Science is United By Its Method and not by Its Subject - Assignment Example

Unity of Science Argument against the Proposition that Science is united by its Method and not by its Subject matter i. Introduction The intimate connection between scientific method and its original subject matter has been lost sight of, and the method has been regarded not as a tool, not as secondary to the demands of the subject of investigation, but as primary and self-sufficient. Moreover, scientific method is now considered as the unifying factor of all sciences rather than the subject matter of investigation. The focus of this paper is to invalidate the proposition that science is unified by its method and not by its subject matter. Our study includes discussions on the nature of science itself and analysis of the principle behind the methodological unity of science. ii. The Nature of Science Science as a rigorous and theoretically systematised experience of humanity, as a raw product of its culture, in the 20th century has been wielding an increasing influence on the development of man and society. “It is deductive as well as inductive”1. Science has a persistent but often understated influence on almost all facet of modern life. The influences are both from the technology that emanating from it and the deep philosophical inference coming from its ideas. However, regardless of this massive effect, only a minority of individuals have a basic perception on how the scientific activity operates2. “Science seeks explanations to satisfy the wonder”3. The dissimilarity between science and other enterprises that seen rationalization of why things are the way they are evident in the kind of paradigm that science itself established 1 Ritchie A.D., ‘Scientific Method: An Inquiry Into the Character and Validity of Natural Laws’, U.K.: Published by Routledge, 2001, p.1 2 McComas W. F., ‘The Nature of Science in Science Education: Rationales and Strategies’, Netherlands, Published by Springer, 1998, p. 3 3 Rosenberg A., ‘Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction’, U.K.: Published by Routledge, 2005, p.22 as an excellent and better explanation. “Science is practiced, as matter of circular definition, by scientist”4 and it is characterised by its selection of subject matter5. The philosophy of science is trying to unearth those norms and other systems guiding ‘scientific methods’ or the “logic of science”6 itself. The proficiency of science led to issues that science cannot possibly answer. Issues that needs skills that scientific training does not provide since there is no laboratory for exploring the nature theories and we certainly cannot determine the nature of ‘explanation’ by experiments7. To explain the relationship of disciplines that informs science education about the nature of science itself, the history and philosophy of science has been used. The nature of science is a complex productive field that combines characteristics of different social studies of science. These include history, sociology, and philosophy of science united with study from the cognitive sciences such as psychology and the like. The result is a rich description of the true nature of science and its functions, the behaviours of scientist as a social group and society’s response to scientific accomplishments. However, a great deal of incongruities remains regardless of momentous development in relation to exemplifying science. For instance, some asserted that no reliable and accurate explanation exists regarding the nature and structure of science. 4 Dear P.R., ‘The Intelligibility of Nature: How Science Makes Sense of the World’, U.S.: Published by University of Chicago Press, 2006, p.1 5 Cole S., ‘Making Science: Between Nature and Society’, U.S.: Published by Harvard University Press, 1992, p. 2 6 Gower B., ‘Scientific Method: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction’, U.K. Published by Routledge, 1997, p. 6 7 Smith W. N., ‘A Companion to the Philosophy of Science, U.K: Published by Blackwell Publishing, 2000, p. 7 Others pointed out the lack of concurrence concerning the correct image of scientific inquiry and the development of scientific knowledge. “The nature of science is neither universal nor stable”.8 iii. Philosophy of Science and Scientific Methodology A philosophy of science is growing increasingly essential for a number of reasons. Due to growing specialization and to the persistent and accelerated build up of new evidence, the general behaviour of scientific systems become increasingly lost to view and the amalgamation that relies on coexistence of diverse knowledge in a single mind becomes increasingly complex. As means to conquer this complexity, it is essential that occasionally, an expert competent of disengaging himself from details should explain the key points and fundamental structure of his science as it exists now. However,” it is not the results that interest a man but the method used”.9 In our time, philosophy of science is progressively more familiar in investigating the increasing role of scientific and technical advancement