The US Embargo on Cuba - Report Example

CUBA: WHEN AND WHY WAS THE EMBARGO ESTABLISHED, AND SHOULD OR SHOULDN’T THE UNITED S END IT? Thesis ment: The US embargo on Cuba was fuelled by the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Cold War. Whilst the end of the Cold War and the continued economic hardship of the embargo support the cause for ending the embargo, it is submitted that the Cuba issue is a complex domestic political issue on the US creating a central obstruction to US/Cuba relations in moving forward towards the lifting of the embargo. 1.Introduction & Background to US embargo against Cuba The United States embargo against Cuba operates at commercial, economic and financial level and from a political perspective has remained a stagnant issue in the United States due to the voting preferences of pro-embargo Cuban American exiles in the election battleground state of Florida (Haney & Vanderbush). Indeed, Haney & Vanderbush comment that Bush’s support for maintaining the embargo is directly reflected in his support from Cuban Americans in the 2000 where “The Cuban-American leadership in Miami campaigned tirelessly for George W. Bush as they tried to turn the election into a referendum on Clinton’s Elian policy” (Haney & Vanderbush 131). The catalyst for the US embargo on Cuba was the Cuban missile crisis, which was arguably the pinnacle of the Cold War, resulting in the Kennedy initiated economic embargo on Cuba on February 7 1962 (Perez). Moreover, in August 1 1962, the Kennedy administration extended the domino effect of its embargo on Cuba within the international political framework by amending the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to prohibit US aid “to any country which furnishes assistance to the present government in Cuba” (Available at www.usaid.gov/policy) . The 1962 Act was a culmination of a series of triggers contributing to the rising tension between US/Cuban relations during this period and Schwab comments that since 1959 Cuban Revolution “the United States has been in the throes of a national paranoia, what Richard Hofstader referred to in 1965 as the paranoid style of American politics” (Schwab163) This “paranoia” has continued, and whilst the embargo is arguably comprehensible form a political aspect in terms of the historical context of the Cuban missile crisis and the triggers for the Cold War; the embargo continues today and was indeed codified in 1992 under the controversial Cuban Democracy Act. Moreover, in 1996 the US Congress enacted the Helms-Burton Act, which maintains restrictions on US citizens from doing business with Cuba along with limitations on assistance to any successor regime in Cuba. However, Purcell et al comment that “US policy towards Cuba may be frozen in time, but on the island, things have changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War” (Purcell et al 2). Indeed, the collapse of the former Soviet Union proved disastrous for a reliant Cuba’s economy, which has been forced to implement economic policy changes, which have included “a series of market-oriented reforms, among them the reestablishment of free farmer’s markets, the devolution of many state farms and co-operatives, sharp reductions in subsidies to state enterprise, the legalisation of self-employment, and -most significantly the legalisation of the US dollar” (Purcell et al 2). Moreover, from a political perspective, the change in Cuban policy and the end of the Cold war has fuelled debate as to whether upholding the current economic embargo is justified by the US. The focus of this paper is to critically evaluate the current rationale for upholding economic sanctions on Cuba. 2. Current US Justification for Continuation of Embargo It is submitted in this paper that whilst the current Cuban regime inherently operates to undermine civil liberties and fundamental freedoms; the US economic embargo whilst recently veiled in being “morally” necessary and justifiable, ignores the hypocrisy of its moral high ground particularly by comparative analysis with the US stance vis-à-vis China. As such, it is further submitted that the continuing US embargo on Cuba is inherently complex, serving as a key election tool for Cuban Americans, which is further intertwined with the imperial nature and evolution of US foreign policy in contemporary international relations. On this basis, the question as to whether the embargo should be abolished arguably becomes secondary behind the myriad of interrelated political and internal factors shaping US foreign policy. To this end, Haney and Vanderbush highlight the point that the current contextual background pertaining to the current position of the US towards Cuba highlights the fact that “the embargo has some holes in it, and sooner or later the embargo will fall. It may fall because Castro’s eventual death leads to a new democratic government (though this is far from preordained). Or it may fall because an American president asks Congress to life the embargo by repealing its legislative foundations…………a more likely scenario is that the embargo will wither away, eroding over time as a growing bipartisan coalition in Congress, made up of a patchwork of farm state legislators” (Haney and Vanderbush 2-3). Additionally, as posited above the economic embargo on Cuba was catalysed as a direct result of the Cuban missile crisis and the ensuing Cold War (Staten). However, whilst the understanding of the embargo in its historical context clearly lends itself to empathy with Kennedy’s objectives in the precarious political climate, debate has raged as to the relevance and appropriateness of the embargo in the contemporary political framework. Interestingly, the previous Bush administration asserted that “the sanctions against the United States enforced against the Castro regime are not just a policy tool, but a moral statement. It is wrong to prop up a regime that routinely stifles all the freedoms that make us human. The United States stands opposed to such tyranny and will oppose any attempt to weaken sanctions against the Castro regime until it respects the basic human rights of its citizens, frees political prisoners, holds democratic free elections, and allows free speech”. As such, this would indicate a change in US policy justification for the continuation of the embargo. George Bush’s statement suggests that the central underlying rationale is the contravention of fundamental freedoms and liberties under the Cuban regime. Whilst the Cuban regime has indeed been in breach of fundamental rights and civil liberties, the moral justifications for the continued US embargo are somewhat questionable in context of its business relationship with China, which has become its fourth largest trading partner. Indeed, if