Fire Safety and Building Environment - Assignment Example

Lame Horse fire This fire took place in December 2009 and the fire was reported to have started at 1 a.m. in a nightclub in Khromaya Loshad in Russia. It was approximated that there were 300 people in the club at the beginning of the fire. It was also reported that 150 people lost their lives in the fire with 160 being injured many of them succumbing to their injuries when receiving treatment in the hospitals. The club was located on 9 Kuybyshev Street. The start of the fire was attributed to sparks from fireworks that caused the ceiling in the club hall and the will twig covering to catch fire. As the fire quickly spread to the walls the electrical wiring system was destroyed and this caused the failure of the lights. The people in attendance at the club were alerted of the fire by the announcer and as they were on the process of leaving, the interior decorations of the walls ignited and this led to the house being filled with smoke. At the on set of the evacuation some of the people made their exit through the rear exit. The vast intake of oxygen played a major role in turning the club’s hall to a very large fire tube which activated the spread of the fire. With fumes and smoke overtaking the air, there was panic which resulted into the stampeding of the patrons towards the exit. It was reported by one of the person at the scene that one leaf of the club’s double doors was sealed shut in addition of the people not being aware of a back door exit which was behind the stage and lacked emergency lighting. This is a clear indication that the management did not have the safety measures in place at the time the fire occurred. It is recommended that there should be signs which should easily be seen by the occupants showing the presence of an emergency door. The width of the exit door and the stairs to be used in relationship to the number of occupants is also a very important factor. The fact that the back door was not available for use serves as an indication that there was lack of enough exit means for the occupants. Considering the number of occupants (more than 60) and the area of the floor it was necessary to have two exits available but this was contravened. It farther made the distance of travel before accessing the exit door to increase with some of the occupants having to travel the whole length of hall. From the findings from investigation it was established the certificate for the premises was obtained in a questionable manner. There was also some construction work which was done on the building which the officials were said to have turned a blind eye on as no official checks were made. The checks that were conducted after the fire incident revealed that there was critical difference on the original planning permission, with the initial design the premises was expected to have large windows that would make it possible and easy for people to escape during the fire incident. There was also overcrowding in the club at the time of fire since number of people were well above the 50 which was the number that was allowed according to the license. The new extension wall lacked windows with the large windows that were expected from the design being bricked in and this left only two exit to be available for use by the hundreds of people that were inside the club at the time of fire. The overcrowding in the hall made the fire escape facilities inadequate for the occupants inadequate. From this fire incident it is clear that there was lack preparedness in dealing with fire. It is also clear that the management did not address the fire safety risk assessment issues. The management needs to be well aware of the risk rendered to the occupants of the premises (Safer Scotland, 2009). The fact that the hall was beyond capacity is a clear indicator that the management was not conscious of the safety of the occupants. It is also expected that the management is able remove or reduce risks to the people. The fact that the management did not block the use of the fireworks in the hall is an indication that the management was not fully committed to reducing risks to the people. The ventilation system is identified to have high potential of spreading fires (British Standard 5266: Part 1: 2005) . The ventilation system can be deigned in such away that there could be automatic shut off in case of fire would have been helped in controlling the fire (Communities and local Government, 2006). The Gothenburg fire. The fire incident occurred in 0ctober 28, 1998 with official report indicating that there were 400 people in attendance. The fire brigade determined that the maximum number of people that could accommodate was supposed to be 150 people. The hall where the party was taking place had dimensions of 32 meters by 9.5 meters with two exits being located at each end of the hall. In each of the endsides there was a door with an opening of 800mm wide that was fitted in away that it swung outward in the direction of travel leading to stairways that were 1.5 m wide. The main stairway which was located on the northwest end had a direct discharge to the exterior, while the other stairway located on the southeast had a discharge that went into a corridor on the first floor that people were