The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam - Term Paper Example

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam of the of the The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam History The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was formed in the year 1976 by Thiruvenkadam Velupillai Prabhakaran. He was convinced that Sri Lankan Tamils had to obtain their freedom from the Sinhalese, and that this would require actions that were beyond the domain of parliamentary politics. Prabhakaran soon realized that the Sri Lankan Tamils would support a violent inter-ethnic conflict, only when they were deprived of all other options (Biziouras, 2012, p. 553). Prabhakaran gained considerable experience in conducting violent attacks, by engaging in a sequence of localized acts of small-scale violence. Subsequently, he utilized this hard gained skill to conduct several campaigns of violence and intimidation. Prabhakaran used the LTTE cadres for this purpose, and his targets were the longstanding and moderate Tamil political leaders (Biziouras, 2012, p. 554). The LTTE membership was chiefly from the lower-caste Tamils hailing from the rural areas of the Northern Province of Sri Lanka. The leadership of the LTTE was replete with these lower-caste individuals, who brought about the institutionalization of the LTTE, by repeatedly emphasizing their intention to promote the lower castes in the independent Tamil state that they would be creating. This ideological posturing was nationalist, radical, and unique with respect to the traditional political parties of that region and the competing Tamil revolutionary groups (Biziouras, 2012, p. 555). The LTTE’s moves served to enhance Sinhalese apprehensions regarding the continued territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. In addition, the political and institutional solutions suggested by the traditional Tamil political leadership were rejected outright by the LTTE, which strongly promoted sustained armed struggle against the Sinhalese dominated Sri Lankan State (Biziouras, 2012, p. 555). During the 1970s, the LTTE and other armed Tamil groups embarked upon an armed struggle, with a view to seceding from Sri Lanka. This strife underwent considerable intensification, in the aftermath of the anti-Tamil riots. These riots transpired in July 1983 in Colombo and other parts of Sri Lanka. Several attempts were made to resolve this strife, notably in the years 1985, 1989-1990, and 1994-1995. However, these attempts ended in a fiasco, and the armed engagement between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan armed forces underwent an escalation in scope and intensity (Nadarajah & Sriskandarajah, 2005, p. 88). During that epoch, approximately 90,000 people lost their life, and the majority of these people were civilians. At the same time, around a million individuals were internally displaced or became refugees. The LTTE emerged as a small group of fighters in the year 1972. Thereafter, it mushroomed into a significant military organization that deployed thousands of fighters who were provided with heavy artillery support. Moreover, the LTTE had a large naval force that supported these battles (Nadarajah & Sriskandarajah, 2005, p. 89). Later, a ceasefire was declared, with regard their mutual hostilities, between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan authorities. At that juncture, the LTTE had control over 70% of the North and East regions, which were chiefly populated by the Tamils. However, the five chief population centers of these regions were under the control of the Sri Lankan Government. In the areas under its control, the LTTE had established a civil administration structure, which was comprised of a judicial system, and police force. The LTTE imposed its own taxation system in the territory under its control, as well as in the five government controlled centers. Furthermore, it had a customs regime in the borders between the territory controlled by it and the rest of the nation. In the years following the late 1990s, the LTTE’s civil administration was so firmly entrenched that the region was being described as a de facto state (Nadarajah & Sriskandarajah, 2005, p. 89). After the commencement of the peace process, the LTTE increased its political presence. Prior to this uneasy truce, the major political parties of the Tamils had come together and developed a common manifesto. This manifesto recognized the LTTE as the exclusive representative of the Tamils. Thereafter, in April 2004, the Tamil National Alliance contested the elections and obtained a landslide victory in the Northeast and emerged triumphant in 22 seats. This party was the self-acknowledged proxy of the LTTE (Nadarajah & Sriskandarajah, 2005, p. 89). Between September 2002 and March 2003 six rounds of important talks were conducted between the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE. These negotiations were conducted under the