Analysis of the Financial Crisis 2007-2010 - Essay Example

?THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2007 WAS IT SIMPLY THE RESULT OF LAX REGULATION, OR WERE A RANGE OF FACTORS AT PLAY? INTRODUCTION The financial crisisof 2007-2010 had its first interaction with the US economy in 2007. This crisis started from the US and then spread around the whole world. All the countries felt the affect of this global crisis but with different intensity. The impact of the financial crisis affected all the economies and hence challenged the incorporations and businesses to strive for their mere survival. The businesses with weak business models in this time were forced to shut down. The closure of business functions resulted in unemployment. This shattered the trust of the businesses on the economy and specifically the financial institutions that actually drove the boom. The recession gave a very wrong impact to the consumers. The effects of the financial crisis can still be prominently seen on the global economies’ resisting to take up growth. The intensity of the financial crisis was very high. The seriousness of the impact can be noted from the fact that due to the financial crisis around 4000 banks in the US collapsed (Mike, 2013). The topics of the financial crisis have been discussed on a regular basis in many academics, business and institutional forums. Therefore, topic of the underlying debate has also been concerned to focus on the factors which resulted in the financial crisis. DISCUSSION OF REASONS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS World Bank reported that entire episode of financial crisis as a series of three event including the US sub-prime mortgage loans, followed by the bankruptcy of US investment giant Lehman Brothers (Baba & Packer, 2009) and final phase of the episode came to the picture as economic recession hitting hard to the developed economies than developing ones (Mike, 2013). To date, the recession is still resisting the recovery; therefore, in order to strengthen recovery it is important to assess the factors of failures. Tax System Implications and Bad Policies The implications of the tax system on the financial crisis plays very important role. The tax burden on the individuals is determined by the tax rates. The variation in the amount of taxes paid by the companies and by the individuals in any economy play a very vital role in determining the effectiveness of the implementation of the tax in that particular economy. Taxes along with being source of revenue from for the public finance also forms the core reason of business’s debt orientation. Since debt capital rising provides tax benefit therefore, business in order to take tax benefit attempt to take excessive debt. Further, in referred debt orientation to take tax benefit businesses sometime ignore the rising bankruptcy cost that rises in proportion to the debt; hence, increasing the chance of crisis with excessive debt (de Mooij, Keen, and Orihara, 2013) The relationship has also been asserted in the IMF report with two different models both having positive relationship as presented below (de Mooij, Keen, and Orihara, 2013): (de Mooij, Keen, and Orihara, 2013) Some researcher, in contrast, hold view that crisis has been caused from the bad policies and tax factor shall not be held responsible for it. For instance, Peter J. Wallison has presented a detailed discussion in the book entitled “Bad History, Worse Policy’ on the financial crisis of 2008. The author debated in specific reference to Dodd-Frank act, housing policy and other policies from the government that was unable to regulate the market in true spirits and hence the fragile economy collapsed. Complex Structured Financial Products Financial product increasingly took over the market as the financial market managed to take over the reins of the economy. Many financial products were complex in nature. New methods had been brought up by the banks and the financial institutes to promote more loans. Product innovations such as financial derivatives are given special responsibility for the crisis. Increased resort of the financial system to innovate the product had many reasons behind: first, innovation allowed financial market to offer range of products to businesses and institutions. Second, the financial complex engineering of the product caused increased inability of the market buyers and even traders to understand the impact deeply while third being such engineered products also benefitted tax evasion and so on so forth (Kapoor, 2010). Financial derivatives, shadows banking, repo 105 and repo 108 are some of the products and mechanism that provided ground field for the crisis to make its way. For instance, for financial derivatives Pennsylvania State Auditor Jack Wagner stated that derivatives were financial weapons of mass destruction as reflected below: (Washington Public Bank Coalition, n.d.) Moreover, globally in 2011 according to an estimate $1.3 