The Success of State Reconstruction Varies according to the Scale of State Collapse - Literature review Example

?The Success of Reconstruction Varies According to the Scale of Collapse Boutros Boutros Ghali, former Secretary General of the United Nations,describes state collapse as the “collapse of state institutions with resulting paralysis of governance, a breakdown of law and order, and general banditry and chaos” (Thurer 1999). Ghali further pointed out the need for international intervention to rebuild and help such societies with forms of action not only limited to military intervention but also through development efforts and humanitarian aid in order to restore governance and order (Thurer 1999). Reconstruction of States following conflicts is usually conducted with the help of various countries and organizations in the spirit of peace, development and brotherhood of nations, infusing financial and human resources in to a target State. In most cases, donor countries provide assistance in the forms of technical expertise and establish cooperative development programmes for locales where the State has no capacity to provide for the needs and protect the right of its populace (Giorgetti, p. 20). International Development Programmes Many developed countries like the United States of America, Japan, Canada, Germany and the United Kingdom, have their own foreign aid agencies and programmes providing technical and financial assistance to other countries rising from collapse, poverty or underdevelopment affecting its populace (Giorgetti, pp. 18-20). Most foreign development interventions normally follow the necessity for consent and cooperation of a recipient country. International development projects and programmes normally involve the infusion of technical advice and assistance from foreign international experts, and in some cases, these experts are tasked to manage key functions of governance within target countries. International development programmes and projects may range from the delivery of basic human services like healthcare services, agricultural and food development, to the restructuring and strengthening of judicial and legal systems of target/host countries. The first organizations to establish development assistance packages, through the study, expansion and institutionalization of good governance as an accepted policy for development, are the World Bank (WB) and the United Nations (UN) through its various agencies and international programmes. The World Bank is best known for its implementation of economic governance programmes in the form of technical assistance and loan packages. The United Nations on the other hand focused on the delivery of basic human services and assistance as well as resolving conflict and legal issues within target or recipient countries. Food and agriculture improvement programs of the UN are the World Food Program (WFP) and programs by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), with healthcare development, like provision of water, sanitation and general health, implemented by the World Health Organization and the UN International Children’s Educational Fund (UNICEF) (Giorgetti, pp. 18-20). Over the years, foreign aid programmes and the number of donor countries increased and were not limited to developed nations. To date, an estimated thirty nations, including European, North American, Middle East, former socialist countries, India, China, Japan and other middle – income countries like Turkey, Korea and Thailand, have established international development assistance loans and programmes providing aid to other less developed nations of the world. International organizations and programmes have also increased like the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Asian Development Bank (ADB), African Development Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) as well as international civic assistance organizations like the United Kingdom based Volunteer Service Organization (VSO) and the US-based Peace Corps, all of whom provide technical and financial assistance to target countries. In 2004 alone, an estimated $100 billion was provided worldwide in terms of development programmes and aid to target states. Total world estimates of foreign aid and assistance provided by different governments and organizations between the years 1960 to 2004 have already exceeded $1.6 trillion. Foreign aid and development programs have funded construction and reconstruction projects in war-torn and developing countries, micro-enterprise loans and development, post-graduate, under-graduate and technical training scholarships of nationals from developing countries, improvement and expansion of local education institution programs, food production and energy generation improvement and research programs, health and population control initiatives, HIV research and prevention, debt relief, reforms in the judiciary, elections and civil society development, as well as the direct assistance provided for humanitarian relief in countries ravaged by natural and man-made disasters worldwide (Lancaster, 2007 pp.1-2). Reconstruction Approaches The success of reconstruction efforts vary not only in the scale or degree of state collapse experienced by a country. Reconstruction is dependent on a participatory and bottom-up development approaches involving the active participation of local key stakeholders of such development efforts. The old-school top-to-bottom approach of development program implementation has shown that such approach to development usually results to failure and non-sustainability of programme implementation (Zartman, 1995, p. 1) I. William Zartman (1995, p. 1) defined state collapse as a phenomenon which is deeper or more serious than mere conflicts such as “rebellion, coup or riot”. Serge Michailof (2010) stated that over the past dozen years, attempts