The Scottish Parliament Building - Book Report/Review Example

?Introduction The Scottish Parliament Building was in its planning stages in 1997 when the s for accommodation where made. The earliest cost estimates, in April 997, of the building were between ?24.5 million and ?34 million (White, 2005). The second submission to the Ministers in June of 1997 were between ?27 million and ?43.5 million. Then, in July 1997, the minimum was reduced to ?10 million and the maximum was ?40 million (White, 2005). There is question as to what the ?10 million figure would have covered, as it was likely to cover “no more than the minimal refurbishment of the Old Royal High School….it would only have sufficient to provide temporary accommodation for the Scottish Parliament, and not a permanent home” (White, 2005). Moreover, the high number that was submitted in July of that year was unrealistic, as this number would only cover a very basic Parliament building, or it might have only covered the construction cost or professional fees (White, 2005). The eventual cost of the project was ?431 million (Max’s Project Management Wisdom). The cost estimation for the Holyrood site for just the construction was ?49.5 million, with another ?5 million for site acquisition, and a designer competition for the site was underway that same month (White, 2005). The following table describes the designers who were considered for the design, the estimated cost that each designer submitted and the estimated area that they submitted for the building (Project Failure: Scottish Parliament): Competitor Estimated Cost Area Metres Squared Glass Murray/Denton Corker Marshall ?57.89 million 23,620 Richard Meier/Keppie ?43 million Did not estimate EMBT/RMJM ?62.6 million 27,610 Rafael Vinoly/Reiach & Hall ?89.6 million 38,700 Michael Wilford & Partners ?73.4 million 39,885 Of these competitors, EMBT/RMJM was successful in getting the contract to design the building, and the ministers at the press conference announcing them as the winners estimated the building to cost around ?50 million (White, 2005). By this time, the costs overrun were foreshadowed already, as the estimated size of the building grew by 700 metres, due to an anticipated staff increase in connection with the Official Report and the Public Information Service, which would require three entrances, instead of the originally planned two (White, 2005). Almost immediately, costs estimations were increased because of “increased requirement for space and budget; the expansion of costs due to the foyer roof and use of kemnay granite” and the cost overruns estimates were because an increase, from 17,500 to 23,000, of the briefed gross area in the design proposals, which was necessary because of more staff than was anticipated, because of more knowledge about Parliament operations; secondly, the gross/net proportions in the brief were overly optimistic, and the design proposals could not match them; thirdly, a formal entrance was needed because of increased space demands. Additionally, ?17 million was supposed to an allocation for risk allowance, but this allocation did not occur (White, 2005). This is a brief background to the project and the estimated costs. In the end, the cost overrun was significant, and the project went significantly over the time limitation that was initially sought. The reasons for these were many, not the least of which is that the initial costs were unrealistic to begin with (The Holyrood Inquiry: Conclusions and Recommendations). There were many complications in the construction and design of this building, and a brief synopsis of the problems will be explained below. An analysis of the reasons that explain the delays or cost increases encountered during the project The problems began with the selection of the EMBT/RMJM Ltd., in that there this was a joint venture between two entities, and there was little inquiry made about this joint venture. Moreover, there was not due diligence or collateral warranties obtained from EMBT/RMJM (The Holyrood Inquiry: Conclusions and Recommendations). Other early problems involved the budget estimates. While the early estimates indicated that the final design would determine the final costs, there were other elements of the final costs that were not quantified at this stage (The Holyrood Inquiry – Project Management). This was partly due to the fact that, at this stage, there were no other contracts given with any private sector consultants (The Holyrood Inquiry – Project Management). Moreover, a design that would be delivered within budget was not received by the project team, so this affected the project team’s control process, as it was based upon artificial and inadequate numbers (The Holyrood Inquiry – Project Management). The project manager at this time was Bill Armstrong, who was an experienced professional project manager. Of utmost importance was the relationship between Mr. Armstrong and the designer, and this relationship was not on firm footing, to say the least. Mr. Armstrong indicated in later inquiries that there was very little dialogue between himself and the appointed designer, as Mr. Armstrong was bypassed and was not present