National Subsidiaries of Multinational Companies - Research Paper Example

National subsidiaries of multinational companies are largely powerless to direct their own destiny, being, instead, dependent on decisions taken by the parent company or the government of the host country. Contents Page 1. Abstract 1 2. Introduction 2 3. MNC-Subsidiary 3 4. Organization Structure 4 5. Control in MNCs 4 6. Control Types and Mechanisms in MNCs 5 6.1 Bureaucratic Control 5 6.2 Cultural Control 5 6.3 Output Control 5 6.4 Behavioural Control 6 7. Centralization/Decentralization in MNCs 6 8. Factors Affecting HQ-Subsidiary Relationship 6 8.1 Organization Age 6 8.2 Resource Requirement 6 8.3 Ownership Level 7 8.4 Location 7 8.5 MNC Nationality 7 8.6 Subsidiary Management's Nationality 7 8.7 Information Symmetry 7 8.8 Strategic Function of Subsidiary 7 9. Language Barrier 8 10. Geographical Distance and MNC Network 9 11. HRM in MNCs 10 12. Strategic Behaviour and Power 11 13. Management of Entry Modes 12 14. Conclusion 14 15. References 15 Abstract This paper attempts to uncover the Headquarter-Subsidiary relationship in multinational corporations and argues that subsidiaries of multinational corporations are powerless in terms of decision-making and autonomy and that they are largely influenced by the decisions of the headquarter. In doing so, various factors have been considered such as language barrier, geographical distance, HRM practices. References to various previous studies on the subject have been provided to further affirm the aforementioned argument. Introduction Global business is constantly evolving and competition across businesses has led to a surge in companies expanding across domestic borders. Multinational companies and their subsidiaries have become an increasingly important part of the global business landscape. How the business is conducted is dependent on the relationship between the headquarters of the MNC and their subsidiaries. Various factors affect this relationship and in turn, determine the ultimate positioning of power in the organization. Organization structure affects communication patterns and information flows within the MNC. Organization structure facilitates control and improving structural fit with organization strategy serves to bring the goals of the subsidiaries and the MNC on par with each other. The aim of the paper will be to show that national subsidiaries of multinational corporations are powerless and are totally dependent on their parent company or the host government. The paper starts with some information on MNC-Subsidiary relationship and moves on to discuss the organization structure and the various control mechanisms that are required to ensure that goals of subsidiaries and the headquarters are in parity with the organizational goal. Centralization and decentralization in MNCs, and how it affects the level of control and decision making in organization is discussed. Moreover, the paper discusses the effects of language barrier, geographical distance and human resource management practices on the headquarter-subsidiary relationship and sheds light on the level of autonomy in each situation. The choice of entry as an investment in foreign markets is explained and how the two choices affect the level of control exercised by the headquarters is discussed. The paper ends with a conclusion. MNC-Subsidiary In the last two decades a substantial number of studies have focused on the role of subsidiaries in Multinational corporation (MNC) network. MNC is defined as "a group of geographically dispersed and goal disparate organizations" (Younes, 2003, p.2). The key aspect of the headquarter-subsidiary relationships is the way in which the headquarters ensure that the subsidiaries are working towards common organizational goals. Control mechanisms and centralization/decentralization level are major pointers for the nature of relationship between headquarters and subsidiaries. The headquarter-subsidiary relationship can be thoroughly understood by analyzing organization structure and strategy, control mechanisms, and centralization level in decision making. The strategic multinational integration of management operations in different locations is a vital issue for managers of MNCs. A successful integration of all organizational activities (operations, marketing, finance, human resources, etc.) involves developing effective strategy structure, control mechanisms and systems in both the headquarter and the subsidiaries (Younes, 2003). The need for national responsiveness is also of paramount importance to the success of headquarter-subsidiary relationship. Several factors are believed to be contributing to the national responsiveness in MNCs. For example, host government demands, trade barriers, regulations of MNC activity, and diversity among national markets in market structure, distribution channels, manufacturing process. Factors that contribute to the global integration are multinational customers, global competitors, technology, investment intensity and access to raw material (Younes, 2003). The balance between responsiveness and global integration is achieved by effective communication between headquarters and subsidiaries. Structuring the relationship between the headquarters and subsidiaries is the most critical job for the top managers in MNCs. In order to identify the right structure of the relationship, it is imperative to analyze organization structure and organization strategy. Strategies for MNC