quadrillion have been invested in derivatives as reported in the given figure (Washington Public Bank Coalition, n.d.): (Washington Public Bank Coalition, n.d.) The fact that derivatives are product with pure financial engineering and not being asset based products; therefore, on shake these products risk losing value and hence it has lead to the crisis. Therefore, despite the fact that these factors have caused the losses and paved great way for crisis, their presence in the market is resisting the confidence of investors in the financial market as well as institutions. There has been increased pressure on the developed economies to regulate the derivatives financial product as well as other financial engineered products to ensure the security of the public money to revive the investors’ confidence. Sub- Prime Mortgage Loans Another reason for the financial crisis was the banks giving away subprime mortgage loans to the individuals on a frequent basis. This increased the banks’ vulnerability to the default of bank loans. The subprime mortgages given to the individuals were increasing the risks associated with the nonpayment of the loans. Since low payment capacity, therefore, high risk loans defaulted when the financial crisis hit the economy and the system collapsed. The financial institutions failed to maintain their stability as huge losses from non-payment of loans affected the balance sheets. Community Reinvestment Act generated the wave of low income groups getting loans for home and sub-prime securities. In a study it has been identified that US banks that have been restricted due to leverage ratio started investing the high risk assets. By 2003 47% increase was reported in the sub –prime lending as compared to loans in 1996. In addition to what increasingly contributed to the financial crisis was the fact that almost 93% of the sub-prime loans were made by top subprime lenders. This increased the vulnerability of the banks and as crisis knocked the door of economy the crisis engulfed as high risk investments in sub-prime loans could not sustain the economy. The role of the Fannie Mae, Federal Home Loan Banks and Freddie Mac in securitisation of sub-prime loans cannot be underestimated. An estimate of losses from these loans amounted to almost US $.300 billion. Further, according to an estimate from J.P. Morgan approximately US$1.5 trillion (?0.8 trillion) of CDOs are present in the global market of which ?300 billion are structured products such as CDO’s constituting bonds with backing from sub-prime mortgages. Mortgage backed securities increased as ratio of GDP as the economic prosperity gained momentum. While reached peak before financial crisis and declined on the market hit as presented in the image provided below: Hence, increased investment in the subprime loans upon shake could not sustain the economy as unemployed people could not pay off debts hence high risk securitisation started to default. Flawed Rating from Agencies Among the reasons that can be regarded as the criminal contributors to the financial crisis rating agencies are among one of them. It is general phenomena to rely on the expert opinion before buying a product while the phenomenon has extensive role in the financial market. It is also for the fact that people in general as well as institutions or businesses as well do not have acute knowledge to assess the cost and benefit of the complex financial products that offer solution to their problems. However, the First Amendment giving protection to the rating agencies from the law suits of investment failure left the agencies to be less concerned of the fear of investors default based on the ratings. Rating of opaque and complex financial structures being given by the rating agencies make them part of underwriting process. More appropriate to state is the fact that credit rating agencies approval of the product actually provides financial institutions a core attraction to be provided to the investor. Therefore, rating agencies’ role in the financial crisis is much higher than actually perceived from the rating of the firm only. Role of financial products rating agencies can be viewed in two aspects; first if the products were increasingly vulnerable that didn’t not sustained the quality over time while the other being the rating agency owing to relaxation from the act were less concerned with actually evaluating the quality of the product in the light of booming market. However, whatever, the reason behind, the role of credit rating agencies cannot be underestimated as an equal contributor in causing the crisis. Inefficient Risk Management Process The firms around the globe underestimated the nature of risk to which they were exposed. The key reason for the financial crisis was the correlation of the risk in different markets. The market performance and the prediction of the response of the participants to the current market position failed. For instance, excessively growing interest in