in the life of man and society, to the extent that the forceful nature of modern social development is mainly a consequence of the scientific and technological innovation10. Philosophy of science explains the features common to all the sciences and qualities that separate them from one another11 8 McComas W. F., ‘The Nature of Science in Science Education: Rationales and Strategies’, Netherlands, Published by Springer, 1998, p. 6 9 Poincare H., ‘Science and Method’, U.S: Translated by Francis Maitland and Published by Courier Dover Publications, 2003, p. 6 11 Fenstad J.E., Frolov I. T, and Hilpinen R., ‘Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science VIII: Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science’, Moscow: Published by Elsevier, 1987, p. 3 12 Elster J., ‘Explaining Technical Change: A Case Study in the Philosophy of Science’, Norway: Published by CUP Archive, 1983, p.15 However, philosophy of science has become such a remote and dedicated activity that nobody is competent to generate a convincing study of the field, even at an introductory level. It is a problematic subject to define because “philosophy is difficult to define “.13 It reflects on, critically analyses the functions of science, and attempts to recognize the value of its objective and methods, together with its standards, procedures, and accomplishments.14 According to Kantorovich15, a descriptive philosopher of science will not find any list of explicit and comprehensible methodological rules, which direct scientist in their work. This is not the usual research methods used for chemical solution and solving equations, but collective rules comparable to hypothetic-deductive method that comprise the so-called ‘scientific method’. While some general methods of science are sporadically discussed in scientific literature, consensus relating to their clear formulation is unavailable. Additionally, scientists do not learn their trade by studying methodology. Actually, one of the lessons, which a graduate student learns when he turns to actual research, is that he has to disregard several pleasant and orderly principles and slogans he has been taught during his school years, specifically those principles that are supposed to comprise the scientific method16. 13 Rosenberg A., ‘Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction’, U.K.: Published by Routledge, 2005, p.1 14 Salmon M. H., Earman J., Glymour C., and Lennox J., Introduction to the ‘Philosophy of Science: A Text by the Members of the Department of the History and Philosophy of Science of the University of Pittsburgh’, U.S.: Published by Hackett Publishing, 1999, p. 1 15 Kantorovich A., ‘Scientific Discovery: Logic and Tinkering’, U.S.: Published by SUNY Press, 1993, p. 126 16 ibid, p. 127 iv. The Notion of the Methodological Unity of Science The notion of the methodological unity of science was developed in resistance to the opinion that the mental or cultural disciplines are characterized from the natural sciences by fundamental dissimilarities in the methods that are essential to determine and to explicate the facts with which these branches of learning are involved. The theory on the unity of science through its method states that regardless of the various divergence in the techniques scientist used in exploring phenomena, the manner in which they testing and support there statements are the same. This is because most scientist derived their facts from inferences that can be tested inter-subjectively and perform for those inferences the suitable investigational or examination tests17. Although the unity of scientific method may be significant to comprehend the culture and philosophy of science, it evades the actual concern associated with unity of science arguments. The unity of science and knowledge according to Scoular18 is completely correlated to the supposition of a unity of nature. This means that if we can illustrate the unity of nature, then we can also show the unity of knowledge and unity science. According to Suppes19, a disparate and less linguistic approach is to compare the ‘unity of scientific subject matter’ with the ‘unity of scientific method’. Countless people would have the same opinion that various sciences have dissimilar subject matters. 17 Hempel C. G., Fetzer J. H., ‘The Philosophy of Carl G. Hempel: Studies in Science, Explanation, and Rationality’, U.S.: Published by Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 269 18 Scoular S., ‘First Philosophy: The Theory of Everything’, U.S. Published by Universal-Publishers, 2007, p. 5 19 Suppes P., ‘Models and Methods in the Philosophy of Science: Selected Essays’, Netherlands: Published by Springer, 1993, p.43 For instance, the subject matter of astronomy is certainly not the same as that of psychopharmacology. However, many would also insist that regardless of the clear difference in subject matters, there are some points in which the methods of science are identical in all area of research. For instance, psychological theories of motivation and cosmological theories of the universe utilize the