Analysis of Olson's Dictatorship, Democracy, and Patrick Henry's Speech Regarding Liberty - Research Paper Example

Freedom and Justice Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death by Patrick Henry (1775) In this famous speech, the man who would be post-colonial Virginia Governor, Patrick Henry, argued for the mobilization of military forces in open revolution against British rule. Henry’s main proposition is that the conditions prevailing at the time show that the avenues for reconciliation between the American colony and the Crown have been exhausted, and the only remaining alternative is to commence open armed revolt in order to win their liberty. While his more pacifist countrymen have pinned their hopes on a peaceful petition for the Crown to grant them their freedom, Henry passionately argued for the alternative. He said that ten years of pursuing the same petition without effect is more than sufficient time to realize that their British masters had no intention of taking it seriously. Furthermore, the British have shown every indication that they are gearing up for a show of force in the colony. They have made warlike preparations by sending their fleets and armies to America – a move, Henry said, designed to intimidate the petitioners from pursuing their bid for freedom, since Britain had no enemies in that part of the world for which the armaments may have been otherwise intended. These are signs that the time for argumentation is past, and the time for forceful action has come. It appears that what Henry employed most to greatest effect was little more than rhetoric. His fiery speech ended with the immortal line, “Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what course others may take; but as for me, give me liberty, or give me death!” It was said to have impassioned his listeners to the point that immediately after, they rose to their feet and cried, “To arms! To arms!” (Hemple, 1977) Equating domination with slavery, he appealed to his listeners’ senses by making them feel (“…until our enemies shall have bound us hand and foot”), hear (“Our chains are forged! Their clanking may be heard on the plains of Boston!”) and see (“A British guard stationed in every house”) subjugation fleshed out. He called their struggle “noble” and their cause “holy”, and assures them of Divine help (“There is a just God who presides over the destinies of nations, and who will raise up friends to fight our battles for us.”). Then he compels them to action with a sense of duty (“struggle… which we have pledged ourselves never to abandon “) and a sense of shame (“Our brethren are already in the field! Why stand we here idle?”). These aside, Henry’s ratiocination is simple and straightforward. His unshakeable premise, as with his compatriots’, is that the Americans have a Divine right to self determination, which means freedom from foreign domination. However, they are currently under British rule, and the British monarchy has refused to recognize their God-given right, because: (a) they have ignored the Americans’ petition for independence for ten years; (b) they have increased their military presence in the colony for no other reason than to signify aggression in reaction to the petition; and (c) the Americans have exhausted all peaceful means to attain their right to independence without favourable response from the British monarchy. Therefore, the Americans will be justified to risk life and limb to stake their righteous claim to independence through force. Had Patrick Henry made his argument in this manner, America might have remained a British colony for a longer time. It is doubtful that a sober recitation of these justifications would have inflamed even the most ardent compatriots into bearing arms. There is nothing incisive or intricate in the analysis. In fact, there appears to be a common set of convictions that are shared by the community at large, so Henry’s speech is able to cut through the intellectual debate and “short cut” to the emotional issues. For instance, no one doubted God’s existence, nor that He sanctions a war that would result in loss of lives, if it was done in the attainment of liberty. Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development by Mancur Olson (1993) This treatise by Olson examines the various motivations that are at play in dictatorships and democracies, and the impetus by which they fuel development. It purportedly sought to debunk the assertion that “Monarchy is the best kind of government because the King is then owner of the country. Like the owner of a house, when the wiring is wrong, he fixes it.” (Olson, 1993, p. 567, citing Blanfield, 1958, p. 26) This belief is attributed by Edward Blanfield (1958) to a village monarchist in a “poor” (one wonders if he meant “lacking in sophistication or education”) village in Southern Italy. Olson decided that a theory of how autocracies and democracies emerge and affect development is necessary to analyze the statement. He began his discourse by establishing the premise that voluntary societies (i.e., social order as a matter of consensus) existed only for small hunter-gatherer groups and could not be possible when the population has grown to significant numbers. Large societies allegedly demanded a single strong ruler, who, Olson assumed, usually takes the form of a “bandit” for his willingness to employ strength