Change Throughout the New Zealand Defense Force - Report Example

Change Throughout the New Zealand Defence Force Introduction Established in 1845 as a way to protect national interests within New Zealand, and to prevent armed rebellions from taking place, the New Zealand Defence Force has blossomed into a complex organisational structure encompassing more than 14,000 people employed in a variety of sectors. While the defense structure itself has undergone many changes in its delineation over the decades, the system now consists of three main branches of service. These include the Royal New Zealand Navy, Army, and Air Force. While New Zealand is geographically distanced from many of the world’s main superpowers, it does not rest and get lulled into a false sense of security. In fact, the country spends nearly 2% of its annual Gross Domestic Product on defense, amounting to just over 3 Billion New Zealand Dollars1. Throughout its existence, the New Zealand Defence Force has maintained three main objectives in justifying its existence. The first of these involves protecting New Zealand itself from low-level threats to its own safety and well being. Apart from this, the Defence Force has as its second main objective to contribute to security throughout the region, largely by lending support to its allies found in neighbouring Indonesia and Australia. Finally, New Zealand might be a small country from a population perspective, but its Defence Force stands ready plays a vital role in global affairs and will do their part to maintain a peaceful and safe community throughout all regions2. Because it is so isolated from other countries, and it has positive relations with the few neighbours that it does have, the Defence Force itself is smaller than many similarly statured countries around the world. They have, however, found it fit to afford roughly 600 personnel to serve active roles in areas throughout the South Pacific, Asia, and the Middle East. As time has gone on, however, many changes have been made to the organisation itself3. Much of this change has been recent and has been radical, particularly in light of an ever-changing global situation that has necessitated the need for New Zealand to rethink the function and role of its own Defence Force. Much of this change has not been popular, and some has been met with resistance. To determine if such resistance is justified is the focus of this paper, as well as it an examination of the basis for the change in the first place. A combination of theoretical leadership perspectives and management ideals will form the basis for this discussion. The Need for Change The beginning point for change at the New Zealand Defence Force can probably be traced back to the publishing of a white paper by the Prime Minister John Key back in 2008. As part of a campaign pledge by the National Party, the focus was to be placed on restructuring the Defense force in light of a battered economy the likes of which New Zealand had not seen in recent memory. In times of economic peril, budget cuts are rarely popular, particularly when they hit on the nation’s defense structure4. There are many who stop the basis of the white paper right there and argue that, sure, cuts must be made in New Zealand, but the money spent on defense should simply be used in a smarter manner. It should not, however, be cut. Regardless, this was the springboard towards the recent changes that have occurred throughout all three branches of the New Zealand Defence Force. One of the arguments for changing the structure of this massive organisation rests in the reality that many view New Zealand as a country that is largely unthreatened. It was said commented during this time that, “Other factors in the equation include the reality he New Zealand is a trade dependent maritime nation with the world’s fifth-largest exclusive economic zone, and the very warm state of New Zealand-United States relations, particularly since the White House came to accept that no New Zealand government was likely to commit suicide by repealing anti-nuclear legislation”. 5 Because of this reality, and the increasing budget shortfall facing the country, the government simply felt that massive changes were needed in defense in order to conserve valuable capital, particularly in light of the view that many felt existing resources being spent in this area were simply going to waste. Basically, the white paper in question, focusing on the state of the New Zealand Defence Force, was the first to be published in the country in over 12 years. This would certainly result in massive debate, discussion, and eventual change that you would likely prove to be unpopular in some circles, and seen as necessary in others. Ensuing governments have been seen cancelling orders for military aircraft and armaments made by predecessors, and have begun slashing budgets6. The recent government of John Key was seen as likely to continue this trend. Basically, Key was not advocating for a leaner defence force, but he was advocating for a more streamlined operation that made more practical use of existing resources and capabilities throughout the country. In order to set out on this path towards change, the National Party embarked on creating is definition of what the security interests of the nation truly entailed. They determined that this begins with New Zealand playing a part in ensuring the safety and security of the South Pacific region. Beyond that, a second function of the defence forces must be to continue fostering the building and promotion of international peach initiatives that