Systems Engineering in International Space Station - Research Paper Example

Systems Engineering in International Space Station INTRODUCTION It is often argued that continuous researches andexperiments act as the foundation to advancement in human civilization. A major feature or rather a major leap taken towards such progression can be identified as the space shuttle programs launched by different nations conducting rigorous and critical experiments in the Earth’s orbit. To be mentioned in this regard, these space shuttle programmes involve huge financial costs, often demanding collaborative efforts from numerous funding sources. One such initiative was taken by the US in 1998, when it launched its International Space Station (ISS). The objective to set up the space shuttle was to host the experiments conducted to examine the micro-gravitational effects on how microorganisms behave and other hypotheses related to life sciences in such conditions. While the technical issues remained inherent to such a large-sized project as a natural and most obvious phenomenon, it also had to witness significant challenges in the form of political and economic factors. In its history of development and if the chain of events were to be followed, the political and economic issues had been inherent to the establishment process of ISS. These issues eventually led to the formation of a united council between the US and Russia to finance the project, having significant effect to its governance system overall. With an objective to conduct in-depth assessment of the challenges faced by the project, the discussion in this paper will emphasize three main issues, i.e. its change from Space Station Freedom (SSF) to International Space Station (ISS) due to cost, extended development cycle and execution issues. CHANGE FROM SSF TO ISS DUE TO COST To put it precisely, SSF is the predecessor project to ISS. SSF was a major leap taken by the US, to host scientific research programs in low-orbit zone of earth. In lieu to its stated objective, the US invited its various allies, resulting with the responses from Europe, Japan and Canada, through which, scientists from these nations would be allowed to conduct their experiments in the permanent set-up of SSF. In accordance to the agreement, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), European Space Agency (ESA), Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and Canadian Space Agency (CSA) collaborated as International Partners (IPs) to the programme. Although the intention of the US was to keep its IPs aside from the critical path, during execution this IPs eventually became major contributors to the project. It was at the onset due to two most crucial reasons that led to the deepening roles of this IPs, which was deemed to have political effects on the interests of the US. Firstly, the bilateral and multilateral frameworks adopted by the nations bound the critical path of the project that further led to a greater importance for the IPs as was initially assumed by the US. Secondly, the cost of the project increased substantially and at a continuous rate that was further raising burden to the US, as the only financial support and hence, seeking assistance from its IPs. Through gradual progression of the programme, Russia, one of those IPs, came to the forefront as one of the major funding sources besides the US. On the realization of these points, it became necessary to develop a more integrated plan that would help in achieving the settled goals behind creating the SSF. Subsequently, the ISS was formed following a bilateral agreement within the US and Russia (Stockman, Boyle and Bacon 14). As apparent from the gradual progression of the project, budgetary and developmental lacunas possessed by the IPs to SSF programme acted as a major cause for NASA to instigate the bilateral framework with Russia. While the financial problems associated with the program could be managed through better participation of the IPs, the bilateral collaboration between the US and Russia, to form the ISS led to certain challenges for NASA when concerning its objective to cease unilateral power. Correspondingly, various managerial issues were noted to be emerging from time and then among which, the rising pressure on NASA to bargain developmental strategies with its IPs was one of the majors. An in-depth consideration to the set-up reveals that the programme was based on a traditional hierarchical framework, which indicated that the one holding the chair of governance in the complex chain of different boards would have the power to make unilateral decisions. However, in reality, even though NASA representatives apprehended the chairs, the practice of making unilateral decisions was rare. Hence, the decision making process for the developments of the project became subjected to the network-centric framework (Wenger, Antoniev and Gorod 2). Emphasizing the changes that led to the formation of ISS from SSF and further, it can be rationally argued that the key managerial problem inherent to the ISS project was its limitation in the form of faulty planning, absence of budgetary forecasts and defective decision-making framework to suit the enormity of the programme both in economic and financial terms. Notably, as these problems persist in the developed programme currently, it is further proposed to be re-framed following a System of Systems Engineering (SoSE) methodology in replacement of the existing Systems Engineering (SE) framework (Wenger, Antoniev and Gorod 2). This has in turn, evidently, extended the cycle of development. EXTENDED DEVELOPMENT CYCLE The above discussion indicates that problems are yet persistent to the execution of the various phases in the ISS programme, following the changes made from its set-up as ISS to SSF. A significant gap remains observable in its planned infrastructural improvement steps and that implemented through its engineering procedure. To be noted in this regard, the currently implemented ISS programme is based on the SE methodologies emphasizing traditional approaches of budget cycles, product life cycles, block diagrams, GANTT charts and others. Undoubtedly, since its initial stage, the programme efficacy of ISS has developed substantially on the speculative terms but failed to be instilled in the implementation process relying on its SE methodologies. As a result, the development cycle of the project increases that in turn limits the life cycle of the products and the budgetary planning. As argued in Wenger, Antoniev and Gorod, “…An extended development life cycle which leads to technology and hardware obsolescence and knowledge retention