the real estate market led investors to believe that positively rising property value will never undergo correction. The risk associated with the financial markets was very high and the inefficiencies which came with the crisis changed the markets adaption. The banking inadequacies were also a major cause of the turnaround for this platform. For instance, IMF researched of 113 financial incidents have taken place within past 30 years in the developed markets and of these The researcher further noted that banking sectors’ stress accounts over 60% of the responsibility of such accidents. Therefore, owing to the boom with similar activities in pre-crisis time period turned market participants to present considerably less attention to the risks associated with these products. Finally, on the shock proved to shake the standing pillar for many investors, business and even institutions etc. Bankruptcy Of Lehman Brother Fall of Lehman Brother, as initially defined in the earlier section noted to gain the position of the forming complete phase of the global financial crisis. Lehman Brother’s being among the biggest firms in the US financial market with global existence was overvalued to be too big to fail. Though, Valuka (2010) has reported in detail of the demise of the LB has been consistently noting the flaws in the business model of LB that already had taken the business on the verge of failure. However, the impact of the failure of LB had ripple effect not only in the financial market of US but also from global spectrum. LB, on 15th September, 2008 filed bankruptcy within 72 hours of failure reports with mounted debt of USD$613billion (Mike, 2013). The news shattered the market and Dow Jones Industrial Index also fell by 500 points and the event necessitated the injection of US $105 billion by the US Treasury to sustain the economy (Mike, 2013). The failure of Lehman Brothers is being attributed to the factors such as excessive over leveraging, pursuing high risk investments for aggressive growth strategy and the mismatched capital structure with highly illiquid assets with long term maturities against low maturities high risk liabilities that multiplied the impact. Impact of LB’s decline was extensively broad such as Prime money market funds with investment management for corporate debt and asset backed securities faced $320 billion redemptions within single week. All these, along with putting contribution on the failure of the firm, shook the entire economy locally and globally. It is for the same reason that people are still unable to regain the confidence on the financial markets. Socially Irresponsible Behavior Working in the financial markets lends increased responsibility on the shoulders of financial market drivers. Banks and other financial institutions were consistently paying attention to increase the value of their balance sheet. Such as Lehman Brothers’ excessive investments in high risk products for being leaders in market and persuasion of aggressive growth strategy resulting in the failure of the giant is self evident of social as well as business irresponsible attitude of bankers (Mike, 2013). Furthermore, since aggressive growth has increased pressure on the market participants in all therefore, bankers took support from unethical sources for diffusing the pressure. Such as Professor David Nutt, the former government drugs tsar, claimed that bankers have been using cocaine to deal with pressure and gaining confidence to take increased risk and generate higher returns. High risk taking that initially resulted to rising returns and added value to the balance sheets of banks and institutions eroded the resistance of investing public money in avenues that had all chances to turn down. Along with financial professionals the responsibility also lies to great extent on investors that pressured bankers for aggressively higher returns underestimating the set rule of high return can only be generated from high risk. Hence, the greed as well as socially irresponsible behavior of the finance professional, other business managers and investor in all contributed equally to the financial crisis. Impact of Interconnectedness Businesses increasingly relied on the principal of diversification for reducing risk. Though advisable for sustained portfolio; however, the economic crisis showed the downside of the diversification. Diversification spreads effect of every incident equally and therefore, the crisis that begun at US was not accepted by other developed economies unless it reached their door step. Bank of England anticipated the impact of US crisis to affect equally to UK economy but the research was over ruled. CONCLUSION Economic cycle has been defined as the momentum that moves in pattern with peak and decline after every certain period. However, the matter of concern has been factors that cause such a decline posing significantly negative impact on the lives of millions of individuals. The financial crisis of 2008 