should be developed from an international perspective in order to successfully compete on a global scale. Though the strategies at the subsidiary level are developed from a local perspective, both headquarters and subsidiaries are supposed to follow a compatible strategy and structure that is oriented to achieve the organization's goal as a whole (Harzing, 1999). Organization Structure Each organization strategy needs a structural configuration to be carried out successfully. Headquarter-subsidiary relationship can be seen as a classical problem, whose attributes are similar to those of principal-agent relationships (Nohria, Ghoshal, 1994). This is because managers of subsidiaries may attempt to maximise their own self interests while the CEO of the firm attempts to look after the interests of the organization as a whole. The agency theory argues that organization structure powerfully influences internal communications in large complex organizations. Improving structural fit with organization strategy can enhance communication patterns and information flow and ensure they are in parity with the whole organization strategy (Younes, 2003). Control in MNCs Organization structure facilitates control in MNCs. The headquarter-subsidiary relationship can be observed by analyzing the control relationship between the two parties. Control is identified as the process by which management at the headquarters ensures that subsidiaries think and acts in ways that lead to the effective and efficient attainment of the MNC's organizational objectives (Younes, 2003). Controlling is about regulating the activities within an organization. As an organization grows in size and function, the task of integrating various units becomes more challenging. The ability to retain control in a growing multinational organization is an indicator of a successful headquarter-subsidiary relationship. Control reduces risk and uncertainty while ensuring that all units within the organization are directed towards a uniform organizational goal. Control Types and Mechanisms in MNCs The traditional categorization of control types and mechanisms in the relationship between headquarters and subsidiaries was started by Weber in 1946 as formal bureaucratic control and informal cultural control. However, additional types of control were identified later by other authors (Younes, 2003). Bureaucratic Control: The control mechanisms in this category are impersonal and indirect. They consist of utilizing a set of codified rules and regulations which define desired performance in terms of output and behaviour for an individual (Harzing, 1999). Poor performance of subsidiaries increases the drift towards bureaucratization and centralization by management at the headquarters. Other factors influencing such decision are the size and age of the organization, and the age of the industry the organization belongs to. Also of importance are the environment and organization structure as well as the quality of information. The more hostile the environment, the more uncertainty it brings to organization managers. As a result, the tendency to apply bureaucratic control systems decreases. Compromise on the quality and timeliness of information increases the tendency to bureaucratize and centralize (Harzing, 1999). Cultural Control: This type of control is opposite to bureaucratic control, i.e. it is more implicit and informal. Cultural control systems may be used in organizations depicting low turnover and in jobs demanding secrecy and high level delegation (Younes, 2003). Output Control: Output control is practiced in situations where the headquarters demand evidence that the performance of their subsidiaries meets the organization's goals. It includes measuring the desired quality and quantity of output (Harzing, 1999). Behavioural Control: This type of control is comprised of human resource management practices designed to coordinate the actions of individuals on the job. Behavioural control is exercised in subsidiaries lacking knowledge or where output control does not exist (Younes, 2003). Centralization/Decentralization in MNCs Centralization is defined as "the division of decision-making authority between the headquarters and the various operational units" (Younes, 2003, p.8). Centralization level is the level at which a decision needs approval prior to implementation. The degree of centralization or the level of delegation varies from one MNC to another. However, in theory, geographically dispersed MNCs should encourage headquarters to give more delegation for their subsidiaries in order to attain faster responsiveness to local conditions, to cope with unexpected problems and to react timely with unexpected opportunities. This theory can also prove to be disadvantageous in crisis situations when subsidiaries managers may not act correctly and the headquarters could be too late in imposing a corrective action. To correctly understand the level of autonomy granted to subsidiaries, it is imperative to understand the factors that affect the headquarter-subsidiary relationship. Factors Affecting the Headquarter-Subsidiary Relationship As mentioned above, in order to rightly examine the type of relationship between the headquarters and their subsidiaries, it is important to understand the organization structure, strategy and control systems and mechanisms (Younes, 2003). These can be understood by examining the internal and external factors that affect this relationship. According to Younes (2003), these factors are: Organization Age: Age is directly proportional to the level of power exercised by the subsidiaries, i.e. the older the subsidiary, the less are the control mechanisms exercised by the headquarters. Resource Requirements: this is measured by the dependency of the subsidiaries on the headquarters for resources such as human resources, technology, financial, and other services. The more the dependency of the subsidiaries on the headquarters for resources, the tighter will be the control imposed by the headquarters. In other words, the subsidiary will be primarily controlled by the headquarters if there is evidence of greater resource-dependency. Ownership Level: The percentage of investment by the parent company in the subsidiaries will determine the level of control exercised. The greater the investment, the lower will be the level of autonomy granted to the subsidiaries. Location: Geographical distance plays a role in determining the power of headquarters over the subsidiaries. Distance affects the ease with which skills can be transferred to the subsidiaries. For example, it is easier for the Japanese to manage and transfer technology to East Asian countries rather than to a European or western country. MNC Nationality: The domicile of the MNC affects the relationship in that it is assumed that the parent's culture is transferred to the foreign subsidiary. Subsidiary Management's Nationality: Similarity in the nationality of top managers and the MNC lead to a swift transfer and easy exercise of culture, goal and strategies at the subsidiary level. Similarity in nationality also boosts trust between the two parties. Information symmetry: Symmetry in information reduces level of control on part of the headquarters. Where information asymmetry increases, headquarters impose tighter control on the subsidiaries. Strategic function of the Subsidiary: it is believed that when the functions (production, marketing, development and sales) performed by the subsidiary increase, the subsidiary's level of autonomy and negotiation power will increase and will moderate the relationship between the degree of ownership and subsidiary's control. The aforementioned factors affect the relationship between the headquarters and their subsidiaries. The level of autonomy exercised by the subsidiaries depends on the above factors. Subsidiary autonomy is the antithesis for HQ control. The control mechanisms adopted by the MNC to disallow potential opportunistic behaviour in the subsidiary have important effects on the subsidiary's autonomy. Subsidiary autonomy is likely to be associated with the subsidiary's supremacy over the headquarter with regard to knowledge of the local market, the subsidiary's transformation process, distribution, procurement, and other relevant issues (Johnston, 2004). Language Barrier Communication is essential to management. It relies upon a shared language; a pre-requisite which does not exist in many international organizations (Feely, Harzing 2004). Evidence suggests that as many as three out of four multinational companies now manage networks of twenty or more overseas operations (Feely, Harzing, 2004). MNCs are routinely characterized by the interaction between managers belonging to different language groups. Even if the managers possess relative competency in the language of the other party, loss of rhetorical skills is always present as the use of humour, negotiation, persuasion and motivation requires a high level of fluency (Feely, Harzing, 2004). Misunderstandings are therefore easily caused leading to anxiety and uncertainty. This problem is particularly relevant to headquarter-subsidiary relationship. If it is the subsidiary management with relative competency, it may fail to create a good impression on the senior managers, and hence be undervalued in terms of their contribution to the organization. In case of parent company management depicting incompetent linguistic skills, subsidiary management may take it as lack of confidence and leadership skills and therefore, may choose to ignore direction from parent management. Communication failures may lead to adversarial climate and in turn, group boundaries (Feely, Harzing, 2004). Not all parent companies are domiciled in English-speaking countries. In such cases, power-authority distortion becomes a critical issue. For example, in meetings with subsidiary team, parent company staff will be forced to use the other language. This creates distortion in the power-authority balance. The parent company management team may feel frustrated, resulting in disputes between the two parties. The language barrier is likely to reduce the level of trust in the relationship. As a result, it is likely that the parent company management will retain as much control centrally as possible. The higher the language barrier between the headquarter-subsidiary relationship, the lower is the level of subsidiary decision-making authority. One way to implement personal centralized control in MNCs is to use parent company expatriate managers. This is because for multinationals this will be an important way to realize direct supervision of centralization of decision-making by creating mini-headquarters at the subsidiary level (Harzing, Sorge, Paauwe, 2001). Geographical Distance and the MNC Network The MNC is seen as a network of transactions that comprise capital flows, product flows and knowledge flows, the latter of which is argued to be the most important Two aspects of