to restore order and revive the economies of collapsed states have been conducted through international aids such as “financial, economic, technical and military efforts” but still, the results are disappointing. These, together with what Giorgetti has said about humanitarian and development programs which are implemented by the UN, are still not enough for a successful reconstruction in a short span of time. In the book Fragile Peace: State Failure, Violence and Development in Crisis Regions (2002), Nicole Ball identified several factors necessary for rebuilding war-torn societies. For donor efforts to succeed there must be a commitment from the national leadership for local reform with developed institutional structures and policies rooted to the country’s history and societal frameworks. Ball added that there is a necessity for participatory consultation and involvement between the implementing agencies and key stakeholders within government (p. 39). For reconstruction to be successful, the sentiments of not only the leadership but the population should be considered. It should be noted that these factors that Ball mentioned focus on the leadership, policies, reform and the participation of stakeholders and not the severity of the collapse or prioritizing only on the basis of need. Ball also discussed the roles of external actors or international organizations in reconstruction and transformation of war-torn societies. She said that a major challenge which the society emerging from a conflict and the international development community aiming to assist them is to identify how to” incorporate longer-term objectives of institution-building into short-term rehabilitation and reconstruction” (p. 38). The Lessons of Afghanistan In the case of Afghanistan, which according to J. Warnock is considered by the political leaders of Canada, the United States, and Great Britain as a failed state (2008, p. 21), Goodhand (2002, p. 838) argues that the crisis in Afghanistan has already mutated and undergone many different phases through time. Goodman further stated that the Afghan conflict is not just the breakdown of order in that country, rather, has already created new legitimate forms of order and protection in that nation, transforming societal structures and civil institutions which in turn have created new societal relationships. He adds that “conflict and struggle have historically been essential for the advancement of peoples on the margins and one could argue that minorities have advanced their position as a result of the conflict. Aid strategies therefore need to be built on an appreciation of the fact that society has moved on.” Goodhand may be correct about Afghanistan undergoing several phases and has mutated over time, but this does not mean that aid strategies for reconstruction “need to be built on an appreciation of the fact that society has moved on (Goodhand, p. 838)”. This is one example of strategy being based on the scale of collapse. Afghanistan may have moved on or has risen in terms of the level or scale of collapse but donors cannot propose aid programs without considering the possible effects of these programs to the majority of the population. In considering the scale of collapse, prioritizing sometimes tend to neglect other considerations such as the possible effects of development of certain areas to other areas not covered by development at the same time. In Time Lag and Sequencing Dilemmas of Post-conflict Reconstruction, Andrew Natsios stated that “post-conflict states suffer from time lags between the development of rural versus urban areas, of one region versus another, and in the proper timing and sequencing of vari­ous sector programs” (2009, 63-64). According to Natsios, in Afghanistan, one of the manifestations of this time lag is the effects of developments in urban areas. Modernization of Afghan society has created changes in terms of family income, opening the communities to outside world and its modern products, one of which is the presence of television which in turn disturbed the conservative style of living of Afghan families. Education is now one of the priorities of parents in urban areas especially college education. In rural areas on the other hand, access to education is not like in urban areas in that college education is not as available. Modernization is advancing its way in urban areas but not in rural areas, creating social tensions which in turn add to the severity of Taliban resurgence within rural areas (2009, p. 64). This is one example of program implementation based on what the donors have identified as their effective solution to a problem in need of an immediate response. The severity of the need for modernization is one indicator of the severity of the scale of collapse in Afghanistan in the donors’ eyes and thus needed to be addressed immediately. Culture and religion were not taken into consideration, thus, resulting to social tensions. There has been a significant increase in the support for reconstruction by international aid to fragile and failed states which has just emerged from severe conflicts or civil war but what happened in Afghanistan, according to Michailof (2010) is due to mistakes made by the Western coalition, particularly in the way development support efforts were made. The efforts, according to him were disorganized, lacked coherence in strategy, local administration and ensuring stakeholders’ security. He further pointed out that donor-driven approaches in program implementation translates to weak state institutions established locally to implement such in-country development initiatives. He also identified the establishment of a superficial democratic government which proved to be weak as it was generally unsupported by the populace. He states the need for a grass-roots based democratic institution for governance and