was avoidable. The crisis arose because a bubble that was created by the human actions burst. During the crisis the representatives had a lax attitude towards everything and from everyone. More appropriate to state would be fact that financial crisis that shook the entire economic framework of the work has been originated from single factors of greed. Greed evident in the performance of banker, investors and most specifically the fall of investment giant Lehman Brothers’ endorses the proposition. Hence, if can be safely stated that despite fact that economic down turn being the component of economic cycle is unavoidable; however, socially and ethically responsible attitude from the participants including government could have controlled the intensity of shock wave across the world. References Baba, N., & Packer, F. (2009). From turmoil to crisis: Dislocations in the FX swap market before and after the failure of Lehman Brothers. Warwick. Available from http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/wbs/subjects/finance/confpapers09/baba_packer_pap er.pdf [Accessed 22 April 2013] de Mooij, R., Keen, M., and Orihara, M. (2013). Taxation, Bank Leverage, and Financial Crises. IMF Working Paper, Available from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1348.pdf [Accessed 22 April 2013] Kapoor, S. (2010). The financial crisis – causes & cures. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Available from http://www.sopol.at/get_file.php?id=915 [Accessed 22 April 2013] Mike, O. (2013). What Collapsed Lehman Brothers, Could it Have Been Saved?. Available from http://ssrn.com/abstract=2213717 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2213717 [Accessed 22 April 2013] Washington Public Bank Coalition. (n.d.). Derivatives contributed to the Economic Crisis. Available from http://www.wapublicbankproject.org/index.php?view=article&catid=40%3Aderivative-gambling&id=50%3Ahow-derivatives-caused-the-economic-crisis&format=pdf&option=com_content&Itemid=60 [Accessed 22 April 2013] COULD LEHMAN BROS.’ COLLAPSE HAS BEEN AVOIDED IF IT HAD FOLLOWED A DIFFERENT BUSINESS MODEL INTRODUCTION After the great depression of 1930, world economy has gone through the series of financial shocks while most of them have been originated from irresponsible attempts from banks (Mike, 2013). Since 1930, the recent financial crises have been noted to world’s worst financial crises. World bank defined the current shock to the global economy in three phases with first being the U.S. subprime-mortgage loans that originated from the mal-financial structuring that led to catastrophe (Lenza et al. 2009), the phase gained increased momentum from Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy and final phase being the economic recession that has spread around the world (Mike, 2013). In contrast to the broader factors of economic recession and sub-prime loans Lehman Brothers failure played significant role that it is being regarded as the entire phase. Lehman Brothers was one of the biggest US investment firm with long history since 1840. With long history of mergers and acquisitions the firm has managed to sustain over many jerks. However, September15, 2008 proved to be devastating event in the history of Lehman Brothers and US financial market. On the mentioned date, Lehman Brothers filed bankruptcy with USD$613billion debt within 72 hours of failure announcement. US’s Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) also could not resist the shake and fell by 500 points. Lehman’s share price in 2007 declined 93% from $86.18 to $4 by 2008 (Valukas, 2010). The devastating event has gained the importance for two reasons; first, Lehman brothers was considered too big to fail and therefore, failure and bankruptcy apart from the financial shake, was intense shake to the confidence on entire economy. The other reason that made Lehman story centre of debate was the timing of the bankruptcy. There has been great debate on the matter that failure was core impact from the financial crises or it was weak business model that collapsed. The second factor being more important as capable of providing strict lessons to the financial market as well as corporation; hence, has been made the topic of discussion. Therefore, the discussion herein is developed for exploring factors that would have saved the giants from bankruptcy if given due diligence. CAUSES COLLAPSE OF LEHMAN BROTHER Baba & Packer (2009) states that it is difficult to identify the main cause of failure of the LB; however, spillover of failure was faced world wide as straight 25000 people lost jobs and other impact is reflected in the image below: (PWC, 2009) While only the US equity market to sustain required emergency infusion of US three trillion dollars; being single aspect to mention. Understudy features formed the failure causes of US investment giant’s business model: Aggressive Expansion Strategy Lehman Brother’s expansion strategy attempted to increasingly integrate the element aggressiveness in a way defined as “eat what you Kill”. CEO of then Dick Fuld pursued the strategy in continuous support from company’s board members (Mike, 2013). LB’s aggressive growth strategy resulted in 13% growth in revenue while capital in the balance sheet was expanding at the rate of 15% per annum in time when market boomed before collapse (Valukas, 2010). Moreover, by the end of the 2007, the balance sheet of LB reported assets of US $700 billion with most of them being long term particulars in contrast to the liability US.