aegis of the Norwegian Government, and were held in Thailand in September, October, and January; Norway in December; Germany in February; and Japan in March. In April 2003, the LTTE discontinued these talks, on the grounds that the Sri Lankan Government had failed to implement the agreements that had already been concluded (Nadarajah & Sriskandarajah, 2005, p. 89). Organizational Leadership Prabhakaran was depicted as an indomitable leader whose sole objective was to achieve an independent Eelam or nation. He repeatedly stressed that politicians who interfered with the affairs of the LTTE and its objectives were traitors to the cause, and that the other militant groups seeking independence for the Sri Lankan Tamils were criminals and puppets in the hands of the Sri Lankan Government. Prabhakaran evoked unswerving loyalty from his cadre, who considered it an honor to give up their life at his command (Kaarthikenyan & Raju, 2008, p. 138). This redoubtable revolutionary leader of the LTTE had tremendous intelligence-gathering and operational skills. He had successfully employed these skills against the Indian and Sri Lankan forces, from the fastness of his hideouts in the jungle. These forces had been considerably superior to the LTTE’s forces, in terms of weapons, resources, and sheer numbers. In addition, Prabhakaran was endowed with skills that were a source of inspiration to his followers and cadres. The latter established a number of companies in the Far Eastern commercial cities (Kaarthikenyan & Raju, 2008, p. 138). In addition, these people established a number of shipping companies that conveyed arms to his cadres, in addition to conducting the usual commercial shipping. The LTTE personnel were given to collecting money from the Expatriate Sri Lankan Tamil community. The sole objective of Prabhakaran was to establish an independent state for the Tamils of Sri Lanka (Kaarthikenyan & Raju, 2008, p. 139). Moreover, it was repeatedly declared by him that he was the only true savior of the Sri Lankan Tamils, and that the other Sri Lankan Tamil militant groups and the politicians had become the stooges of the Sri Lankan Government, with a view to deceiving the Sri Lankan Tamils. Accordingly, he assassinated his opponents, without any qualms. In his opinion, the Sri Lankan Tamils could hope to live with dignity and justice, only upon the formation of an independent Tamil State. He offered the people either death or the Tamil Eelam, without any other alternative. This was succinctly portrayed by the LTTE’s motto, which declared that “The Tigers thirst for a Tamil Motherland” (Kaarthikenyan & Raju, 2008, p. 139). Terrorist Acts During the 1970s, militancy and violence erupted between the Tamil and Sinhalese youth. Those were times of great turbulence, and several insurgent groups cropped up among the Tamils. Amongst these violent groups, the LTTE led by Thiruvenkadam Velupillai Prabhakaran emerged as the most powerful and influential extremist group. Gradually it acquired the status of the principal group that was seized with achieving the Tamil Eelam. At that juncture, the Sri Lankan Tamil parties came together as a coalition that was termed the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). The TULF, in the Vaddukkodai Resolution of May 1976 promoted the notion of a separate and independent Tamil nation in Sri Lanka (Brun & Nicholas, 2012, p. 63). By the late 1980s, the LTTE marginalized or eliminated the other Tamil groups in Sri Lanka. This initiative served to render the LTTE, the sole organization fighting for the Tamil Eelam. The national question became the most important issue of Tamil politics, and this eclipsed the immediate requirements and rights of the Tamils. During the 1990s, the LTTE and the Sri Lankan forces were engaged in a war. This engagement was confined to the north and east of the nation. During this period, the LTTE consolidated their power over the populace of the areas falling under their control. This was achieved by creating a model Tamil Eelam (Brun & Nicholas, 2012, p. 64). The capacity of the LTTE to retain control over the Tamils of Sri Lanka and abroad, was seriously compromised due to certain developments that transpired during 2004 to 2005. The first of these developments was the defection of Karuna, a very powerful commander of the LTTE. Karuna combined forces with the Sri Lankan forces. Another development was the tsunami that inundated coastal Sri Lanka (Brun & Nicholas, 2012, p. 64). In addition, politics, leadership, institutions, and the greater portion of society were monopolized by the LTTE. The Vanni region of Sri Lanka, located to the south of the Jaffna peninsula, had been under the control of the LTTE for a very long time. During the war between the Sri Lankan forces and the LTTE, the trials and tribulations of the residents of this region were highlighted by the latter, in order to procure the support of the diaspora (Brun & Nicholas, 2012, p. 65). During the epoch of