sustainability to be truly effective. In Afghanistan’s case, the financial and human resources from donor countries extending aid since 2001, Michailof pointed out, were mishandled. Many traditional mistakes of donors have been made in the management of foreign funds. These are mainly due to the deteriorated local domestic policies, a ‘mafia-system’ corrupting the regime connected to the Pakistani army’s aims in the country, and regional policies (Michailof, 2010). J. Warnock stated that development programmes and aid extended to Afghanistan failed because the Afghan government was not consulted on what programmes and assistance are needed to be implemented, rather, donor-agencies and institutions implemented what they thought was needed in Afghanistan. Another factor which led to the failure of assistance efforts in that country was that the economic assistance packages were not channelled through the Afghan government, thus undermining and not strengthening the viability of the present leadership and form of government (2008, p. 29). Ball supports this in her preconditions for any development programme or assistance to succeed; there is a necessity for participatory consultation and a need to involve implementing agencies and key stakeholders within government prior to any form of program implementation, for reconstruction to succeed. History – Jump-Off to Success Truth be told, the primary reason why countries extend foreign aid is security, regardless of the severity of the situation. I fully agree with Volker Boege, Anne Brown, Kevin Clements and Anna Nolan when they said that military policies and national issues of the different nations are becoming more focused on the issue of fragile states and that the issue of fragile states are cause for their concerns about transnational terrorism and the international war on terror. The authors argue that many such development programs currently being implemented in fragile states are in reality security programs designed to “securitise” such states, with more focus on the security dimension rather than real development efforts (Boege, Brown, Clements and Nolan 2009 pp. 17-18). The first concern of donor governments is the effects of the situation in terms of security not only in the failed or collapsed country but to their countries as well. This includes the possibility of terrorist attacks. Being the case, the first priority of donor countries is usually to establish a military presence in the region which more often than not, adds to the severity of the situation. Minna Jarvenpaa, in her report said that according to NATO estimates, there is an increase in the number of insurgency from 2005 to 2010. From a few thousand, there is now as many as 35,000 fighters in Afghanistan. This is caused by the foreign troops’ actions such as detention and night raids and the resulting civilian casualties. Taliban for their part has policemen, tribal elders, government officials, development contractors and aid workers as target of assassination and assaults. Roadside bombs placed by Taliban fighters kill civilians but this does not hinder the momentum gained by insurgents and continue to increase in number as even non-Pashun fighters are enlisted (2011, pp. 2-3). Robert Rotberg, in his paper entitled Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators, defined and classified states as failed when conflict is tense, dangerous and “contested bitterly by warring factions (with) government troops battling armed revolts led by one or more rivals” (2003, p. 5) . In contrast, he describes a collapsed state as a “rare and extreme version of a failed state (with) security equated with the rule of the strong and exhibits a vacuum of authority” (Rotberg, p. 9). State reconstruction does not succeed by basing aid and development programs on the scale of collapse alone. Other factors such as the local government’s commitment to change, the attitude of the population towards change and development, the present situation, religion, culture and tradition should also be taken into consideration. Many development programmes fail because they fail to take into consideration the prevailing social conditions and programs acceptable and applicable for different states. Prioritizing programmes based on all the factors mentioned above and not the possible outside effects of the collapse on donor countries must be the foremost and primary task of organizations prior to its implementation (Rotberg, 2003 pp. 5-9). The OECD-DAC International Network on Conflict and Fragility in 2010 stated that a “study shows that donors should focus less on the instruments and approaches available within particular managerial structures, and more on the actual objectives that they are trying to support.” It particularly identified the need for long-term sustainability of initiatives by coordination “across humanitarian, development and defense budget lines” in order that comprehensive and holistic approaches be utilized and implemented in order to achieve successful transition of program implementation initiatives (p 10). The Social Development Department in the Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Network of the World Bank in their Social Development Notes on Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction recognized that “it is often tempting for donors to try and bypass weak government capacity and to attempt to rebuild the country themselves” especially in regions with weak governance, absence of skilled professionals and weak local implementation agencies. Direct action on the part of donor institutions is tempting especially if the prestige of the donor agency is at stake (pp. 1-2). This form of action however, though immediate and direct, would not insure the sustainability of development activities as key stakeholders would not have participation in the programs. A