knowledge flows are distinguished; the magnitude of transactions (the extent to which subsidiaries engage in knowledge transfer) and the directionality of transactions (whether subsidiaries are providers or receivers of knowledge). Four generic subsidiary roles can be defined based on the above two aspects; Global Innovator (high outflow, low inflow); Integrated Player (high outflow, high inflow); Implementor (low outflow, high inflow); and Local Innovator (low outflow, low inflow) (Gupta, Govindarajan, 1991). The Global Innovator (GI) subsidiary has characteristics whereby it engages in knowledge transfer to other organizational units and is itself less dependent on knowledge inflows from the headquarters or other subsidiaries. This particular role of GI has become important in recent times as more MNCs move towards adopting this role. In the GI role, subsidiaries act as the centre of excellence for specific product lines (Bartlett, Ghoshal, 1989). Integrated Player subsidiary has a profile of engaging in knowledge transfer as well as being heavily dependent on knowledge inflows from the HQ or other subsidiaries. Implementor subsidiary does not engage in knowledge creation but is dependent on inflows from either HQ or other subsidiaries. Local Innovators are rather autonomous subsidiaries, in that they do create knowledge but do not transfer this knowledge to other organizational units, nor receive any knowledge from them (Harzing, Noorderhaven, 2005). Geographical isolation influences the role a subsidiary plays within the internal MNC network. Gupta and Govindarajan (1991) find that Australian and New Zealand subsidiaries have a high tendency to perform the role of Local Innovators and a low tendency towards Global Innovators. Geographical distance is expected to have an impact on the physical flows within an MNC network for obvious reasons of transport economies. Geographical isolation also impacts knowledge flows due to absence of normative integration. According to Ghoshal and Bartlett (1998) the extent to which a subsidiary is normatively integrated with the parent company is associated with practices such as extensive travel and transfer of managers between the headquarters and the subsidiary, and joint task forces and committees. Since geographical distance makes centralised decision making less feasible, the headquarters grant a higher level of autonomy to such subsidiaries. HRM in MNCs It has been argued that human assets are an emerging source of competitive advantage for MNCs (Schuler, Rogovsky, 1998). Human Resource Management (HRM) is evolving from being just a support function to one of strategic importance (Teagarden, Von Glinow, 1997). HRM policies and practices are becoming crucial because they serve as mechanisms for coordination and control of international operations. HR systems help to shape organizational culture. On the other hand, it has also been argued that HRM serves as a deterrent when MNCs try to implement global strategies (Adler, Bartholomew, 1992). This is primarily due to the complexities faced in employing and managing people from disparate national and cultural backgrounds. A company is an organization composed of many differentiated practices. Within the same subsidiary, some management practices might follow the parent company ones, while others may stick to the practices of the host country. A crucial issue in the MNC literature is the extent to which subsidiaries act and behave as local firms - local isomorphism - as opposed to the extent to which their practices resemble those of the parent company or some other global standard - internal consistency (Rosenzweig, Nohria, 1994). Research has revealed that companies in different countries differ with respect to their HRM policies and practices (Ferner, 1997). Transferring HRM skills to other countries can be quite daunting because of disparity in national cultures. Failure to adapt HRM practices to a host country's culture can lead to negative consequences and deteriorating subsidiary performance (Myloni, Harzing, Mirza, 2004). Subsidiaries that are managed consistently with national cultural expectations have been found to perform better than the subsidiaries that are managed otherwise (Newman, Nollen, 1996). It is not only the cultural values that determine an individual's behaviour that subsequently affects management practices. Individual behaviour can also be explained to a certain extent in terms of the social structures that act as a guide for individuals (Lukes, 1973). There has been research over the past two decades on the impact of social forces on organizational structure and behaviour. The basic argument behind the research has been the systematic influence that social institutions have on company practices resulting in processes that reflect national patterns (Sorge, 1995). With regard to the transfer of management practices to host countries, the extent to which firms are able to transfer home country practices to the host country depends on the host country's national business systems and their institutions which can either facilitate or inhibit the transfer (Ferner, 1994). Host country legal regulations represent a strong environmental pressure on MNC subsidiaries (Taylor, Beechler, Napier, 1996). The legal environment in which the MNC subsidiary is embedded also impacts the transfer of HRM practices from its parent (Beechler, Yang, 1994). Strategic Behaviour and Power MNCs are physically dispersed and internally