LTTE control, administration was from the village to the provincial levels. Some of the institutions developed by the LTTE pertained to finance, judicial systems, policing, taxation, and a political wing and educational organization. These entities were supported by the taxes collected from the local Tamil population and contributions from the diaspora. Government offices were permitted to continue. However, these were either taken over by the LTTE or were required to function according to the directions of the LTTE. Furthermore, the traditional village leaders were supplanted by LTTE functionaries. During the period of government control, the LTTE exercised the actual control and influenced the thoughts and activities of the population. In the period 2002 to 2005, a ceasefire had been in force between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Forces. During that era, the institutions of the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE functioned in a parallel manner (Brun & Nicholas, 2012, p. 65). Albeit, the Sri Lankan Government rejected the notion of the Tamil Eelam, it was compelled to acknowledge the political power of the LTTE. Gradually, the relations between the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE deteriorated. This happened in the year 2004, and the Sri Lankan Armed Forces launched an offensive against the LTTE in the year 2005. This was in the Vakarai area, and it was the precursor to the final war in the Vanni, which commenced in the year 2009 (Brun & Nicholas, 2012, p. 65). Consequently, the LTTE forced the civil population to accompany them during this war. However, many civilians managed to escape from the LTTE and were accommodated in camps, by the Sri Lankan authorities. These camps were located in the territory that was under the control of the Sri Lankan Government. Control over the Vakarai was officially regained by the Sri Lankan Government on 21 January 2007 (Brun & Nicholas, 2012, p. 66). Furthermore, the demands of the LTTE upon the population under its control, increased in the 1990s. These Tamil civilians were forced to undergo conscription, and provide resources and money to the LTTE. During that epoch, the diaspora increasingly remitted funds for supporting the armed struggle, and to succor the civilians trapped in that region. Many Tamils arrived in Australia, Canada, UK and other European nations, as refugees (Brun & Nicholas, 2012, p. 67). As such, the Tamil Tigers had been some of the most dangerous extremists of the world. They had unleashed unbridled bloodshed and terror in the island nation of Sri Lanka, for nearly thirty years. The objective of the LTTE was to separate from Sri Lanka, by establishing an independent Tamil nation. Whilst pursuing this objective, the LTTE conducted a number of suicide attacks; assassinated prominent Sri Lankan Politicians, including the Sri Lankan President and the Prime Minister of India; made individuals hostages; and committed a variety of crimes to finance their operations. Since, the year 1983, more than 70,000 people had lost their life, in the civil war in Sri Lanka (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2008). Moreover, the LTTE has caused untold misery to the people, in addition to perpetrating bloodshed on a very large scale. Furthermore, their terror tactics had been adopted by Islamic militant groups, such as the al Qaeda. In addition, the LTTE had deployed its operatives in the US, who had resorted to clandestine fund raising for meeting the costs of its terrorist activities, chiefly with respect to the purchase of explosives and weapons (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2008). Most importantly, the then Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi was brutally assassinated by a suicide bomber. This transpired on 21 May 1991 at Sriperumbudur, which is near Chennai, in India. In this incident, Velupillai Prabhakaran and his intelligence chief Pottu Amman, who had planned this terrorist attack, were declared offenders. The assassination had been conducted in retaliation for the deployment of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka, in the year 1987 (Press Trust of India, 2009). Combatting the Terrorism of the LTTE by the CIA The US Government classified the LTTE as a terrorist organization, and made it very clear that its activities in the US would be prevented with all the means at its disposal. For instance, the Joint Terrorism Task Force in New York detained the US director of the LTTE. This individual had conducted a number of fundraising events in public schools and a church. Moreover, this person had facilitated several important meetings between the LTTE’s supporters in the US and the leaders of the LTTE. Furthermore, the US authorities had arrested 11 suspected members of the LTTE in the New York City region. In addition, two Indonesians were prosecuted and sentenced for exporting surface to air missiles, sophisticated firearms, machine guns, and