problems hampers the systems adaptability” (2). Thus, rather than rewarding a control on the costs engaged to the entire programme, the system has rather faced problems in terms of adaptability, hampering its managerial scope towards progress. These aspects can be related with the limitations of the traditional SE methodology, which increases gap between the planned developmental stages and the rapidity of its adoption by the engineering teams. For instance, the focus of SE methodologies currently applied in the ISS programme relies on a single complex network aligning almost hundreds of engineers, contractors, sub-contractors and technical experts, capable of producing low-volume. The objective of this particular framework emphasizes optimization through a static approach, often making the entire process implementation a long-term issue involving multiple phases of decision-making in a linear order. In addition, this methodology also lacks flexibility to adapt with the changes identified in its external environment; hence, leading to the extension in the developmental life cycle of the project. Records show that at often instances, the decision making process in the ISS programme took a long tenure that in turn affected the mechanical obsolescence in the implementation phase affecting the overall efficacy of the project (Wenger, Antoniev and Gorod 3). EXECUTION ISSUES Challenges related to budget and managerial progression are deemed inherent to any huge project and are manageable with proper execution strategies. It is in this context that the development of ISS project failed to meet expectations of its creators owing to faults in its entire execution process. To be specific, the project was indeed humongous and required utmost care in its staffing and training strategies, which would in turn help its scheduling and cost related aspects. Since its instigation, the project failed meeting many of its developmental stages as was scheduled, imposing the burden of effective staffing, knowledge retention, training and technology maturation among others. With such pressure on board, the project faced cancellation votes in the Congressional meetings indicating that retention and knowledge management shall erupt as a major issue of the project that was also observed in the later phase of its execution (Stockman, Boyle and Bacon 22). Considering the complexity of alignment to its various verticals, implementation of effective test and verification processes were also deemed as nearly impossible that again raise many execution issues in terms of unforeseen challenges, as validation was an impulsive factor in the project. Besides, political conflicts between the IPs jeopardized the entire plan execution process invariably, which indicates the gaps persistent between the US perceptions and the viewpoints of its partners headed by Russia politically (Logsdon and Miller 3-5). The planned execution stages also failed to consider maintenance costs and costs related to operations. Even if these variables might have been considered, the magnitude of these costs was subjected to the limited forecast of project dais and hence, proved to be of almost no or negligible advantage to facilitate project execution. It is to be mentioned in this context that owing to its traditional and complex network structure, handling even a computer failure at a vertical of the entire set-up imposed challenges to the execution process leading to huge costs. Therefore, realistic execution of its architectural design also proved to be a challenge and a cost variable to the entire program (NASA, “Architecture Design Evolution”). Transportation costs were the other features criticized to have been overlooked in the planning of the entire project. The aggregated cost to transportation to the US Space Station is estimated at USD 10,000 per pound. Principally owing to the huge cost of transportation, the proposed agenda stresses on the strategy that partners using transportation facility to the space centre will be bearing their costs (NASA 4-5). Although at the managerial level this proposition seems valued and effective, on execution it might result in further political conflicts wherein partners able to incur larger costs than the other collateral parties shall gain greater control on the station. Apparently, these fallacies indicate towards the execution issues of the entire ISS program. CONCLUSION The above discussion highlights upon the need for identifying and confirming the magnitude a particular project to be implemented when strategizing its opportunities and inherent challenges to its ultimate execution. The ISS project implemented by NASA lacks in these particular terms that has given rise to the various risks and threats it witnesses currently. While the objective of the project was distinguished and was noted to be worthy of consideration, the implementation process seems vague and obscure to accommodate its demanding goals. However, the key issue identified inherent to the entire project was the limited alignment between the political intents of the parties or partners collaborating in the programme. The limited skills and efficacy of the managerial planners to oversee political objectives and benefit the project in assurance to its particular goals hampered the programme intents largely. In addition, the project can also be identified to have lacked a step-by-step progress that might have contributed to the overall efficiency of the ISS program, assuring the capacity demanded to deal with challenges upcoming one after another throughout its execution phase. In conclusion, it can be asserted that NASA’s ISS project had been subjected to various criticisms owing to the managerial deficiencies that further resulted in the failure of the project to execute its various phases with adequate efficacy. Its over-ambitious program execution can be stated as a major cause to its failure that is not without indicating ISS’s virtually certain dissolution in the near future. Works Cited Logsdon, John. M. and James R. Millar. “U.S. -Russian Cooperation in Human Space Flight Assessing the Impacts.” NASA (2001): 1-31. Print. “International Space Station: National Laboratory Education Concept Development Report.” NASA (2006): 1-44. Print. Architecture Design Evolution. NASA, 2002. Web. 23 Mar. 2015. . Stockman, Bill, Joe Boyle and John Bacon. “International Space Station Systems Engineering Case Study.” Air Force Center for Systems Engineering (2010): 1-122. Print. Wenger, Noah, Anastasia Antoniev and Alex Gorod. “The International Space Station: Applying System of Systems Methodology.” Baruch College (2013): 1-8. Print. Read More