The Palestinian-Israeli - Research Paper Example

Running Head: Hamas: The Palestinian Hamas: The Palestinian-Israeli Question APA Style The Palestinian-Israeli conflict can not be discussed without a thorough investigation into the roots, political position, leadership and social importance of Hamas. An understanding of the group and of the integral part it plays in any future successful solution to current political animosities between the Palestinian people and the state of Israel is key. No amount of good will on the part of any negotiating parties can override the reality of Hamas’s power and influence over the Palestinian people, or Israel’s mistrust of its motives and its declared position that Hamas is a terrorist organization. In this paper I hope to clarify these positions and offer a more complete understanding of Hamas and its role and position regarding the resolution to Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In his UPI report, Richard Sales describes the events leading up to Israel’s declaration of Hamas as a terrorist organization. In June, 2002, Hamas took credit for a suicide blast in Jerusalem that killed 19 Israelis and wounded 70. The Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, took credit. Before this event Hamas played a very different role in the politics between Israel and the Palestinians. After it, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon declared it a terrorist organization, "the deadliest terrorist group that we have ever had to face." The history of this shift is politically intriguing. According to Sales, several current and former U.S. intelligence officials say that in the late 1970s Tel Aviv gave direct and indirect financial aid to Hamas as a more friendly group to counterbalance the generally hostel Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The move attempted to divide support for the PLO, a secular group, by using Hamas, a more socially and religiously oriented organization—an identity that would change over time. Hamas evolved from cells of the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928. After the 1967 Six Day War, it became the cornerstone of the social, religious, educational and cultural infrastructure, called Dawah, that worked to ease the hardship of Palestinian refugees. Hamas’s influence eventually grew to be political, with strong religious Islamic tones and ties favorable to groups which wanted to set up an Islamic state much like Iran’s. In the opinion of Mishal and Sela, “...in addition to Hamas’s daily competition with the United Nations over shaping the agenda for the Intifada (Holy War), the PLOs possible inclusion in renewed peacemaking efforts threatened Hamas’s political future and compelled it to address this issue immediately... It was against this background that Hamas embarked on an intensive propaganda campaign against the Palestinian National Council’s (PNC) resolutions, invoking deep-rooted Islamic symbols and beliefs to delegitimize the PLOs diplomatic efforts to achieve a settlement in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.” (Mishal, Sela p 49) Over time the group developed a Jihad Ethos: “A primary aim of Hamas was to establish an Islamic state in the territory of Palestine whose liberation was to be achieved by holy war...Hamas presented itself as a link in the chain of holy war against Zionism and Israel in the defense of Palestine.” (Mishal, Sela p 50) “In its charter, Hamas specifies that the nationalist goal is no longer incompatible with Islam and the practice of the true faith.” ( Labévière, p 205) The storied leadership of Hamas is one of reciprocal violence. Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the founder and leader of the Hamas terrorist organization, was killed on March 22, 2004 in retaliation for the killing of four Israeli border guards. Saleh Shade, appointed by Yassin, according to the Israelis, admitted during questioning to the establishment of a military element within the organization that approved terrorist attacks. Abdel Aziz Rantisi was chosen to lead the organization after Yassin’s death; he also is charged with establishing the terrorist policy and has also served as its main spokesperson. Hamas has vowed revenge for the killing of the senior Hamas official, Abdullah Qawasmeh, in an Israeli raid. Qawasmeh is said to have masterminded a series of suicide attacks. Khaled Mashaal, a physics teacher, directs Hamass political bureau from Damascus and is considered its world leader. Mahmoud Zahar, one of the group’s founders, was the first public spokesperson and rival of Rantisi and Mashaal. In September 2003, Israel bombed the home of Zahar in Gaza City. Zahar survived but several family members were killed. Following the overwhelming Hamas victory in the Palestinian elections of 26 January 2006, Zahar announced that Hamas would extend its year-old truce with Israel, if Israel agreed to reciprocate—a reality which has eluded fruition due to a series of bombings by Hamas and retaliation by Israel. In his article for Newsday, Bazzi reports, “The hard-line Palestinian party (Hamas) governs with a delicate balance of politicians in exile in Syria and militants in West Bank and Gaza” (Bazzi, 5/28/2006). After elections in 2006, they now in effect ran the Palestinian government. Bazzi’s response to the question: who’s running Hamas? Is emphatic: “Its a simple question, but the answer is complex. Hamas has many facets: a religious movement, a network of social services and a guerrilla group engaged in terrorism.” (Bazzi, 5/28/2006) Bazzi goes on to explain that most daily decisions fall upon its political bureau with eight to ten members living in exile in Syria, along with Mashaal. The bureau is chaired by Mashaal. Hamas also has a Shura Council, an internal parliament made up of about fifty members who live both inside and outside the Palestinian territories. The council has final say on major policy decisions such as change in Hamas stance toward Israel or whether the group would enter into peace negotiations. There are unusual logistical problems (fear of assassination by Israel) that keep them from meeting in one place at the same time. All interaction and information sharing is done by e-mails, faxes, cell phones and coded messages. The political bureau in Syria is the main fundraising arm and manages relations with other Arab and Muslim countries. Its fundraising dictate, Kalman says, is religiously centered and based on passages in the Koran. “Economic Jihad is inspired by a verse in the Koran which says: Fight with your possessions and your souls in the way of Allah. Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a radical Islamic theologian, ruled that instead of building mosques or going on the hajj pilgrimage to Mecca, Muslims should donate their money to support Palestinians fighting occupation and other struggles of Muslim populations, such as in Bosnia.” (Kalman, 7/18/2005) Some Arab diplomats and officials, however, say the fact that Mashaal and his inner circle are responsible for fundraising makes them more practical than the Hamas leadership within the territories—a reality that might in future cause rifts between the two factions should Mashaal decide negotiation is best and the internal officers disagree. An interesting note is that unlike Arafat and the PLO, Hamas did not support Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf War, when Iraq invaded Kuwait. Instead they called for both Iraqi and US withdrawal. As a consequence, Gulf States shifted their funding from PLO to Hamas, and may have donated as much as $28m per month (from Saudi Arabia primarily). Kalman in rebuttal cites a Palestinian General Intelligence report from the late 1990s which estimates Hamas’s annual “income” at between $60m and $70m, 12m of which came from various Hamas front organizations in Britain, including one called, Interpal. “The Charity Commission decreed that Interpals donations to Hamas were intended for education and welfare projects, not terrorism. We now know to our cost that the education and welfare projects of extremist groups can be used for Economic Jihad designed to buttress their military activities.” (Kalman, 7/18/2005) In November, 2008, five leaders of a former US-based Muslim charity based in Texas called the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development were convicted 100 counts of of financing terrorism. Others are under surveillance, so we know this is going on. A secondary quote from Bazzi’s article by an unnamed Arab official is not encouraging considering Hamas now runs the Palestinian government. “The entire group (Hamas) is hardline. There is no moderate Hamas. No one is going to rise into the leadership ranks of Hamas by openly advocating negotiations with Israel." (Brazzi, 5/28/2006) Playing the spoiler in the peace process, Hamas has officially sanctioned suicide attacks as a means of achieving that goal. “Hamas urged more violence as relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority improved.” (Bloom, p 20) A Palestinian document released in 2004 described suicide bombings as a key element in the struggle. According to the report, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad had have agents who provide information on political developments, including peace negotiations, that prompt Hamas and the Jihad to respond accordingly. Chosak and Sawyer report for Peace Watch that “The Park Hotel bombing, considered the terror groups most devastating attack since the outbreak of the second intifada, had implications extending far beyond the murder of thirty innocent civilians.” (Chosak, Sawyer) The attack, they say, launched Operation Defensive Shield and Israel’s reoccupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. “Additionally, the bombing highlighted Hamass program of radicalization and recruitment in Palestinian universities and the groups experimentation with chemical and biological agents...Many committed Hamas members willing to sacrifice their lives in terrorist attacks have emerged from the Kutla Islamiya (Islamic Bloc) at Palestinian universities, especially al-Najah University in Nablus. Funded in part through Hamas charities, the Kutla Islamiya has long been a critical component of Hamass social and political infrastructure.” (Chosak, Sawyer) Beyond universities, there are reports that Hamas is expanding its recruitment in efforts to gain fighters in Chechnya and several other foreign conflicts, a sign that they are willing to align themselves with other insurgent groups. A special piece to World Tribune.com says documents seized from Hamas strongholds in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have cited the Chechen revolt as one of the leading Islamic struggles. The documents include propaganda posters that tout the Islamic war against Russia in Chechnya as well as the Al Qaida-aligned leader Shamil Basayev, Middle East, Newsline reported. Israels military also seized videos distributed by Hamas to schools and youth clubs that lauded the Chechnya revolt. It is alleged that the videos are used to recruit new members to Hamas and the global Islamic insurgency. The videos were found at the American University in Jenin and Hebron University and the Hamas-financed Orphans Home in Hebron. Western states decided to freeze financial aid to the Palestinian Authority (PA) after Hamas victory in the January Palestinian legislative elections. PA President Mahmoud Abbas, for his part, also chose to politically confront the movement in an attempt to force Hamas to honor prior agreements between the PA and Israel. However, for Hamas, changing its strategy effectively means ceasing to exist. Survival also means securing