Conflict Negotiation: The Iran-US Hostage Crisis - Example

Conflict Negotiation: The Iran-US Hostage Crisis Contents Introduction 3 Background 3 Analysis 5 References 8 Introduction On 4th November 1979 a group of around 150 student revolutionaries who called themselves “Muslim Students following the Line of Imam” forcibly entered the US Embassy in Tehran and took sixty six persons (members of staff and marines who guarded the US embassy) inside the premises as hostages. The occupants demanded that Shah of Iran Reza Shah Pehalvi who was undergoing treatment for cancer in America to be returned to Iran to face a trial for the atrocities he committed on the people of Iran during his rule (Sick, 2010). The occupants also demanded the return of the multibillion dollar assets placed in banks in the US by the Shah of Iran and an apology from the United States for its interference in the internal affairs of Iran (Sick, 2010). It is said that that the students only wanted their voices to be heard and had no intention of holding the hostages in captivity for more than a week but the inability of Carter regime to judge the seriousness of the situation and handle it accordingly and the political motives of Khomeini led to one of the gravest conflicts in the political history of the United States (Bowden, 2014). The hostages were held in captivity for 444 days and cost Carter his presidency. Background US had always been involved in the internal affairs of the oil rich Iran but in a very restricted way. In 1951 when the Iranians chose Mossadeq as their president and the reforms he introduced made it very clear that the US and UK interests were at stake (Tadman, 2011). The CIA played a major role in overthrowing the elected government of Mossadeq and brought a pro- West Shah Mohammed Reza Pahalvi as the ruler. The US and Iran later formed strong relations and Iran emerged as US’s strategic ally in the region of Persian Gulf (Corey, 2013). Although Iran prospered under the Shah’s rule, the distribution of wealth was largely uneven and Iran was slowly drifting towards westernization which was a cause of concern for the Islamic Clerics. In 1963, an uprising by the cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was curbed and he was exiled to Iraq (Tadman, 2011). The brutal use of force to silence those who opposed the Shah by his private army SAVAK was common in Iran. The members of SAVAK were trained by the CIA; even the US President Jimmy Carter who was a great advocate of human rights remained silent on human right abuses in Iran. The opposition to the Shah’s rule increased to a great extent and it was obvious that the days of his rule are numbered (Takeyh, 2011). At this point President Carter was presented with two options; first was to help curb the revolution using force suggested by Zbigniew Brezinski National Security Advisor and the next was to reach out to the opposition to ensure a smooth and non-violent transfer of power to the new government put forward by the State Department. President Carter did not act on both advices and thus paid heavily for his indecisiveness. The Shah fled to Egypt and later when his condition deteriorated (Shah was suffering from cancer), he asked for permission for medical treatment in the US. In October 1979 , President Carter reluctantly allowed the Shah to enter US and this led to the occupation of the US embassy in Tehran by a group of students as Iranians had always associated the Shah and his atrocities with the US (Corey, 2013; Sick, 2010; Tadman, 2011). President Carter tried to negotiate with the Iranians but they refused to talk and every attempt at a meaningful dialogue was foiled. However, Iran did free thirteen hostages (Afro-Americans and women) and later Richard Queen who had developed multiple sclerosis (Sick, 2010; Corey, 2013). President Carter was looking for a peaceful solution of the conflict and so decided to impose economic sanctions against Iran and freeze all its assets present in the United States. All the deals and contracts to supply weapons and military equipment to Iran were also cancelled. He ruled out military operation as he feared that it would jeopardize the safety of the US hostages. However the economic sanctions did not work because Soviet Union vetoed the move in the UN. It then quickly stepped in and strengthened its trade ties with Iran. Other European states such as France and England and even China also did not impose economic sanctions on Iran on the pretext that if Iran was isolated economically it will get closer to Soviet Union (Corey, 2013). When economic sanctions did not work, a frustrated President Carter agreed to a secret rescue operation in April 1980 although the Secretary of State Cyrus Vance opposed it. Eight helicopters were to enter Iran and land at an abandoned airstrip code named Desert One but due to a dust storm, one of the helicopters malfunctioned and collided with another US carrier which resulted in the death of eight servicemen. This attempt humiliated the Americans further and earned disapproval from other countries as well (Corey, 2013). In the same year neighboring country Iraq invaded Iran, in the US, elections were to be held in November and Jimmy Carter was running for the office again. The war weakened Iran economically and it also needed weapons