$675 billion with short term maturities (Mike, 2013). In addition, glimpse of LB’s intense debt exposure in the similar period as noted by Erguson (2009) was almost $111 billion in commercial and residential real estate holdings and securities being double than the total exposure for two years before. More worrying fact was the referred exposure was something less than five times of its total equity Erguson (2009). Director of LB were in great favour of the exploiting the opportunities in the market boom irrespective to the level of risk and hence Dick Fuld conducted deals that had intense risk exposures. Therefore, the aggressive strategy gaining incremental growth was resulted with high risk investment and borrowing ventures instead of the sustained growth that shall have been the characteristic of the business model with long experience of booms and shocks. Caplan et al., (2010) also noted that Lehman brothers in 2006, for accelerating growth, moved on from low-risk brokerage model to buying and storing assets for their own growth than buying it for the growth of its customers; the business model being described as capital-intensive banking model Latifi, 2012) Following the wake of 2007 shock the company attempted to sustain the high risk short term debts with consistently daily basis funding from the market. Market participants resulted in losing confidence in the giant while the high risk exposure started the bubble to burst and spreading the impact thereby causing among the core reasons of failure. Shadow Banking Shadow banking has taken significant position in the market based financial industry. Examples of shadow banking products include ABCP (asset-backed commercial paper), SIVs (structured investment vehicles), LPFCs (limited-purpose finance companies), credit hedge funds etc. factor that distinguishes (Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft, and Boesky, 2012). Risk from shadow banking can be gauged from the fact that liabilities of shadow banking increases in much steeper pattern as compare to the traditional banking as reflected in the image below: (Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft, and Boesky, 2012) LB’s business model with extensive liabilities had significant support from shadow banking that facilitated LB in continuing business without taking measures for balancing assets and liabilities. Valukas (2010, p. 16) reported that LB taking constant support from shadow banking over time could not sustain the confidence of lenders. Investments in real estate businesses increase by 56% within two years from 2004 forming the incomparable pace of growth in the investment banks. Further within just one year from 2005 to 2006 the securitized mortgages increased by 10%. Though the firm reported record incomes from such investments such as $4.2 billion on revenue of $19.3 billion for 2007; however, on the beginning of shock that caused decline the market value of such assets while at the same time position of LB illiquid assets grew to 72% causing firm to run short to pay off its debt by around $4.5 billion on the day it filed bankruptcy (Mike, 2013). Hence, shadow banking formed another reason to fail LB as it did to Bear Stearns (Dealbook, 2009). Repo Securitization Among reasons that are being documented for causing the failure of one of the biggest investment firms of US had been its involvement in repo securitization. The mechanism known as repo 105 and repo 108 allowed financial transaction to be transformed into an asset disposal. The system is an extension of the core repo transactions that allows to repo product to be sold onwards with pricing being certain level higher than its purchase price. Repo 105 and repo 108 has been used by LB, for financing and the reduction of the extensive leverage on the financials. Further, LB used these manipulative options at the very specific point in time of its financial disclosures. On bankruptcy, it was revealed that LB has been involved in such practices that reported around US $50 million repo outstanding in the mounted debt. LB has been consistently denying such practices before it filed for bankruptcy specifically the top management such as Dick Fuld. The intentional misleading from top management on the matter and hiding the due information from regulators as well as other stakeholders is also asserted from two facts; first, LB used third party firm to conduct the transaction on LB’s behalf and while the service provider firm was located in UK and not in home land. The second fact asserting the intentional involvement from the top management was noted as when Matthew Lee, Senior Vice President reported such attempts of shifting the debt temporarily from balance sheet as assets and requested top management for to conducting an enquiry for the matter, it was ignored (Mike, 2013). Hence overall the above factor added reason to the causes of LB failure being the matter of excessively greedy intentions of management with over confidence. 