a compelling dispute to universalism. It is worth mentioning that it was Western theorists who expressed this principle, and thereby used a Western intellectual perspective, both a Western epistemology and ontology (Pollis & Schwab, 2000). Certainly, ‘nontranslatable’ notions have been taken for granted although they may communicate important behavioral norms, values, and meanings (Bruun & Jacobsen, 2000, 59). Moreover, several cultural relativists explain ‘traditional’ cultures and assign a fixed value to them, ignoring the mechanism of social change (Mullerson, 1997). On the other hand, more recently, anthropologists specifically are starting to study the influence of social change on long-established behavior and ideals (Doebbler, 2004), generally at the local level. The argument of cultural relativists, although originally articulated by anthropologists, has pervaded every discipline in the social sciences (Doebbler, 2004). Inopportunely this principle has been abused in the recent decades, most intensely by East Asian societies, to defend their despotic administrations (Barr, 2002). Within the practice of ‘Asian values’ Malaysia, China, and Singapore have claimed that they have a unique cultural and historical birthright and, as a result, their ideals deviate from Western concepts of human rights (Brannigan, 2000). Attempts to ‘enforce’ Western ideals or to assert their moral dominance are condemned as cultural imperialism and an indication of lack of respect for these Asian culture and legacy (Hashimoto, 2004). Overlooked in this claim is the fact that non-Western cultures, whether by means of their own rebuilding or colonialism, have espoused the Western social structure of the state and the ever-present objective of economic progress and modernization (Bell et al., 2001). In truth, one powerful claim made by leaders of East Asian states is that their principles of unity and social order are the motivator of the Asian economic wonder (Hashimoto, 2004). As furthered by Hashimoto (2004), neither scholars, nor the Asian leaders, consider or examine the effect of these developments on ‘traditional’ cultural ideals. This is not to say that concepts and ideals of human rights are in truth universal; rather, it is to claim that modern African and Asian cultures and societies should be studied in more profoundly to determine the recreated cultural arrangements that have surfaced as an outcome of social change (Donnelly, 2007). Recently, the debate between cultural relativists and Universalists has been questioned. Universalists have eventually accepted that cultural diversity is a fact (Barr, 2002). In spite of this, the claim of the moral dominance of the Western human rights principle continues, specifically in the foreign policy of the United States, and the issue often becomes one of tactic and approach, of how the liberal principle of political/civil rights and legal parity in the West can become universalized (Bruun & Jacobsen, 2000). In dealing with the subject of cultural diversity, a number of Universalist scholars claim that ‘modernization’ will be escorted by the integration of the Western rights notions, frequently referring to the emergence of a middle class as the stimulus in the democratization of Asian states (Bruun & Jacobsen, 2000). Other theorists, like Allison Renteln, look for similarity in non-Western cultures and ideals (Doebbler, 2004). Others, particularly Abdullahi An-Na’im, have begun an internal cultural dialogue and cross-cultural discourse. An-Na’im thinks that through these procedures non-Western societies and cultures bear more resemblance to the West (Hodgson, 2004). The debate between cultural relativism and universalism has been impeded by its disregard of a major systematic domain. For majority of human rights theorists, the ontology of the West establishes the theoretical perspective for interpreting and perceiving the world (Pollis & Schwab, 2000). This is the environment not just for Western scholars but for numerous theorists from non-Western cultures who have adopted Western principles (Pollis & Schwab, 2000). Thus the representation of social reality and the facts accumulated to justify it is sorted out through the context of this model and its consequent framework. The interpretation of social reality by scholars, although a concept, is certainly discriminating and addresses just those factors and that facts believed relevant and in agreement with its framework (Sloane, 2001). Ideas or evidence outside the dominant framework are often ignored. A theoretical implication of this cognitive structure is that the ontology of the West develops into a variable in which non-Western societies and cultures are interpreted and obtain meaning (Bruun & Jacobsen, 2000). Applying a Western variable has resulted unavoidably in the rift between cultural relativists and Universalists (Hashimoto, 2004). To overcome this deadlock a reconstruction, devoid of ethnocentrism, is important wherein components from the arguments of cultural relativists and Universalists can be combined and formed into a reinterpreted universalism. In the Context of Asian Values Debate The Asian values and human rights debate has been persistent. Some Western regimes have charged several Asian regimes of severe human rights violation. As a rejoinder, these Asian regimes charged their opponents of imperialistic domination, insincerity, and hypocrisy (Bruun & Jacobsen, 2000). Inopportunely, both of these allegations appear to have valid basis, and none of them can prevail over the other. Hence Western regimes can continue condemning Asian regimes’ terrible human rights violations and their alibis until they have displayed substantial changes, and likewise Asian regimes can keep on questioning the insincerity and hidden political scheme behind some of the Western regimes’ human rights diplomacy. Political debates of this form would perhaps continue at the global level, according to Donnelly (2007), but they cannot build a great deal of philosophical debate and argument. Neither is the framework of universality of human rights exposed to intense disagreement. Nowadays there appear to be a small number of governments who would clearly refute the notion of universal human rights (Sloane, 2001). A large number of Asian governments, in the Bangkok Declaration, clearly substantiate universal human rights. They instead claim that, ‘while human rights are universal, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious background’ (Mullerson, 1997, 82). Obviously, it is just a thin line between a quite powerful stress on the details of human rights and a refutation of their universality. It might be logical to think that those regimes that place too much importance on details are totally refuting universal human rights (Barr, 2002). The Chinese delegate, for instance, to the Vienna Declaration of the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights explained the argument in the following manner (Hodgson, 2004): The concept of human rights is a product of historical development. It is closely associated with specific social, political and economic conditions and the specific history, culture and values of a particular country. Different historical development stages have different human rights requirements. Countries at different development