Canadian Senate Reform - Coursework Example

Canadian Senate Reform History of Canadian Politics   Reflecting British influence, Canadas Constitution, originally set out in the British North American Act of 1867, established parliamentary government in a centralized federation. Since then, Canada has moved from a highly centralized political situation to one of the most decentralized federal systems in the world (Landes, 1995). This reflects the central issue of Canadian politics: the place within it of French-speaking Quebec. this division goes back to the countrys origins. From the sixteenth century, France and the Britain colonized the territories of Canada, inhabited at that time by around ten million indigenous people. Britain finally defeated the French in 1759.  In Quebec itself, the PQ elected to power in 1994, held a provincial referendum in 1995 on sovereignty association for Quebec. This would have combined political sovereignty for Quebec with continued association with Canada. The proposal lost by the narrowest margins. Subsequently, the issue of constitutional reform declined in intensity, with the PQ voted out of office in 2003 (Hague and Harrop, 2004).   Even so, the regional foundations of Canada remain central to its politics. An earthquake election in 1993 saw the national emergence not just of the PQ but also of the Western-based Reform Party now called the Canadian Alliance (NewsInReview, 2002). The Alliance is a populist party which seeks to make members of parliament more an uneasy balance between national and regional parties, of pro- and anti- system themes. The question What is Canada?" remains permanently on the table, never to receive a final answer. Yet as Williams (1995, p. 69) puts it, “Despite all Canadas domestic turmoil, it is endowed with a responsive federal system. Over time this has created a good safe place to raise a family and earn a crust, the ultimate test of a states obligations to its citizens” Introduction to the Reform Initiative Today, Canada still has a federal parliamentary democracy with ten provinces. Most Canadians live in Ontario or Quebec. Its legislative body is composed of the 301-seat House of Commons which is the lower chamber. Most unusually for a federation, the 104 members of the Senate, the upper chamber, are appointed by the prime minister, not selected by the provinces.  Federalism is a method for sharing sovereignty and not just power, between governments within a single state (Forsey, 1984). It is a constitutional device, presupposing a formal political agreement establishing both the levels of the government and their spheres of authority. So, like the constitutions within which they are embedded, federations are always a deliberate creation. The United States served as the first modern constitution and, as part of the settlement reflected in that document, it established the worlds first and most influential federation.  In a federation, a legal sovereignty is shared between the federal government and the constituent states. Neither level can abolish the other. It is this protected position of the states, not the extent of their powers, which distinguishes federations such as Canada from unitary governments such as the United Kingdom and France. In nearly all federations the states have a guaranteed voice in national policy-making through an upper chamber of the assembly. In that chamber, each state normally receives equal, or nearly equal, representation (Williams, 1995).  The natural federal structure is for all the states within the union to possess identical powers under the constitution (Forsey, 1984). However, reflecting national circumstances, some federations are less balanced. Asymmetric federalism arises when some states within a federation are given more freedom than others. This can be seen in Canada, for example, Quebec nationalist have long argued for special recognition for their French-speaking province. Thus, this kind of federalism is a natural response to differences in power and culture between regions within a federation. Senate Reform   For much of Canadian history, the reform of the senate has been always an issue and in fact predates Confederation in the Province of Canada. Most plans for reform mainly constitutes amending the appointment process. It was in 1874 that the Parliament first considered reform measures and it was debated by that current Senate that it would reform itself in 1909. In 1965, there was a mandatory retirement age for new senators set at 75 years which is considered as a minor reform change, along when the Senate was given a qualified veto over certain constitutional amendments in 1982. The Meech Lake Accord which refers to a series of constitutional amendments proposed by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney is just one of the twenty-eight major proposals advanced for constitutional senate reform (Horman, 1989). It proposes for the state to choose a senator from a list of qualified individuals who was nominated by the provincial government the accord, however, failed to obtain the requisite unanimous consent of the provincial legislatures. This was followed by another proposal named the Charlottetown Accord which involved a provision under which the Senate would include an equal number of senators from each of the ten provinces of Canada, elected by either the provincial legislatures or by the provincial electorate (Horman, 1989). In 1992, the Charlottetown Accord was severely overpowered in the referendum held that year. More proposals for Senate that