Humes Posteriori Argument against Miracles is not Valid - Coursework Example

Hume’s Posteriori Argument against Miracles is not Valid Introduction In this essay “On Miracles,” Hume argues against the miraculous (Mossner 64). His argument is divided into two parts, his a priori (before the experience) argument of part I, and his a posteriori (after the experience) argument of part II. The ‘a priori argument’ argues that miracles are incredible events that cannot be believed because: I) The testimonial evidence will never provide enough verification conclusively, that one has occurred (this is his main point), and 2) by a miracles definition and principle (of violating natural law), it cannot be believed (a sub-point) (Spencer 99). The ‘a posteriori argument’ states that even if miracles were a possibility according to evidence, they in fact, have never occurred (Johnson & Anthony, 72). Hume’s ‘a posteriori argument’ has some merit from a general perspective, they are problematic from the perspective of an individual miracle test-case, i.e., the alleged resurrection of Jesus. I will argue that although the first of Hume’s three ‘a posteriori argument’s succeeds in showing that there may be no miracle proofs, it doesn’t show that there is not a sufficient probability for establishing our test case. Anti-Thesis In his first argument from a posteriori considerations, Hume sets out the qualitative requirements of a proof and a successful probability for a miracle along with the quantitative requirements of a miracle proof, and he argues for the (implied) thesis that the quantitative requirements of a proof have not been satisfied (Hume, Enquiry, 116-117). For Hume, the following qualitative conditions are required for a good individual miracle-testimony: the witness must be highly educated, socially outstanding, patently honest, have lots to lose by lying, and be situated in such circumstances that, if lying, exposure would readily result. But also, according to Hume, a "full assurance" i.e., a proof-based on the satisfaction of these qualitative conditions is not forthcoming, since there has not been "a sufficient number" of conjoinings of qualitatively good individual miracle-testimonies with the miraculous objects of those testimonies (Hume, Enquiry, 56,58). Thus, in defense of the thesis that the testimony for a miracle does not amount to a proof, he points out that there have not been enough witnesses who have these qualifications. Although Hume does not in "Of Miracles" defend his list of qualifications of a good witness, it is reasonable to think that Hume built up these criteria by his observation of human nature in many circumstances quite independently of miracle reports. As Hume points out in the introduction of his A Treatise of Human Nature, We must… glean up our experiments in this [study of human nature] from a cautious observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common course of the world, by mens behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures (p. xix). In view of Humes weigh scales consisting of opposing frequencies of constant conjoinings-now with those of the allegedly violated natural law on the one side and those of testimonies and their objects on the other-the implication of Humes assertion is that the scales are heavier on the side of natural law (i.e., natural law descriptive of the physical, non-human world). Response to Anti-thesis Recall that Humes first ‘a posteriori argument’ holds that there is in fact no miracle proof because history gives us no miracle attested by (1) a sufficient number of (2) highly educated, (3) socially outstanding, (4) patently honest men who have (5) lots to lose by lying and who are (6) situated in such circumstances that, if lying, exposure would readily result (Hume, Enquiry, 116-117). I will examine each of these criteria of credible testimony individually and with respect to our miracle test- case, i.e., the alleged resurrection of Jesus. 1. No sufficient number is not sufficient for precluding reasonable belief in miracle testimony Even though Hume gives no specific number as to what exactly constitutes a sufficient number of high-quality witnesses for a miracle proof, Flume seems safe in simply asserting that there is no such number of that type of witness available. After all, for there actually to be a testimonial proof for a miracle requires that we have a very frequent and constant conjunction of good miracle- testimony and miracles, and it is common knowledge that such a conjunction is not a characteristic of our world. However, in view of the fact that Hume overestimates the opposition to miracle testimony, it does not follow that the lack of a miracle proof necessarily precludes the establishing of reasonable belief in a miracles occurrence. With a reduced estimate of the destructive force for a miracle testimony arising from the infrequency of the miracle, to establish or found a miracle on reason the strength of the miracle testimony need only be a successful probability as opposed to a proof. And, as we will see, the remainder of Humes criteria do not show that such a successful probability does not exist. 2. Degree of education depends on that to which the testimony testifies According to R. M. Burns, a higher education "is not a necessary qualification for a witness in a court of law except specifically where a special expertise is relevant" (237-238) In other words, for a miracle such as our non-dissolving salt sample a higher (relevant) education is required of a credible witness because only with the competence that comes from a higher education can the witness perform the tests to ensure the specimen is in fact sodium chloride, to ensure the water is in fact water, etc. However, for a miracle such as our test-case--i.e., the alleged resurrection of Jesus- it is not so clear that a higher education is needed. To be sure, no higher education is needed of witnesses for them to see that Jesus was in fact alive after His alleged death1; however, it may not be so clear that no higher education is needed of the witnesses for them to see that Jesus was in fact dead before His alleged resurrection. That a higher education is not required for the witnesses of Jesus death to discern that Jesus was actually dead can be determined from the circumstances of Jesus execution. In the New Testament record, Matthew reports not only (a) that Jesus died via crucifixion but also (b) that during the night before his crucifixion Jesus accusers from the Sanhedrin "struck him with their fists" (Matthew 26: 67 NIV) and (c) that on the