dole-out mentality would also be cultivated in the minds of program recipients. The involvement of stakeholders in influencing and sharing decisions in approaches to development programme implementation is termed as participation. The involvement of key stakeholders ensure that a sense of ownership of development programs is inculcated in the stakeholders. This essence of participation by the community originates from the phases of project inception, planning, design up to program implementation and assessment. Through this approach, “the widest possible participation of the poor and beneficiaries of development projects, in contrast to the alternative model of development where project conceptualization, objectives and design are imposed on the community by external agents. Participatory approach to development will challenge perceptions, attitudes, agendas and can be a rich and illuminating source of contextual insights to determine development outcomes” (Ahmed 2006: p 3). Jean-Philippe Platteau describes participatory approach to development as more complex and requires the adoption of a much longer time horizon. “A long-term perspective is especially needed when communities exhibit characteristics that make them vulnerable to serious pitfalls such as is the case, it will be argued, in societies dominated by lineage- or patronage-based relations, or in ethnically fragmented societies” (undated p 3) as in the case of Afghanistan. Due to the lessons learned from the failure of development programs in some areas of the world, there have been changes into the way international development aid is being allocated. Mark McGillivray (2006) identified that early changes involved considering notions of equity and efficiency in aid allocation criteria where countries with “inferior policy regimes receive less aid as they are thought to (cause) reduced impact of aid on growth and poverty reduction” (pp. 5-6). Stephen Browne (2007) in his paper, ‘Aid to Fragile States – Do Donors Help or Hinder?’ lays down several pre-conditions for reconstruction to succeed. These are a) treating every case as different, where no two states are similar and the need to determine appropriate and socially acceptable types of donor intervention; b) gaining a comprehensive understanding of the state’s capacity, mainly it’s political, institutional, economic, social and security capacities; c) realistic approval of loans and bottom-up approach to development, where lending should only be given to states based on realistic prospects of repayment and where donors should refrain from imposing their agendas; d) coordination of development aid in order to avoid harmonization and development programmes and avoid duplication of development programme initiatives among individual donor institutions; in order that e) development support could be sustained (pp. 26-31). Considering the actual experiences and lessons learned from the Afghan crisis, it is very clear that all efforts of various countries and all other international organizations involved in aid and development of other states, whether, weak, failed or collapsed have their negative and positive effects. As Waldman (2008) stated, most Afghans still endure conditions of hardship and millions live in extreme poverty. Far too much aid has been prescriptive and driven by donor priorities – rather than responsive to evident Afghan needs and preferences (p 2). Whether through “altruism or self-interest”, reconstruction programmes based on the scale of collapse has yet to prove totally effective (Browne 2007: p 1). Other areas of considerations, such as attitudes, tradition, culture, capacity, will and commitment of both the donor and the recipient should be taken into account prior to planning and implementation of different development programs (Waldman pp. 2-3). Anent to all these, donors should establish working groups with Afghan government and NGO representation to maximize ownership of the development process and assure sustainability of the programs (Waldman pp. 3-5). Bibliography Boege, Volker, Anne Brown, Kevin Clements and Anna Nolan (2009) On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: What is Failing – States in the Global South or Research and Politics in the West? Berghof Handbook Dialogue No. 8, Building Peace in the Absence of States: Challenging the Discourse on State Failure Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. Ball, N. (2002) State failure and the transformation of war-torn societies. In: Debiel, T. and Klein, A. ed. Fragile Peace: State Failure, Violence and Development in Crisis Regions. New York, Zed Books, Ltd., pp.31-52. Browne, Stephen (2007) Aid to Fragile States – Do Donors Help or Hinder? UNU-WIDER Discussion Paper 2007 (01) May Available in : [Accessed: 11 January 2013]. Giorgetti, C. (2010) A Principled Approach to State Failure International Community Actions in Emergency Situations. Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Goodhand, J. (2002) Aiding violence or building peace? The role of international aid in Afghanistan. Third World Quarterly 23 (5), pp 837–859. Jarvenpaa, M. (2011) Making Peace in Afghanistan The Missing Political Strategy. [pdf] Washington DC. United States Institute of Peace. Available at: [Accessed 11 January 2013]. Lancaster, C. (2007) Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics. Chicago, University of Chicago Press. McGillivray, Mark (2006) Aid Allocation and Fragile States, UNU-WIDER Discussion Paper 2006 (01) May Available in: [Accessed: 11 January 2013]. Michailof, S. (2010) The Challenge of Reconstructing "Failed" States. Field Actions Science Reports [Internet] Available from:< http://factsreports.revues.org/696> [Accessed 08 January 2013]. Natsios, A. (2009) Time Lag and Sequencing Dilemmas of Postconflict Reconstruction. 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