supposed to travel through before having access to the exterior. On the southeast end there was a stage and this was where the disc jockey had set the music equipment. The material used in the construction of the building were concrete and masonry block. The ceiling was composed of acoustical tile with unknown composition of the interior finish in the hall. At the time of the incident, it was apparent that there were decorations which had been hung in the hall for the party with several flags being part of the decorations on the walls. It was also noted that the building lacked automatic fire sprinkler in addition to a fire alarm system not being in place. In the hall it was established that there was clear indication on where the exit were located through lighted exit signs. The building had a series of eight windows located on the northeast wall, six of them being on the wall itself. The dimensions of the window were 1.8m by 1.8 m with the bottom of the window being 2.2m above the floor. There were also five similar windows located on the southeast wall. The windows were noted to have been surrounded with security bars so as to avoid intrusion into the hall. The disco jockey was reported to have opened the door that led to southeast stairwell and this resulted in smoke from a fire in a stairwell gaining entry into the hall. As the stair way had fire it was not available for use during the evacuation exercise. The disc jockey managed to call the fire brigade using his cell phone. The disco jockey realized that the hall was overcrowded and that it was almost impossible to make it through the crowd, he decided to break a window on the northeast wall and through it jumped out of the building. It was difficult for the dispatcher who received the call to ascertain the address of the fire incident as there was a lot of background noise at the time of the call. After the dispatcher managing to establish the location, there was an initial response of an engine and a ladder accompanied by eight fire fighters. It was difficult for the apparatus to have access to the scene due to the large crowd of people who were blocking the way. After clearing the way and approaching the building, there was another barrier as there were a number of people who had been injured as they jumped through the window lied on the ground. Because of the injured being on the ground it was difficult for the fire fighters to place ground ladders up the windows and they tried entering the building through the main entrance. Here it was reported that the stairway was blocked by many people who had been injured and there was need for the people to be dragged out before the fire fighters being able to proceed upstairs. When the fire fighters finally reached the top stairs there was a wall of bodies inside the door of the hall. The fire fighters had to remove the bodies quickly passing them down the stairs. As the bodies were being remove from the door there were other people from inside the burning hall who attempted to make their way through the space that was being created by removal of the bodies. The total number of death reported in this fire incident was 63 and these was majorly through inhaling of smoke. There were 180 people who were injured and those who were reported to have been rescued by the fire brigade were 40 to 50 people. From this fire incident it is clear that the management did address the fire safety risk assessment issues. The management needs to be well aware of the risk rendered to the occupants of the premises. The fact that the hall was beyond capacity is a clear indicator that the management was not conscious of the safety of the occupants. Availability of escape routes and signs and notices is important in case of fire emergence (Safer Scotland, 2009). There was no fire alarm in the hall and this resulted in a fire build up before it could be detected. If there were an alarm system and also some basic fire fighting equipment there is likelihood that the fire could have been contained before spreading. Removing or reducing storage hazards is another important measure of dealing with fires (British Standard 476: Part 22: 1987). The fire originated from the stairwell where we had some combustible materials. (Communities and local Government, 2006) The Windsor Castle fire The Windsor Castle fire occurred on Friday 20 November 1992 in Windsor castle which is situated in West of London. The fire caused severe damage to the castle with most of the historic parts of the building being destroyed. The fire was reported to have started in The Queen’s Private Chapel at 11.33 am as a result of a spotlight igniting a curtain. The alarm went off in the watch room at the Castle brigade, manned by a chief firer officer. At the initial stage it was only the Brunswick Tower alone that had been indicated, but a few moments later lights were seen to have lit up which was a clear indication that there was a quick spread of the fire to the neighboring rooms. The major parts of State Apartments were few moments later were engulfed in the fire. The firemen on patrol were paged through an automatic system and at a bout 11.37 the control room and Reading was alerted through a switch press by the chief fire officer. He also activated public fire alarm and made