The Quality of Democracy in Thailand - Literature review Example

The Quality of Democracy in Thailand Under the coalition between military and monarchy Although the military literally returned to barracks, the 2006 coup d’etat seemingly appeared to be another ‘consistent intervention in the political proves by the military’ (Cook 1993, p 127) which reminds us that Thailand’s politics remains to be a subject to the powerful military-bureaucratic influence. Scholars have labelled military intervention as an obstacle to democracy due to its negative effects on government, internal security, civilian lives and political rights (Mietzcum 2013; Wallis 2012) so it came to apparent that Thailand has a low level/ very limited degree of democracy. Yet, it would be a big mistake to judge the quality of democracy in Thailand by simply making reference to the principles of democracy. Politically, Thailand is a very unique country. Firstly, it is a regime in which the military plays a significantly fundamental and leading role in maintaining the monarchic supremacy and political stability. Secondly, it is a constitutional monarchy in which the King actually holds significant political and military power and reverence by the Thais (Pongsudhirak 2003, p.278). Therefore, the effects of coalition between the military and the monarchy on Thailand’s progress of democracy must also be taken into account if one is to evaluate the quality of democracy (Diamond & Morlino 2012, p.2) This essay serves two purposes: First, by discussing the intertwisted relationship between military and monarchy, this essay argues that military intervention is a part of Thai politics, as if the monarchy is a part of the Thai nation. Military intervention is culturally engrained in Thai society. Secondly, it aims to suggest an alternative approach to measure the quality of democracy in Thailand; considering in what extent the monarchy-military coalition is able to promote political and civil freedom, popular sovereignty, political equality and good governance (Diamond and Morlino 2012, p 3-4). Thai political regime based on the Constitutional Monarchy institutionalised an interlinked framework of political and military authority which has dominated the political mainstream in Thailand. Although the Thai King’s power and authority are limited under the present Constitution, his monarchic role has not been limited to simply performing ceremonial functions as in other countries with such institutions like modern Britain (Bell 2006, p 7). More than being just a symbol of nation, history and culture, the King remains the top moral authority in the country who assures morality, national integrity sovereignty with the assistance of the military. Under the present Constitution, the King, as the Head of State, is enthroned in position of reverence and cannot be violated, that it is the military (commanded by the King) which ensures that no one can expose any sort of accusation to the King, and which concretises the King’s will in the public and political spheres. In such a circumstance, the interests of the King are taken care of over those of the civilians. For one, people’s will can fail to be expressed with such dominance by the military whose functions is to protect the King. Historically, the military has played an essential role in the existence of the Thai state and nation. This has extended their influence in the recent decades where their roles has concentrated on internal politics due to less external attacks. Though the general election carried out in 2007 after the 2006 coup restored the civilian government, military has frequently been involved in domestic politics. Looking at the most recent Thai political protests in 2010, numerous civilian died as Thai troops attempted to quell it. As much as the threats of insurgents may justify the dominance of the military, it is possible to claim that, civilian protests is highly disregarded due to use of force by the military. Today the King remains dominant, though most of his powers are exercised by an elected government. Apart from being the Head of State, Section 10 of the 2007 Constitution clearly states that he also ‘holds the position of Head of the Thai Armed Forces (Connors 2008, p 483). Given that the military by its very nature is never a liberalism-oriented institution, plus its control over the means of destruction, democrats usually perceive it as a constraint to the development of democracy (Chambers 2013, p 77). Healthy criticism is part of democracy and when military is so prevalent and stern, it will tend to incline and extend its loyalty to the dynasty. For instance, the Thai military had dominated seats in the parliament and authority to constitutional amendment, and had sometimes dissolved civilian government even after 1933. Prime Minister Field Marshal Plaek (1938-1944) and General Prem Tinnasulanon even eradicated general elections to prolong the serving terms of their military junta governments. However, the coup d’etat 2006 was an excellent example to show that the military indeed has positive contribution to democratic progress as well as political stability. When thousands of civilians demanded transparency from Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, (the so-called ‘Yellow-Shirt’ demonstration or ‘People Alliance for Democracy (PAD)), the military, on behalf of the monarch, agreed to intervene and offered formal help in the conflict: the military revolution emerged on 19 September 2006 caused the dissolution of the corrupt government. The ‘Council for Democratic Reform under Constitutional Monarchy’ on one hand delivered the democrats’ appeal for better democracy (due to displeasure with the corrupted elections in the past) to the heart of the government, and on the other hand put an end to the conflict and rebuild the collapsing social order. Hence, coup d’etat and military authority in Thailand can in some extents be seen to play a leading role in promoting the democracy and maintaining peace in Thailand society. Some may argue that the use of weaponry itself is a non-peaceful and undemocratic act and thus military and state should be separated as much as possible to avoid any harm to the civilians and society. Nevertheless, one must bear in mind that the Thailand has history of insurgencies from within and external threats. The monarchy, which works closely with military see the military presence as to restore peace and it continuance does not necessarily limit or violate basic human rights. In contemporary Thailand, in contrast to an annihilation of democracy in the