and military equipment. It then showed flexibility in its stance and with Algeria as a mediator, an agreement to release hostages was reached. US was to release the assets of Iran and had to promise not to interfere in internal affairs of Iran again. It was also agreed upon that none of the US hostages or their families would sue the Iran for this incident (Takeyh, 2011). The hostages were finally released minutes after the new president Ronald Regan was sworn in (Takeyh, 2011). Analysis Initially President Carter and his advisors were of the opinion that this situation was a temporary emergency and would soon resolve amicably. This is because the American Ambassador was kidnapped earlier in January by a group of students; however the ambassador was released shortly (after few hours) on the orders of Khomeini and the students were expelled (Corey, 2013). Although initially Khomeini had ordered for the students to be “kicked out”, but after looking at the overwhelming response of the Iranian people towards this action, Khomeini announced his support and approval of the incident (Takeyh, 2011; Corey, 2013). Khomeini saw this occupation as an opportunity to strengthen his political position. Khomeini’s agenda behind the support was to expand his influence and to silence all those who were opposing him. He was well aware of the grudge the Iranians held against the U.S and used it as a tool to discredit America and to demonstrate on domestic and international front the limits of the power of US. At first President Carter tried to seek the release of the hostages through diplomatic dialogues and negotiations. He appealed on humanitarian grounds for the release of the hostages, asked the UN to intervene and reason with Iran but all these measures failed. This shows that the desire to solve the conflict through any kind of dialogues was one-sided only; Iran had no interest in holding talks and ignored all attempts made by the US to solve the conflict through peaceful negotiations. By this time Iranian hostility and the impossibility of real and honest communication had become evident. By holding its citizens hostage and with its rigid stand, Iran wanted to humiliate the US. Although President Carter’s decision to allow medical treatment to the Shah of Iran was based on humanitarian grounds; he either failed to or chose to ignore the resentment that Iranians had against the Shah and the US. The US did not perceive that the resentment was so deep seated until all its attempts for dialogues failed. The President then imposed economic sanctions but this did not soften the stance of the captors either and no progress was made. The failure of economic sanctions was largely due to the veto by Soviet Union and because other countries even American allies did not fully support it. Meeting with failure from all sides, President Carter finally gave in to the option of rescue operation. According to McDermott (1992), President Carter was operating in a domain of losses; internationally he was faced with a tough and embarrassing situation where he was against a hostile opponent that refused to negotiate with him directly and on the domestic front his popularity had declined considerably and elections were just around the corner. The option of a rescue mission seemed a better way to restore his credibility as a president and the honor of his country. War had brought economic problems for Iran which also did not have military equipment to fight the war. President Carter could have used this situation to his advantage and negotiated the release of the hostages on his terms but he let this opportunity to go by as well. Carter should have seen that Iran was ready to negotiate the release of the hostages as they were of no use to it anymore. Furthermore it was sure that the new American government would not adopt the same soft stance as the Regan administration. Finally, a consensus was reached but even at this point Iran did not negotiate directly with America but instead asked Algeria a fellow Muslim country to act as an arbitrator. Because of the indirect communication, the negotiations were prolonged as it took two weeks for every plan to approve or disapprove. References Bowden, M. (2014). Among the Hostage Takers. Retrieved April 08, 2014 from http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/12/among-the-hostage-takers/303596/ Corey, T. (2013). The Iranian Hostage Crisis: Domestic and International Challenges for President Jimmy Carter. University of North Georgia. Études Historiques, volume 1. McDermott, R. (1992). Prospect Theory in International Relations: The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission. Political Psychology 13 (2): 237–263. Sick, G. (2010). The Carter Administration. In: Wright, R. B. (ed.). The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy, pp. 129-132. USA: US Institute of Peace Press. Tadman, K.D.R (2011). Dripping in Oil: American Involvement in the 1953 Iranian Coup of Mohammad Mossadeq. Retrieved April 08, 2014 from http://www.academia.edu/4424829/Dripping_in_Oil_U.S._Involvement_during_the_1953_Iranian_Coup Takeyh, R. (2011). November 4, 1979: The Iran Hostage Crisis. The History Reader. Retrieved April 08, 2014 from http://www.thehistoryreader.com/contemporary-history/november-4-1979-iran-hostage-crisis/ Read More