same arithmetic. Moreover, differential and integral calculus or partial differential equations or probability theory uses similar theories. A considerable number of mathematical methods and results can be use in all domains of science or in very different parts of science. “There is a believable prima facie case for the unity of science in terms of unity of scientific method”.20 “There could be no unity of science, but that there was a unity of scientific method”.21 Numerous philosophers and scientist would argue that there is good logic in which the methods of science are very similar in all domain of research and some characteristic of this sense of unity are well accepted and unquestionable. The widespread use of elementary mathematics and the general teaching of elementary mathematical methods for application in all domains of science can scarcely be denied. However, it appears that it is essential to highlight the plurality of methods and the huge dissimilarities in methodology of various parts of science. The application of simple mathematics in addition to the use of specific fundamental statistical methods is not sufficient to characterize the methodology of any particular field of science. 20 Suppes P., ‘Models and Methods in the Philosophy of Science: Selected Essays’, Netherlands: Published by Springer, 1993, p.42 21 Munz P., ‘Beyond Wittgenstein's Poker: New Light on Popper and Wittgenstein’, U.K.: Published by Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2004, p.16 For instance, if the experimental method for a particular discipline is completely dissimilar then manuals of experimental method for one discipline are more often than not incomprehensible for specialist in another discipline. Let us take for example a physicist working in the solid-state physics who cannot understandably read the comprehensive accounts of methods in other branch of physics. Similarly, in other sciences like psychology where physiological psychologist utilize a collection of experimental methods that are unfamiliar to psychologies specializing in education test theory, and in that order the complex details of the methodology of test construction would be strange to nearly all physiological psychologist. Even within the limited domains of statistical methods, various disciplines have dissimilar statistical methodologies to their individual subject matters. Ordinarily, the statistical tools of psychologies are somewhat diverse from those of economists. Moreover, a fact that is well recognized, within a single broad discipline like physics, there are different areas with great variations in the applications of statistical methods22. v. Disunity in Science The existing emphasis on disunity in science studies and the philosophy of science is due to the conviction that an effort to unify consequentially involves an absence of chronological or realistic appreciation of the sciences. According to Rahman23, this assumption is misleading. This is because one of the goals of the advocates, epitomized by well-known historians and philosophers of sciences, 22 Suppes P., ‘Models and Methods in the Philosophy of Science: Selected Essays’, Netherlands: Published by Springer, 1993, p.48 23 Rahman S., Symons J., Gabbay D. M.., van Bendegem J., ‘Logic, Epistemology and the Unity of Science’, Netherlands: Published by Springer, 2004, p.5 is to “satisfy an abiding human need to understand connection and similarities in contexts of great diversity and apparent disunity”24 (Rahman et. al. 2004, p.5). There is no need to presume in detail the character and functionality of unity to rationalize its existence and academic impact. Moreover, although unification undertakings may vary from science to science, significant and fascinating general lines of philosophical inquiry disclosed itself the moment one consider the likelihood of unity decisively . Although the basis of expansionist programs in philosophy and in science in the nineteenth and the early 20th century according to Wylie25 is the declaration of methodological unity, supporters for the unification of science did not pay much attention to the subject. Later, in the reassessment of the works of Otto Neurath, a committed member of the Vienna Circle supporting the unity of science by its method reveals that Neurath was more concerned in synchronizing scientific methods than unifying it26. Methodological unity for some critic is flawed and indefensible if expressed universal enough to cover all scientific undertakings since it tends to complicate the issue further than to elucidate the actual intricacies of scientific endeavours. Moreover, it is immaterial since scientific method by itself needs an accurate definition and philosophical defence. Finally, disunity supporters argued that where methods are concerned, “science is at best a family resemblance concept”27. 