The Story Of The Attack In Benghazi - Research Paper Example

The Story Of The Attack In Benghazi 1.0. Introduction On the nighttime of September 11, 2012, an overall composed assault was led by Islamic extremists at the American strategic compound in Benghazi, Libya. The incident left a U.S. Diplomat dead. J. Christopher Stevens was the very first U.S. envoy to be murdered on duty since 1979. The assaults focused on the United States office and second area (append). Four Americans were killed. Four Americans and seven Libyans maintained non-fatal injuries. One ought to note that the assailant was approximated at 100 activists (Dougherty, & Mount, 2013). The United States instantly hyped security worldwide at political and military offices and started examining the Benghazi assault. In the outcome of the attack, State Department authorities were reprimanded for failing to grant the request for extra security at the office before the attack. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton along these lines assumed liability for the security slips. By 6th August 2013, the U.S. had recorded criminal accusations against a few people, including state army pioneer Ahmed Abu Khattala for involvement in the assaults. Khattala had been portrayed by both Libyan and U.S. authorities as the Benghazi pioneer of Ansar al-Sharia. This was acknowledged in January 2014 by the State Department of the US as an issue association (BBC News, 2012). On the weekend of 14th June 2014, U.S. Extraordinary Forces, in a joint effort with the FBI, arrested Khattala in Libya. At first, it was announced by the media that the Benghazi assault was a spontaneous dissent activated by a hostile to Muslim film; Innocence of Muslims. Ensuing examinations verified that there was no such challenge and that the assaults were planned. The arrested suspect, Ahmed Abu Khattala, confirmed that the attack was in striking back for the film. The key impetuses of this research paper as highlighted above is to discover the diplomat's reaction, reaction of the State Department, reaction of the Department of Defense and security issues before the crisis. The paper also seeks to outline the crisis operation plans (E.O.P) and whether the plans were used (Kelly, 2012). 1.1. Security issues before the assaults A neighborhood security authority and a legion administrator met with U.S. negotiators three days prior to the assault and cautioned the Americans about crumbling safety in the range. The police said that the negotiators had been prompted. "The circumstance is alarming, and it frightens us." He told CNN. Ambassador Stevens' journal, which was later found at the unsecured site of the assault, recorded his worry about the developing al-Qaeda presence in the range and his stress on being on an al-Qaeda hit list (Dougherty, & Mount, 2013). As a matter of fact, a security officer from the department of defense, Eric Nordstrom, asked for extra security personnel in charge of the mission in Benghazi from his bosses. He made these requests more than twice at the State Department. However, the appeals were denied. As per Nordstrom, State Department official, Charlene Lamb, needed to keep the security condition in Benghazi "misleadingly low." This was an obligation regarding the security passes that were later taken by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (Kiely, 2012). There was evidence gathered by the US forces in the periods between February 2011 and 11th September 2012. These came from Insights Community (IC) and open sources that Benghazi was progressively unsafe and temperamental. The evidence also revealed that a noteworthy assault against American faculty was becoming easier as compared to before. While this knowledge was successfully imparted inside the Intelligence Community (IC) and with the authorities at the State Department, it did not prompt an equivalent adjustment in security at Benghazi. Neither did it cause the closure of the American mission in Benghazi; both of which would have been more than legitimized by the sagacity presented. The regional Security Officer in Libya accumulated a rundown of 234 security episodes in Libya from June 2011 to July 2012, 50 of which occurred in Benghazi (Center, et al., 2008). During the month of April in 2012, two former security guards for the office tossed a natively constructed "fish bomb" IED over the department's fence. The attack did not cause any casualties. Only four days later, another bomb was tossed at a four-vehicle escort convey of the United Nations Special Envoy to Libya blasting only 12 feet from the UN agent's vehicle without harming anybody (Lanny, LeBron, & Trey, 2014). In May 2012, an Al-Qaida group identified as the Imprisoned Omar Abdul Rahman Brigades orchestrated an assault on the International Red Cross (ICRC) office based in Benghazi. A few months the ICRC suspended operations in Benghazi. The leader