would lead to the security of a New Zealand that could conduct trade and commerce free from external threats. Finally, the government wanted to see changes in the New Zealand Defence Force that worked harder to protect the national interests of all New Zealanders. One of the changes that has taken place is to implement a new emphasis on having forces that can be rapidly deployed on land. These personnel would be trained to be highly versatile in order that they accomplish numerous objectives as they arise, thereby minimizing the need for additional numbers to be employed under the auspices of the New Zealand Defence Force. This policy would be in line with the government initiative to streamline the overall organization, while still ensuring the safety, security, and sovereignty of New Zealand. Many, however contend that this renewed focus on the homeland, over time, will minimize the influence that New Zealand has throughout the region by causing it to be a less active player in regional politics and security7. That argument, however, will take years to uncover its validity, but it is a major policy shift nonetheless that has both supporters and opponents. Even as the argument that New Zealand is relatively safe from outside influences begins to strengthen, it is feared that the country may not be positioning itself with a strong defense force in the future that is capable of protecting it vast amount of sea coast. It was recently noted that, “Those tracts of ocean are, in the future, likely to be of increasing interest to countries from outside the region, countries which have not traditionally taken an interest in them and which may have different agenda from those of New Zealand and the region’s other traditional metropolitan powers”8 Among these powers are included Australia, France, and the United States. An argument for restructuring in this way, even in light of potential future threats, rests in the current reality that New Zealand has such strong ties with many of the Western superpowers. This, if it continues, is likely to thwart any desire on the part of a hostile country to invade New Zealand’s water resources. Opponents of this change once again contend, however, that defense forces must be in place to guard against just such an unanticipated scenario. Recent changes at the New Zealand Defence Force have also seen a renewed commitment to increasing air support throughout the country. The philosophy is that modern day security is dependent upon air forces being able to provide much needed support to ground forces in the event of an armed conflict. In anticipation of this, recent changes have seen more budgetary allotments for air related equipment in order to patrol the vast region of water throughout the region. This has largely come at the expense of spending in others of defense that some would argue is more necessary. As mentioned previously, however, in times of economic difficulty, certain cuts will be made in order to sustain spending levels for programs that are deemed more critical to the national defense of the country9. While these changes are not popular, they certainly do not appear to be unreasonable. Another change that has been made in the last five years in the strengthening of an alliance between the United States and New Zealand. While this obviously plays dividends from a safety and security standpoint, many argue that this is lulling the country into a false state of security where they can no longer defend themselves without assistance from outside nations. This actually dates back to the terror attacks of September 2011 in the United States. Immediately after these attacks, the government and people of New Zealand immediately offered any assistance that America might need. Since that time, the United States has formally recognized New Zealand as one of its strongest allies and has pledge to lend full support to its security interests should the need arrive. In addition, as long as New Zealand remains a signatory to anti nuclear weapon legislation and treaties on a global scale, there is no reason to question whether or not this strong alliance will continue for the foreseeable future. As such, the government has changed some spending policies and the structural organization of the New Zealand Defence Force to reflect this reality that national security interests simply do not appear to be threatened moving forward10. Many of the changes being implemented appear to be highly politicized and fractious debates. Dating back to the mid-1980s, the government has been largely divided on numerous issues, including what to do with the national Defence Force. In recent years, however, this division has calmed somewhat to the current state that exists whereby there has been bipartisan support for the changes being implemented. This has quieted opponents somewhat, but has done little to appease those currently directly and intimately involved in the organization itself. The changes being implemented today might appear to be shortsighted and a knee jerk reaction to the poor economic environment that the nation currently finds itself in. This is in direct contrast to the opinion that the defense of a nation depends on a long term outlook and that New Zealand must structure its defense forces to prove safety and security according to a plan that looks 30 years down the road, as opposed to only 5 or 10. The simply reality is, however, that New Zealand may simply not have this luxury and, given the strong regional and global ties it has with other more developed countries, the time is ripe to make these sweeping