24 Rahman S., Symons J., Gabbay D. M.., van Bendegem J., ‘Logic, Epistemology and the Unity of Science’, Netherlands: Published by Springer, 2004, p.5 25 Wylie A., ‘Thinking from Things: Essays in the Philosophy of Archaeology’, U.S.: Published by University of California Press, 2002, p.200 26 ibid. p. 201 27 ibid., p.202 vi. Scientific Method and Subject Matter In the desire to alter society, theories supporting the unity of method may employ scientific pretext to make use of the reputation science has achieved while disregarding its principle. The solution proposed by most advocates of scientific method according to Soros28 (2006, p.218), is to implement the rules developed by natural science. Karl Popper, according to this author, proposed the doctrine of the unity of science as the same methods and standards apply in the study of both natural and social phenomena. However, the primary distinction between these pursuits is that the ‘subject matter’ of the social sciences is impulsive in character and impulsiveness eliminates the gap between statements and facts, which has made the critical process so helpful in the natural sciences. Consequently, we need to consider that theories can significantly shape the subject mater to which they interact and inadequate knowledge of the contributor introduces an ‘element of uncertainly’ into the subject matter consequential to inaccurate assumption and obscure explanations29. The unity of scientific method intends to unite science by endorsing similarities in methods. The most dedicated effort to unify science through method came from the Unity of Science Movement of the 1930s. This movement began in the mid-1920s as the Vienna Circle, now recognized in philosophy as logical positivism or logical empiricism. The unity of science supported by the logical empiricists had its roots in logical analysis and the development of a universal language that seeks to create a sort of unity of method through 28 Soros G., ‘The Age of Fallibility: The Consequences of the War on Terror’, Australia: Published by Allen & Unwin, 2006, p.218 29 ibid., p.218 articulation of scientific knowledge. Their main objective was to condense all terms employed in particular sciences to produce a universal language for the discipline30. Notwithstanding the constraint to the very limited and standardized class of terms, no addition to a unified system of laws could be produced. The goal of scientific unity expressed by some is directly at odds with the notion of unity advocated by others. For instance, the kind of reductionist programme suggested by the logical unity of science seems to stand in the way and undeniably negatively distress the evolution of knowledge in various domains of science. The “reductionist program itself has widespread practical implications”31 and an “inadequate description of actual scientific practice”32 Therefore, the multiplicity and separation between the sciences should be preserved and encouraged, while maintaining unity within the boundaries of the different domains of science33. vii. Analysis and Conclusion “Scientific methodology is a combination of general principles and specialized techniques”34 and is “independent of the subject matter in all its essentials”35. The product of this method is a body of scientific laws, analytically associated to one another, by reference to which the phenomena studied 30 Morrison M., ‘Unifying Scientific Theories: Physical Concepts and Mathematical Structures’, U.S.: Published by Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.22 31 Kincaid H., ‘Individualism and the Unity of Science: Essays on Reduction’, Explanation, and the Special Sciences, U.S.: Published by Rowman & Littlefield, 1997, p.2 32 Smith L.D., ‘Behaviorism and Logical Positivism: A Reassessment of the Alliance’, U.S.: Published by Stanford University Press, 1986, p.63 33 Morrison, op. cit., p.22 34 Gauch H.G., ‘Scientific Method in Practice’, U.K.: Published by Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.5 35 Wilkins L. T., ‘Social Deviance: Social Policy, Action and Research’, U.K.: Published by Routledge, 2003, p.1 can be explained36. Scientist shares some kind of fundamental philosophy and feelings in relation to their work. Fundamentally, different scientific domains are related when it comes to reliance on evidence, use of hypotheses and theories, logic used, and much more. However, they differ greatly from one another in what phenomena they investigate and in how they carry out their work. More importantly, they differ in the degree of reliance they put on chronological data or on experimental conclusions and on qualitative or quantitative methods, in their choice of fundamental principles, and the extent of their reliance on findings of other sciences. In structure, science can be seen as the gathering of all of the various scientific fields, or content disciplines. From anthropology through zoology, there are a number of such disciplines. However, “with respect to purpose and philosophy, all are equally scientific and together make up the same scientific endeavour”37. Similar to the term ‘general history’, the term ‘general methodology’ according to Nersessian38, philosophers connect methodology with the study of conjectures and developmental configurations which all sciences have shared, “is practically