and force in imposing his rule. In this assumption, the author pointed to Chinese history and its string of warlords as backdrop. At once, this first assumption may already be called into question. Olson’s hunter-gatherer societies are a far cry from the city states of ancient Greece where, ironically, the concept of democracy was born and first actualized. The city states were more than mere tribes; Sparta, the largest Greek city-state, controlled more than 3,000 square miles of territory beyond the city boundaries. Originally monarchies, the Greek polis experimented with other forms of government such as timocracy (rule by the wealthy), oligarchy (rule by the few), and, of course, democracy. Some structures were quite complex, such as in Sparta where the oligarchy was comprised of a pair of kings, a council, and a democratic assembly. One form of government, called “tyrranies” (rule by a tyrant) sometimes succeeded oligarchies through overthrow, and is that form which most closely resembled Olson’s “stationary bandit”. The tyrant illegitimately wrested power and wielded absolute control over the people, although oftentimes they were themselves popular. However, unlike Olson’s bandit, the tyrant would try but would generally be unsuccessful in establishing his hold on power through hereditary transmission – otherwise known as monarchy. Despite the personal qualities of some of these tyrants – statesmanship, magnanimity and moral righteousness even – it is the nature of tyrranies that they are unstable, fall apart rapidly, and are quickly overtaken by other forms of government such as oligarchies and monarchies with a substantial democratic component. (Hooker, 1996) The ancient Greeks, it appears, placed a premium on the legitimacy of rule, not just competence and benevolence in providing the requisites of production, and seldom institutionalized a government established by a “bandit”. Thus in this alone, we see that Olson’s model of early, numerically small, social units as being governed by consensus progressing to larger societies of autocratic rule is quite simplistic and does not hold water as a rule. Olson proceeds by differentiating the roving bandit from the stationary bandit. In effect, he states that the stationary bandit, unlike the roving bandit, is interested in the long-term tax revenue potentials of his dominion and, therefore, in the long-term productivity of its inhabitants. Such a bandit would also presumably provide the social costs of development, in the form of public goods that enable a peaceful and productive existence. He does so, not because he is community minded or solicitous of the public good, but because of rational self-interest – to be able to collect more taxes from a more prosperous community. Contrast this with the interest of the roving bandit whose interest is but to plunder for the greatest immediate gain. Olson proceeds to equate the stationary bandit with the autocrat, in a manner that deserves some attention here: “These violent entrepreneurs naturally do not call themselves bandits but, on the contrary, give themselves and their descendants exalted titles. They sometimes even claim to rule by divine right. Since history is written by the winners, the origins of ruling dynasties are, of course, conventionally explained in terms of lofty motives rather than by self-interest. Autocrats of all kinds usually claim that their subjects want them to rule and thereby nourish the unhistorical assumption that government arose out of some kind of voluntary choice.” (p. 568) This, it appears, is another of several points made by Olson that has to be taken with a rather large grain of salt. Olson appears fastidious in the logical consistency of his discourse, but on this point he expects the reader to make the mental leap from banditry to not only autocracy but to monarchy as a rule, on little more than the presumption that titular succession necessarily originated from violent subjugation, that it is impossible for subjects to have wanted rule by a strong leader, and that the idea that monarchical government is a product of voluntary choice is an ‘unhistorical assumption’. The statements are sweeping without mention of fact or proof. It negates implications of cultural and religious beliefs. For instance, it is generally conceded that the European monarchies developed out of the feudal system, and the Egyptian pharaohs and Japanese emperors were deified not because a bandit attributed this to himself, but because the nation’s religious culture declared it to be so. The prevailing, conventional, theory is that the monarchies arose “based on the need for a strong ruler who could raise and command military forces to defend the country.” (Funk & Wagnalls New Encyclopedia, 2006) To argue that the origin of these religious traditions that go back thousands of years was that one bandit conquered a populace and decided to call himself god is one (imaginative) stretch too far to be accorded the status of scholarly truth without proof. Another pivotal point on which the theory of Olson rests has to do with the motivation for the imposition of one-man rule. Olson is of the opinion that the overriding reason for a “stationary bandit” to establish himself in a territory is material gain, opting for a continuous manner of collection as “taxation” rather than the roving bandit’s one-time “plunder”. But