disguise of national security (The Nation 2006), military intervention is considered by the Thai society as an effective technique to resolve political problems. So in essence, the society in a way has interpreted military as part and parcel of democracy. This may limit the move toward political arena where proactive democracy exist. A reactive mode of democracy may not entirely progress democracy as opposition party and other civilian based societies may not realize the prevailing forces that prevent complete democracy. As Connors & Hewison (2008, p 3) argues, citizens were actually encouraged by military to express their political perspective and thoughts via a political demonstration opposing military junta. The short-term civilian involvement limit the extent to which they may participate in day-to-day affairs of their state. As Thai military is institutionally obsessed by security and secrecy sectors, these are also seen as two of the key elements to wage a war if opposition is noted. The coalition guarantees that army quickly jumped into the political fray once the interests of the monarchy are threatened. Looking at such a condition, there is a general feeling that most powers are invested in the intertwined monarch-military relationship which is more inclined to peace than ultimate democracy that would in turn promote peace and reduce the dominance of military. Objective democracy may not be seen as military remains a major influence within the Thai political system interlinked with an influential Thai Palace. Walker (2008, p 84) observes that, even with a myriad of non-democratic realities happening in the State and considering that freedoms have limits, such limitation in Thailand is generally accepted in order to protect the reputation of the Kin Dynasty. Limitations are however supposed to be placed by law enacted by the people or by their representatives. Democracy in Thailand nation-state is only seen through the mature electoral system, liberal market economy and a fair (acceptable) degree of civil rights and freedom are guaranteed by the Constitution. The military, whose power largely backed by the monarchy, continues to serve as the loyal guardian to the Kingdom. It aloes serves the social order and actively step into the political sphere only when the Dynasty/King’s interests are threatened. Evidence shows that the military in certain degree limit the pervasiveness of democracy due to its secretive functions. As Reilly (2002, p 156) observes, based on the criteria suggested, the basic role/function of a quality democracy should be able to deliver freedom, political equality, public control, public policies and also control of those who make the policies to citizens. These should be achievable due to the existence of genuine, operational and stable institutions. In order to pursue a qualified democracy, the government resulting from it has to be seen as being legitimate which caters for the needs and expectations of the citizens. In such a democracy, individual citizens and the associations they form as well as the communities they form get civil liberties and are equal in the eyes of the law. The sovereign power of a high quality democracy rests on the citizens. The power to evaluate the extent to which their government gives them liberty and equality according to the laws of the land rests should rest on the citizens. In terms of procedure, the quality of a democracy is determined by the extent to which citizens parties and organizations are permitted to get involved in holding of elected officials accountable for their actions in government, how efficiently and fairly laws are applied, how well thought out and effective government decisions are and how responsive and responsible elected officials are and how well institutions established under the constitution check and balance each other. Riley (2002) lays more emphasises on a combination of qualitative and quantitative steps in making an empirical analysis of democracy. Considering the main goals of an ideal democracy as political and civil freedom, popular sovereignty and political equality, Riley splits the assessment of quality of democracy to include eight dimensions: freedom, rule of law, vertical accountability, responsiveness, equality, citizen participation, competition between different views, policies and ideologies, horizontal accountability, transparency and effectiveness of representation. Employing Riley’s model, the essay evaluates the quality of Thailand democracy in consideration of the monarchy and military’s political manipulations. The 2007 Constitution describes the Thai Monarchy as being ‘sacred, popular and democratic’. In the communist years and the tussle between communism and monarchy, the monarchy won after the 1976 massacre in which tarnished the image of communism irrevocably to the advantage of the monarchy. Rituals of deification, some ancient and some recently invented by the government and civil society work to enhance the virtuous power of the king (barani) (Jory 2002). The monarchs have also shown dedication to projects targeted to the poor in the rural areas (Chanida 2004). While these projects are laudable, their success or failure cannot be probed, yet a majority of them are funded from public coffers after starting as non-governmental projects. This lack of accountability is due to the highly exalted position of the monarch to the extent that calling him to account for his actions cannot even be contemplated. This is due to the notion that the king is completely depoliticized and all his actions are as a result of his moral power. This raises questions on just how democratic the king is. Thai monarchy, though apolitical has done much to provide political stability to the country. The king intervened the 1973 students upraising which became violent when the military shot demonstrators in Bangkok. He ordered military leaders to exile and appointed a Prime Minister before appointing an electoral college which would elect a legislative and constituent assembly. In 1992 the king acted as an arbiter when demonstration a coup leader, General Suchinda, who had become prime minister became violent leading to shootings. The General and his rivals were summoned by the king who, in a nationally televised audience asked them to reconcile, the following day General Suchinda resigned and brought the bloodshed to an end (Hirschfeld 1994, p 64). According to Hardley (2006), however, the monarchy’s involvement in politics is no different from involvement of all other people in a political society in that it is in order to