day of his crucifixion Roman soldiers used a "staff and struck him on the head again and again" (Matthew 27: 30). Also, John reports that while Jesus was still impaled on a cross, after having endured an official flogging and then an unofficial beating from Roman soldiers, "one of the soldiers pierced Jesus side with a spear, bringing a sudden flow of blood and water" (John 19:34 NIV). Concerning the Romans efficiency of execution by crucifixion, Paul Maier writes: True, there is a recorded instance of a victim being taken down from a cross and surviving. The Jewish historian Josephus, who had gone over to the Roman side in the rebellion of 66 A. D., discovered three of his friends being crucified. He asked the Roman general Titus to reprieve them, and they were immediately removed from their crosses. Still, two of the three died anyway, even though they apparently had been crucified only a short time. In Jesus case, however, there were the additional complications of scourging and exhaustion, to say nothing of the great spear thrust that pierced His rib cage… Romans were grimly efficient about crucifixions: victims did not escape with their lives. (Maier cited in Josh McDowells The Resurrection Factor, 49). Hence, the witnesses of Jesus death had no need for special expertise to believe that Jesus was dead: the fact that the Roman executioners obviously did their job well along with the fact of the obvious brutality of the manner of execution and its preamble of beatings constitute an easily recognizable case of fatality. 3. The requirement of social prominence is not necessary Were the witnesses of Jesus alleged resurrection socially outstanding persons? Definitely not, except perhaps for Matthew, Luke, and Paul. Matthew was a tax agent for an occupying foreign government (and therefore socially outstanding in a negative way); Luke was a physician; and Paul was a Jewish lawyer as well as a citizen of Rome. The others were primarily fishermen of low social status. Nevertheless, as Burns points out (citing John Leland), the requirement of credit and reputation is worthless as a general principle: If the facts recorded in the Gospel, the miracles and resurrection of Jesus Christ, had been patronized and attested by the Chief Priests and Rulers of the Jewish nation, it would undoubtedly have been pretended that they had political designs in view (cited in Burns, The Great Debate, 238). In other words, an individuals social prominence is not a necessary requirement for that individual to be a credible witness. 4, 5, & 6. Having lots to lose by lying and being situated in such circumstances that, if lying, exposure would readily result makes for a patently honest witness In the case of the witnesses for the alleged resurrection of Jesus, we do not have information concerning their honesty prior to their testimony for the resurrection. However, it is clear that regardless of a witnesss previous track record, a witness can be determined to be honest on a particular occasion if the witness has lots to lose by lying and if the witness is situated in such circumstances that, if lying, exposure would readily result. Would the witnesses to Jesus alleged resurrection suffer great personal loss by telling lies? Yes. As Burns points out, the apostles "may not have had reputation to lose, but we know that they had lives to lose, and many of them did so" (Burns, The Great Debate, 238). Indeed, says Francis J. Beckwith, "The disciples of Jesus were willing to suffer martyrdom and torture because of what they allegedly had witnessed" (p. 84). If the witnesses were dishonest, would their lies be readily detected? Yes. As F. F. Bruce points out, The disciples could not afford to risk inaccuracies (not to speak of willful manipulation of the facts), which would at once be exposed by those who would be only too glad to do so. On the contrary, one of the strong points in the original apostolic preaching is the confident appeal to the knowledge of the hearers; they not only said, We are witnesses of these things, but also, As you yourselves know (Acts ii. 22). Had there been any tendency to depart from the facts in any material respect, the possible presence of hostile witnesses in the audience would have served as a … corrective. (Bruce, 46) Thus, it is reasonable to believe that even though we may not be aware of the previous track record of the witnesses for the alleged resurrection of Jesus, these witnesses can be judged to be honest because they had lots to lose by lying and because they were situated in such circumstances that, if lying, their lies would have been readily exposed. Conclusion In view of the fact that (contrary to Humes first ‘a priori argument’) the quantitative requirements for a miracle testimony need only be that of a successful probability as opposed to a proof; in view of the fact that (contrary to Humes first ‘a posteriori argument’) our miracle test-case of the alleged resurrection of Jesus seems to satisfy the qualitative requirements of credible testimony; and in view of the fact that not all people are liars and credulous: it is not clear that Humes ‘a posteriori argument’ is successful in showing that the testimony for our miracle test-case is not sufficient to establish a rational belief in a miracles occurrence. Work Cited Beckwith, Francis J. David Humes Argument Against Miracles. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms International, 1989. Bruce, F.F. The New Testament Documents: Are They Reliable? Downers Creve, Illinois: Inter-Varsity Press, 1943. Burns, RM. The Great Debate on Miracles From Joseph Glanvill to David Hume. London & Toronto: Associated University Presses, Inc., 1981. Hume, David A Treatise of Human Nature. Second edition edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978. Hume, David. Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. Third edition edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975. Johnson, Ralph H., & J. Anthony Blair. Logical Self-Defense. 3rd edition. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1993. McDowell, Josh. Evidence That Demands a Verdict: Historical Evidences for the Christian Faith. Revised Edition. San Bernardino, California: Heres Life Publishers, Inc., 1979. McDowell, Josh. The Resurrection Factor: Does the historical evidence support the resurrection of Jesus Christ? San Bernardino, California: Heres Life Publishers, Inc., 1981. Mossner, Ernest Campbell, The Life of David Hume (Oxford University Press, 2001) Spencer, Mark Hume and Eighteenth-Century America (Rochester University Press, 2004). Read More