for an important meeting in which proposals were presented that were not technically scrutinized, and did not comply with the Brief (The Holyrood Inquiry – Project Management). Erich Miralles, the lead designer, directly met with Donald Dewar, Secretary of State for Scotland, without the input of Mr. Armstrong, or even the knowledge that these meetings were taking place. As a consequence, the proposals were never vetted with Mr. Armstrong, and he felt resentful that he had to “pick up the pieces” (The Holyrood Inquiry – Project Management). Mr. Armstrong sent some strongly worded letters to EMBT/RMJM about their not involving him in the process, letters to which EMBT/RMJM did not respond. The relationship between Mr. Armstrong and Mr. Miralles grew more and more tense, as there was evidence that not only was there poor communication between EMBT/RMJM and Mr. Armstrong, but that there was poor communication between EMBT and RMJM – both entities submitted, as to difficulties experienced in Stage C, separate solutions. This showed that the two entities in the joint venture were at odds with each other (The Holyrood Inquiry – Project Management). The tensions grew when EMBT/RMJM submitted a claim for payment for 10% of their total fee when they completed Stage C, a claim that was rejected by Mr. Armstrong, who authorized only a partial payment because Stage C was not yet completed. This added to the growing tensions between Mr. Armstrong and the designers. Moreover, Mr. Armstrong had the view that Mr. Miralles wanting to control the project was causing the tensions between EMBT/RMJM and himself and the tensions between the two entities of the joint venture, stating that “As long as Miralles insists on making every decision on the design of the building, the joint venture problems will not be resolved and the project will fall further behind programme” (The Holyrood Inquiry – Project Management). Because of the difficulties he was having in overseeing the project, difficulties that were apparently the fault of Mr. Miralles, Mr. Armstrong resigned as project manager in December of 1998 (The Holyrood Inquiry – Project Management). As the parting shot, Mr. Armstrong informed Mrs. Doig, who was the head of the Parliament Accommodation Division at this time that he had “bowed out of the Project Manager’s job and shouldn’t be offering comment or criticism, but, for your own sake and the others involved, a stand must be taken to either bring Miralles to heel, or to accept his inadequacies. He does not believe that he has any. The programme will drift, the cost will increase, the design team will make claims, the contractors will make claims, and the project will become a disaster” (The Holyrood Inquiry – Project Management). Thus, Mr. Armstrong felt that the control issue that Mr. Miralles was exhibiting, combined with the fact that Mr. Miralles was seen by Mr. Armstrong as incompetent, would lead to the eventual downfall of the entire project if something was not done. By this time, in March 1999, new estimates were submitted that estimated that the project would cost upwards of ?112 million. The numbers increased because the original number of ?50 million was based upon the estimates of the space being 17,500 to 23,000 m, but an increase from this space estimate was necessary because of the larger numbers of staff; the proposals for the design could not match the gross/net area proportion of the brief, as these numbers were overly optimistic; and the additional entrance further increased space costs and demands (The Holyrood Inquiry - Project Management). This changed the layout so fundamentally that, according to Mr. Paul Curran, who was the Senior Project Manager in March 1999, the areas and adjacencies needed a fresh review (The Holyrood Inquiry – The Project from Handover to February 2000). Furthermore, the new project management team decided that the risks that had been identified would not be shared with the Ministers. These risks were the possibility that the project would be delayed; and that the costs and size of the building would be more than what the client desired. These items of risk were not included in the revised budget, because Robert Gordon, civil servant and head of Constitution Group 2, felt that included these risks in the budget was “a totally imprudent use of public money” and that seeking a budget increase to allow for these risks would be irresponsible because this would have resulted in automatic fee increases, which would, in turn, encouraged the Design Team and contractors to overrun (The Holyrood Inquiry – Project Management ). Other problems involved construction management. Procurement options were not considered in any detail, and there was indecision on the site selection (The Holyrood Inquiry: Construction Management). The key concerns about contract management went unaddressed, and assessment of the construction management disadvantages was not done. Some of the disadvantages to construction management include “1) greater client risk; 2) the complexity of administering many different trade packages (around 60 in the case of Holyrood; 3) the requirement for the client to be informed and