Canterbury Television Building Collapse - Assignment Example

? Canterbury Television (CTV) Building Collapse: Case Analysis Executive Summary The Canterbury Television Building (CTV) collapse is an excellent example of flaws in structural design leading to destruction and the attendant loss during an earthquake. This report looks at the incident from a management perspective. It evaluates the consequences and makes specific recommendations to prevent such a situation in future. It recommends promoting a safety culture where it is non-existent, education and awareness regarding the consequences and implications of the quake, practical drills to rehearse actions and management procedures, and involvement of stakeholders in the strategic planning decisions. Table of Contents 1. Introduction 2. Analysis of Case Study 2.1 Key Role Players 2.1.1 Consulting Engineer 2.1.2 Structural Engineers 2.1.3 Structural Draughts men 2.1.4 Deputy Building Engineer – 1 2.1.5 Building Engineer 2.1.6 District Building Inspector 2.1.7 Deputy Building Engineer – 2 2.1.8 Foreman 2.1.9 Construction Manager 2.1.10 Pre-purchase Review 2.2 Stake holders 2.2.1 Developer 2.2.2 Construction Company 2.2.3 Consulting Engineer 2.2.4 Christchurch City Council (CCC) 2.2.5 Smart Group Limited 2.2.6 Union Construction Limited 2..2.7 Canterbury Television and Other Tenants 2.2.8 New Owner 2.2.9 Royal Commission of Inquiry 2.2.10 The Victims 3. Conclusions 3.1 Mr. Reay 3.2 Mr. Tapper 3.3 Mr. Bluck 3.4 Mr. Jones 3.5 Mr. Shirtcliff 3.6 Outdated Procedures 3.7 The Quakes 3.8 Evacuation 4. Recommendations 4.1 Council Efforts 4.2 Retrofit Design Standard 4.3 Seismic Performance 4.4 Rules and laws 4.5 Organisational Structure 4.6 Scientific Advancement 4.7 Others 5 References 1. Introduction The primary purpose of any building structure is not only the creation of enclosed spaces but also the capacity to withstand natural disasters i.e. durability. On September 4, 2010, an earthquake struck Canterbury in New Zealand’s South Island but it caused no fatalities. However, many of the unreinforced masonry (URM) buildings in the Central Business District (CBD) were damaged. The Canterbury Plain is a region that is relatively less seismic in New Zealand. Compared to the average in New Zealand, the aftershocks were relatively under-productive for the first 5 months until February 22, 2011, when an aftershock occurred 7 km northwest of the city of Christchurch and caused 185 deaths and over 7,000 injuries. A major part of the 185 confirmed deaths are due to the collapse of the mid-rise reinforced concrete (RC) office building in the CBD known as Canterbury Television Building (CTV). 75% of the occupants in this 6 storey building died. 2. Analysis of Case Study This is a report on the key role players and stake holders in the Canterbury Television Building (CTV) collapse incident. The report concludes with conclusions and recommendations. 2.1 Key Role Players The following is a list of persons/institutions that played a pivotal role in the creation of the CTV building. 2.1.1 Consulting Engineer Mr. Reay, the Consulting Engineer, should have paid more attention to the work that was undertaken viz. the construction of the CTV building. Though he had high academic qualifications he did not spend reasonable time in the project i.e. he had a hands-off approach to it. 2.1.2 Structural Engineers Mr. Henry and Mr. Harding were employed by Mr. Reay in the capacity of structural engineers. Mr. Reay wanted them to design medium height multi-storeyed buildings. Mr. Henry was with Mr. Reay for a year, whereas Mr. Harding had two stints with Mr. Reay. 2.1.3 Structural Draughts men Many draughtsmen worked on preparing structural drawings for the CTV building project. After the engineer made the architectural drawings, the draughtsmen worked out the dimensions. 2.1.4 Deputy Building Engineer - 1 Mr. Graeme Tapper, was the deputy building engineer for Christchurch City Council (CCC). He raised the structural issue of the connection of the floors (diaphragms) to the north wall complex with Mr. Reay’s firm. 2.1.5 Building Engineer Mr. Bryan Bluck was the building engineer for CCC at the time of the CTV Building. Reay convinced him that Tapper’s objections (see 2.1.4) were unfounded. Tapper was asked to sign on the design at Bluck’s behest. 2.1.6 District Building Inspector As found in the Summary and Recommendations in Volumes 5-7 & Section 6: Technical discussions on structure, Mr. Leo O’ Loughlin was the building inspector for CCC in the central city area at that time. He received the building permit application for the construction of the CTV building. He would check the documents provided with the application for missing information. He would also review parts of plans for legal compliance. 2.1.7 Deputy Building Engineer - 2 Mr. Peter Nichols was deputy building engineer, second-in-charge to Bluck at that time. He would take a copy of the designer’s calculations for reviewing the design and the assumptions made. He would also make a mathematical analysis for legal compliance. 2.1.8 Foreman Mr. Jones was the foreman of the CTV site. He was a managing tradesman who constructed the building to the plans and kept the construction on schedule. He was basically a carpenter who had picked up construction skills over the years. 