Economic analysis to predict the effects of hand gun laws - Essay Example

Running head: Economic analysis to predict the effects of and guns laws Some federal and laws in the United s of America permit ordinary citizens to carry guns either covertly or openly. However some states have very strict gun laws which make it hard for ordinary citizens to possess guns by raising the standards of the demands one is required to meet so as to qualify for gun ownership. In states where guns are easily accessible by ordinary citizens such as Texas and Nevada, it has been noted that the percentage of crimes committed by armed gangsters have considerably reduced (McPheters, 2006).

It is assumed that the gangsters fear committing crimes to any one since they are not sure to differentiate between who has a personal gun and who does not possess one. Licensed guns increase the confidence of citizens for they tend to feel safe and can therefore go on comfortably with their business. The penal codes in the states that authorized local sheriff departments in the various counties to license gun ownership changed the general landscape in as far as criminal activities are concerned.

Crime committed by robbers in Texas, for example, reduced by about 15% when the legislation to allow gun ownership by qualified persons came into effect as compared to the previous year. As for Georgia, the reduction in robberies was about 11%. Nevada on the other hand recorded a higher percentage of reduction in the number of robberies committed at about 19% one year since the legislation came into effect in the state (Myers, 2006). This is highly attributed to two main reasons: 1. Most gangsters were killed whenever they tried to carry out robberies in other people’s business premises and homes hence reducing their number in the respective states. 2. Those gangsters or robbers, for that matter, who had intentions of carrying out their criminal activities, feared being killed by the citizens possessing guns.

These fears resulted into less robberies being committed (McPheters, 2006). This can be explained better by the use of the various types of economic analysis tools. The legislation about personal ownership and possession of guns by the ordinary citizens in the various states had an impact on the robberies’ marginal costs. According to the prediction by the economic model, the reduction is as a result of the likelihood of the robbers being killed (McPheters, 2006). The criminals, therefore, considering this were forced to revaluate their strategies in such states with regard to the marginal costs incurred on one hand and the benefits that would be gained if they continue carrying out their criminal activities.

It should also be noted that criminals will always remain criminals and will always look for new opportunities in which they can carry out their activities. When one state passes legislation that has a greatly negative impact on the normal activities of the criminals, they will always change their way or place of committing robbery. Research shows that when crimes decreased in states that allowed citizens to possess guns, there was considerable increase in the robberies committed in the neighboring states that did not allow its citizens to carry guns, or in which the laws to carry guns were too strict for most people to own guns (Mathieson, 2004).

The type of crime committed by the criminals was affected differently. For example legislation reduced person to person robberies but did not limit the number of home break-ins (Ozenne, 2001). In economic terms, the laws affected the marginal costs of personal contact crimes on a larger scale as compared to the other crimes. References Mathieson, D. et al. (2004). “Homicide and Robbery in New York City: An Economic Model”, Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 5, 83-98. McPheters, L. et al. (2006).

The Economics of Crime and Law Enforcement. Springfield: Charles R. Thomas. Myers, S. (2006). “Estimating the Economic Model of Crime: Employment versus Punishment Effects”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 157-175. Ozenne, T. (2001). ‘The Economics of Bank Robbery”, Journal of Legal Studies. Vol. 3, 19-51.