decisive; 4) the need for a good team and brief; 5) the relative difficulty of managing delay and disruption; and 6) most important of all, the absence of any overall contractual programme or contract sum” (The Holyrood Inquiry: Construction Management). Because the disadvantages to construction management were not properly assessed, this became a problem because there was a need to revisit the requirement for an early completion date in light of the questions that should have been asked, and there could have been an adoption of a procurement method that was less risky. As it was, the procurement was risky and was without a fixed budget (The Holyrood Inquiry: Construction Management). Moreover, there was considerably higher risk in procuring through construction management, then the alternative, which was management contracting and there was no comparison of client risk between the respective profiles (The Holyrood Inquiry: Construction Management). There was a third option, which was traditional contracting, and this considered to be not feasible because traditional contracting would have delayed the project until mid to end 2002, and this was unacceptable at this time (The Holyrood Inquiry: Construction Management). The Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body took over the project on June 1, 1999. The Secretary of State handed over the project. By December 1999, Mrs. Doig, Head of the Parliamentary Accommodations Division, was expressing doubts about the SPCB as a client (The Holyrood Inquiry: Early 2000 and the Establishment of the Holyrood Progress Group). Mrs. Doig felt that the SPCB did not know the full story about the cost and programme implications, and did not understand the complexities of their role, that the members of the SPCB attended meeting sporadically, and that the members were constantly changing their views, while having difficulty remembering factual information and previous presentations and decisions accurately (The Holyrood Inquiry: Early 2000 and the Establishment of the Holyrood Progress Group). Indeed, different estimates were given to the SPCB ranging from ?108 million to just under ?200 million (The Holyrood Project – June to December 2000). That said, a progress group was hired by the SPCB, who job was design finalization and project completion by the end of 2002, with a ?195 million budget, which met for the first time on June 28, 2000 (The Holyrood Inquiry: Early 2000 and the Establishment of the Holyrood Progress Group). The Holyrood Progress Group (HPG) stated that a detailed cost plan was a matter of immediate urgency, but there was never a firm agreement on the costs (The Holyrood Project – June to December 2000). The SPCB also hired a new project director, Mr. Alan Ezzi, in November 2000 (The Holyrood Inquiry: The Project from Late 2000). He put together some cost cutting measures that were rejected by the architect, as they would have made the building unsound (The Holyrood Inquiry: The Project from Late 2000). Mr. Ezzi found it difficult to work with the architect, and confidence was lost in Mr. Ezzi, and he soon resigned. Matters were further complicated when Mr. Miralles died of a brain tumor on July 3, 2000, after taking ill only four months earlier. By the time he was feeling ill, in March of 2000, the doctor found a large tumor in his brain. In light of this, perhaps his earlier, rather erratic behavior with Mr. Armstrong can be explained, if the tumor had been growing for quite some time. At any rate, the death of Mr. Miralles was a severe blow to the project, as Mr. Miralles was the vision for the project, and his death gave way to a “substantial period of disharmony within the architectural Joint Venture and the only conclusion can be, sadly, that it caused further delay” (The Holyrood Project – June to December 2000). Another death that caused a problem was that of Donald Dewar, Secretary of State of Scotland, on October 11, 2000 (The Holyrood Project – June to December 2000). An analysis of the relationship between the problems you identify in (ii) and the role of project management It is pretty obvious in analyzing the situation that the entire project, from start to finish, failed because the lack of leadership. It is laughable that the figure of ?10 million was ever put out there, and it is even laughable that the early figures showed that the maximum was to be ?50 million, considering that the final price tag was almost ten times that amount. Although some things could not be helped, such as the death of not one, but two, key figures, mostly the problem with the Scottish Parliament Building was that there simply was not leadership, so there were too many cooks in the kitchen, so to speak. The problem began, of course, with the exit of Mr. Armstrong. His exit was understandable, however, as the designer was communicating directly with the government about the project and leaving him out of the loop. Nobody can work like that, and it seems that the designer on the project, Mr. Miralles, was a control freak. The problem with that, of course, is that Mr. Miralles, being a designer and not a project manager, could not really work with the numbers and