of the ICRC's designation in Libya said that his team was "dismayed" by the assault and "to a great degree concerned" about heightening insecurity in Libya. The convicted Omar Abdul Rahman's people released a film of what was said to be an explosion of a bomb outside the doors of the U.S office on June 5th (Dougherty, & Mount, 2013). Despite the fact that this bomb brought on no life losses, it damaged the department's wall that was described as "large enough for forty men to break." Omar's people claimed that the assault was because of the killing of Abu Yahya al Libi; a Libyan al-Qaeda pioneer who had quite recently died in an American drone assault. The drone attack was likewise timed to correspond with the entry of a U.S ambassador in Benghazi. There were no injuries, but the group of extremists circulated handouts promising more assaults against the United States of America. It was around this time that an English diplomat to Libya, Dominic Asquith, survived an attempt on his life in Benghazi (BBC News, 2012). Additionally, two British insurance officers were harmed in the assault when their guard was hit by a rocket-pushed explosive 300 yards from their office. As a result, the British Foreign Office extracted all consular staff from the war-torn city in late June (Youngman, 2011). On 18th June 2012, the Tunisian office in Benghazi was stormed by people associated with Ansar Al-Sharia Libya. The attack was purportedly in light of "assaults by Tunisian specialists against Islam." Upon the day of the assault, two department security gatekeepers identified a man in a Libyan police uniform taking pictures of the office with his phone from a close building that was under construction. The security guards quickly tried to bring the man in. However, he escaped in a squad car (Kiely, 2012). An objection was then made to the Libyan police headquarters. Sean Smith perceived this observation, posting on the web "expecting we do not die today. We saw one of our police" watching the compound and taking pictures." 1.2. White House’s take on the attacks President Barack Obama accepted obligation regarding the lethal assault in Libya that killed four Americans. This was after Hillary C. (Secretary of State) attempted to shoulder the fault for any missteps the organization made. "She works for me," Barrack Obama said in New York in his second presidential verbal confrontation with Republican challenger Mitt Romney. "I'm the president, and I'm capable, and that is the reason no one is keener on figuring out precisely what happened than I do." With only 3 weeks to the presidential election, Obama's administration had not been able to close the Benghazi assault that caused the death of Ambassador Chris Stevens. Also killed during the attacks were two navy seals who had been assigned to the embassy as security guards (Burton, & Katz, 2014). During one of the debates, Romney asked the president to clarify why U.S authorities did not take action for more than one week after the September 11th attack on US soil. This was even after realizing that it was a revenge mission against an American-made film that insulted Islam."Whether there was some deception or rather whether we just did not understand what happened, you need to ask yourself for what reason we did not have even a clue," Romney said. He asserted that it was clear this was not a protest (Kiely, 2012). Prior to the heated discussion, Clinton tried her best to defuse an issue that was debilitating to turn into a potential deterrent to Obama's re-election battle. In an announcement that could have long-term implications given the relentless hypothesis that she may run for president, Clinton took responsibility regarding the wellbeing of the State Department's staff and political missions. It was immediately dismissed by the Republicans who directed their wrath at the president. However, her message left a few waiting inquiries unanswered (Youngman, 2011). For example, the questions sought to know whether the assault on the eleventh commemoration of 9/11 happened due to failure of the system to act on intelligence. "I assume liability," Clinton said, emphasizing remarks she made in a TV question earlier. "I'm responsible for the State Department's 60,000 or more individuals everywhere throughout the world at 275 posts." Clinton's comments may have been deliberately obscure. Amidst all these, the secretary of state did not explain her actions. This was a strategy that may have been utilized to distance her from culpability. State Department representative Victoria Nuland said Clinton "was amazingly clear what she assumes liability for, which is the operation of this office; the greater part of the men and ladies here." The appraisal offered nothing complete about brainpower that may have been utilized to settle on security choices before the assault or the organization's records of the occurrence of