2.1.9 Construction Manager Gerald Shirtcliff was made the Construction Manager of the CTV site. A person with structural and construction experience was needed to strengthen the management structure. 2.1.10 Pre-purchase Review Mr. John Hare, a senior engineer with Holmes Consulting Group (HCG) reviewed CTV building for a prospective buyer. He noted a non-compliance with contemporary building conventions. 2.2 Stake holders Given below are those who were associated with or affected by the CTV building in a major way. 2.2.1 Developer Prime West Corporation Limited purchased three sections of land on the corner of Cashel and Madras Streets where the CTV building was erected. This was Prime West’s first project in Christchurch and they wanted to keep the cost at a minimum. 2.2.2 Construction Company Williams Construction was to submit a design-build proposal for an office building. Mr. Brooks, the Managing Director wanted to increase the open floor area for the purpose of leasing. 2.2.3 Consulting Engineer Alan M. Reay Consulting Engineer (ARCE), the firm of Mr. Reay was selected as structural engineer for the CTV building. Williams Construction had previously worked with ARCE on other projects. 2.2.4 Christchurch City Council (CCC) The building permit for the CTV building was to be given by CCC. However, the permit was given in spite of reservations by the deputy engineers of CCC. Non-engineers had inspected the building following the September 2010 earthquake. They gave the building a green sticker which allowed re-entry. This ultimately reflected on the CCC as an organization. 2.2.5 Smart Group Limited Williams Property Holdings Limited was sold to Smart Group Limited by the time the foundation and first floor of the CTV building had been constructed. 2.2.6 Union Construction Limited Union Construction was established as a new construction company with Mr Brooks, Mr Scott and Mr Shirtcliff each holding a 10 per cent stake. Soon after completion of the CTV building, it became insolvent and was wound up. 2.2.7 Canterbury Television and Other Tenants Canterbury Television held the naming rights of the building and occupied the ground and first floors of the building at the time of the quake. The second floor was not tenanted during the quake. An English as a second language school was on the third floor. There was a medical clinic and a non-profitable agency on the fourth and fifth floors respectively. A nursing school was also located in the building. 2.2.8 New Owner There was an announcement that The Crown had bought the land for the Eastern Frame. An earthquake memorial at the CTV site was under consideration. 2.2.9 Royal Commission of Inquiry It was responsible for conducting a thorough and in depth investigation into the reasons behind the collapse of the building. The commission interacted with those who were involved with the CTV site in various ways. 2.2.10 The Victims 115 people were killed in the collapse. These included staff of the various tenants present during the collapse. Patients and students who were at the building when the collapse took place also lost their lives. There were seven survivors among those present in the building during the collapse. 3. Conclusions As per the report of BBC Asia (9 February 2012) and the report of Wright (2012, December 11) in Sydney Morning Herald, there were not sufficient steel reinforcements for the concrete columns that bore the load of the CTV building. As Isobe and Ido (n.d.) point out, structural Design and Structural Damage are some of the causes for the collapse of the CTV building. 3.1 Mr. Reay He adopted a hands-off approach to the activity at hand. While this was justifiable given Mr. Henry’s experience, the same could not be said about Mr. Harding. Knowing well that Mr. Harding had not worked with multi-storey structures, he chose to use his services to this effect. 3.2 Mr. Tapper He was wrong in issuing the building permit when there were issues regarding the design of the CTV building which required sorting out. Non-compliance of standards and accepted norms cannot be tolerated even if there is approval from a higher-up. This was a criminal offence punishable under the law. 3.3 Mr. Bluck He had the tendency to take the word of the designer given his expertise. While insistence on procedure may be stifling in terms of delays in construction, it is no excuse for ignoring structural and design flaws. Due diligence on his part could have prevented a disaster of such proportions. 3.4 Mr. Jones Rather than selecting a carpenter who learnt the tricks of the trade (i.e. construction) over time, it would have been better, if a foreman with a sound academic background in the same field had been selected. Such a person would have been able to provide creative and constructive advice towards construction. 3.5 Mr. Shirtcliff Mr. Reay should have probed the credentials of Mr. Shirtcliff before taking him on board. A person who had assumed another’s identity should not have been entrusted with a job which requires critical decisions to be taken. More than CCC procedures, the implications of faulty design were lost on Mr. Shirtcliff. 