Coplan’s theory on emotional contagion is nothing short of convincing. She speaks from a scientifically proven point of view which is empirically evidenced. She seeks to take advantage of processes already occurring automatically in order to create the exact film experience intended. Question Three Carroll’s and Plantinga’s accounts of sympathy versus antipathy in movies are somewhat similar to Coplan’s ideas on emotional contagion. These accounts argue that sympathy is not just an emotion of pity, but rather a type of emotional solidarity that the spectators of a film create for the protagonist.
This solidarity then causes them to root for the protagonist so much so that they are able to feel his pain during his setbacks and celebrate with him in triumph. Antipathy works in much the same way as sympathy only the former invokes the opposite of solidarity in the spectators (usually for the villain of the film). It is what causes them to hate the villain prompting them to root for his plunder (Carroll 2001). Films thus have moral obligations to their spectators to create a “correct” idea of what is good and what is evil in the mind of the spectator.
Being aware of the power at hand, film makers need to consider how they may use their power to perpetuate ideological positives and deter the negatives through influencing their spectators by tagging on the empathic strings within their minds (Carroll 2001). Question Four In recent times, the idea of doing philosophy through film has received lots of chatter, as always, with hordes of film critics on being for or against the concept. Philosophy through film may mean either using film as a resource for understanding and developing philosophical constructs or using film as actual philosophy.
The phrase “Film as philosophy” means that film is literally to be understood as a medium through which we can philosophize—a more robust engagement with philosophy by film. There has been great debate concerning the extent to which film can contribute to the knowledge of philosophy or simply be philosophical. However, it is agreed by and large that many films ‘resonate in fruitful ways with traditional and contemporary philosophical issues’ (Falzon 2015). Paisley Livingston is of a different school of thought.
He proposes that if film was to be able to philosophize, it would have to generate independent and innovative contributions which are significant to the field of philosophy by employing means and tools unique to cinema as a medium. For such contributions to be independent, Livingston says, they have to be inherently cinematic as opposed to those philosophies whose basis is formed on verbal articulation (Livingston & Plantinga 2009). His argument agrees that film can be used as an interesting resource on matters philosophical, but to state that is gores beyond that would be to overreach.
Livingston rejects the ‘bold thesis’ of film as philosophy which he defines as the idea that films engages in creative thinking of the philosophical nature and forms new concepts in philosophy. He bases this rejection on the ‘problem of paraphrase’; that is either cinematic philosophical content can be paraphrased verbally which refutes the idea that it is unique to film or it cannot be paraphrased which brings to question its supposed existence (Falzon 2015). As certain philosophers have come out strongly in support of the bold thesis, so has Stephen Mulhall.
He states that he does not view films as simply a resource for philosophy and its arguments (film through philosophy), rather he sees films as evaluating and reflecting philosophical arguments and views (Mulhall 2002). In his eyes, films seriously and systematically ponder about these in much the same way as is done by philosophers. They are therefore not simple ornamentation for philosophy, or its raw material, they are instead philosophizing—philosophy in action. In this way, a modified idea of film as philosophy can and has been supported in such movies as The Matrix- one of the most philosophically acclaimed movies.
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