1.1. MISMATCHED ILLIQUID ASSETS AND RISK MANAGEMENT Well balanced components of the balance sheet are reflective of sound position of the business model. In accordance with M&M capital structure model, the business is advised to acquire debt as it cost cheap and brings tax benefit. However, model also suggests restraining from excessive debt as every marginal increase in debt proportion increases bankruptcy cost. LB’s business model had over excessively followed debt orientation. Further, the business also did not not manage the basics of the business capital structure requirement of matching the asset debt maturity timing. Therefore, as already noted above, LB’s business structure by the end of 2007 had US $700 billion long term assets against the liability of US.$675 billion with short term maturities (Mike, 2013). Therefore, mismatch principle violation caused among the reasons of the LB’s failure. Further, the referred mismatch added vulnerability when LB employed various strategies to shadow its critical position. The asset liability portfolio of the LB also had poor risk management. 6 noted that LB in aggressive pursuit of the growth strategy expanded extensively in 2006 till first phase of GFC in 2007with expansion in leveraged lending, over concentrated investment in commercial real estate and private equity using its own capital; this incremented the risk of failure to great extend. Managerial Implications Managerial implication, in the view of many researcher, formed the central reason of failure of LB. Hudson (2007) declared that management of LB was overly driven by greed for establishing itself as a leader in the market of extremely excessive risk sector. McDonald, vice president of distressed debt and convertible securities at LB, remained with LB for over years and on failure described LB a story where 24,992 people were consistently in effort to increase the wealth of the organization and stakeholder while remaining eight heads, who headed the firm, were aimed to decline the value of the firm. It has been declared that 3000 legal entities under the management of LB with only 10 board of directors; while role of eight of them has been already described as responsible for failure by McDonald. Dick Fuld, in support of board members in aggressive pursuit of the growth strategy consistently invested in high risk exposure that increased the firm’s risk. Fuld, final CEO then, had less technical knowledge of the CDOs (Collateralized Debt Obligations), CDSs as his areas of expertise remained in bond trading (Robinson 2009, p.91, 234-236 (8) . Further, the CEO was also given the name of Gorrila as have been very misleading and fierce. For instance, in AGM of LB Fuld declared that GFC is behind LB and had to declare quarterly losses of $2.8 billion within two months of the announcement (Latifi, 2012). Further, many of people anticipated LB to be second in line after Bear Stearn; top management showed full confidence on strategies. Moreover, Fuld had been ruthless in eliminating the personnel that reported the trouble of the business (Latifi, 2012). Finally, Fuld well informed of whatever he has done not only to firm but to entire 25000 employee base and millions of investors, after collapse when approached by journalist for interview found stating “, "You don't have a gun. That's good." (Cohan, 2010). Hence, overall risk oriented culture of LB along with low level of communication across the management levels added vulnerability. The huge corporation having low level of accountability as well as none or least functioning transparency were also factors that added to managerial implications and contribution to failure. MANIPULATED INFORMATION DISCLOSURE Lehman Brothers’ problem would not have reached to the point of bankruptcy if it had not been using manipulating tactics in financial reporting. As reported above that, LB used repo 105 and repo 108 to misrepresent excessive leverage as asset right at the time of disclosures. Further, Valukas, (2010) reported that along with the management, the role of Earnest and Young in not performing the job of auditor in true spirits. Valukas (2010) for evidence has mentioned that E&Y has been supporting to the LB as it served as the auditor to the firm left unquestioned US $ 50 billion transaction conducted off-balance sheet and was not provided with any disclosure . Fuld has been accused of manipulations in the financials