we contrast the US position as regards economic relations in China it is evident that there have been a variety of entry mode choices in China available since the implementation of the first “open door” policy of 1979, with the continuous momentum of US foreign direct investment (FDI) (Charles). Interestingly, by the end of May 2000, the contractual FDI in China had totalled $623 billion in 349,500 investment ventures (Charles). Moreover, the influx of US FDI fuelled rapid economic growth, creating jobs and technological change to the country. The figures in 2000 coupled with China’s desire to close the economic gap with other developing nations led to the Government driven “Western Development Strategy” as part of the tenth fie year plan (2001-2005) covering six provinces.. This has been further proliferated by the fact that foreign investors are ultimately autonomous on the mode of entry into the Chinese Market from equity joint ventures (EJV), wholly foreign owned enterprises (WFOE)and contractual or cooperative joint ventures (including licensing and technology transfer agreements) joint exploration, and co-operative development (Luo). Since, the late 1980s the predominant mode has been EJVS and WFOES (Luo). Until 1996, EJVs were the most popular entry vehicle, however the last decade has seen the proliferation of WFOES (Charles). Between 1993 and 1997, the actual use of WFOEs in China grew at an annual rate of more than 25 per cent while EJVs grew by only 6 per cent (Rugman & Hodgetts). If we further contrast the moral argument behind the US embargo on Cuba and contrast the position with previous Cold War enemy China, it is evident that Cultural Revolution in China and Deng Xiaoping’s ambitions to modernise China, brought the issues of legal reforms and the rule of law to the fore (Charles). Indeed, Chinese media propaganda continually refers to the rule of law as an entrenched part of Chinese culture (Charles). However, the concept of China and its relationship with the rule of law has fuelled academic debate with many Western scholars finding the notion hard to grasp. On the one hand, investors and human rights activists advocate a critical indictment of the distinct absence of the rule of law in China. Indeed Pei extrapolates the concept of a “trapped transition” whereby the political strategy impedes the necessity of moving towards a true rule of law in order to achieve the modern economic goals China has set itself, particularly the flourishing economic relationship with the US (Pei). Moreover, some posit that China’s advocacy of a rule of law system is merely a veil; intended to facilitate foreign investment arguing “just another one of those self-congratulatory rhetorical devices that grace the public utterances of Anglo-American politicians” (Peerenboom). Conversely, the response to this slightly cynical approach is the proliferation of Foreign Direct Investment into China with some touting China’s broad ranging agreement with President Clinton in the 1990s as a rule of law driven initiative, which in turn triggered the legal and judicial co-operation programme between EU, the US and China in 1998 (MacFarquhar). In contrast, the Cuban economic position remained entrenched in reliance on the former Soviet Union until the collapse forced Cuba to adapt its economic policies for survival. However, it is precisely the survival instinct which highlights the isolationist position of Castro’s Cuba in contrast to modern China’s race for economic dominance on the world stage. Indeed, Purcell et al make the point that “there is no doubt that Fidel Castro authorised these changes with the greatest reluctance. In oft repeated public declarations, he has lamented the need to make concessions to the market, denounced the negative social effects of market orientated change, and reaffirmed his commitment to socialism” (Purcell et al 3). In contrast to China’s move towards cooperation with the West insofar as economic goals are concerned, Castro’s Cuban socialist paradigm has remained a consistent attack on US authority, undermining its ability to crush enemies through unilateral foreign policy initiatives. This in turn has fuelled the political stalemate within the US internal framework in terms of the embargo. 3. Conclusion Accordingly, the above analysis highlights that the economic embargo on Cuba symbolises a myriad of complex, interrelated factors. From a simplistic moral viewpoint, the continued hardship of the Cuban people as a result of the US enforced embargo clearly supports the proposition that the embargo should be lifted. Alternatively, the Cuba issue is a sensitive matter in domestic policymaking particularly with regard to Cuban Americans. Directly appurtenant to this is the fact that US foreign policy has been undermined by the stoicism of Cuban socialism. To this end, Schwab comments that a central problem lies in Castro’s continued attack on US imperialism and that even in subsequent relations with Cuba, the US will “not be able to walk all over Cuba, as it did from 1898 to 1959 and his forthright stand against US imperialism, Castro has distanced Cuba from such an ignominious future” (Schwab 172) As such, even if the embargo is lift and when it ultimately will be it evident that “pre-1959 Cuba will never again be seen, as Fidel Castro, along with the heritage he will leave behind, will be responsible for that fortuitous new standard” (Schwab 172). Works Cited Charles, W. L. International Business. McGraw Hill, 2005 Foreign Assistance Act 1961 at www.usaid.gov/policy Haney, P. H. & Walt Vanderbush. The Cuban Embargo: The Domestic politics of an American foreign policy. University of Pittsburgh Press. 2005 Luo, Yadong. How to Enter China: Choices and Lessons. University of Michigan Press. 2000 MacFarquhar, R. The Politics of China. Cambridge University Press, 1994 OECD. Foreign Direct Investment in China. Prospects and Policy Challenges. Available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd 2002 Peerenboom, R. (2002). China’s Long March Towards the Rule of Law. Cambridge University Press, 2002 Pei, Minxin. China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy. Harvard University Press, 2008 Perez, Louis. Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution. New York Oxford University Press, 1988 Perez, L.A. Cuba and the United States: Ties of singular intimacy. The University of Georgia Press, 2003 Purcell, S. & D. J. Rothkopf . Cuba: the Contours of Change. Lynne Rienner Publishers 2000 Rugman, Alan & Richard Hodgetts. International Business. Prentice Hall 3rd Edition, 2003 Schwab, P. Cuba: Confronting the US Embargo. Palgrave Macmillan, 2000 Staten, C. The History of Cuba. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003 Read More