differentiated. Differences between national cultures in which the subsidiaries and the central office are embedded, will shape the perception of the power structure between company units. Moreover, the interactions between people of various units have an impact on the distribution of power (Wubben, Ruimschotel, 2001). The greater the cultural difference between home-country and host-country, the greater is the risk for problems arising out of cultural differences in headquarter-subsidiary relationships. These problems are more pronounced when there is greater interdependency between the headquarter-subsidiary relationships. The core organization, represented by the central office and formal control systems, derive their power from their exclusive relationship with the owners. The member companies, represented by subsidiaries, derive their power from the industrial network they belong to. Power may be conceptualized as either authority or influence (Bacharach, Lawler, 1981). Authority refers to the formal aspect of power, and is the formal right to make decisions. Influence is the informal aspect of power and is the right to steer decisions. The central office uses authority and influence, the member companies use influence, i.e. critical resources. The subsidiary provides and receives resources both from within the corporate context and from the external context. From the perspective of dependency relations, a subsidiary can either be fully dependent on the headquarters, partially dependent, or independent. The less dependent subsidiary is typically considered to be more powerful. The degree of dependency, and therefore, power, depends on knowledge, product and capital flows between the subsidiary and the headquarter (Wubben, Ruimschotel, 2001). Management of Entry Modes The choice of entry mode has received a lot of attention from international business researchers in recent years. Expansion into foreign markets requires a decision on two related but distinct issues; whether to acquire an existing local firm (acquisition), or to set up a completely new plant (greenfield investment). Are greenfields and acquisitions managed in the same way or do headquarter-subsidiary relationships differ between the two entry modes Headquarters cannot make all decisions because it does not possess all the necessary knowledge or resources, and at the same time it cannot leave all decisions in the hands of subsidiaries because the interests of subsidiaries can differ from that of the headquarters or the MNC as a whole (Harzing, 2001). The level of autonomy practiced in subsidiaries is dependent on the type of entry mode chosen by the MNC. The impact of the MNC's international strategy on the choice between greenfields and acquisitions can be argued from two theoretical perspectives; the different firm-specific advantages associated with the two strategies and the different levels of internal versus external isomorphism that are portrayed by subsidiaries. According to Rugman and Verbeke (1992), firm-specific advantages (FSAs) are either location-bound or non-location bound. Location-bound FSAs are those whose benefits depend on their being used in a particular location(s). They cannot be easily transferred to other locations without significant adaptation. On the other hand, non-location-bound FSAs can be used on a global scale due to their low transfer costs. Global companies tend to focus on the exploitation of non-location-bound FSAs, such as for instance a proprietary technology. This is because it is cost-efficient to build an entirely new production site so that it can incorporate the latest production technologies and can be built to match the company's exact requirements, rather than acquiring a company and having to accept the existing operations which may not be cost-efficient (Harzing, 2001). In an international setting, subsidiaries are confronted with an external environment that could include parent and host government, local organizations and other interest groups. Subsidiaries of MNCs are also subject to institutional pressures from within the organization to become isomorphic to the parent organization's norms (Kostova, Zaheer, 1999). Therefore, MNC subsidiaries have to conform to both internal (parent organization) and external (host country environment) isomorphism (Rosenzweig, Singh, 1991). In terms of isomorphism, global strategies will focus on internal isomorphism and strive for a high level of integration and low level of local responsiveness. Based on the above mentioned factors, greenfield investments are chosen over acquisitions. Headquarters are expected to exercise high level of control over greenfield investments since transfer of FSAs is difficult when subsidiaries are allowed to operate independently. A high level of expatriate presence can complement high level of control, therefore, high expatriate concentration is obvious in greenfield investments. The main role of greenfield investments is to serve as a pipeline for headquarter-based FSAs and it is unlikely that greenfield subsidiaries are given ample opportunity to be locally responsive (Harzing, 2001). This is in parity with the idea that internal isomorphism is given preference over external isomorphism. The main reason behind this preference is to maintain a high level of control over the subsidiaries. Subsidiaries formed out of acquisitions in foreign markets are bound by external isomorphism and are given more power to exercise in decision making due to requirement of