The Importance of Aristotle's Logic: Ontology - Research Paper Example

For the topic of substance, the most logical beginning in Aristotle, might be best realized by beginning with his logic, in particular, in the Categories the topic of predication itself. In Greek, kategoríai means predication (Peters 72). There is a parallelism with the doctrine of predication with his ontology in the Metaphysics, and the importance of Aristotles logic, unlike more formal modern systems of logic, is that it is an ontology. There is not a hard separation between the rules governing what is said of the sensible world, and the sensible world itself. Walter Leszl (1970) claims that "the division of the categories has nothing to do with the rules of language", and argues that what occurs in nature is reflected in language, which is why the Categories must be viewed as intertwined with ontology (Leszl, 49). It will be argued along with Leszls claim that substance is more than just a category for logic, and that it is really an argument for the nature of being. There is no separating logic from ontology in Aristotle when it comes to substance and it with regard to ontology, substance is that which is constant set against everything else which changes. The context in which "first substance" emerges, concerns the "combination of words, expressions and phrases." (Categories, 1a16). Aristotle first divides these kategoríai of words, expressions and phrases by distinguishing how some predicates are are "present" in a subject, while others are "parts within a whole" (Categories, 1a20), which is marked by a difference between something "which cannot exist apart from the subject referred to", such as an attribute like "whiteness" (Categories, 1a24-1b2), and something which can be attributed but which is not found phenomenally "in a subject", such as predicating the species "man" to an individual man, as a subject. Aristotle adds that there may also be predicates which can be asserted of a subject, and yet which are neither present physically, or related in a genus-individual relation. These kategoríai he raises as particular or individual expressions with a direct object, or direct reference: "this or that man or horse, for example" (Categories, 1b4), which is a form of predication related to both substance, and the mind, and will be outlined in more detail in the section dealing with De Anima. At this point in the Categories, Aristotle is explicit about this instance of substance as being "primary" (Categories, 1b11-13), and it is therefore a topic which is not a question for the agenda at hand, which are the rules of "combination of words, expressions and phrases"-- or, "secondary substance" (Categories, 1b14). He proceeds at this point to establish further specifications for the rules of predication, such as predicate of a subject, is also a predicate of a substance(Categories, 1b9-15, 1b21-25), and how some predicates may help to differentiate genuss, but not species (Categories, 1b16-20), and finally how "each uncombined word or expression" will be determined by a particular form of possible predicate. Having covered the possible predicates in terms of their forms, relation via genus, species, and how whether the predicate is necessarily "present" in a subject or not, he addresses the criteria itself which determines all of these possible combinations and types of combinations, which is the first important step into substance-- a step which more clearly divides primary from secondary substances, and a division which can be characterized as a division between substance (primary) and subject (secondary). Aristotle gives the simple example that "`Footed, `two-footed and `winged" are attributes which are true of genus, but which do not allow for the distinction of a particular species, given that many species possess these attributes.(Categories, 1b16-20). Primary substance is more a topic proper to the Physics and Metaphysics, given that actual being and actual beings are the focus, not, as in the Categories with how these beings can be "expressed". As we shall see, the Metaphysics addresses substance which presupposes the rules established here in the Categories, which is why it is most prudent to begin here. As was stated previously, the central division between primary and secondary substance, is marked by a difference of substance and subject-- the latter being the proper topic of substance for the Categories. A difference again between between the way a being is spoken of, and how an individual being actually is (Categories, 1b11-15). Thus, primary substance inheres within the individual itself. Aristotle asserts that of secondary substance that "were there no individuals existing of whom it could thus be affirmed, it could not be affirmed of the species" and that "all things are predicates of primary substances or present in such as their subjects . . . were there no primary substance, nought else could so much as exist." (Categories, 2a38-2b7). So, in the schema of individual, species, genus, primary substance inheres within, for example, an instance or a particular living phenomena of a man, while secondary substance belongs to man as a subject in discourse of the man. The species man, for example, is a secondary substance with necessary and accidental attributes, and given the proximity of species to the particular, as opposed to the particular and the genus (a particular man and the genus animal), Aristotle asserts that "we may hold that of secondary substances species is more truly substance than genus" (Categories, 2b22). In the Metaphysics, Aristotle dismisses the possibility that "ideas", such as "mathematical objects" can exist apart from sensible beings, and that although they are "apriori" in definition-- that is, they stand as a means of knowing or apprehending sensible beings (an act of counting beings without considering the essence of the beings themselves would be an example of this), the sensible beings and hence the substances underlying them, are prior in existence (Metaphysics, 1077b1-4). A formula can be prior to other formulas, but not prior to sensible things, for if we cannot conceive of a formula without a substratum-- that is, a formula for Aristotle concerns the discernibility of the "parts" of a "whole", and although parts can be mentally conceived as prior, it does not mean that the parts are prior with