to the stakeholder in all. LB’s failure can be regarded as deliberate attempt to turn off eyes, if not intended bankruptcy, as firm has been constantly pursuing strategies that has no justification. For instance, use of Repo transaction was denied in early stage while firm had been using the services of third party. Therefore, it is evident that business has reached point of bubble burst by excessive leverage and no capacity as well as well-defined plan to meet the challenge. Effect Of Interconnectedness Though from above assessment it has become clearly evident the business of LB in itself turned increasingly vulnerable. Therefore, on the shock from economy it collapses. Of the total impact five percent of the forming reasons of the collapse can be granted to the economic shock. LB’ over concentration in high risk segment while intense level of interconnectedness among the financial markets made bankruptcy the final fate of the organization. Therefore, overall complex structured market and financial products made respective contribution to the business failure. Role of interconnectedness in cross border and cross institutions of the economy as well as within LB’s area of exposure are presented below: (PWC, 2009) Bankruptcy of Lehman immediately resulted in bankruptcy filings from 75 entities (PWC, 2009).Hence, failure of too big to fail is being still regarded by more than 80% people as the most significant event of industry within the recent crises era (PWC, 2009) CONCLUSION Lehman Brothers, one of the biggest giants of the financial industry has significant role in the market in both points in times of performance and failure. The discussion on the business model of the giant with respect to chances to save the organization if would have followed different business model revealed interesting facts. For instance, it revealed that big organizations when deviate from the defining principles could not sustain, irrespective of their capacity and capability to engineer complex models. Therefore, over excessive financial engineering in stark contrast to the principle of doing business is not expected to sustain in any way. Hence, business model of failure timing can only be attributed to economy’s denial to sustain the extensive level of window dressing made failure was inevitable. Moreover, the role of entire economy has also been very evident. Apart from malfunctioning of the management of LB; the role of auditors, role of government agencies is extensively worth questioning as activities of one of the biggest giants in deviation from set principles went noticed. The deliberate support from the any of the stakeholders shall be given equal responsibility for such failure owing to the devastating impact that failure of single firm had on local and even international economy. Moreover, the responsibility from the social aspect is also an important side of the story. References Baba, N., & Packer, F. (2009). From turmoil to crisis: Dislocations in the FX swap market before and after the failure of Lehman Brothers. Warwick. Available from http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/wbs/subjects/finance/confpapers09/baba_packer_pap er.pdf [Accessed 22 April 2013] Caplan, D., Dutta, S. K., & Lawson, R. (2010). Lehman's $hell Game. Strategic Finance, vol. 92, no. 2, pp. 23-29. Cohan, W. (2010). Dick Fuld in exile. CNN, Available from http://money.cnn.com/2010/08/24/news/companies/dick_fuld_exile.fortune/index.htm [Accessed 22 April 2013] Dealbook. (2009). Dealing With the Shadow Banking System. Available from http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/10/08/dealbook-dialogue-isaac-corre/[Accessed 22 April 2013] Erguson. (2009). The financial crisis inquiry report, < Available from: blackboard, the university> Latifi, P. (2012). Lehman Brothers’ rise and fall: From hero to dust. Available from http://www.lcbr-online.com/index_files/proceedingssym12/12sym13.pdf [Accessed 22 April 2013] Lenza, M., Pill, H., & Reichlin, L. (2009). Monetary policy in exceptional times. Economic Policy Fiftieth Panel Meeting Hosted by the Universiteit van Tilburg 1-34. Tilburg: Economic Policy. Mike, O. (2013). What Collapsed Lehman Brothers, Could it Have Been Saved?. Available from http://ssrn.com/abstract=2213717 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2213717 [Accessed 22 April 2013] Pozsar, Z., Adrian, T., Ashcraft, A., and Boesky, H. (2012). Shadow Banking. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, Available from http://www.ny.frb.org/research/staff_reports/sr458.pdf [Accessed 22 April 2013] PWC. (2009). Lehman Brothers’ Bankruptcy. Available from http://www.pwc.com/en_JG/jg/events/Lessons-learned-for-the-survivors.pdf [Accessed 22 April 2013] Valukas, A.R. (2010). Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Examiners Report, Volume 1 & 2. United States Bankruptcy Court – Southern District of New York, Available from http://jenner.com/lehman/ [Accessed 22 April 2013] Read More