an oxymoron”39. She further argues that any general methodology or mode of science, logical or historical, or one that aims to confine every sciences at all stages of their historical development is problematic because it cannot connect 36 Harris E., ‘Hypothesis and Perception: The Roots of Scientific Method’, U.K. Published by Routledge, 2004, p.19 37 Gauch H.G., ‘Scientific Method in Practice’, U.K.: Published by Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.5 38 Nersessian N. J., ‘The Process of Science: Contemporary Philosophical Approaches to Understanding Scientific Practice’, Netherlands, Published by Springer, 1987, p.53 39 Neressian loc. cit. methodology with the precise content of any specific specialty at a particular time. Domain specific methodology is at times rejected with a funny remark that philosophers need not bother to learn how to wash test tubes. However, philosophers had helped some common but influential methods in developing such as statistical inference and experimental design. Additionally, they also have a hand in issues like explanation and confirmation that can be accepted in general way. On the other hand, in solving research problems, scientist use disparate experimental design and philosophers should know that even the most common description of explanation and confirmation are not always relevant to every domain. “One confirmation strategy or explanation strategy may work best in one world and quite another strategy in another world”40. The term ‘general methodology’ that reduces an assortment of research to their least common denominator, is likely to generalize science by forcing scientific effort into a few simple patterns41. Furthermore, if we consider that research is revealed by the simple patterns, the process of scientific inquiry will be disheartened and the open-future attitude of the working scientist will be ignored. This is because scientific conclusions are not the result of a good bit of human creation and opinion but natural and expected products of the method applied to the data of nature. An allied argument is that scientific methods could not by themselves scientifically justified, upon pain of circularity and relativism. 40 Nersessian N. J., ‘The Process of Science: Contemporary Philosophical Approaches to Understanding Scientific Practice’, Netherlands, Published by Springer, 1987, p.53 41 ibid., p.57 Thus, neutrality of methods is important, as they are not empirical but logical, “a methodological principle whose reliability the empiricist cannot explain”42. “Methods cannot be domain specific in the empirically committed sense, although they could be in the sense that mathematical methods can be domain-specific”43. Although the notion that unity of science can be grounded in the unity of scientific methods is better supported than the notion that history of science presents a triumphant unbroken chain of successful reductions, we must carefully specify what scientific method means in this context and what it does not mean44. Certainly, it does not refer to the mathematical or physical tools used in the methods of measurement and evaluation. This is because methods are connected with the technique and processes by which claim to authenticity in science are validated such as the requirements that theories must explicate not only those phenomena they were invented to clarify but also to give justification of other phenomena which until then had been judged distinctive in nature. Moreover, it must also respond to the demand that a theory predict novel and unanticipated phenomena. The methodological unity of science can actually be considered using such criteria. Similarly, we can also assert that “the unity of science reside in the unity of scientific rationality or in the unity of the criteria of scientific rationality, 42 Van Fraassen B. C., Churchland P. M., and Hooker C. A., ‘Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism’, U.S.: Published by University of Chicago Press, 1985, p.17 43 Nersessian N. J., ‘The Process of Science: Contemporary Philosophical Approaches to Understanding Scientific Practice’, Netherlands, Published by Springer, 1987, p.57 44 Academy of Sciences and Technology in Berlin, ’Einheit der Wissenschaften: Internationales Kolloquium der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Bonn, 25.-27. Juni 1990’, Germany: Published by Walter de Gruyter, 1991, p. 19 which is the unity of the idea of scientific progress”45. “It is now widely recognized that science cannot plausibly be understood as one single kind of thing at all”46. The reality that scientific methods may not be suitable for the purposes of human sciences has been ignored and only recently, that social and humanistic sciences have become aware of the differences of their own subject matter from that of the exact sciences. Consequently, they have attempted towards the construction of a methodology of their own. Due to the peculiarities in the structure of the scientific method and its assumptions, there were efforts to reconsider the assumptions on which the method of the natural sciences is built47. This is because experts in the field of human sciences are progressively realizing the conviction that some significant aspects of human experience have been consistently neglected or misinterpreted.48. 