a telephone call to the Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue Service through a direct line. The Chief fire officer went to the Brunswick Tower to make an assessment of the situation and commence on the salvage operations. It was at about 11:44 when the first appliances of the Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue Service arrived at the scene of fire, about 7 minutes after the issuing of the alarm. By about 11:48 am 10 pumping appliances had been ordered to the scene of fire with the principal officer who was on duty having been informed about the fire. The numbers of fire engines were increased to 20 by 12:12 pm; to 35 by 12:20 and over 200 firemen had arrived at the scene. There was no death which was reported in this incident. The only injury was that of a decorator in one of the Private Chapel who was burnt on the process of removing pictures. He was taken to the royal surgery and later sent to a hospital. The major losses that were recorded were in terms of the fabric of the Castle. The falls roof which was in one of the halls (St. Georges Hall) and the void beneath the floors which used by the coal trucks made it possible for the fire to spread so easily. From the way this fire incident it is clear the personnel in the building were well aware of the procedure involving fire incidents. Management of fire safety entails ensuring that there is emergency fire action plan and availability fire safety information and training. The personnel were fully involved in the containment of the fire with panic not being reported. It is also amazing to realize that although the fire was of great magnitude and it took hours to contain it; there was no death reported. it is of interest to note that the fire took hours to contain even with the quick response. Through fire compartmentation it is possible to ensure that fire does not spread from one section to the other (Bishop, 1995). In this fire the cause of the spread of the fire has been identified as the roofing material and the void beneath the floors which used by the coal trucks. Choosing proper material and design consideration can ensure that fire does not spread to other parts of a building. References Safer Scotland (2009). Practical Fire Safety Guidance For Places Of Entertainment And Assembly. Scottish Government. British Standard 476: Part 6: 1989 Fire tests on building materials and structures. Method of test for fire propagation for products. British Standard 476: Part 7: 1997 Fire tests on building materials and structures. Method of test to determine the classification of the surface spread of flame of products. British Standard 476: Part 22: 1987 Fire tests on building materials and structures. Methods for determination of the fire-resistance of non-loadbearing elements of construction. British Standard 5266: Part 1: 2005 Emergency lighting. Code of practice for the emergency lighting of premises. (Superseded CP 1007 1955 A Code of Practice for Maintained Lighting in Cinemas Communities and local Government (2006). The Building Regulations 2000. Fire safety, Approved Document. Bishop, S & Drysdale, D (1995) Experimental Comparison With A Compartment Fire Model. International Communications in Heat and Mass Transfer. Bullen ML, Thomas PH (1978). Compartment fires with non-cellulosic fuels. Proc Combust Inst. Epstein M. (1988). Buoyancy-driven exchange flow through small openings in horizontal partitions. J Heat Transfer. Kim IK, & Ohtani H, 1993. Experimental study on oscillating behaviour in a small-scale compartment fire (short communication). Fire Saf J Merci , B & Vandevelde, P (2007) Experimental study of natural roof ventilation in full-scale enclosure fire tests in a small compartment . Fire Safety Journal. 42 () p523-535 The 20 storey hotel in the area of East London As away of ensuring a sustainable and zero carbon buildings, there will be a design of a 20 storey building which will conform to the BREEAM scheme. The building materials will be selected to suite this scheme. The selections of materials that will put into consideration are window technologies, door technologies and insulation and heat retention materials. Under the door technologies the materials that will be considered for use will be: electro chromatic window glass, double glazed units, triple glazed units, advanced plastic thermally insulated frames, honeycomb systems and the insulated alloy frames. For door technologies there will be use of insulated plastic doors and insulated alloy doors. There will be various materials that will be used to ensure there is insulation and retention of heat. There will be use of wall insulation materials, heat retention ceramics. For roofing there will be use fibre insulation materials. Other materials that will be used are heat retention surfaces and granular insulation materials. The design will incorporate monitoring and control systems. These systems will include motorized valves and actuators, sensing devices, inter building electronic control systems, balanced inter building heating systems and energy monitoring systems. The technologies have been directed towards materials so as to have improved insulation and reduce the loss of heat that passes through windows, doors, walls and roofs (Kingspan, 2009). In the