followed these two major reform proposals have not met with success, either, especially due to opposition in Ontario and Quebec, the two provinces with the most to lose due to equal representation. Strengths of the Canadian Senate In practice, the role of the senate expanded to more than the Fathers of the Confederation had envisioned. Up until today, this observation remains true however soft or eventually minor that check may prove, for the potential to intervene on greater questions remains. It has assumed investigative, deliberative and political duties to the benefit of the country, even if it can be stated that the Senate has gradually withdrawn itself from more active opposition to the will of the Commons except in a very few instances. It was when the modern welfare state in the 1960s emerged that the Canadian Senate started its social investigative work in earnest. Along with the more noticeable outcomes, Senate reports have led to the ratification of legislation founded on their recommendations and the making of new government departments such as Manpower and Immigration, Consumer and Corporate Affairs and the Ministry of State for Science and Technology. Among the deliberative roles that the senate has played is when it serves as a national forum for the discussion of matters of public interest and raising of concerns and protests from all parts of Canada. In the context of the political arena, senators have played the role as fundraisers and campaign coordinators. Particularly during the legislative stillness of election periods, senators have been competent to serve very important backstage roles in the election process, roles which could otherwise be carried out only by professionals who would likely be rewarded through campaign contributions. Unquestionably, the role of the Senate has largely coincided with the vision of the Fathers of Confederation. Senators have been essential to the revision and correction of legislation through a collective legislative experience superior than that of the House of Commons. Furthermore, when it comes to the development of innovative policy, the Senate has undertaken a vital duty in its investigative work which has by far has proven effective. Weaknesses of the Canadian Senate The Canadian Senate is also known as the ‘chamber of sober second thought’ because of its main role which is to review government legislation originating from the House of Commons. The Senate is capable of initiating bills of its own, but it does not extend to the bills which provide for the spending of public money or that of taxes. It is also capable of amending or rejecting a bill and unless passed by the Senate, no bill can become a law. These powers seem strong in theory but in practice, the Chamber of sober second thought has hardly ever insisted on an amendment that the House of Commons has rejected. For the most part, the Senate has been contented to be what it is- a second thought and it hardly ever rejected a bill passed by the House of Commons. Lately, however, the Senate has started to make use of this power. The call for senate reform is too loud to be ignored, but then, up until now, after a very long time of study, debate and negotiation, Canadians have been unable to abolish or reform this significant national institution (NewsInReview, 2002). Thus, it is important then to discuss in this paper four major structural problems that can be seen in the Canadian Senate based on the discussion of Canada West Foundation. One problem as stated by the CWF is the failure of the Senate to reflect the federal principle which is founded on equal representation of Senate regions. This so called senate region is made up of four- Quebec, Ontario, Maritime Provinces and the Western provinces. Each of which has 24 seats wherein the Western seats are divided equally between the four Western provinces. While the Western seats are divided equally, the contrary happened to the Maritime seats where New Brunswick and Nova Scotia got ten seats each, while Prince Edward Island have only four (CWF, 1998). Williams (1995) expressed that this kind of allocation does not make sense. From statistics, it was said that half of Canada’s senators come from the very same provinces who rule the House of Commons. Thus defeating the purpose of a having a senate which is effective representation of the provinces in policy and decision making. Another structural problem is the issue of accountability which stemmed from the fact that senators are appointed for very long terms instead of short ones. Originally, Canadian senators were appointed for life. It was just in 1965 that the Parliament passed a law which requires senators to retire at the age of 75 (Makarenko, 2009). This make the free from having to face re-election and that they hardly need to be answerable to people of the province they represent. Mapleleafweb (2006) proposed that in order to address this problem, aside from giving the right to the provincial constituents the right to choose their representative, the federal and provincial governments can be given some rights to choose members of the newly reformed Upper House. The federal government is able to appoint half of the members and the remaining half shall be appointed by individual provinces. Third, there is also the setback where the power of appointment as senator lies in the hands of the Prime Minister, the very government that the senate is tasked to limit and check (CWF, 1998). This is probably one of the biggest setbacks of the Senate; the inability by the very