night vision equipment to the LTTE (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2008). A variety of information emerges from intelligence operations. For instance, national or strategic intelligence constitutes information regarding foreign nations. Such information is garnered by the intelligence agencies of the government. Strategic intelligence includes economic, political, and social trends in the target nation, and national security. On the other hand, military intelligence consists of the military capabilities, strengths, and weapons technology of nations that are potentially or actually inimical. Such information is produced by civilian or military analysts, who have been provided with specialized training (Gabel, 2014). As such, the contemporary US has two intelligence organizations at the national level, officially. These are the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA). The CIA is vested with the responsibility of conducting overseas covert operations and engaging in clandestine intelligence activities. The task of supervising the integrity of secret communications and collecting signals intelligence at the international level, has been allotted to the NSA (Gabel, 2014). Moreover, the analysts devoted to counterterrorism evaluate the capabilities, intentions, leadership, motivations, and plans of foreign terrorist organizations and their sponsors. The principal task of these analysts is to identify specific threats, issue warnings and forestall terrorist attacks, compromise terrorist networks, and ultimately defeat terrorist organizations. Moreover, these analysts examine different types of information, in order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of an intricate analytic issue (Central Intelligence Agency, 2014). In addition to intelligence products, such analysts provide briefings to US policy makers, military officials, intelligence agencies, foreign partners, and law enforcement agencies. A major duty of the counterterrorism analysts is to provide analytic support to US government organizations, such as the law enforcement agencies (Central Intelligence Agency, 2014). Critical support for the Global War on Terrorism, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Homeland Security has been provided by the Intelligence Community (IC). Communication and collaboration were significantly enhanced between the Law Enforcement and Counterintelligence Communities and the IC. In what can be termed a highly proactive role, the IC developed the longstanding foreign partnerships and created new collaborations to promote the War on Terrorism (Central Intelligence Agency, 2012). As such, the CIA had been in the possession of information regarding the terrorist activities of the LTTE through its overseas covert operations. The CIA could have instructed its counterterrorism analysts to assess the actual extent of terrorism being practiced by the LTTE. Subsequent to collecting information regarding the terrorist threats and networks, it could have conducted a counter terrorism operation against the LTTE in Sri Lanka with the active collaboration of the Sri Lankan Government. References Biziouras, N. (2012). The Formation, Institutionalization and Consolidation of the LTTE: Religious Practices, Intra-Tamil Divisions and a Violent Nationalist Ideology. Politics, Religion & Ideology, 13(4), 547-559. Brun, C., & Nicholas, V. (2012). Between the local and the diasporic: the shifting centre of gravity in war-torn Sri Lankas transnational politics. Contemporary South Asia, 20(1), 61-75. Central Intelligence Agency. (2012, January 3). Support to the War on Terrorism and Homeland Security. Retrieved November 14, 2014, from https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/archived-reports-1/Ann_Rpt_2002/swtandhs.html Central Intelligence Agency. (2014, April 17). Counterterrorism Analyst. Retrieved November 14, 2014, from https://www.cia.gov/careers/opportunities/analytical/counterterrorism-analyst.html Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2008, January 10). Taming the Tamil Tigers. Retrieved November 13, 2014, from http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/january/tamil_tigers011008 Gabel, C. F. (2014). Intelligence Operations. Retrieved November 14, 2014, from Scholastic: http://www.scholastic.com/teachers/article/intelligence-operations Kaarthikenyan, D., & Raju, R. (2008). Rajiv Gandhi Assassination. New Delhi, India: Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd. Nadarajah, S., & Sriskandarajah, D. (2005). Liberation struggle or terrorism? The politics of naming the LTTE. Third World Quarterly, 26(1), 87-100. Press Trust of India. (2009, April 29). Prabhakaran and Pottu Amman hatched Rajiv killing plot: Karuna Amman. Retrieved November 14, 2014, from The Times of India: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Prabhakaran-and-Pottu-Amman-hatched-Rajiv-killing-plot-Karuna-Amman/articleshow/4463673.cms?referral=PM Read More