respect to their existence-- with respect to their being. This has the same proportion here in the Categories, as the relation between a subject and its attributes, where we can conceive, in thought, of the category of "white" as separable from "this white man", but, ontologically white cannot exist without `this man, which is to say, its existence depends on a subject, just as any part depends on its relation to a whole (Metaphysics, 1029b22-1030a18). This said, the essence of these, or a more precise definition of substance in sensible beings is not the topic of the Categories, which is about the rules of predication and not solely the subject of these predicates, although the subject as substance is still necessary, as we cannot predicate something of nothing according to Aristotle and Joseph Owens in The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, claims that the topic of first philosophy for Aristotle is being and substance, given that being and substance are "equivocal" (Owens 138). The first preliminary definition of essence, is one which distinguishes necessary from accidental attributes. The example given of an accident of a substratum of "man", is that being "musical" is not something which is in "virtue of yourself" (Metaphysics, 1029b14). By this, accidental has to be viewed alongside necessity. And, by necessity, Aristotle defines this as an attribute or predicate linked with a substratum, such that without this predicate the substratum "cannot be otherwise" (Metaphysics, 1015a35). In other terms, if a predicate is separable from a substratum then the substratum cannot be, it cannot exist in definition. So, although it would be accidental that I was musical, and I could can conceive of non-musical men, I could not conceive of a man without a nutritive capacity, for without it, he/she could not exist. Or, it cannot be an intelligible definition of the substratum itself. Thus, the meaning of necessity or essence in regard to substance, has to be determined as a process of distinguishing it from contingency, accidental, or possible – or something which can change. This is an important point, because there is a dialectical relation between the necessary and accidental in Aristotle, which is to say that they are mutually determining, or mutually informative as contraries. If one can conceive of a part of a whole that the whole can subsist without, and the whole itself is in some sense as a `one or a `unity, the process of distinguishing must determine those parts which necessarily subsist as constituents that cannot exist apart without the result of the `whole itself dissolving. It would thereby admit of more than one. If, then, there are certain eternal and unmovable things, nothing compulsory or against their nature attaches to them. (Metaphysics, 1015b11-15). Further, this process of distinguishing and defining the necessary from the accidental leads Aristotle to claim that "only substance is definable" (Metaphysics, 1031a1), which is to say that certain predicates are not intelligible in and of themselves, but only in relation to a substance. This is why he does declare essence and substance as synonymous. Phrased in other terms, he claims that any given being is the same or identical to its essence, if the given being is a substance, and if it is not than it does not exist: "if the essence of good is not good, neither will the essence of being be, nor the essence of unity be one" (Metaphysics, 1031b8). Thus, as a primary substratum or continuity within change, matter is like a substance1 according to Aristotle. However, unlike a substance it is not capable of either separate existence, nor is it capable of being an individual existent, given that it is an element or constituent of individuals themselves. It is in this sense that Aristotle defers the question of matter to a question of substance, which he asserts as the result of substance being something which is "more intelligible" (Metaphysics, 1029b4). That is, although both matter and substance underlie change as beings which are ultimately incapable of being destroyed, Aristotle claims that intelligibility or forming an understanding of a given phenomena requires that matter be subsumed by substance, given that the evidence for the constancy of matter is perceptible, while the constancy of substance is known principally through thought: “both separability and individuality are thought to belong chiefly to substance.” (Metaphysics, 1029a27-1029b4) Thought for Aristotle thought consists in this sense, of separating or abstracting the forms of sensible objects as they are received through perception, and further, the forms can be known without content, or without matter-- where form and thinking are the same: "in the case of objects which involve no matter, what thinks and what is thought are identical; for speculative knowledge and it subject are identical" (On the Soul, 430a3-5). In conclusion, it is important to stress that the discussion of Aristotle here, is largely for the purposes of considering how constancy through change is dealt with-- the focus is aiming, of course, to the topic of identity and distinction. Substance, functions like the stable bank of a river that allows us to perceive sensible change, but these forms themselves are supersensible. For Aristotle, the constancy that permits an explanation of change exists within in the sensible realm, inhering for example, in the soul which he calls the "place of the forms" (On the Soul, 429a27), and inhering as a constant in the beings and things of nature: "substance is thought to belong most obviously to bodies" (Metaphysics, 1028b9). This is a significant final point in demonstrating that for Aristotle, substance is more than just a logical subject but an argument for the nature of being. It represents that which is constant over and against that which changes which is one of the core issues in ontology or metaphysics. Works Cited Barnes, J (Ed.). (1984). The Complete Works of Aristotle. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Leszl, W. (1970). Logic and Metaphysics in Aristotle. Padua: Editrice Antenore. Owen, J. (1978). The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies Press. Peters, F. (1967). Greek Philosophical Terms. A Historical Lexicon. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. On the Nature and Meaning of Substance in Aristotle. Read More