here is the difficulty with equating the bandit with the autocrat. All bandits look solely for material gain, and all other efforts in governance are deemed in service of this overriding goal. However, as has been mentioned, many strong rulers emerge from within the society, to fulfil the social need for security against outside aggression. In such a case, the principal aim, determined by the society itself, is to establish peace and security, unlike in Olson’s model where peace and security is an incidental goal to serve to increase tax collections for benefit of the ruler. These are diametrically opposed propositions. Olson’s bandit emerges not from within the society but from without, therefore his overriding interest is personal gain, with the public good as an accident. History, however, shows us the strong leader who emerges from within the society, and thus his personal interest is the social good itself, not personal gain at the expense of society. In Olson’s discussion, much emphasis is placed on the determination of the “revenue-maximizing level” of taxation. Through a series of mathematical calisthenics, the optimum-yielding tax rates and the revenue to the autocrat (or distribution to the majority) are depicted as a certain ratio of the national income, and that they are reciprocals to each other. In truth, taxation theory is never so simple, because the national wealth/income depends on many more factors than just the determination of a fixed ratio. The effect of natural calamities alone, in the context of an agricultural economy, would many times over determine the success of the harvest and the commensurate change in national income, than would the tax rate, expenditure in public good, or distribution of tax revenues. Actually, it is not so credible to conceive of an autocrat who would go through the complications of determining the income his individual subject make, which in this day and age of intricate cross-validating revenue regulations and computer applications is still a confounding exercise. It is more believable that taxation would have been based on each subject’s capital wealth in the form of his acres of land, head of cattle or number of domiciles, which is always more tangible than the income he makes out of them. Furthermore, the income that forms the tax base is often indeterminable, even by the owner, so it theoretically defies the purpose of building a whole theory around the “revenue-maximizing tax rate” as a known ratio of an unknown income. The same goes for the attempt to establish a theory on the ratio of redistribution of taxation revenues as a determinant of future income, which Olson sought to undertake. Next point to consider is the assumption by the author that a “stationary bandit” precludes the confiscation of individual property in the interest of encouraging his subjects to increase their investments and trades, thereby advancing productivity and, subsequently, tax yield (p. 571). However, history is replete with autocracies that did not merely confiscate private property, but abolished the concept of private property altogether. Communism and extreme forms of socialism are examples of such totalitarian regimes, where all property is considered as belonging to the state, subject to its disposition as it sees fit. Sometimes, confiscation is done not in the name of ideology but economics. For instance, during the era of colonial conquests by Britain, France, Spain and Portugal (i.e., the “stationary bandits”), it was customary that the lands so “discovered” were immediately claimed in the name of the king of the conquering country. This is referred to as the Regalian doctrine, where all colonial lands become the property of the (occupying) state, and therefore also, all of its spices, gold, and valuable resources. The result was the disenfranchisement and dislocation of the American natives from their hunting grounds, and the conquered Asian nations from their tribal and ancestral lands. Towards the end of his essay, Olson calls it a “logical mistake” to assume that a dictatorship makes a transition to democracy because of the initiative of a popular upheaval (p. 573). Rather, he attributes such to the action of special interest groups who, because they are equally strong, agree to a power-sharing system after the overthrow. This mindset has been challenged in the past with the peaceful protests led by Mahatma Gandhi, and more recently by a spate of related events in 1980s. The first “people power” revolution took place in 1986 when the Marcos dictatorship was overthrown without bloodshed by a spontaneous, generally unorganized amassing of millions of ordinary citizens. In 1989, employing the Philippine paradigm, socialist dictatorships of the Eastern Block were likewise ousted through the same socio-political phenomenon. Later, the Mongolian Democratic Union, inspired by the success of the earlier revolutions, staged their own popular street protest against their socialist dictatorship. In the 21st century, the Colour revolutions employed peaceful popular uprising and civil disobedience to effect a lasting change from a dictatorial regime to a democratic one: the Bulldozer Revolution of 2000 which overthrew Slobodan Milosevic; the Rose Revolution in 2003 that overthrew Eduard Shevardnadze; and the Orange Revolution in 2004, which led to the repeat of a disputed