design of the twenty storey building the time of evacuating, fire fighting, searching and rescue has been put into consideration. This being what could be classified as a tall building it is clear that safety of the occupants as well as that of the fire fighting personnel largely depends on the design of the building. The life safety strategy for the building will be to protect people without moving them. The people in the building near the fire will be targeted for evacuation by means of vertical transportation system. On the other hand, the occupants on floors where the fire incidents have not occurred are to remain protected within the building. The way to achieve this is by keeping the fire small while ensuring that the people who are in the affected areas are given permission to move safely within the building (Bullen, 1978).. The key to such a strategy is to ensure that there is design of an integrated fire system, which has high consideration to unique building features which have influence on fire and smoke spread in the entire building. If the prescriptive requirements of the Building Codes are followed without critique these issue may never be addressed (Bishop,1995). Through the use a fire engineered approach it is possible to make an assessment of the level of safety and to establish innovative fire safety solutions that will suit specific risk. The fire scenarios that will be used within the quantitative fire and through smoke analysis will be determined by use of hazard analysis. A variety of fire scenarios will be put into consideration within parts used for different functions in the building so as to determine the fire risk based on ignition potential, frequency and the consequence. It is expected that there will be a variation in the combustible fuel load in content and location. There will be development of representative design fires by utilizing a combination of the anticipated fuel loads, fire test data and the statistical information. There are many benefits when consideration is made in the use of low carbon technologies, life cycle analysis and carbon management for the 20 storey building. Low carbon building (LCB) is innovative and involves the use of existing materials and there is no use of new technologies. A good example is where concrete is utilized retaining and storing of heat; the use of intelligent air flow design in cooling of building during the warm weather and the use hemp lime concrete. The materials which are to be used deliver a reduced carbon footprint that is associated with the process of construction in comparison to traditional materials. The materials also bring about reduction in the energy throughout the lifetime of the building through reduced occupant energy demands. The process also involves off-site production which has benefit in terms of reduction in material wastage. The use of innovative technologies in these building is a worth course due to the fact that 80% of the energy costs are incurred during the service life of the building (The UK Renewable Energy Strategy, 2009) . It is very important for the sustainable buildings to be developed in UK as the benefits accompanied by it. Due to high cost associated with energy consumption in buildings it will be beneficial all the citizens if sustainable buildings are developed. In UK building are known to cause of the largest environmental impacts and the carbon savings that can be gained from improvement are significant. References Kingspan ( 2009 ). The UK‟s approach to the thermal refurbishment of non-domestic buildings, Innovas (2009) Low Carbon and Environmental Goods and Services; an industry analysis. The UK Renewable Energy Strategy (2009) Department for Energy and Climate Control The Green Mortgages Report (2007) Warren and Weatherall Bishop, S & Drysdale, D (1995) Experimental Comparison With A Compartment Fire Model. International Communications in Heat and Mass Transfer. Bullen ML, Thomas PH (1978). Compartment fires with non-cellulosic fuels. Proc Combust Inst. PART 3 1. Compare the chemical reaction rates at three temperatures: 200 C 3000 F 8600 R. The activation energy is 100 k J/mole. Make your conclusion how temperature affects chemical reaction. R = Universal gas constant, 8.314 [J/mole.K] Taking A = 1011 E = Activation energy = 100kJ/K For 200 C 200 = 273.15 +20 = 293.15K Rate = 1011exp) = 26922971918.2 molecules per second For 3000F 0C = ([0F]-32) x 3000F= (300-32)x = 268x = 148.8 0C = 148.8 +273.15 = 421.95K Rate = 1011exp) = 29849874825.75 molecules per second For 8600 R 0C= ([0R]-491.67) x 8600R = (860-491.67) x = 204.6 0C = 204.6+273.15 = 477.750K Rate = 1011exp) 30999129460.25 molecules per second 2. Explain what different and common issues between the Fahrenheit/Rankine and the Celsius/Kelvin temperature scales For Fahrenheit/Rankine Fahrenheit is a relative scale while the Rankine is an absolute scale For temperature intervals 1 0F = 1 0R For Celcius/Kelvin Celcius is a relative scale while Kelvin is an absolute scale For temperature intervals rather than specific temperatures 1 0C = 1 K 3. Calculate the wavelength for infrared thermal radiation with frequency 1014 Hz. Compare the results with the wavelengths for Smooth Radio 100.4 and visible radiation for the human eye. The relationship