changes and position the organisation for a new streamlined future that is more in line with nationalist interests and objectives11. Negative Impact from a Command, Leadership, and Management Perspective Almost by necessity, the New Zealand Defence Force has recently gone through a period of significant of change. Many reports do have this change as having a negative impact on many of the personnel serving in the three branches of New Zealand’s military and, indeed, on the organisation as a whole. Much of this has to do with prevailing management theory in business being applied to a military system that is vastly different. Military organisations, by their very traditional nature, have been largely immune from political influence in many developed nations, New Zealand certainly not excluded. Many of the changes recently made have come from government parties that many feel have little background in military operations12. This has created a dissension between enlisted personnel, commanders, and the national government. Communication must be seen as the key towards bringing about organisational change, and it appears that these lines were blurred when considering the restructuring of the New Zealand Defence Force. In the early days of the proposed changes, top military brass and government leaders were largely accused of not keep open adequate lines of communication with the 14,000 employees that would be most affected by these changes, nor was the public kept fully abreast of what was taking place. This took on the appearance of a process that was less than transparent, particular as far as the public sector was concerned, and this is an area that is receiving much more focus today13. It is important that all parties involved in the military and the security of the nation be kept apprised of any changes, and that a more participatory environment is created as a result. Considering the above sentiments, it is helpful to consider relevant change management theories that indicate, “Organizational change occurs and is driven by communication, rather than the reverse”. 14 Considering this, it is important to make an effort to involve others when bringing about change, particular in an organisation of the size and critical importance as the New Zealand Defence Force. Communication itself should be regarded as an agent of any changes that are either proposed or implemented within the organisational structure itself. Moving forward, it would behoove all affected parties to have more engaging conversations across the organisation and various levels of government in an effort to elicit in input from various sectors of the organisation. This can help avert any potential national security issues in the future, and will most likely help increase overall personnel morale. In addition the public will be more accepting of such changes if they are also kept apprised of what is happening with their defence forces, thereby enabling to feeling more safe and secure within their borders. To be clear, there are certainly more traditional change based theories that could have served as a more solid beginning point towards bringing about the necessary types of change that were needed at the New Zealand Defence Force. Few are denying the current situations did dictate a need for change, yet prevailing leadership and management theories regarding such a radical shift in organisational structure seem to have been forgotten. Such changes were implemented by individuals at the top of the organisation, and those in positions of power within the New Zealand government, will little to no input from other stakeholders and affected parties. Such changes did not properly filter down to the personnel within the organisation that could have truly become advocates from the restructuring process. Had this occurred, these individuals could have lent their full support to implement the new initiatives and required policy shifts that were designed to push the New Zealand Defence Force forward into a more robust force capable of begin major players in the region, and staunch defenders of their own country15. Conclusion While similar in many ways, military organizations are vastly different in structure and form from most corporate entities. As such, the method of change should be viewed through a separate set of lenses. It appears that the recent changes made at the New Zealand Defence Force were pushed through in a time of economic peril within the region, and without proper regard for the men and women who put their lives on the line for the country each and every day. This is the reason that the change was received negatively. It is not so much that individuals within the organisation view the change as being unnecessary. On the contrary, members of the Defence Force, preheats more than any other group of New Zealand society, realise that change can be painful at times. What is frustrating, however, is to not have a voice in such change and for the resulting restructure of the organisation to lack the transparency necessary for military and governmental entities. This should be corrected moving forward in order to future change to be better received. Bibliography Ahlstrom, David. “Rexamining Some Management Lessons From Military History.” Asia Pacific Journal of Management 26, no. 4 (2009): 617-642. Breen, Claire. “Law, Policy, and Practice: The United Nations Collective Security Regime and the Contribution of the New Zealand Defence Force”. New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 7, (2009): 21-50. 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