Modern Philosophy and Nature of Truth - Essay Example

?1a. In Primary Truths provides an account of the nature of truth. How does Leibniz argue for this account of truth? Explain some main consequences Leibniz derives from it in Primary Truths or in Monadology. (Paragraphs in Mondalogy are indicated as ‘p’.) Leibnitz develops several important principles in the Monadology that lie at the basis of his philosophy. After reducing substances to the concept of monads, in paragraph 18 and by them establishes the principle of self-sufficiency, such that a thing is the source of itself and is hence self-sufficient. His course is toward a definition of truth and to get to it he establishes principles of self-identity along with the principle of self-sufficiency. Leibnitz seeks to avoid the pure isolation of the mind from the body as in the case of Descartes. Monads are established as the most simple substance of which there are no parts or extensions (paragraphs 1 and 2). In paragraph 6 "monads have no windows" and hence are self-existing in a way. Leibnitz must explain what he means. Monads are different from each other because it is impossible for there to be the same thing in nature or else one thing would not be "discernible form another", things or monads must have an "internal difference" (p. 9). These differences are created from internal causes (p. 11). It is these internal causes which can make something that is itself, different or cause it to change and appear different. We are aware of our perceptions of these things, or of the thing that is undergoing change. Descartes was mistaken not to treat perception as a way of giving us what a thing and its changes are. Hence Descartes was left with the mind and or consciousness standing by itself. Leibnitz explains that perception represents "a multiplicity in the unit" of the simple substance. This is his way of saying that the mind cannot be separated from consciousness of the body. At paragraph 17, Leibnitz says that "...perception and that which depends upon it are inexplicable on mechanical grounds." That which recognizes substance and its various attributes cannot be based on the "figures and motions", or logic. Leibnitz in 15 has explained that it is Appetition or desire which is able to move from one perception to its wholeness or to new perceptions. If one were to move from the mind to the body, it would take not mere thought, but "Appetition or desire" to place these two together as a collective unit. Monads, as simple substances, are immaterial and have no extension. Yet they have their own perspective and something gives them extension and purpose. They have a certain self-sufficiency based on their internal activities. In paragraph 19 Leibnitz says that perception could allow simple substances to have souls, but that this is not possible unless perception is accompanied by memory. Mind gives monads or simple substances extension, purpose and identity. Whereas Descartes would say there is mind without body, Liebnitz would argue that there can be no mind without body. Mind and body are both monads, but the point is that it is the mind which is able to recognize the perception of the body or a rock outside the body with extension and secondary qualities such as color and taste. Humans are able to think empirically, such that there will be "daylight tomorrow." This is evidence the rational ability that humans have, and the knowledge of necessary and eternal truths that give us Reason and distinguishes us from animals (p. 29). Truth derives from the two great principles of contradiction (p. 31), and of sufficient reason (p. 32). These both refer to the two kinds of truths, reasoning is based on the principle of contradiction, and deals with necessary truths that are found by analysis, such as in mathematics. The principle of sufficient reason allows for contingent truths, or truths based on fact (p. 36). By establishing the concept of simple substances first, Liebnitz is able to move the concept of self-identity as a truth. There cannot be substance with the mind's perception of it. Even the mind has be reduced to a substance. The mind then cannot identify itself without also identifying the body. God is placed in the formula as god can provides the external cause for all other things to exist when they are not perceived by the human mind. 3a. Principles I sec 24 summarizes the results of the foregoing argument: "the least inquiry into our own thoughts" reveals that there can be no meaning that is not self-contradictory in speaking of "the absolute existence of sensible objects." Does Berkeley's argument avoid the further conclusion that the same goes for speaking of "the absolute existence of perceivers"? Explain. Berkeley accepts Locke's idea of the mind as tabula rosa, to the extreme. In paragraph 2 he locates the "MIND, SPIRIT, SOUL, or MYSELF" as that thing which perceives ideas. In paragraph 3 he offers the radical view that nothing can exist without the mind. Nothing has existence unless it is perceived. It is "repugnant" that these things can exist unperceived. This argument allows him to establish the "Eternal Spirit" that enables things to exist unperceived and as well, enables abstract ideas to exist in the mind. Berkeley invokes the possibility of Reason in paragraph 18 as allowing one to connect bodies with the mind, but argues that the materialists do not hold the "necessary connection betwist them and our ideas". Materialists do not know how ideas are produced and have no good explanation for why good created all the material things he has created. However materialists and other philosophers are able to deduce who the perceiver is. It is the one who perceives ideas or bodies. Is this the way in which Berkeley views the concept of “our own thoughts”? Certainly there is something to which these thoughts are affixed. Berkeley later raises the question who is responsible for ideas of which one knows they are not responsible for? He says that there are philosophers who know that “they were not the authors of their own sensation” (p. 56). What Berkeley eventually gives to God can, in the end, be seen as the way in which his position does question the existence of the perceiver, where it not for God as Spirit. The main point of Berkeley’s position is that it is impossible to be a complete idealist without reaching for something on the outside to give credence to one’s position. Read More