3.6 Outdated Procedures Mr. Reay, with all his experience and good standing in construction circles, should have avoided procedures which had been abandoned by the rest of the industry. Following current and advanced methods would have mitigated some of the flaws to the design and structure of the CTV building. 3.7 The Quakes Both the quakes in Christchurch were a wakeup call to take corrective action. All the anomalies and irregularities should have been sorted out and repairs should have been undertaken without any further delay. The CCC should have ensured that the vulnerability of the buildings in the vicinity was correctly measured. 3.8 Evacuation The building should have been evacuated after the first two quakes given that fissures and cracks had become more pronounced after the second quake. While loss of life could have been totally prevented, even property could have been saved had the evacuation of the building happened soon after the second quake. 4 Recommendations 4.1 Council Efforts As Brookie (2012) purports, bodies like the CCC should ensure community participation in long-term recovery. However, such bodies must be made effective to sustain long-term recovery. 4.2 Retrofit Design Standard It is not sufficient to just add a few anchors to limit the damage to Unreinforced Masonry (URM) buildings in large earthquakes. “A proper retrofit design standard is needed to safeguard existing URM buildings in New Zealand from future earthquakes” (Dhakal, 2011). 4.3 Seismic Performance “The individual structural elements should be examined to see if they have capacity to resist seismic and gravity load actions in an acceptably ductile manner” (Section 9: Summary of conclusions and recommendations). 4.4 Rules and laws According to the rules and laws; (a) Scientific research should be used to modify building codes. After-quake studies are valuable in appraising codes, (b) Application of earthquake code should be promoted, (c) Estimates of ground shaking levels should be included, (d) Design for post-event repair should be included as a standard design approach, and (e) Building owners should be made to follow building codes. (Source: Summary and Recommendations in Volumes 5-7) 4.5 Organisational Structure involves (a) Promoting equality by considering all vulnerable locations irrespective of economic or political importance, (b) having emergency plans as a contingency measure and to deal with various regions, (c) addressing vulnerability in communication, (d) co-ordinating relief and recovery, and (e) strengthening local synergies with government and non-government organisations. (Source: Summary and Recommendations in Volumes 5-7) 4.6 Scientific Advancement must meet (a) Collaboration among seismologists, engineers, urban planners, health specialists etc. in research (b) cost-effective methods to strengthen older buildings, and (c) Systematic post-event surveying of buildings. (Source: Government Office for Science). 4.7 Other aspects involve (a) strengthen old buildings to new building standard is beneficial in places of high seismic hazard, (b) strengthening all older buildings cannot be justified in places of low seismic hazard, and (c) all substandard high-occupancy buildings irrespective of age should be strengthened. (Source: Cousins, 2013). References Brookie, R. (2012). Governing the Recovery from the Canterbury Earthquakes 2010-11: The Debate over Institutional Design. Working Paper. Institute for Governance and Policy Studies. Retrieved from http://ips.ac.nz/publications/files/27b07e4270b.pdf BBC News. (2012, 9 February). “New Zealand quake: CTV building 'was sub-standard”'. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16958906 Cousins, W. J. (2013). Potential benefits of strengthening earthquake-prone buildings. NZSEE Conference. Retrieved from http://www.nzsee.org.nz/db/2013/Paper_43.pdf Dhakal, R. P. (2011). Performance of Unreinforced Masonry Buildings in Canterbury Earthquakes. JSEE, 13 (1). Government Office for Science. Institutions and disaster outcomes: successes, weaknesses and significant research needs. Commissioned Review, Foresight. Retrieved from http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/foresight/docs/reducing-risk-management/supporting-evidence/12-1299-institutions-and-disaster-outcomes.pdf Isobe, D & Ido, Y. (n. d.). Numerical Investigation on the Collapse of the CTV Building Caused. 2011 New Zealand Earthquake. Retrieved from http://eccomasproceedings.org/cs2013/pdf/1578.pdf Section 9: Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations. Retrieved from canterbury.royalcommission.govt.nz/...9/.../Vol%206_Section%209.doc Summary and Recommendations in Volumes 5-7., Christchurch. The City and Approach to this Inquiry. Retrieved from http://canterbury.royalcommission.govt.nz/Final-Report-Volume-Five-Contents/Vol_5_Pt1-Page1-34 Section 6: Technical discussions on structure. Retrieved from http://canterbury.royalcommission.govt.nz/Final-Report-Volume-Six-Contents/Vol 6_Sections 6_to_end-Page-196-324/ Wright, M., Greenhill, M & Rutherford, H. (2012, December 11). Catalogue of errors in collapsed building. The Sydney Morning Herald (World). Retrieved from http://www.smh.com.au/world/catalogue-of-errors-in-collapsed-building-20121211-2b6o6.html Read More