The Militarization of Policing in the United States - Literature review Example

The Militarization of Policing in the United s THE MILITARIZATION OF POLICING IN THE UNITED S The recent police responseto protests in Ferguson County following the shooting to death of an unarmed teenager has helped reignite national debate about the militarization of the police force, which has pushed domestic policing to the center of domestic policy. Victor (2014: p287) identifies direct and indirect militarization as two ways through which domestic policing integrates military tactics in their operations. In direct militarization, the government uses its military forces to suppress and control its citizens domestically, such as the current situation in Syria and the Ukraine, where the constraints that demarcate military and policing functions are either absent or ineffective. On the other hand, direct militarization involves the gradual acquisition of military characteristics by domestic police forces, whereby the police proactively seek and engage criminals using militaristic weaponry, strategy, and tactics (Victor, 2014: p287). While there are effective constraints in place to prevent blurring of military and policing functions in the US, these constraints can erode with time, particularly due to the political process by which military and policing activities are conducted. To understand how the process that blurs the line between military and policing functions have occurred in the US, it is important to appreciate both functions as having the tendencies of US government bureaucracies. Balko (2013: p60) notes that the success of bureaucracies is assessed by the size of its workforce and discretionary budgets, specifically in the absence of profit and loss measures. As a result, while both functions are not vying for profit, they are in competition over how pooled government resources are distributed, which means that they are involved in actions that seek to attract as much funding as possible. The law enforcement and military agencies, thus, attempt to expand their activity portfolio to increase personnel and budgets, attempting to signal that their agencies are involved in providing essential and crucial services. In addition, by expending most of their budgets, government bureaus signal the need for more resources in the future in order to fulfill their growing crucial activities portfolio (Balko, 2013: p60). Viewing the military and police through the government bureaucracy lens is important in the current analysis, especially as both have a tendency to expand their activity range, increasingly blurring the demarcation between them. The incentives that face both police and military bureaus lead to a relationship where they both benefit from ever increasing interactions. In looking to expand its powers, the military increases personnel and its budget gaining incentive to extend influence over policing function. Through the provision of training, weapons, and additional resources to police departments, the military is able to augment the human resources under its control and the power of its agencies (Balko, 2013: p61). Similarly, police departments benefit through an extension of interactions and operations with the military as they also seek additional staff and financing. Where the military is involved in activities like drug interdictions and counter-terrorism efforts that have significant funding windfall, there is a great incentive for police to also use the same methods and activities. When the police achieve this additional weaponry, tactical training, and funding, their incentives to utilize the equipment and training in order to justify future funding and spending also increase (Balko, 2013: p61). As a result, the dichotomy between military and policing functions is blurred, while the constraints on the activities of domestic police are eroded. Another factor that has eroded existing constraints between military and policing functions is the involvement of special interest groups. These pressure groups operate by influencing the government in favor of their financiers and members, contributing to increased erosion of government power checks and balances (Kappeler & Kraska, 2014: p4). Special interest groups compete for funds from the government in a similar manner to government bureaus, seeking to secure for its members a significant share of the available funding. The result of their activities is intense competition as they finance political campaigns, lobby Congress, and seek to influence public opinion so as to, in turn, influence policy. Not only do these groups seek to maintain status quo, they also work to influence allocation of resources and expand spending in areas that are of most benefit to their members. For example, the War on Terror led to the emergence of a terrorism industry that was made up of technocrats, government agencies, private firms, and consultants that offered anti-terrorist and security services. All of these parties were representative of special interest groups that lobbied government to increase spending on the policing function by fostering a constant state of fear so as to attract additional funding (Kappeler & Kraska, 2014: p4). However, special interest groups and bureaucracies have been in existence for a long time in the US, while militarization of the police is a fairly recent phenomenon. As a result, the role of these entities cannot be used alone to explain the United State’s indirect police militarization. Campbell and Campbell (2010: p332) identify one such mechanism as related to the political economy of crises, in which both perceived and actual crises, such as terrorism drug gang threats, provide the government with opportunities to increase its activity scope and size. In a time of crisis, US citizens will normally call out for the government to correct the situation, which is taken advantage of by special interests and the bureaucracy to expand operations and activities. When the government expands spending on new initiatives and programs, there is immediate rent-seeking behavior as each group attempts to secure funding related to the new crises. Campbell and Campbell (2010: p333) also note the “ratchet effect” that crises have on government size, where the government reduces activity after the crisis ends but does not return to its level before the crisis as some spending, expanded agencies, and programs persist. This is what happened, for example, after the government’s initial war on domestic terror threats where the government is still operating at similar levels of activities as after 9/11. The War on Terror and the War on Drugs are two of the best examples of how police departments and the military have taken advantage of crises to expand massively. Both of these crises were conducted internationally and domestically, which meant that there were military operations conducted on the domestic front (Campbell & Campbell, 2010: p334). In addition, both crises do not have any end in sight with increased activity by Mexican drug cartels and the emergence of ISIS, which means that the crises and the subsequent expansion of law enforcement activity is set to continue into the future, further increasing government power and spending. Fisher (2010: p33) offers a complementary mechanism to explain why policing in the US is increasingly militarized, pointing to the vast improvements in military technologies and that the overall growth in police militarization can be attributed to the rise of particular technologies. The invention of new technologies like communication devices, better transportation, and electricity in the 20th century enabled the police to expand in scope and scale. While the role played by technology has been important in overall government growth, it has been especially vital for the expansion of the defense industry, alongside the increasing permeation of militarization in police departments (Fisher, 2010: p33). Increased information technology and surveillance are incontrovertibly critical in current military and police operations on both the international and domestic front. In addition, the cost of collecting and gathering almost any form of information has been increasingly eased by the advances made in computer technology. Now, activities like the monitoring of suspects and the access and compilation of criminal histories, as well as crime mapping, which were at one point impossible or could only be achieved via numerous hours of leg work and surveillance, is now discoverable and can be monitored using technological methods like the internet (Fisher, 2010: p34). In addition, some technologies that were once exclusively utilized by the military, such as satellite monitoring, thermal imaging, facial recognition systems, and retinal scanner have now become increasingly common in police departments. Today, these technologies are transferred and used regularly by police departments for domestic activities across the US. The War on Terror and the War on Drugs opened the window for domestic policing to be militarized, while technological improvements enabled relatively easier transfer and use of various military capabilities by the police for domestic purposes (Fisher, 2010: p35). As of today, there are still no clear mechanism for how the demarcation between military functions and policing in the US can be re-established, meaning that militarization will continue into the foreseeable future. References Balko, R. (2013). Rise of the warrior cop: The militarization of Americas police forces. New York: Public Affairs Campbell, D., & Campbell, K. (January 01, 2010). Soldiers as Police Officers/ Police Officers as Soldiers: Role Evolution and Revolution in the United States. Armed Forces & Society, 36, 2, 327-350. Fisher, J. (2010). SWAT madness and the militarization of the American police: A national dilemma. Santa Barbara, Calif: Praeger. Kappeler, V. E., & Kraska, P. B. (September 12, 2014). Normalizing police militarization, living in denial. Policing and Society, 2, 1-8. Victor, E. K. (January 01, 2014). Hailing the police, occupy politics and counter-militarization: a reply to Matthew Morgan. Global Discourse, 4, 285-290. Read More