the side-effect of furious dissents (Dougherty, & Mount, 2013). The Obama administration has since named it a well-orchestrated terrorist attack. The intelligence may have originated from the CIA or different agencies that were beyond the reach of Clinton. The Benghazi assault has turned profoundly political even inside the State Department, with Hillary Clinton turning the management of information over to one of her most trusted helpers, Philippe Reines (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1993). Reines had been on Hillary Clinton's side since her time in the Senate and during the heated presidential campaign. He was an integral part of a different crisis management group that worked from a large office on the ground floor of the headquarters of the department. The team focused on preparations for a major congressional hearing meant to address the Benghazi issue in November 2013. Clinton, in the mean time, had been to a large degree protected from the Benghazi aftermath. Susan Rice, the US representative to the UN, was given the responsibility to report the incident as a protest that had fallen out of proportions. Clinton arrestingly abstained from addressing questions as the events unfolded (Aronsen, 2012). Indeed in Clinton's area of expertise, authorities were not provided with full information regarding the incident in Benghazi. Some said secretly that they saw Clinton's actions less as an instance of her falling on her sword just for the sake of the administration. However, it was showing herself as the statesperson who has acknowledged her part in any disappointment (Lanny, LeBron, & Trey, 2014). As a result of this, they said, she was winning the hearts of Republicans and taking herself out of habitual pettiness she said in her announcement that she needed to evade. Senator John Mccain, recommended a more muddied picture, noting "there are numerous individuals that believe that Clinton might have further political desire. Of cause, this could apparently harm her ambition to some extent (Youngman, 2011). Additionally this would accumulate some extra backing from President Obama, who cannot run once more." Obama had reliably bested Romney in issues of foreign policy questions with his regular reminder to the voters that he finished one war in Iraq. Additionally, he was in the process of ending another in Afghanistan, and that Osama was executed on his watch (Burton, & Katz, 2014). However, the Benghazi assault has permitted Republicans to augment their disapproval of the president; which mostly had been centered on his record in making occupations and reducing America's $16 trillion debt (Dougherty, & Mount, 2013). During Vice President Biden's debate with Romney's running mate Paul Ryan, Biden commented, "we were not told." He was referring to the extra security that was sought in Benghazi just before the attack. One ought to note that this came only one day after the State Department admitted to being aware of the request but rejected it (Aronsen, 2012). Representatives from not just the State Department but also the White House thereafter had a difficult time while attempting to make clear that Biden's "we" was in reference to the White House; where such security solicitations would not go. Clinton was compelled to support Biden's affirmation. "The president and the VP unquestionably would not be proficient about particular choices that are made by security experts," she asserted. 1.3. The State Department and the Benghazi attacks A mid-level official stationed at the State Department had denied appeals for a modest bunch of extra security for the officers at the Benghazi department. That notwithstanding, he denied a checked uptick in restlessness in the Libyan security powers (Kiely, 2012). The cautioning signs, including a June bombing outside the department, did not seem to compel the office to hype security. The biggest appeal was for 12 extra men; there were only five at the time of the assault. The State Department primarily depends on its government for security, and possibly for this situation the CIA also, albeit extreme obligation regarding State Department security would appear to rest with the agency itself (Lanny, LeBron, & Trey, 2014). 