between wavelength, speed and frequency for electromagnetic waves is given by λ = c / ν where λ is the wavelength, c is the speed of the wave and ν is the frequency of the wave. The speed of electromagnetic wave in the air is co = 2.99 x 108 m/s For infrared thermal radiation whose frequency = 1014 Hz λ =  = 2.99x10-6 m Smooth radio 100.4 frequency =100.4 MHz λ =  = 2.978 m From the electromagnetic spectrum the visible light has a wavelength of approximately 0.5x10-6m Figure 1 4. Find the flame height of the fire involved plastic materials of 0.4 m2 circle area with burning rate approximately 15g/s at a heat of combustion -35kJ/g 5. Mixed fuel is composed by methane (volume percent is 0.45), carbon monoxide (0.25) and hydrogen (0.30). Calculate the lower flammable limit concentration for the mixture and the concentration of each component in the mixture with air. Combustion reactions are as follows Methane CH4 + 2O2 + 7.52N2 → CO2 + 2H2O +7.52N2 as the volume of nitrogen will be 2×79÷21=7.52. For CO 2CO + 02 +3.76N2 → 2CO2 +3.76N2 or CO + 0.5O2+ 1.88N2 → CO2+1.88N2 For H2 2H2 +O2 +3.76N2 → 2H2O +3.76N2 or H2 +0.5O2+ 1.88N2 → H2O+1.88N2 Now considering one volume of the mixture Methane content requires 0.45(2+7.52) = 4.284 volumes of air CO content requires 0.25(0.5+1.88) = 0.595 volumes of air H2 content requires 0.3 (0.5+1.88) = 0.714 volumes of air Total volumes of air required for one volume of mixture = 5.593 Thus the flammable concentration of the mixture = x100 = 15.16% of air mixture Concentration of methane in the mixture = 0.45x15.16 = 6.822% of the air fuel mixture Concentration of CO in mixture = 0.25 x 15.16 = 3.775% of the air fuel mixture Concentration of H2 in mixture = 0.3x15.16 = 4.548% of the air fuel mixture. 6. A person with initial speed of 1.2 m/s is moving to fir exit as described on Fig. 1. His travel consists of two parts (AB and BC). In the first part (AB) he is moving with constant speed of 1.2m/s. when he has achieved the point B, he will start to move with constant deceleration of 0.01m/s2 due to the crowd in the second part of his trip. What time is needed for the person to achieve the fire exit (point C)? Assume that AD is 6m, BC is 5m and α = 300. Distance AB = 6/COS30 = 12m Time taken to cover AB = 12/1.2 = 10 S Distance BC S = ut +1/2at2 Using the linear motion equation V2 = u2 +2as Where v = final velocity (velocity at C) U= initial velocity = 1.2 m/s a= acceleration = -0.01m/s2 s=distance BC = 5m therefore v2= 1.22+2x -0.01x5 = 1.34 v=1.16m/s Average velocity = (v+u)/2 = (1.2+1.16)/2 = 1.18m/s Time taken from B to C = distance/average velocity = 5/1.18 = 4.2 s The total time required to achieve the exit = 10 +4.2 = 14.2 s 7. A person is moving to a fire exit through a corridor with initial speed of 1.2m/s . There is a strong air movement in the corridor. Speed of air movement is 0.3m/s, width of the corridor is 7 m and angle α =300. Find the minimum time needed to reach the fire exit. (Point C). Explain your answer and indicate the right direction for his evacuation. For the person to move from the start point of the evacuation point there is need to put into consideration the effect of the air movement in the corridor. It is also noted that if the original direction of the person with α =300 is used the addition of the air velocity component will drift the final point away from the exit point. For the person to end up at the exit point there is need for him to change his initial direction as shown in the diagram such that the drift from the wind will make the person to end up at the exit C . Assuming the diagram to be proportional to the air components CC is the air velocity component (0.3). AC is the is the initial velocity of the person (1.2m/s) BAC = α =300 CC = 0.3m/s AC = 1.2m/s Also BCA = 180-(90+30) = 600 The velocity vector c can in triangle ACC be calculated using the sine rule  =  Taking a to be side AC ; A as angle BCA; b as side CC and B as angle CAC Substituting  =  SinB = Sin60 x0.3/1.2 = 0.217 CAC= B = 12.50 Calculating the resultant velocity AC (a) ACC = 180-(12.5+60) = 180-72.5 = 107.50  =  a = 1.2xsin107.5/sin60 = 1.32 m/s The distance AC = a  =  a = 7xsin90/sin60 = 8.1m Time taken to reach fire exit = 8.1/1.32 = 6.14s For the person travelling at 1.2m/s to end up at the exit point he will have to reduce her starting angle to (30-12.5) = 17.50. Because of the strong wind the person will be drifted so that the angle will increase to the desired 300 and the resultant velocity will be 1.32 m/s. 8. How different is the result for the previous question, if air movement changes its direction on opposite (U= -0.3m/s) Suppose there is a change in the wind direction the velocity vector will changes as shown in the diagram In this case the distance to be travelled will remain as in the previous case since the starting point and the end point will remain the same. AC = 8.1m Angle BAC = 300 ; BCA = 600 ; ACC = 180-60 = 1200 In terms of velocity AC = 1.2m/s; CC = 0.3m/s Using the sine rule angle CAC can be established  =  SinA = 0.3sin120/1.2 = 0.22 A = angle CAC = 12.70 Angle ACC = 180-(120+12.7) = 47.30 Applying the sine velocity AC can be established  =  a = 1.2sin47.3/sin120 = 1.02 m/s Thus the velocity vector AC = 1.02m/s Time taken to reach the exit point = 8.1/1.02 = 7.94s