election, and finally installed Viktor Yushchenko and rejected Viktor Yanukovych. Similar popular protests took place in Dominican Republic, Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. (Hartford, 2008) Overall, while Olson’s treatise holds some cogent views on the dynamics of dictatorship, democracy and development, it fails to account for too many historical situations for it to be given a broad and general application. At best, it can be relevant in selective situations. Synthesis: Henry and Olson compared The two selections have entirely divergent contents and styles. Henry is impassioned and appeals to the emotions, precisely because it aimed to convince people to take the extreme and ultimate military course. Olson, on the other hand, is studied, structured, and cerebral, seeking to convince through logical argumentation the proposition that democracy is the system best suited for development. Their aims are different, but they arrive at the same ultimate conclusion, which is a stand in favor of democracy. As to their views on the nature of democracy, they differ. Henry takes what appears to be the prevailing view of his compatriots, that all people have a God-given right to rule themselves. The sole alternative, which is slavery, is unacceptable. Therefore, there is no recourse but war. In the case of Olson’s essay, democracy is viewed as the natural end to a succession of political systems because it is only democracy that provides for security of private property and the guarantee of contractual obligations. Democracy is the political system that is ideal for progress and development in a market economy. For Henry, democracy is an absolute right to be claimed at whatever cost. For Olson, democracy is but a means to economic advancement. The two authors also differ in their views on freedom and subjugation. Henry views subjugation by the British as slavery. History bears out that the British were not cruel taskmasters, nor were they unnecessarily oppressive nor tyrannical, therefore the allusion to “slavery” is more figurative than factual. But for Henry, just the concept of paying taxes and being beholden to a foreign master is abhorrent and unacceptable. Olson, on the other hand, views subjugation as a possible compromise that may be embraced if the cost of subjugation is compensated by greater economic prosperity. There are degrees of acceptable subjugation: thus, the roving bandit is worse than the stationary bandit, and people prefer the latter than the former. The two authors have different concepts of freedom. For Henry, freedom is an aspiration, a desire of the heart, the need to determine one’s own destiny whether that destiny leads to ultimate redemption or annihilation. Freedom is man’s birthright and God’s ordinance, and cannot be relinquished while one lives. Olson’s discourse does not discuss freedom directly as a positive concept; if anything, freedom consistent with Olson’s theory would merely be the absence of constraints. Freedom in the abstract exists in the nation’s psyche as a matter of identity. However, freedom is neither guarantee nor condition precedent for economic progress, which is why it does not figure in Olson’s paradigm. Development could be attained even under the rule of a foreign sovereign; of this we could find concrete evidence. Singapore and Hong Kong are clear examples of how some Asian nations have benefited under the governance of European colonial masters. Post-WWII Japan flourished and attained industrialization under American occupation. The same is true of what used to be West Germany. Citing West Germany begs the question for the case of East Germany. How one part of the same nation could attain economic strength while the other succumbs to economic instability brings to focus the rest of Olson’s theory. It is confirmation of Olson’s conclusion that the political system provides the framework for development. A democratic system allows for free enterprise, a system of feedback, accountability to the electorate, but more importantly protection of private property and statutory recognition of the validity of contracts. East Germany was totalitarian, while West Germany was democratic. West Germany progressed while East Germany stagnated. The defining factor, as Olson stressed, is democracy. In summation, Patrick Henry was idealistic in approach and advocated the primacy of a nation’s right to freedom, while Olson adopted the pragmatic view that democratic institutions are essential to economic progress. In this, the two theories are quite complementary. References Funk & Wagnalls New Encyclopedia (2006) “Monarchy,” as cited in History.com (2008) Retrieved 21 August 2009 from < http://www.history.com/encyclopedia.do?articleId=216712> Hartford, B. (2008) Nonviolent Resistance, Reform, & Revolution. Retrieved 21 August 2009 from Hemple, J. (1977) "The Textual and Cultural Authenticity of Patrick Henry's 'Liberty or Death' Speech," Quarterly Journal of Speech, vol. 63, pp. 298-310. Hooker, R. (1996) “Polis: City State” World Civilizations. Retrieved 21 August 2009 from < http://www.wsu.edu:8080/~dee/GLOSSARY/POLIS.HTM> oHool Manchester College (2008) Nonviolent Social Change. Retrieved 21 August 2009 from Olson, M. (1993) “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development.” The American Political Science Review, vol. 87, issue 3, pp. 567-576. Read More