new funding, which is why Hamas only real option was to turn to Iran, the one government that officially and fully shares its goals. Iran, for its own part, needs Hamas too--maybe even more than Hamas needs Iran. But while Iran, in supporting the Sunni militant movement, is pursuing its own interests, Hamas by aligning itself with Iran, is not. The alliance with Iran will increase Hamas isolation from the West while Iran, these days, seems willing to pursue a new relationship with it. Hamas, by all accounts, does not want to transform itself from a resistance movement into a political party, a move it will need to make if it wants to maintain its alliance with Iran should that country decide to become less antagonistic toward the West. What financial aid it will receive from Tehran is unclear. Reports range from $50 million to $100 million. But even the higher sum is hardly enough to sustain the Palestinian Authority which is always in debt. Hamas still hasnt recognized the difference between governing a country and supporting poor Palestinian refugees, or perhaps that is no longer a concern for the ever more militant group. Moreover, the alliance with Iran will cost Hamas the support of its Sunni base: Saudi Arabia had already delayed $92 million it promised the PA and released only $20 million at the personal request of Abbas, who has since resigned. Hamas only gain from its alliance with Iran will be support for its terroristic resistance against Israel, and that only if that support remains in tact. The Hamas-Iran alliance is a fatal attraction. Hamas and the ever antagonistic Islamist, Ahmadinejad, may be on the same political page for now. However, that may not always be the case. But let us not be deluded into thinking Hamas has lost power or is in any way being suppressed. As we said before, if anything it seems to be reaching out to join forces with other groups in it efforts to ensure Islamic states throughout the region. What is known is that Israel’s blockade of Gaza has done nothing but strengthen Hamas. For every one member killed by the Israelis, many join the ranks. It is a vicious cycle that seems unending. Despite talks and attempts at peace, nothing seems to hold, with Israel blaming Hamas and Hamas stating its claims to lands historically claimed by both the Jews and Palestinians. Despite attempts by the Oslo Accords to put historical claims to the land aside, neither side seems serious about doing so. And despite Israel’s superior weaponry, mostly compliments of the U.S., members of the Hamas movement seem intent upon winning in the end at the cost of peace and thousands of lives on both sides. Meanwhile, some worry about the U.S. government’s role in controlling the group. According to an article by Joseph Farah on the Worldnet Daily website, agents from the Central Intelligence Agency are training Palestinian Authority personnel in police techniques. The author questions the wisdom of this practice, citing that in past trainees have ended up fighting for the very terrorists groups we are sworn to defeat. He worries that these trainees could just as well become Hamas recruits, only with better fighting capabilities. From the HAMAS Charter: “This covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) has taken shape, unveiling its identity, stating its position, clarifying its expectations, discussing its hopes, and calling for aid, support, and additions to its ranks. Our battle with the Jews is very long and dangerous, requiring the dedication of all of us. It is a phase that must be followed by succeeding phases, a battalion that must be supported by battalion after battalion of the divided Arab and Islamic world until the enemy is vanquished and the victory of Allah is sure. (Mishal, Sela p 176) With Israel’s new right wing government lead by Benjamin Netanyahu, chances of the above position softening, even in the best of circumstances, are remote. “‘Complementary Enemies,’ as Labévière refers to Islamists and Zionists, “work toward the same ends as theocratic entities laying historical claim to the land in question. With Hamas upping the (terrorist) anti, the Likud (Israel’s conservative party) is all the freer to pursue its broad scale policy of establishing colonies...and completing the encirclement and Judeification of East Jerusalem (based on historical claims, which the Oslo Accords were supposed to have ‘relegated to the quarrels of historians.” (Labeviere p 206) ) References Bazzi, M., Middle East Correspondent (5/28/2006). Inside hamas’ power structure. Newsday. Newsday.com (April 6, 2009). http://www.newsday.com/news/local/longisland/nywohama014759067may28,0,1813242.story Bloom. M. (2005) Dying to kill: The allure of suicide . Columbia University Press, p 20. Chosak, J. & Sawyer, J. (October 19, 2005). Hamas tactics: Lessons from recent attacks. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Policy Watch/Peace Watch. Peace Watch #522. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2382 Kalman, M. (July 18, 2005) Declare war economic jihad. The Daily Mail. (London, England). Labeviere, R. (2000). Dollars for terror: The united states and islam. Martin DeMers: Algora Publishing, NY, p 205-206 Mishal, S. & Sela, A. (2000) The palestinian hamas: Vision, violence, and coexistence. Columbia University Press, 3, 49-50; Introduction p 176. Sale, Richard, UPI Terrorism Correspondent (6/18/2002). Hamas history tied to israel. United Press International. http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article10456.htm Other internet sources http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hamas-leaders.htm http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/05/front2453511.1458333335.html http://www.iranvajahan.net/cgi-bin/news.pl?l=en&y=2006&m=05&d=07&a=10 http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=33292 Read More