budgets like a project manager could, and he needed a project manager to keep him and his design team in line. Since he did not do this, this was the beginning of the project getting out of hand. Then, when Mr. Armstrong left, there was no leadership for almost a year, as there was not a new project manager or director from the time that Mr. Armstrong left in December 1999 to November 2000, which is when Alan Ezzi was appointed the project director. By the time Ezzi came on, however, it was already too late – the project had gotten completely out of hand, and it would have taken a genius to try to reign it back in. An analysis of the strategic or operational project management actions that could have been taken to better control the project and increase its chance for successful delivery against time and cost targets . In the end, what should have happened is that more support needed to be given to Mr. Armstrong from the beginning. As it became clear what was happening, the government official should have taken control of the situation and made sure that Mr. Armstrong was in the loop. By all accounts, Mr. Armstrong was a strong, capable leader, but if he does not know what is going on because nobody bothers to tell him, this will obviously make him ineffectual. This could have been prevented if only the government had made sure that Mr. Armstrong was able to do his job properly. This would have made all the difference, because a project manager really needed to be on the project from the beginning, and the same project manager needed to have the job from start to finish. Without a strong project manager at the helm, the project will meander, flounder, go from one agency to the next, its costs ever escalating, because there is not a strong leader to keep it in line. The key lesson to be learned from this is that project managers need to be given support when they are faced with a conflict with the designer or anybody else. The government or any other client needs to realize that project managers are the most valuable part of any project, because they can keep the costs in line – this is what they do, and without this core leadership and expertise at the heart of a project, the project will go haywire, as what happened here. Conclusion The Scottish Parliament building was a project that rapidly spiraled out of control, due to a clash of egos, insufficient data on the space that would be needed, bad luck, and a lack of communication between the bodies who were overseeing this project. The original designs did not take key elements into account when estimating the costs, and one of these elements is that they severely underestimated the size of the building. The project manager who was on the project from the start, Bill Armstrong, was a successful and respected project manager, but he could not do his job because he was consistently kept out of the loop in design changes. Since a project manager is a key element in any project, when there is weak or non-existent management, then there will be a confusion of all elements of the design, as happened here. The overriding lesson is that project managers need to be kept in the loop, because, without them overseeing the project, the project can and will run amok, as what happened here. Sources Used The Holyrood Inquiry. “Conclusions and Recommendations.” [online] Available at: http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/ vli/holyrood/inquiry/sp205-18.htm The Holyrood Inquiry. “Programming and Design Delay.” [online] Available at: http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/vli/holyrood/inquiry/sp205-15.htm The Holyrood Inquiry. “The Project from Late 2000.” [online] Available at: http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/vli/holyrood/inquiry/sp205-13.htm The Holyrood Inquiry. “The Hollyrood Project – June to December 2000.” [online] Available at: http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/vli/holyrood/inquiry/sp205-12.htm The Holyrood Inquiry. “Early 2000 and the Establishment of the Hollyrood Progress Group.” [online] Available at: http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/vli/holyrood/inquiry/sp205-11.htm The Holyrood Inquiry. “The Project from Handover to February 2000.” [online] Available at: http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/vli/holyrood/inquiry/sp205-10.htm The Holyrood Inquiry. “Project Management – 1998 to 1 June 1999.” [online] Available at: http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/vli/holyrood/inquiry/sp205-09.htm The Holyrood Inquiry. “Construction Management.” [online] Available at: http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/vli/holyrood/inquiry/sp205-09.htm Max’s Project Management Wisdom. 2010. “Risks in Political Projects.” [online] Available at: http://www.maxwideman.com/papers/political_projects/commentary.htm “Project Failure – Scottish Parliament.” [online] Available at: http://strategicppm.wordpress.com/2011/02/08/project-failure-scottish-parliament/ White, I. 2005. “Building the Scottish Parliament, The Hollyrood Project.” [online] Available at: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/briefings/snpc-03357.pdf Read More