stages or with different historical traditions and cultural backgrounds also have different understanding and practice of human rights. Thus one should not and cannot think the human rights standards and model of certain countries as the only proper ones and demand all other countries to comply with them (p. 122). The point in this statement may raise the idea that human rights are severely strapped to the society’s historical conditions that there cannot be any universal human rights norms or paradigms among different societies with different conditions (Hodgson, 2004). What different societies have in common may merely be an unclear classification of human rights within which any notion of human rights is acceptable. At this point Universalists would definitely be worried about this statement (Brannigan, 2000). In what appears to be a clear reaction to this issue emerging from the Bangkok Declaration, the Vienna Declaration announces that even though national distinctiveness is important, “it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic, and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Doebbler, 2004, 129). Even though the Vienna Declaration is obvious in its assertion of universal human rights, it is unclear on the issue of the distinctiveness of human rights. It concurs that national distinctiveness is vital in making sense of human rights (Doebbler, 2004). Both the Vienna and Bangkok Declarations have failed to clarify the connection between the distinctiveness and universality of human rights. The problem is exactly to discern how these two components are interrelated and to establish their relative values. The heart of the matter rests precisely here: how would the distinctiveness of a culture influence the content and interpretation of universality of human rights? (Barr, 2002). The realization of human rights should not, specifically, be entirely apathetic to major differences in the existing social and moral standards within a country. Some distinction is acceptable—definitely, possibly even favorable, since the value of international human rights law completely rests on a “process of interaction, interpretation, and internalization of international norms” (Sloane, 2001, 527). Development towards intellectual agreement on the value of various human rights may gain advantage from the resilience facilitated by ‘a domestic margin of appreciation’ (p. 527). For instance, it is apparent that ‘due process’ within universal human rights principle does not denounce the Continental ‘inquisitorial’ in favor of the Anglo-Saxon ‘adversarial’ paradigm, or vice versa (Sloane, 2001, 527). Practically comparable protections in each structure can separately fulfill its conditions. However, it is similarly apparent that a politically-maneuvered judicial body, within one of the two framework, and whether ‘Asian’ or ‘Western’, would not abide by the universal human rights principle (Pollis & Schwab, 2000). Thus, possibly most importantly, it should be recognized that there is nothing distinctively ‘Asian’ about the basic issue that the Asian values debate reveals, namely, ‘to what extent subordinate systems of morality and social values can subsist within an overarching legal framework structured by international human rights’ (Sloane, 2001, 527). Existing cultures all over the world should face this issue, and theorists appropriately exert effort to express moral explanations to a variety of issues it produces (Donnelly, 2007). Relying on how we restrict their range, several Asian values will reveal their agreement with human rights principle, whereas others will breach or at last be in conflict with it. Once there is a consensus that universal human rights law actually presents the appropriate general norm, we can evaluate systems of value in relation to their distinct compliance to it (Hashimoto, 2004). Hence, cultural relativists, such as supporters of Asian values, should refute the earlier argument, that universal human rights principle presents the correct standards. Conclusions In this essay it has been discussed that relativist and Universalist arguments of human rights have not be equally independent. A Universalist argument involves the underlying, moral imperative of human rights, which have general acceptance all over the world. A relativist argument, on the contrary, includes the actual distinctiveness and forms of rights, their implementation processes, priority, range, explanations, and standards, which are created in reaction to the distinctive conditions of a society or culture. What have been established from Asian values and human rights debate is that the two arguments are essential, and they play distinctive roles. Broadminded critics frequently bring into play a relativist argument of human rights in their denunciation of severe human rights violations abroad or in their own societies. The definite, universalistic rhetoric communicates strongly the passion and inflexibility of the requirements of human rights within which all regimes across the globe have to conform. No distinctive claims expressed by authorities of Asian regimes can validate their abuses. However, when attention is shifted to the denunciation of violations to continuous deliberation of the progress of human rights legislation, standards, and processes in a certain culture or society, the relativist argument of human rights will become important. All cultures or societies should build a relativist argument of human rights appropriate to its own conditions. This essay have supported the importance and legality of a relativist claim to human rights for Asian cultures and states, a subject matter frequently ignored or underestimated in the Asian values and human rights debate. The pursuit for human rights standards entails the pursuit for a strong political principles and integrity, which completely entails a pursuit for national individuality. For numerous Asian cultures and societies this pursuit for distinctiveness or identity is a challenging task. However, it is inevitable, and of great magnitude. References Barr, M.D. (2002) Cultural Politics and Asian Values: The Tepid War. London: Routledge. Bell, L.S., Nathan, A.J. & Peleg, I. (2001) Negotiating Culture and Human Rights. New York: Columbia University Press. Brannigan, M. (2000) Striking a Balance: A Primer in Traditional Asian Values. New York: Seven Bridges Press. Bruun, O. & Jacobsen, M. (2000) Human Rights and Asian Values: Contesting National Identities and Cultural Representations in Asia. Richmond, England: Curzon. Doebbler, C. (2004) International Human Rights Law: Cases and Materials. New York: CD Pub. Donnelly, J. (2007) International Human Rights: Dilemmas in World Politics. New York: Westview Press. Hashimoto, H. (2004) The Prospects for a Regional Human Rights Mechanism in East Asia. New York: Routledge. Hodgson, D. (2004) Individual Duty within a Human Rights Discourse. England: Ashgate Pub Ltd. Mullerson, R. (1997) Human Rights Diplomacy. New York: Routledge. Pollis, A. & Schwab, P. (2000) Human Rights: New Perspectives, New Realities. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Sloane, R. (2001) ‘Outrelativizing Relativism: A Liberal Defense of the Universality of International Human Rights’, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 34(3), 527. Read More