1.4. Communication crisis and whether emergency operation plans took effect before and after t he Benghazi attack It is worth noting that the communications approach used by the Barrack regime during and after the Benghazi attack was founded on the intelligence collected. These developments were a clear indication that the authorities took a unidirectional approach in publicizing the events before and after the attack. It did not explore information that would potentially soil its reputation. The research was geared towards: Communicating the facts of the Benghazi attack Assuring the American people that the government had taken appropriate measures and that it would ensure justice is served Establishing that the Obama administration had made sound foreign policy choices It is evident that there were not only lapses in the administration's communications strategy but also its emergency operational plans following the attack on Benghazi. In addition, the government made an attempt of conveying that the assaults were spontaneous and hence beyond the control of the administration. At first, the government was hesitant to declare the attack a terrorist attack. In fact, the president's Rose Garden speech intentionally failed to refer to the attack as a terrorist attack but instead referred to is as "an act of terror" that was never to shake the resolve of USA (Kiely, 2012). A spokesperson for the State Department and the president claimed on 17th September that there was no evidence whatsoever that proved that the Benghazi attack was planned. For this reason, it did not meet the threshold of a terrorist attack. However, it was until 2nd September of the same year that Hilary Clinton described the assault as a "terrorist attack" while with the Pakistani Prime Minister. President Obama's response to Hilary's sentiments was that investigations were still underway. It was then clear that there were no proper emergency operation plans before and after the deadly attack on US embassy in Libya. Based on the incidents that followed the assault, it appeared that the white house did not have a coordinated communications strategy to execute (Youngman, 2011). 1.5. Conclusion The Benghazi attack was well orchestrated and the hesitation of the administration to declare it a terrorist attack was a direct indication of the lack of proper emergency operation plans to address such issues. However, it was unclear whether the administration had a live feed of the happenings of that day. The claims that the government had live drone footage over the consulate hours before the attack and that it was privy to the attack have not been proven and therefore remained hypotheses. As a result, it was difficult to base matters of national security on mere claims that did not have proof. The only footage of the embassy before the attack was not live but was a recording that was not retrieved hours after the attack. At least this is the only official statement regarding footage of the embassy before the attack. While it may have proven very difficult for the White House to have only one spokesman on the attack because top government and security official appear before the media on a daily basis, it would have been important to have a single voice on the matter (Youngman, 2011). This would have assisted significantly in mitigating the doubts about the administrations intelligence capabilities. It was also noted that the government's communications regarding the Benghazi attack were reactionary to the Republicans' attack and not an official statement concerning the situation in Benghazi (Kiely, 2012). 1.6. References Aronsen, G. (2012). Timeline: How the Benghazi controversy unfolded. Motherjones Online. Retrieved from http://consulate.motherjones.com/mojo/2012/11/benghazi-timeline- obama BBC News (2012). Did Ansar al-Sharia carry out Libya attack? BBC News Online. Retrieved fromhttp://consulate.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19575753 Burton, F., & Katz, S. M. (2014). Under fire: The untold story of the attack in Benghazi. Center, A., Jackson, P., Smith, S., & Stansberry, F. (2008). Public Relation Practices: Managerial Case Studies and Problems. New Jersey: Pearson Education. Dougherty, J., & Mount, M. (2013). Pentagon releases official timeline of Benghazi attack. CNN Online. Retrieved from http://consulate.cnn.com/2012/11/09/world/africa/libya-benghazi- timeline Federal Emergency Management Agency. (1993). Are You Ready? Your Guide to Disaster Preparedness, H-34. Washington, DC: FEMA. Kelly, T. (2012). Full transcript of Obama’s Rose Garden speech after Sept. 11 Benghazi attack. Forex TV Online. Retrieved from http://consulate.forextv.com/forex-news- story/full-transcript-of-obama-s-rose-garden-speech-after-sept-11-benghazi-attack Kiely, E. (2012). Benghazi timeline: the long road from “spontaneous protest” to premeditated terrorist attack. Factcheck Online. Retrieved from http://consulate.factcheck.org/2012/10/benghazi-timeline/ Lanny, D., LeBron. J., & Trey, G. (2014). “LeBron’s Announcement: Crisis Management Lessons For House GOP On Benghazi?” dailycaller.com. Retrieved from http://dailycaller.com/2014/07/16/lebrons-announcement-crisis-management-lessons-for- house-gop-on-benghazi/ Transcript of Obama on ’60 Minutes’ (2012). Fox News Online.  Retrieved fromhttp://consulate.foxnews.com/politics/2012/09/24/transcript-obama-on-60-minutes/ Youngman, S. (2011). UN ambassador: Gadhafi ‘delusional’. The Hill Online. Retrieved fromhttp://thehill.com/homenews/administration/146541-un-ambassador-gadhafi- delusional Read More