concentrated local responsiveness. Continued employment of local managers, rather than their replacement by expatriates, will be preferred in order to tap into local knowledge (Harzing, 2001). Marketing strategies and product development is adapted to local circumstances in order to stay competitive and attain the objectives of acquisition investments. A high level of independence is assigned to acquisition subsidiaries in order to fulfil the role efficiently and effectively. MNC is considered to be a differentiated network where knowledge is created in various parts of the MNC and transferred to several inter-related units (Hedlund, 1986). Conclusion This paper has attempted to uncover factors that affect headquarter-subsidiary relationships. There are many factors that affect the HQ-subsidiary relationship such as the age of MNC, its location, ownership structure, subsidiary management structure and functions. Other variables that affect this relationship are language barrier, different human resource management practices that prevail in the home versus the host countries, geographical distance which has an impact on the knowledge transfer and transport economies, and intercultural differences which play a key role in shaping the organizational structure and behaviour. The choice of entry in foreign markets also affects the level of autonomy granted to the subsidiaries of MNCs. The paper has discussed that subsidiaries formed out of greenfield investments are characterised by a low level of autonomy since the entire control lies in the hands of the headquarters. The paper has also elaborated on the various control mechanisms that are in place in MNCs wishing to retain control authority. The different types of controls that prevail in MNCs are indicative of its strategies and the way operations are conducted. It has been shown with reference to many studies that national subsidiaries of multinational corporations are largely powerless in directing their own destiny. Subsidiaries are, instead, dependent on their headquarters in terms of resources such as human resources, technology, financial, material, and services. References Adler, N.J. and Bartholomew, S. (1992). Managing Globally Competent People The Academy of Management Executive, Vol. 6, Issue 3, pp: 53-65 Bartlett, C.A. and Ghoshal S. (1991). Managing Across Borders: The Transnational Solution London: London Business School Beechler, S. and Yang, J.Z. (1994). The Transfer of Japanese Style Management to American Subsidiaries: Contingencies, Constraints, and Competencies Journal of International Business Studies, Vol.25, Issue 3, pp: 467-491 Feely, A.J. and Harzing, A. (2004). Language Barrier and its Implications for HQ- Subsidiary Relationships Paper presented at the 2004 AoM Conference, New Orleans, August. Ferner, A. (1997). Country of Origin Effects and HRM in Multinational Companies. Human Resource Management Journal, Vol.7, Issue 1, pp:19-37. Gupta, A.K. and Govindarajan, V. (1991). Knowledge Flows and the Structure of Control within Multinational Corporations The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 13, Issue 4, pp: 768-792 Harzing, A. and Noorderhaven, N. (2005). Geographical Distance and the Role of Management of Subsidiaries: The Case of Subsidiaries Down Under Asia- Pacific Journal of Management, vol. 23 Harzing, A. (1999). Managing the Multinationals: An International Study of Control Mechanisms Cheltenham : Edward Elgar Harzing, A. (2001). Acquisitions versus Greenfield Investments : International Strategy and Management of Entry Modes Strategic Management Journal Johnston, S. (2004). Firm Strategy, Subsidiary Type and Subsidiary Autonomy in Multinational Corporations Academy of International Business, Stockholm. Lukes, S. (1973). Individualism Oxford: Basil Blackwell Myloni, B., Harzing, A.K., Mirza, H. (2004). Host Country Specific Factors and the Transfer of Human Resource Management Practices in Multinational Companies International Journal of Manpower. Nohria, N. and Ghoshal, S. (1994). Differentiated Fit and Shared Values: Alternatives for Managing Headquarter-Subsidiary Relationship Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 15, pp: 491-502 Rosenzweig, P.M. and Nohria, N. (1994). Influences on HRM Practices in Multinational Corporations Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 25, Issue 2, pp: 229-251. Rugman, A. and Verbeke, A. (1992). A Note on the Transnational Solution and the Transaction Cost Theory of Multinational Strategic Management Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 23, Issue 4, pp: 761-771 Schuler, R.S. and Rogovsky, N. (1998). Understanding Compensation Practice Variations Across Firms: The Impact of National Culture Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 29, Issue 1, PP:159-177 Taylor, S., Beechler, S. and Napier, N. (1996). Toward an Integrative Model of Strategic International Human Resource Management. Academy of Management Review, Vol. 21, Issue 4, pp:959-985 Teagarden, M.B., and Von Glinow, M.A. (1997). Human Resource Management in Cross-Cultural Contexts: Emic Practices versus Etic Philosophies. Management International Review, Vol.37, Issue 1, pp:7-20. Wubben, E.F.M. and Ruimschotel, A. (2001). The Power of Influence: A Differentiated Approach Towards Power in the Multinational Corporation Wageningen University Younes, T. (2003). Managing Headquarters Subsidiary Relationships: A German Corporation Acting Globally EAMSA, 20th Annual Conference, Stockholm. Read More