45 Academy of Sciences and Technology in Berlin, ’Einheit der Wissenschaften: Internationales Kolloquium der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Bonn, 25.-27. Juni 1990’, Germany: Published by Walter de Gruyter, 1991, p. 19 46 Nye A., ‘Philosophy of Language: The Big Questions’, India: Published by Blackwell Publishing, 1998, p.242 47 Hausman D. M., ‘The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics’, U.S.: Published by Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.319 48 Taba H., ‘The Dynamics of Education: A Methodology of Progressive Educational Thought’, UK: Published by Routledge, 1999, p.3 viii. Bibliography The Academy of Sciences and Technology in Berlin, ’Einheit der Wissenschaften: Internationales Kolloquium der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Bonn, 25.-27. Juni 1990’, Germany: Published by Walter de Gruyter, 1991 Cole S., ‘Making Science: Between Nature and Society’, U.S.: Published by Harvard University Press, 1992 Dear P.R., ‘The Intelligibility of Nature: How Science Makes Sense of the World’, U.S.: Published by University of Chicago Press, 2006 Elster J., ‘Explaining Technical Change: A Case Study in the Philosophy of Science’, Norway: Published by CUP Archive, 1983 Fenstad J.E., Frolov I. T, and Hilpinen R., ‘Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science VIII: Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science’, Moscow: Published by Elsevier, 1987 Gauch H.G., ‘Scientific Method in Practice’, U.K.: Published by Cambridge University Press, 2003 Gower B., ‘Scientific Method: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction’, U.K. Published by Routledge, 1997 Harris E., ‘Hypothesis and Perception: The Roots of Scientific Method’, U.K. Published by Routledge, 2004 Hausman D. M., ‘The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics’, U.S.: Published by Cambridge University Press, 1992 Hempel C. G., Fetzer J. H., ‘ The Philosophy of Carl G. Hempel: Studies in Science, Explanation, and Rationality’, U.S.: Published by Oxford University Press, 2001 Kantorovich A., ‘Scientific Discovery: Logic and Tinkering’, U.S.: Published by SUNY Press, 1993 Kincaid H., ‘Individualism and the Unity of Science: Essays on Reduction’, Explanation, and the Special Sciences, U.S.: Published by Rowman & Littlefield, 1997 McComas W. F., ‘The Nature of Science in Science Education: Rationales and Strategies’, Netherlands, Published by Springer, 1998 Morrison M., ‘Unifying Scientific Theories: Physical Concepts and Mathematical Structures’, U.S.: Published by Cambridge University Press, 2000 Munz P., ‘Beyond Wittgenstein's Poker: New Light on Popper and Wittgenstein’, U.K.: Published by Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2004 Nersessian N. J., ‘The Process of Science: Contemporary Philosophical Approaches to Understanding Scientific Practice’, Netherlands, Published by Springer, 1987 Nye A., ‘Philosophy of Language: The Big Questions’, India: Published by Blackwell Publishing, 1998 Poincare H., ‘Science and Method’, U.S: Translated by Francis Maitland and Published by Courier Dover Publications, 2003 Rahman S., Symons J., Gabbay D. M.., van Bendegem J., ‘Logic, Epistemology and the Unity of Science’, Netherlands: Published by Springer, 2004 Ritchie A.D., ‘Scientific Method: An Inquiry Into the Character and Validity of Natural Laws’, U.K.: Published by Routledge, 2001 Rosenberg A., ‘Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction’, U.K.: Published by Routledge, 2005 Salmon M. H., Earman J., Glymour C., and Lennox J., Introduction to the ‘Philosophy of Science: A Text by the Members of the Department of the History and Philosophy of Science of the University of Pittsburgh’, U.S.: Published by Hackett Publishing, 1999 Scoular S., ‘First Philosophy: The Theory of Everything’, U.S. Published by Universal-Publishers, 2007 Smith L.D., ‘Behaviorism and Logical Positivism: A Reassessment of the Alliance’, U.S.: Published by Stanford University Press, 1986 Smith W. N., ‘A Companion to the Philosophy of Science, U.K: Published by Blackwell Publishing, 2000 Soros G., ‘The Age of Fallibility: The Consequences of the War on Terror’, Australia: Published by Allen & Unwin, 2006 Suppes P., ‘Models and Methods in the Philosophy of Science: Selected Essays’, Netherlands: Published by Springer, 1993 Taba H., ‘The Dynamics of Education: A Methodology of Progressive Educational Thought’, UK: Published by Routledge, 1999 Van Fraassen B. C., Churchland P. M., and Hooker C. A., ‘Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism’, U.S.: Published by University of Chicago Press, 1985 Wilkins L. T., ‘Social Deviance: Social Policy, Action and Research’, U.K.: Published by Routledge, 2003 Wylie A., ‘Thinking from Things: Essays in the Philosophy of Archaeology’, U.S.: Published by University of California Press, 2002 Read More