protect selfish interests. It is therefore an affront to democracy that the monarch’s actions cannot be questioned due to the aura of Dhammaraja. The monarchy returned into prominence in Thailand through its engagement in the development of parliamentary system of government. Its position and involvement was meant to place it higher than normal political institutions which were perceived by the general public as being extremely corrupt, the monarchy, therefore was seen as an institution to enhance quality of democracy by way of increasing the governments responsiveness and accountability. The existence of the monarchy and the perpetuation of the concept of Dhammaraja led to the clamor for ‘clean politics’ which has been a source of problems for politicians at all levels even the seemingly powerful ones like Thaksin Shinawatra. While electoral politics began to be established in Thailand in 1970s and 1980s, rich individuals spent a lot of money as a way of gaining public offices. A case in point was the election of General Kriangsak Chomanan, a former military chief who was a prime minister after the coup of 1977 and had amassed huge amounts of wealth. He ran for office in a province in the north-eastern province of the country. His election became an indication that moneyed individuals could invest heavily in a parliamentary seat (Anderson 1990). Corruption remained rampant in politics leading the public and civil society clamour for clean politics in 1980s. The King became one of the prominent individuals who referred to corruption as a serious plague that needed to be addressed urgently. In 2000, Dr Sumet Tantiwechakul, a trusted associate of the king who oversees the implementation of royal projects established the Foundation for a Clean and Transparent Thailand (FaCT). The foundation’s objectives were fighting of corruption and the promotion of morals and ethics in all sectors of the society. The view of the society on clean politics, with which the monarch, from his actions, agreed, was one of the main reasons why there was a coup in 2006. This is because in the psyche of the Thai nation, democracy is equal to clean politics and politicians are extremely corrupt. The Thai people seemed to be of the opinion that corruption in their politics is the most severe in the world and they have the support of a virtuous king on their side. Politicians who ascend to power, therefore, do so through corrupt means including vote buying which makes it necessary for them to steal from public coffers once they are in power in order to recoup their investment (Callahan 2005, p 97). Elections, do not result in a democratic government owing to the equating of democracy with lack of corruption. Other means may be used to remove such a government from power. The origin of this notion was given intellectual weight by public intellectuals who in the ‘90s came up with the concept of ‘people’s power’ as a way of countering ‘politician’s democracy through their argument that the rules that were in existence in Thailand were not democratic (Kasian 2006a). Activists who supported the king worked to undermine elections as a key component of democracy in regard to the assumption of office by the Shinawatra government. There also exists a strong bias by the urban middle class against rural voters, since they believe that the rural voters are gullible victims of vote buying schemes by politicians. According to the royalist activists and the middle class, the election of Shinawatra could not have been legitimate since the bulk of his support was from rural areas and votes could only have been bought in those areas. The argument that rural voters only care about money is, however, not accurate (Arghiros 2001, p265-6). The rural voters are just as informed as the urban voters concerning their interests specially from the recent past (Walker 2008). While vote buying is not as prevalent as per perception, the complaints on the vice in the media about the vice and the blame on rural voters may be more dangerous for democracy than vote buying (Callahan 2005, p108). Military The struggle between the military and civilian rule has been a fixture in Thai politics for over 70 years. The military established itself as the most disciplined institution in the country since 1932 (Isarabhakdi 1990, p 13). The notion that the military is the pillar of the Thai nation is still strong among the populace (Phongpaichit and Baker 1997, p 326). The high levels of involvement by the military in Thai politics have contributed greatly to the retardation of democracy (Case 2009 p, 259). Although the military was involved in politics in a very dominant way, the rules of democracy were largely ignored (Crispin 2009). Some of the key questions raised by the involvement of the military in politics in Thailand is whether they can deal with the question of social cohesion. Beeson and Bellamy (2008, p 8) argue that, the democracy of Thailand which is yet unstable owes its current state to the intervention of the military in politics. Arguments for military intervention in political matters is that it has a role to play in protecting the states security even from threats posed by the internal political order. The military uses this as the rationale behind its acquisition of political power which they attain at the expense of political stability and social order (Hirchfeld 1994). Thai military like most other militaries in Asia consider economic and political developments as part of their duties to the nation (Alagappa 1988, p17; Hoadley 1975, p 153). This means that the military from time to time feels the need to reign in on the civilian authorities which is in diametrical opposition to the principles of democracy where state institutions are to all be overseen by civilian authorities. While the Thai military argues for its professional duty to intervene in the nation’s politics (Royal Thai Army 2009), its actions do not portray a professional detachment and disinterest in the politics of the nation. The military, obviously, has vested interests in the nation’s political affairs which explains constant forays into politics. While politics in Thailand is riddled with corruption, it is difficult to make an argument for military involvement in politics as a solution to the problem. During the coups preceding 2006, full democracy was not even discussed (Albritton and Bureekul 2004, p5; Tasker 2006). Continued direct involvement of the military in politics was not tenable in Thailand owing to the worsening conditions in the country. 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