people who will be represented to choose who will represent them nor do they have veto powers in cases where their senator is incapable of doing his job properly. Lastly, the problem of legitimacy which stemmed from the three mentioned earlier. One main goal for the reformation of the state is that of institutional change. The major concern here is for the Senate to be fashioned in a way that it can effectively represent the regional concerns of Canada’s provincial political communities. Also, in connection with the institutional changes is the goal of making the Senate capable of effectively checking on the dominance of the parliamentary executive. The second concern is that of legitimacy. It is one assumption that legitimacy can mostly be found in some electoral procedure for the selection of the senators. If the Senate is going to be reformed, it would become an effective regional representation, because the people of the province would choose senators themselves. The Senate would then become more vital for issues affecting the whole country. A regionally elected Senate can be a vehicle for representing municipal and aboriginal interests such as the issue of whether there should be a proportional representation in the House of Commons. If it happens, there is great possibility that there would be a drop in overhead, bickering and duplications and thereby taxes (Campbell, 1978). Global changes and the last June Canadian elections point out that Canada necessitates a reformed senate, with a permanent geographic base in order to survive. The reforming of the senate such as the ineffective representation and the unequal distribution of senators would necessitate a constitutional reform. Again, there is another problem, the reform proposals remains on paper and is hardly transformed to actions. Indeed it has received a significant degree of public, academic, and government interest, yet very little has in fact been accomplished. Reasons for this include periods of incongruity between the federal government and the provinces over the nature of Senate reform, the perception that Senate reform was perhaps a lower priority relative to other constitutional issues; and, the attachment of Senate reform to larger constitutional packages that failed to receive government and public support (Makarenko, 2009). This constitutional reform needs the consent of seven out of the ten provinces of Canada containing at least 50 percent of the population. Abolition will never solve the structural problems inherent in the case of the Canadian senate. As the Canada West Foundation (1998) puts it, doing so is just like burning down a house because of leaking roofs. What one should do is climb to the roof and patch the holes which cause the leaks- and this represents the argument for the case of reforming the senate. Conclusion The reformation of the senate initiative dates back in 1874. For the time being, the call for this process is louder than before, thus, it is hard to ignore it. The reform falls under the broader category which deals with the issue of Canadian democracy. Although the senate has fulfilled some roles such as investigative, deliberative and political duties to the benefit of the country, it still has not fulfilled some of the much more important roles set out back in 1867 such as effective representation. Why should then the Senate be reformed? The reason is exactly that which is mentioned above. At present, there are institutional problems that are hampering the senate to play their roles as set out by the Fathers of the Confederation almost a century ago. First, as the so called Chamber of Second Thought, the senate has hardly ever contradicted or insisted on an amendment that the House of Commons has rejected. Second, there is unequal representation rooted on the appointment process. Third is the issue that the senate is not accountable to its constituents basically because they are appointed until they retire at the age of 75 which makes them exempted from facing re-elections. Lastly, like the other two, there is the problem of the power appointment which lies in the hands of the Prime Minister which does not help at all in upholding equal representation. Senate reforms have been proposed for many years now and a number of governments have said they will take on reforms but none of them, up to the present, have delivered so far.   Sources Campbell, C. (1978). The Canadian Senate: A Lobby from Within. Toronto, MacMillan of Canada CBC News. 2006. Reforming the Senate. Retrieved May 2009 from Canada West Foundation. (1998). Why a Senate, Why Senate Reform, and Why a Senate Election?. Retrieved May 2009 from Forsey, E.(1984). Reform of the Canadian Senate. The Parliamentarian. No. 65, January Horman, J. (1989). Senate Reform and Meech Lake. Canadian Parliamentary Review Landes, R. (1995). The Canadian Polity: A Comparative Introduction. Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice- Hall Canada. Hague, R. & Harrop, M. (2004). Comparative Government and Politics. Palgrave Macmillan Makarenko, J. The Canadian Senate: Role, Powers and Operation. Retrieved May 2009 from http://www.mapleleafweb.com/features/canadian-senate-role-powers-operation Mapleleafweb. (2008). Senate reform in Canada. Retrieved May 2009 from NewsInReview. (2002). Canada’s Upper House: Do we still need the senate?. Retrieved May 2009 from < http://www.cbc.ca/newsinreview/apr98/senate/legisl.htm> Williams, C. (1995).A Requiem for Canada?, in Federalism; the Multi-ethnic Challenge. Harlow Longman, pp. 31-72 Read More