It can be seen that the time talen to reach the exit is higher compared to the previous case. The person will also start at an angle of 30 +12.7 = 42.70C so that after the drift due the wind the angle will reduce to 300C. 9. There is a post flashover fire in a 3x3x3 (m) compart. The flame inside the room is cherry red. Calculate the total emissivity of the media inside the compartment and the rate of energy emission by thermal radiation from a broken window 1x1m. . Soot volume fraction is 0.3ppm Mean beam length = 3m (height of the building) Taking V to be the volume of the room 3m x 3m x 3m = 27m3 If the sum of estimated mole fractions for carbon dioxide is 0.1 and water vapour is 0.2 Total mole fractions = 0.1 +0.2 = 0.3 Where ksoot = 258C0.T.fv T = temperature [K]. = 700+273.15 = 973K fv = soot volume fraction, – assume 0.3x 10-6. Taking the value of C0 = 7 ksoot = 258 x7 x 973.15 x 0.3x 10-6.= 0.527  =1-   = 0.613  +  = 0.1 + 0.2 – 0.1x0.2 = 0.28 Thus emissivity of the media = = 0.28 + 0.613 – 0.28x0.613 = 0.72136 Where = is the energy emitted through window A = Area of opening = 1m3  = 0.72136 σ =Stefan Boltzmann Constant, 5.67x10-8 W/m2/K4  = 1 x 0.72136 x 5.67x10-8 x973.154 = 36.682Kw. Read More

When the fire fighters finally reached the top stairs there was a wall of bodies inside the door of the hall. The fire fighters had to remove the bodies quickly passing them down the stairs. As the bodies were being remove from the door there were other people from inside the burning hall who attempted to make their way through the space that was being created by removal of the bodies. The total number of death reported in this fire incident was 63 and these was majorly through inhaling of smoke.

There were 180 people who were injured and those who were reported to have been rescued by the fire brigade were 40 to 50 people. From this fire incident it is clear that the management did address the fire safety risk assessment issues. The management needs to be well aware of the risk rendered to the occupants of the premises. The fact that the hall was beyond capacity is a clear indicator that the management was not conscious of the safety of the occupants. Availability of escape routes and signs and notices is important in case of fire emergence (Safer Scotland, 2009).

There was no fire alarm in the hall and this resulted in a fire build up before it could be detected. If there were an alarm system and also some basic fire fighting equipment there is likelihood that the fire could have been contained before spreading. Removing or reducing storage hazards is another important measure of dealing with fires (British Standard 476: Part 22: 1987). The fire originated from the stairwell where we had some combustible materials. (Communities and local Government, 2006) The Windsor Castle fire The Windsor Castle fire occurred on Friday 20 November 1992 in Windsor castle which is situated in West of London.

The fire caused severe damage to the castle with most of the historic parts of the building being destroyed. The fire was reported to have started in The Queen’s Private Chapel at 11.33 am as a result of a spotlight igniting a curtain. The alarm went off in the watch room at the Castle brigade, manned by a chief firer officer. At the initial stage it was only the Brunswick Tower alone that had been indicated, but a few moments later lights were seen to have lit up which was a clear indication that there was a quick spread of the fire to the neighboring rooms.

The major parts of State Apartments were few moments later were engulfed in the fire. The firemen on patrol were paged through an automatic system and at a bout 11.37 the control room and Reading was alerted through a switch press by the chief fire officer. He also activated public fire alarm and made a telephone call to the Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue Service through a direct line. The Chief fire officer went to the Brunswick Tower to make an assessment of the situation and commence on the salvage operations.

It was at about 11:44 when the first appliances of the Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue Service arrived at the scene of fire, about 7 minutes after the issuing of the alarm. By about 11:48 am 10 pumping appliances had been ordered to the scene of fire with the principal officer who was on duty having been informed about the fire. The numbers of fire engines were increased to 20 by 12:12 pm; to 35 by 12:20 and over 200 firemen had arrived at the scene. There was no death which was reported in this incident.

The only injury was that of a decorator in one of the Private Chapel who was burnt on the process of removing pictures. He was taken to the royal surgery and later sent to a hospital. The major losses that were recorded were in terms of the fabric of the Castle. The falls roof which was in one of the halls (St. Georges Hall) and the void beneath the floors which used by the coal trucks made it possible for the fire to spread so easily. From the way this fire incident it is clear the personnel in the building were well aware of the procedure involving fire incidents.

Management of fire safety entails ensuring that there is emergency fire action plan and availability fire safety information and training.

Read More